INDICATORS FOR SOCIAL COHESION

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The paper has three tasks. The first is to define the concept of social cohesion within the framework of social quality. This is undertaken in the first two sections. In the introduction the theoretical relationship between social cohesion and social quality is briefly addressed along with the links between social cohesion, socio-economic security, social inclusion and empowerment. Section 2 gives an overview of the state of play in the Foundations theoretical development of the social cohesion construct, particularly in relation to sociological theories relating to solidarity and social integration, as expounded in the second book.

The paper’s second task is to review key intellectual themes of social cohesion and place it within a European context. Section three addresses the extensive literature on the relationship between social cohesion and its close relation, social capital. This provides the foundation for the identification of domains of social cohesion and their operationalisation via sub-domains and indicators which comprises the final sections of the chapter. Social cohesion is then situated within the European policy context in Section 4, relating to policy frameworks developed by both the Council of Europe and the EU.

The final task of the paper is to present a set of domains, sub-domains and indicators for social cohesion within the social quality context. This is undertaken in section 7. Prior to this, the rationale for the operationalisation of social cohesion into its constituent domains is laid out in section 5 and elaborated in section 6.

1 INTRODUCTION

A theme running through this chapter is the interweaving of theoretical and conceptual linkages between the social quality construct, its social cohesion component, and the domains and sub-domains of social cohesion and their related indicators. These linkages necessarily start with the meaning of social quality itself. It is defined as: ‘the extent to which citizens are able to participate in the social and economic life of their communities under conditions which enhance their well-being and individual potential’ (Beck et al., 1997:3).

Herein lies the fundamental theoretical justification for the centrality of social cohesion to social quality. Social cohesion – understood metaphorically as the glue that binds society together or as societal solidarity or, more prosaically, as being to do with social relations, norms, values and identities – is central to the social because interactive social beings, collective identities and the social world itself are impossible without social cohesion.

It is thus clear that, of necessity, there can be no social quality without social cohesion. But this in itself does not justify the inclusion of social cohesion as one of the central pillars of social quality. It might be, for the sake of argument, that other, essential, the conditional factors of social quality themselves incorporate all those aspects of social cohesion that are necessary for social quality thereby rendering
social cohesion – whilst still indispensable – redundant as in independent component. In other words social cohesion might possibly be anyway already subsumed within other elements of social quality. Therefore it is essential to demonstrate that social cohesion can be clearly distinguished from the other conditional factors of social quality.

Defining the subject matter of social cohesion is a complicated task. Beck, van der Maesen and Walker point out that because of its long scientific and political history the concept has been associated with a wide range of other concepts and related connotations such as inclusion, exclusion, integration, disintegration, social dissolution and social capital. Jeannette (2000) states that the European Union, the OECD and the Council of Europe do not have an explicit or widely accepted working definition of the term. Yet there is a growing literature on cohesion in societies, and this without an agreed understanding of what is meant by the term social cohesion. This is particularly the case in the Council of Europe and the European Union which have promoted studies about cohesion in order to underpin public policies to create positive conditions for citizens in Europe. Given the proliferation of diverse studies without a common definition (see for example Canadian studies, and studies prepared by the Council of Europe) it has now become urgent to find a precise delineation of the concept in order to give it a heuristic meaning. It appears that much is being done without a clear understanding of its conceptual coherence.

2 THE FOUNDATION’S APPROACH

According to the first book of the Foundation: ‘Social cohesion concerns the processes that create, defend or demolish social networks and the social infrastructures underpinning these networks. An adequate level of social cohesion is one which enables citizens “to exist as real human subjects, as social beings”’ (Beck, van der Maesen et al. 1997:284). The infrastructures and inputs underpinning social cohesion include those needed to maintain and strengthen civil society – legislative frameworks of legal, political and social protection, along with cultural norms and mores relating to citizenship, cultural pluralism, tolerance and respect. The processes needed to enhance social cohesion, as well as those linked to the inputs just noted, include policies and provisions for regional development, equal opportunities in both the public and private sectors, and economic and fiscal equity to overcome unequal sharing of economic burdens.

Social cohesion is not easy to operationalise in terms of the aspired goal of ‘real human subjects, as social beings’ but it is easier to do so if conceptualised in terms of being close-knit: then social cohesion maximises solidarity and shared identity. Suggested indicators presented in the Foundation’s second book take this approach and are as follows: public safety; intergenerational solidarity; social status and economic cohesion; social capital; networks and trust; altruism (p. 352). But social cohesion’s outcome and impact are still difficult to pin down. There is – or appears to be – an unresolved conflict between cohesion as solidarity and as minimising of inequalities. This has consequences for choice of indicators and for measurement levels: thresholds versus measures of central tendency (eg. proportion below minimum acceptable level versus standard deviation). Most of the indicators from the Foundation’s second book deal with issues of solidarity rather than inequalities and,
with the exception of altruism (and possibly trust) do not differentiate between authoritarian and liberal societies. Indeed, one of the problematiques of social cohesion relates to the high levels of cohesion found in most authoritarian and totalitarian societies. An extreme example of this is in Germany up to and in the Second World War where the goal of a homogeneous and highly cohesive society was pursued with ruthless efficiency. Here perhaps the key issue is the dynamic tension between solidarity and homogeneity. For social cohesion to be conceptualised in a way that is totally consistent with the social quality construct it needs to be construed as being entirely consonant with both the maximisation of individual self-realisation and the effective formation and development of collective identities. If this is to happen then it is necessary to have the sort of solidarity that facilitates and nurtures group membership and loyalty while at the same time respecting diversity and difference. (Joppke and Lukes, 1999). Such an approach would stress a pluralistic conceptualisation of social cohesion rather than one with implied homogeneity. Given the substantive complexity of the construct there is a need to explore in depth the interaction of the different domains and sub-domains of social cohesion in order to identify whether its indicators map to social cohesion in a linear or polynomial manner. This can be expressed more abstractly in terms of whether the best level of social cohesion is achieved by a maximisation or optimisation. Optimisation indicates relativity that varies according to the dynamics of the relationship of the individual’s self-realisation to the different collective identities.

3 SOCIAL COHESION IN CONTEXT: THE SCIENTIFIC DEBATE

Social cohesion has a rich theoretical history. Social cohesion is more or less directly descended from Tönnes’ notions of Gemeinschaft and Gesellschraft, Durkheim’s mechanical and organic solidarity and Parsons’ normative integration. In its most radical interpretation it embraces social solidarity, collective social welfare and egalitarian aspirations. Durkheim considered social cohesion as an ordering feature of a society and defined it as the interdependence between the members of the society, shared loyalties and solidarity. For Durkheim, ‘the continuous distribution of the different human tasks is the principal constituent of social solidarity’. From a Durkheimian perspective, a cohesive society depends on shared loyalties, which citizens owe to each other and ultimately to the state because they are bound by ties of interdependency.

Talcott Parsons was sensitive to what he saw as the dangers of excessive liberalism and he stressed the importance of the presence of a set of shared values and norms enabling members of society ‘to identify and support common aims and objectives, and share a common set of moral principles and codes of behaviour through which to conduct their relations with one another’ (Kearns and Forrest 2000:997).

According to Alaluf (1999) insofar as the idea of social cohesion is linked to the functionalist tradition it gives more room to consensus, adaptation, norm, values and balance than to the opposition of interests, conflicts and antagonisms. The social system is the framework that gives a meaning to cohesion. It is in fact delimited by the nation and the social State, even if they are not explicitly named. That is why the same set of characteristics are often used for national identity and social cohesion.
This melding of attributes of social cohesion and national identity leads to a terrain not far removed from that of social citizenship, as popularised by Marshall (1950) and subsequent writers (Roche and van Berkel, 1997). There are many similarities in the debates on social quality and social citizenship but these will not be discussed here for two reasons: first the literature on social citizenship is voluminous; secondly its primary focus is on nation (or sometimes a supra-national state, the EU) rather than on society, and therefore shifts to focus towards politics. Notwithstanding this, the comparative study of social quality and social citizenship would be a useful exercise to undertake at some point in the future.

Lockwood

Lockwood’s approach as developed by Gough and Olofsson (1999) is both a point of departure for the Foundation’s second book and a major contribution to the debate on social cohesion. Gough and Olofsson’s aim is to link the themes of social integration and social exclusion across sociological and social policy debate within the context of integration / differentiation theory. A central theme of the book is Lockwood’s distinction between social integration (relationships between actors) and system integration (relationships between the parts) in a social system. Olofsson (1999) links this to Polanyi’s concepts of embeddedness, as developed by Granovetter, and concludes that embeddedness can be used as the basis for a theory of social cohesiveness. Embeddedness, according to Olofsson (1999:59), enables ‘the interpenetration of systemic / institutional aspects of system integration, and the social / moral aspects of societal integration’ through processes of social participation and inclusion which result in social integration’.

This social integration is decomposed by Lockwood into ‘civic integration’, the integrity of the core institutional order of citizenship at the macro-social level, and social cohesion, the strength of primary and secondary networks at the micro- and meso-social levels. The antonyms of these are civic corruption and social dissolution respectively (Lockwood, 1999:6). Confusingly, Lockwood’s use of ‘social cohesion’ in this context is not consistent with usage by other authors cited in this paper – Lockwood’s usage is very similar to the Putnam or Coleman usage of social capital. Civic integration / dissolution is manifested through: political participation, support for democracy, and political extremism; economic crime and economic participation; and universalism and selectivity in social rights and the provision of welfare. Manifestations of social cohesion / dissolution are: voluntary associations; traditional crime; and family disorganisation (Lockwood, 1999:69).

For Lockwood, civic integration and social cohesion are distinct both analytically and empirically but high levels of civic corruption have a negative effect on social cohesion and vice versa. The boundary between civic integration and social cohesion is bridged by secondary associations intermediating between the individual and the state. Lockwood makes a distinction between actors at the macro level (political parties, trade unions, the church etc) and associations at the meso or micro level (Lockwood, 1999:176).

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In relation to system integration, Lockwood (1999:64) warns that the extent to which system legitimacy is grounded in principles that are procedural – that is, impersonal, universalistic, ‘rules of the game’ – should not be underestimated. Gough and Olofsson (1999:4) also stress that modern types of solidarity ‘cannot rest at the level of mere consciousness, but must be institutionalised as rights and duties, if anomie and other types of pathological consequences are to be avoided’.

To conclude, Lockwood’s approach, while muddying the waters in terms of nomenclature, is very helpful in situating social cohesion theoretically. The distinction between civic integration and what others would call social capital is most helpful in that it introduces a meso level of intermediary networks and institutions between the micro levels of groups of individual actors and the macro level of systems. This overcomes an apparent weakness in Woolcock’s and Narayan’s conceptualisations which otherwise have much in common with Lockwood’s approach. The link with embeddedness provides the basis for further and fruitful theoretical development – which might eventually lead to as rigorous a conceptual framework within the field of economic sociology for social cohesion (at least in its non-normative interpretation) as there is for social capital in its most parsimonious conceptualisation.

Other Approaches to Social Cohesion

Therbon (1999) distinguishes between three dimensions on which a definition of social cohesion may be based. These are: the trust in particular in institutions; a feeling of belonging based on individuals’ social integration, and on the place given to them in society; and a willingness to show solidarity (in terms of social and fiscal contribution) with their society. Therbon also emphasises that ‘sharing common values’ is not sufficient to bring about social cohesion. He says that cohesion may be based, beyond common values, on innovation, creativity or civic practices resulting from the necessities of everyday life. It may also be sectarian types of unification, based on discipline and obedience.

Alaluf (1999) suggests that the idea of social cohesion leads us to associate this concept with forms of solidarity produced by what we have called the social State. He writes that it is important, however, to adopt two methodological points of reference when speaking of social cohesion. First one must clearly identify the social framework that conditions the forms of social protection. Secondly, one must be careful not to consider each national system of social protection in its own right as a closed system but rather as a process within which the different elements evolve and change. It is therefore necessary to think of the various components of social protection separately without, however, taking them out of their historical context.

Another facet of social cohesion is a feeling of belonging to or identification with a group (Vranken, 2001). Identification with a group could also be regarded as an integration of the two dimensions a relational dimension (structured solidarity, social networks, and social capital) and a cultural dimension (common value pattern and group identification). The forces leading to this group formation are internal and external. Internal are the networks facilitating interaction and communication, and common cultural frameworks, providing shared values, facilitating common meanings and interpretations, and common norms. The external force promoting identification with the in-group is the perception of the out-group as a threat.
Definitions

Defining social cohesion is not straightforward because the notion of social cohesion is contested at two levels. First, there is a major debate about its nature, meaning and scope, ranging from the notions of community and solidarity favoured by initiators of the sociological tradition such as Tonnes and Durkheim through to present-day theorists on social capital such as Dahrendorf and Gough. Secondly it is not universally accepted that social cohesion is genuinely a concept at all; Bernard (1999), for example, claims that it is no more than a quasi-construct, and there is considerable confusion in the literature about the distinction between social cohesion and social capital.

The multitude of approaches to social cohesion has produced a number of definitions of the concept that indicate variations of content as expressed through the labelling of the dimensions of the concept. For example, the General Planning Commission of the French government defines social cohesion as ‘all the social processes which help individuals to feel they belong to the same community and are identified as belonging to that community’ (quoted by Jenson, 1998,5). The same terms could also define belonging to a collective identity.

Canada has been a leader in the use of social cohesion as an integral part of its social policy. It can be seen as part of the motivation of Canadian policies in the 1960s and 1970’s that attempted to foster a new distinctly Canadian identity (Woolley, 1998). The Social Cohesion Network of the Policy Research Initiative of the Canadian Government defined social cohesion as ‘the ongoing process of developing a community of shared values, shared challenges and equal opportunity within Canada, based on a sense of trust, hope and reciprocity among all Canadians’ (Policy Research Initiative, 1999, p.22). ‘ This network identified five dimensions for social cohesion (Jenson 1998).

- Belonging – Isolation: that means shared values, identity, feelings of commitment
- Inclusion – Exclusion: concerns equal opportunities of access
- Participation – Non-Involvement
- Recognition – Rejection: that addresses the issue of respecting and tolerating differences in a pluralistic society
- Legitimacy – Illegitimacy: with respect to institutions.

It should be noted that the Canadian experience with social cohesion is based partly on its ‘defence’ from American socio-cultural encroachment and globalisation. This is conceptually antithetical to the European Union experience that uses the term social cohesion as a unifying factor among different member countries.

Woolley (1998) in discussing social cohesion in the Canadian context, states that one can differentiate processes, the way that social cohesion is created, and outcomes, whether a particular society is cohesive or not. She emphasizes that social cohesion is a property of societies, thus inherently in the ‘social’. Woolley finds that one can describe a cohesive society in three ways: (1) Social cohesion may be interpreted as
absence of social exclusion; (2) Frequency of social interaction and (3) Shared values and communities of interpretation.

The normative element in defining social cohesion becomes more prominent in the following approaches. Berger-Schmitt (2000:7) argues that elements of a society’s social cohesion form an integral part of the quality of life experienced by individuals – including perceived inequalities in the work-place, school or neighbourhood – and that ‘quality of life represents the common overarching policy goal with social cohesion as an important component to be addressed’. Berger-Schmitt (2000) states that the concept of social cohesion incorporates two societal goals dimensions: (1) the reduction of disparities, inequalities, and social exclusion; (2) the strengthening of social relations, interactions and ties. It also includes social capital. The conceptualization of social cohesion by Berger-Schmitt conceives social exclusion as one aspect of the first dimension of social cohesion. Social capital is an inherent part of the second dimension. This is similar to the World Bank that uses the terms social capital and social cohesion synonymously (see, for example: http://www.worldbank.org/poverty/scapital/)

An Overview – the Relationship Between Social Capital and Social Cohesion

The World Bank usage, along with Lockwood’s and Berger-Schmitt’s, as noted above, lead to the complex area of the relationship between social capital and social cohesion. This sub-section attempts to disentangle this relationship.

From social capital to social cohesion – an exercise in incrementalism

Perhaps the easiest way to look at the relationship between social capital and social cohesion is to see it as an aggregation, with three staging posts or steps, with in general each step building on the one that came before. The first step comprises ‘pure’ social capital of trust and networks. Then at the second step, these elements are expanded and others are added until a wide definition of social capital starts to merge with the more tightly focused non-normative definitions of social cohesion. Finally, social capital is transcended by the addition of normative elements into a construct unambiguously recognisable as a delineation of a holistic and normative interpretation of social cohesion.

Step one: pure social capital – trust and networks

All the conceptualisations of social capital and social cohesion include, to a greater or lesser extent, both trust and associational networks somewhere or other in their explications of the constructs. There is, however, a debate in the social capital literature about whether they are: (a) inseparable manifestations of a unitary notion of social capital (Brehn and Rahn, 1997); (b) two separate elements which (possibly along with other elements) comprise social capital (Feldman and Assaf, 1999); (c) two

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This is an example of the sort of approach, referred to in the introduction that treats cohesion and exclusion as being the obverse of each other.

1 See previous footnote.

different aspects of a unitary social capital; with associations being the cause and with trust the outcome (Woolcock, 1998); (d) individually manifestations of two different kinds of social capital (Knack and Keefer, 1997) – or even two different social capitals (Hall, 1999); (e) or if they are both multiple constructs that can be disaggregated into smaller components, each of which may interact differently with overall social capital (Falk and Kilpatrick, 2000). Most definitions fall into the first two categories and are not problematic for our present purposes.

Most ‘pure’ social capital definitions give relatively equal weight to trust and networks but some prioritise one over the other.

(i) Trust predominates

The most influential presentation of ‘social capital as trust’ is by Fukuyama who defines social capital as ‘a set of informal values or norms shared among members of a group that permits cooperation between them’ (Fukuyama, 1999:16). The most important of these values is trust: ‘the expectation that arises within a community of regular, honest and cooperative behaviour, based on commonly shared norms’ (Fukuyama, 1995:25). Here trust is seen as ‘a lubricant that makes the running of any group more efficient’ (Fukuyama, 1999:16). For Fukuyama, a central theme is the ‘radius of trust’: the further it expands beyond the family, the more likely it is to be based on ‘moral resources’ and ethical behaviours.

(ii) Horizontal associational networks predominate

There are two strands to the approach in which networks predominate over trust and its related values and norms. The first is presented cogently by Woolcock (1998:155), who argues that, irrespective of its manifestations, which undoubtedly include trust, definitions of social capital should focus primarily on its sources rather than its consequences. ‘Trust and norms of reciprocity ... do not exist independently of social relationships’. Therefore, according to this analysis, social capital should be defined only in terms of its relationships.

The second strand acknowledges that resources such as trust are indeed a defining characteristic of social capital but nevertheless places primary emphasis upon the networks which nourish these resources. This is an appropriate approach for commentators who conceptualise social capital explicitly as a form of capital. Bourdieu (1986: 249), for example, defines social capital as:

‘The aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalised relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition – or in other words, to membership of a group – which provides each of its members with the backing of the collectively-owned capital. ... The volume of the social capital possessed by a given agent thus depends on the size of the network of connections he can effectively mobilise and on the volume of the capital ... possessed in his own right by each of those to whom he is connected’

It is clear that in this approach social capital is seen as appropriable by individuals and can in principle be derived and computed via a form of network calculus. This is not a universally acceptable interpretation but it does facilitate the construction of indicators of social capital.
(iii) Trust plus horizontal networks

Most mainstream definitions of social capital include both trust and associational networks. Putnam’s (1993:36-7) approach is unusual in excluding vertical networks, that is, networks with differential power. Putnam definition of social capital is: ‘horizontal associations between people: i.e. social networks (networks of civic engagement) and associated norms that have an impact on the community’. Putnam’s approach has been highly influential and has been used by many researchers in studying social capital in small groups, particularly in relation to micro-credit unions in developing nations (Buckland, 1998). Very few other researchers, however, have taken a similarly restrictive line in relation to vertical associations (Greeley, 1997).

(iv) Trust plus horizontal and vertical networks

Definitions of social capital most commonly include both horizontal and vertical associational networks (World Bank, 1998; Feldman and Assaf, 1999). Woolcock (1998:153) gives a neat general definition of this type of middle-range conceptualisation of social capital as: ‘the information, trust, and norms of reciprocity inhering in one’s social networks’. Crucial to this definition is that the norms and values are attached to specific relationships rather than being at a more abstract level.

Coleman’s definition is somewhat broader: ‘a variety of different entities, with two elements in common: they all consist of some aspect of social structure, and they facilitate certain actions of actors – whether personal or corporate actors – within the structure’ (Coleman, 1988:s98). Coleman’s approach, while normally interpreted as middle ranging, does leave open the possibility of a wider interpretation including more abstract and generalised social norms.

*Step two: social capital meets social cohesion: trust and networks plus civic and societal institutions*

This leads on to the more wide-ranging conceptualisations of social capital, including such generalised social norms as civic responsibility. Here, the precise link between specific networks and specific sets of norms is broken. These conceptualisations of social capital, leading on to social cohesion, all share an allegiance to generalised rather than context-specific trust.

(v) Trust, networks, and societal institutions

Brehn and Rahn (1997:1001) take an approach consistent with Coleman’s definition but which moves beyond network-specific norms in that it introduces a civic dimension: ‘Our specific operationalisation of the social capital mechanism represents the concepts as a tight reciprocal relationship between civic engagement and interpersonal trust’. This approach links in to Simmel’s notion of ‘reciprocity transactions’, which is one of four contextualising factors for a broad conceptualisation of social capital, noted by Woolcock (1998:161).

An even broader approach is taken in the World Bank’s (1998:i) review which identifies social capital as referring to ‘the internal social and cultural coherence of
society, the norms and values that govern interactions among people and the institutions in which they are embedded. Central to this approach is a commonly agreed sense of ‘civic responsibility’ and common identification with forms of government, cultural norms, and social rules. These include: the political regime; rule of law; the court system; and civil and political liberties.

Lockwood (1999) and Hall (1999) both refer to altruism and ‘other-regarding’ behaviour as central to the development of social capital towards being positively useful as a ‘social glue’ enabling society to operate effectively. Other-regarding behaviour, trust and civic responsibility are all ingredients not only of broad definitions of social capital but also of all definitions of social cohesion

(vi) Normative integration – the social capital / social cohesion interface

Many approaches to social cohesion are not dissimilar to these broad definitions of social capital, although mostly at a wider, societal level. Vertovec (1997), for example, claims that it implies ‘the presence of basic patterns of cooperative social interaction and core sets of collective values’. Stanley (1999) calls it the bonding effect within a society that arises spontaneously from the unforced willingness of individual members of society to enter into relationships with one another in their efforts to survive and prosper. Pahl (1991) sees it as a binding normative framework. In a major report on social cohesion undertaken for the Club of Rome, it is concluded that it is not possible for a society to operate only on the basis of a state’s legal and political systems, without recourse to any form of normative unity (Berger, 1998:353). This approach, in its stress on common normative orientations, is derived from a Durkheimian perspective, as is Gough’s and Olofsson’s approach, which stresses organic solidarity, grounded in moral experience (1999:2). Gough and Olofsson link this to Parson’s work on normative integration which they conclude ‘can be seen as an argument for the integration of a society based on a consensus about fundamental civil, political and social rights’ (Gough and Olofsson, 1999:2).

Step three: normative social cohesion

Gough and Olofsson’s discussion of citizenship rights marks the introduction of normative elements that characterise the third step of the social cohesion aggregation.

(vii) Social cohesion as equality of opportunity

Perhaps the most modest of the normative approaches to social cohesion is that adopted by Dahrendorf (1995). Its bottom line is that no members of society should be deprived of opportunity: ‘Social cohesion comes in to describe a society which offers opportunities to all its members within a framework of accepted values and institutions. Such a society is therefore one of inclusion. People belong: they are not allowed to be excluded’ (cited in Berger-Schmitt and Noll, 2000:14). Percy-Smith (2000:20) uses a somewhat more forceful definition requiring ‘reconciliation of a system based on market forces, freedom of opportunity and enterprise with a commitment to the values of internal solidarity and mutual support which ensures open access to benefit and protection for all members of society’.
Neither of the above approaches, however, are committed to full equality of opportunity. The Canadian government’s definition does make this commitment and requires an ‘ongoing process of developing a community of shared values, shared challenges and equal opportunities ... based on a sense of trust, hope and reciprocity’ (Jenson, 1998:4). Nevertheless, as Jenson points out, this equality is of opportunity only and it is seen as just one value among several. This definition of social cohesion does not strive ‘to achieve social justice via the active promotion of equitable outcomes’ (Jenson, 1998:4).

(viii) Social cohesion as mitigation of inequalities

The normative element in defining social cohesion becomes more prominent in the following approaches. Berger-Schmitt (2000:7) argues that elements of a society’s social cohesion form an integral part of the quality of life experienced by individuals – including perceived inequalities in the work-place, school or neighbourhood – and that ‘quality of life represents the common overarching policy goal with social cohesion as an important component to be addressed’.

The Council of Europe’s definition introduces the notion of human dignity: ‘Because it makes respect for human dignity and personal integrity paramount and enables the social link between the individual and society to be restored, the best response to the tragedy of exclusion ... is to strengthen social cohesion’ (Council of Europe, 1998:15).

In Canada, social cohesion is a major issue among policy makers as well as social scientists. While many of the former use the Canadian Government definition given above, many academics use the more radical definition given by Judith Maxwell: ‘Social cohesion involves building shared values and communities of interpretation, reducing disparities in wealth and income, and generally enabling people to have a sense that they are engaged in a common enterprise’ (Maxwell, 1996:13).

(ix) Egalitarian social cohesion: aspiring towards equity and social justice

Finally we arrive at the most strongly normative approaches. These take one of two forms in the literature. The first is to link a non- (or minimally) normative approach to social cohesion to other social goals in the pursuit of higher aspirations. Gough (1999:104) does this in striving towards Lockwood’s aspiration of maximising both system integration and social integration by pursuing solidarity and social cohesion along with minimising inequality, poverty and exclusion.

The second approach provides a normative definition of social cohesion linked to the larger overarching social construct of social quality: ‘the extent to which citizens are able to participate in the social and economic life of their communities under conditions which enhance their well-being and individual potential’ (Beck, van der Maeson et al., 2001a:7). Within this framework a high level of social cohesion maximises solidarity and shared identity and enables people ‘to exist as real human subjects, as social beings’ (Beck, van der Maeson et al., 1997b: 284). On the other hand anomic – the opposite to social cohesion within the social quality construct – is fostered by regional disparities, the suppression of minorities, unequal access to public goods and services and an unequal sharing of economic burdens. The role of social cohesion in relation to the social quality construct is discussed later in this
4. THE EUROPEAN POLICY DEBATE

European institutions see social cohesion as an important goal of their social and economic programmes. Jeannotte (2000) has made a valuable contribution by analyzing the approach to social cohesion of two European related institutions, the European Union and the Council of Europe. She found that the implicit definition of social cohesion used by the organizations has evolved from a fairly narrow economic and materialistic focus to encompass elements related to social well-being, as well as cultural and democratic cohesion. The major elements stated or implied in the definitions of social cohesion include: democratic/political cohesion, economic well-being, social well-being and cultural cohesion. At the same time the study concludes that there is greater consensus about what threatens social cohesion (unemployment, poverty, income inequality, social exclusion and exclusion from the information society) than on what promotes it.

Jeannotte's characterisation of a cohesive society demonstrates the interlinking of the different social quality conditional factors. The Political characteristic of a cohesive society can be linked to the justice aspects of social cohesion but also to social inclusion (active participation in society) and empowerment (Freedom of expression, free flow of information). The Economic characteristics are invariably linked to socio-economic security. The 'Social' characteristic is essentially an expression of social inclusion, but 'strengthened sense of European identity' can be seen in our context as a social cohesion indicator. One may conclude on the basis of this analysis that within a European context, there is a harmonization of social cohesion with the other social quality conditional factors. This has implications in the development of indicators for the conditional factors and their analysis.

The European Union

The European Commission has strongly promoted economic and social cohesion of Europe as a main policy goal of the European union. In the Maastricht Treaty we find: ‘The Union shall set itself the following objectives: to promote economic and social progress which is balanced and sustainable, in particular through the creation of an area without internal frontiers, through the strengthening of economic and social cohesion ….’ (European Union, The Maastricht Treaty: Title 1, Common Provisions, Article B.).

An intergovernmental Conference briefing in the European parliament on Economic and Social Cohesion (http://www.europarl.eu.int/igc1996/fiches/fiche31_en.htm) emphatically stated that cohesion should be “given an importance equal to that of the establishment of the EMU and the creation of an area without internal frontiers”.

The provocative aspect of the above document is the view that social cohesion can take place within a European context. Social cohesion is seen as a responsibility and goal of the European Community. It sees Europe as a cohesive society. This approach as viewing Europe as a unique social entity has implications for the Foundation in its definition of self-realisation within collective identities for the social cohesion.
component. As we have seen in the introductory chapter collective identities for social cohesion range from the national level to the family. The above document of the European Parliament gives a good argument to include Europe (international institution) within the social cohesion context. This will require an additional set of indicators within the spirit of for example: European identity.

The European Union has characterized its approach to social cohesion as being consistent with ‘the European model of society’, founded on a notion of solidarity that is embodied in ‘universal systems of social protection, regulation to correct market failure and systems of social dialogue’ (European Union, 1996, p.14). An analysis of documents provides elements of the definition of social cohesion. This includes: the link social cohesion has with the objectives of the European model of society that is founded on the notion of the social market economy. In it the solidarity dimension is facilitated through ‘universal systems of social protection, regulation to correct market failure and systems of social dialogue’ (European Union, 1996, p.14). In the 2001 Report on the social situation in the EU it is written that: ‘the strengthening of the European economy and its social model will result from policies promoting synergy and positive interaction between economic growth, employment and social cohesion’ (Eurostat, 2001, p.7).

Council of Europe
Within the Council of Europe, social cohesion aims to assist the reintegration of excluded persons in five main areas: access to social protection, housing, employment, health care and education (http://www.social.coe.int/en/cohesion/strategy/CDCS/sumstrat.htm). The Strategy for Social Cohesion approved on 13 July set out a precise agenda for the Council in the social field for the coming years. It does not define social cohesion as such but seeks to identify some of the factors in social cohesion such as: (1) setting up mechanisms and institutions which will prevent the factors of division (such as an excessive gap between rich and poor or the multiple forms of discrimination) from becoming so acute as to endanger social harmony; (2) the importance of decent and adequately remunerated employment; (3) measures, to combat poverty and social exclusion, particularly in areas such as housing, health, education and training, employment and income distribution and social services; (4) strengthening social security systems; (5) developing policies for families, with particular emphasis on children and the elderly; and (6) partnership with civil society bodies, in particular trade unions, employers’ representatives and NGOs.

Accordingly, social cohesion policies should ‘help to revitalise the economy and capitalise on the contribution made by the two sides of industry and other interested bodies, particularly by creating employment, stimulating enterprise and ensuring employment opportunities for all’. It should also ‘meet people’s basic needs and promote access to social rights within the universal spirit of the Council of Europe’s many conventions and recommendations, particularly in the fields of employment, education, health, social protection and housing’. It should ‘acknowledge human dignity by focusing policies on the individual and guaranteeing human rights in Europe’ and ‘establish forums and procedures enabling the underprivileged and those whose rights are insufficiently upheld to make themselves heard’. Finally, it needs to ‘develop an integrated approach bringing together all the relevant fields of action’ (http://www.social.coe.int/en/cohesion/strategy/CDCS/sumstrat.htm).
The European experience has demonstrated that the use of social cohesion as a policy goal is ‘needs-led’ and is basically a catalyst for action. This flexibility of the term social cohesion while making it convenient for policy orientations and programming prevents it from being a useful theoretical concept. The promotion of social cohesion requires the reduction of disparities that arise from unequal access to employment opportunities and to the rewards in the form of income. Van der Maesen (2002) notes that the European Union associates social cohesion with institutional development. van der Maesen reports that Jacques Delor saw social cohesion as a policy ‘as a counterpart for neo-monetarists approaches’ (p.4) while during the Portuguese presidency in 2000 social cohesion was seen as a goal.

5 THE SUBJECT MATTER OF SOCIAL COHESION

According to van der Maesen (2003) the three aspects of the trinomial nature of each of the social quality conditional factors relate to: the specificity of the component itself; the subject matter of the social; and the mutual relationship of the conditional factors. Each of these aspects have specific implications for social cohesion, as follows:

1. The specificity of social cohesion has been the central rationale for the discussions in the previous sections of this paper. It is, of course, centrally related to the definition of the construct and, according to van der Maesen (2003:26) determined via the component’s dimensions. Dimensions are seen as a heuristic instrument for determining a component’s specificity and are defined as: ‘abstract formulated parts of daily existence immediately related with the component’s subject matter.’

2. van der Maesen (2002b) defined the subject matter of the social as ‘the outcome of constantly changing processes through which human subjects realise themselves as interactive human beings’. Central to this is the dialectical relationship between individual self-realisation and the formation of collective identities. Given the holistic nature and orientation of social cohesion it is clear that collective identities are central to the operationalisation of social cohesion. This raises a question of the extent to which identity or identities per se could or should feature in the domains constructed to operationalise social cohesion. This issue is further discussed below.

3. An indication of some of the issues involved in the mutual relationship of the conditional factors was given in the introduction to the paper. These are taken into account in the analysis of each potential social cohesion domain with a view to ascertaining the most appropriate location for domains. Additionally, the aptness and potential overlap between the conditional factors of some suggested indicators need to be addressed. This is done in Section 7.

The process of operationalising social cohesion as a social quality construct begins with the identification of domains. According to van der Maesen (2003:26) a domain is ‘an empirical knowable construct with which to operationalise the consequences of the component’s trinomial nature.’
In the process of identifying domains he further distinguishes between:

a. ‘the component’s most abstract identity, with which to understand the intrinsic affinity between all the conditional factors (see its subject matter)
b. the component’s specificity with which to discriminate between the conditional factors (see its dimensions)
c. the component’s mutual focus, with which to recognise the relationships between the conditional factors (see both characteristics)
d. the component’s empirical demonstrations (see its domains).’ (van der Maesen, 2003:28)

It is clear from (a), (b), (c) and point 2 above, that the operationalisation of the social quality conditional factors is not only iterative and recursive in relation to each component individually but is, and has to be, simultaneously interactive among all four conditional factors. Given that the task of operationalising the social quality conditional factors has been given to four separate individual / teams working collaboratively but, of practical necessity, mostly independently of each other, then this process will be partial and incomplete until the a further mutual iteration takes place where the operationalisation of each component is mutually informed by all the others. Hence, at this stage of the process, the outcomes will be tentative and incomplete.

But it is necessary to make a start. this will be done in relation to the specific nature of social cohesion itself.

Social Cohesion: its nature – specificity and definition

The EFSQ’s approach in historical perspective

In the Foundation’s first book, social cohesion was presented (as were all the other conditional factors) as a continuum and was defined as follows:

Social cohesion/anomie concerns the processes which create, defend or demolish social networks and the social infrastructures underpinning these networks. An adequate level of social cohesion is one which enables citizens ‘to exist as real human subjects, as social beings’. On the other hand anomie is fostered by regional disparities, the suppression of minorities, unequal access to public goods and services and an unequal sharing of economic burdens (Beck et al. p 284).

In the Foundation’s second book, social cohesion is characterised as ‘the necessary collectively accepted values and norms [that] will enable community building.’ (p.314), and the subject matter of social cohesion is identified as ‘the strength or weakness of primary relations and its theoretical impact is seen as encompassing ‘social cohesion / social dissolution and differentiation / integration’ (Figure 17.10; p.351). A first attempt to operationalise the domains of social cohesion is presented in chapter 18 of the Foundation’s second book (p. 364):

There are strong conceptual links between social cohesion and social capital and a starting point here is to include two facets of social capital – trust and associational networks – as social cohesion domains. Other social cohesion domains include: public safety, intergenerational solidarity, social status cohesion, economic cohesion, and altruism.
After the second Foundation book a debate ensued in ENIQ about whether the component should be labelled as *social cohesion* or just as *cohesion*. Keizer (2002), along with van der Maesen and Walker (2002) characterised the latter as follows: ‘[people] living in communities and societies characterised by a sufficient level of *cohesion* as a condition for collectively accepted values and norms which are indispensable for their social existence.’

The Specificity of Social Cohesion

In identifying the specificity of a construct it is important to note that, in van der Maesen’s formulation, specificity is derived from the dimensions of social cohesion and presumably is the source from which the domains are derived, along with its subject matter – see (a) and (b) above. Therefore a component’s specificity is at a higher order of generality and abstraction than its domains. In other words, a component’s specificity cannot itself be a domain but must encompass all the domains of the component for it to be genuinely the component’s specificity. Under these circumstances it seems most appropriate for the actual name or label of the component to be its specificity. This is attractive with regard to social cohesion – because the name, or identifier of a construct serves its purpose best if it distils, metaphorically, the essence or true meaning of that construct. This comment is, of course equally true for the other three social quality conditional factors. At this point it might be wise to make a case for the specificity of social cohesion to be identified as just that – social cohesion.

There are two potential problems in denoting the construct and its specificity with the same term. The first is that it hints at tautology. If the name and the specificity are the same then there is no point in distinguishing between them: indeed it serves only obfuscate and confuse. The second problem illuminates the reason why, at least specifically in relation to the social cohesion component, there is a point in distinguishing between the construct’s name and its specificity. This is simply because of the multitude of different meanings that the term ‘social cohesion’ has accumulated. The specificity given to social cohesion as a social quality construct is the means of situating it precisely and distinguishing it from other conceptualisations of social cohesion. Therefore it has to be distinct from the label of the construct.

There is, of course, an integral relationship between the specificity and definition of a construct (a point that does not seem to be noted or developed by van der Maesen, 2003) in that the specificity (i.e. the act of having a special determining quality) needs to cover, at least implicitly or at a high level of abstraction, the detailed delineation of the topic that is the definition (i.e. stating *exactly* what a thing is; or the precise statement of the essential nature of a thing). Put succinctly the specificity of social cohesion is its *special determining quality* whereas its definition is a precise statement of its *essential nature*.

So, how can one identify the specificity of social cohesion as a component of social quality? The starting place has to be its referents in the social quality literature. The key referents, as presented above, can be distilled to the following: processes that build or destroy social networks and their underpinning infrastructures; reduction of inequities and inequalities; primary relations, cohesion/dissolution and
differentiation/integration; links with social capital; collectively accepted values and norms. Now, taking all these into consideration it becomes more clear what the possibilities are for identifying both social cohesion specificity and a definition of the term – i.e. its special determining quality and its essential nature.

There seem to be three strong candidates for its special determining nature. the first relates to social relations; the second to integrative norms and values (including trust); and the third to a more generic overarching descriptor which captures its quality and points to and links with its essence (such as, as discussed above, a synonym for ‘social cohesion’). ‘Social relations’ certainly captures some of the quality of social cohesion but seems does not capture its holistic nature. ‘Integrative norms and values’ are certainly central to social cohesion but, as will be argued below, they are more appropriate as domains rather than the specificity of social cohesion because they neatly encapsulate the quality of domains as ‘empirically knowable’ and patently operationalisable. In addition they do not cover all of the potential aspects of social cohesion (e.g. aspects of collective identities).

So what is needed, then, is a generic overarching synonym for social cohesion which captures its essence in relation to ‘the social’. The one word that does seem to meet all the requirements for being the specificity of social cohesion is ‘solidarity’, which has been extensively used in both the social quality and social cohesion literature. The Oxford English Dictionary defines ‘solidarity’ as follows:

1. The fact or quality, on the part of communities, etc., of being perfectly united or at one in some respect, esp. in interests, sympathies, or aspirations; [1856 Emerson *One secret of their power is their mutual good understanding... They have solidarity, or responsible ness, and trust in each other*].
2. Community or perfect coincidence of (or between) interests.
3. Civil Law. A form of obligation involving joint and several responsibilities or rights.

Solidarity has a long intellectual pedigree in European social science, stretching back to Durkheim. In contemporary discourse of a number of European organisations it refers to various areas such as citizenship, population diversity, combating exclusion, employment, urban social development and housing. Bockenforde (2003:1) states

that solidarity has a normative aspect. It means ‘a certain attachment among people and a reliance upon one another’ (P.1), and ‘a form of assuming responsibility for one another, associated with positive action or services on behalf of others’. Seymour (1997) has operationalised Bockenforde’s definition of solidarity and explores the link between national solidarity and social solidarity. National solidarity for Seymour is the existence of a certain form of nationalism held by the majority of a population belonging to a particular nation whereas social solidarity, more narrowly defined, refers to a set of measures that will benefit the less favoured members of society. Seymour suggests, first, that national solidarity creates favourable conditions for at least a certain amount of social solidarity and, secondly, that a community with a strong national solidarity among its members may encourage individuals to see beyond their own interest in dealing with other citizens. Seymour concludes that by being members of the same nation, individuals have an empathy towards each other that ‘creates favourable conditions for a genuine concern regarding the fate of all members’. This link between national solidarity and social solidarity is interesting as it hints that identity, seen as a domain of social cohesion, may be the link to stronger solidarity within a nation.

Grabbe and Tewes (2002) have a broad view of solidarity as a requirement to meet challenges of the European Union. Thus, solidarity is not only a goal in itself but the basis for further action. The challenges that solidarity is a requirement for are: economic disparities, changing conceptions of citizenship and identity and a balance between economic competitiveness and social cohesion. Grabbe and Tewes approach is valuable as it provides solidarity with a more generous agenda.

Definitions of Social Cohesion

A definition of a construct covers its essential nature. Further, the essence of a construct incorporates those attributes that are necessary and sufficient to identify the nature of the construct. This is where specificity differs from definition: it is required of a definition that it is not merely ostensive (in that it points unequivocally to that construct – as can be said to be the case for a specifier) but that it must be substantive too: it must identify that set of attributes that between them are necessary and sufficient unambiguously delineate the construct. In effect, a good definition provides the bridgehead to the operationalisation of the construct because it sets out the parameters and constraints for identifying the domains associated with the construct in a logically necessary way. This present exposition demonstrates a similar rationale – or, perhaps even the same rationale but presented from a different perspective – to that of van der Maesen (20030 described above.

It was noted above that ‘social relations’ and ‘integrative norms and values’ were strong contenders for identifiers of the specificity of the social cohesion component of social quality. It is clear that they are both necessary to the notion of social cohesion but taken individually neither of them is sufficient. Taken together they certainly address most of the areas covered in the EFSQ’s previous and contemporary writing on the nature of social cohesion, as well as that of most other commentators. Taking these together a definition could be constructed as follows: social cohesion depends

on the strength of social relations and is a function of the integration between integrative norms and values (including trust) in society. ‘Trust’ is putatively differentiated from other norms and values here because of the central role it plays in most definitions and characterisations of both social capital and social cohesion. In the same spirit, ‘social networks’ could be separated out from ‘social relations’ in general. There is one further element which has been presented as central to the essence of social cohesion: this relates to the nature of social collective identities as a manifestation of ‘the social’ itself. This leads on to a wider discussion of ‘the social’ which needs to be undertaken before revisiting the definition of social cohesion in order to produce a definition that relates properly to the component’s specificity and which provides a firm foundation for developing domains, sub-domains and indicators. In so doing, another iteration of the trinomial process is undertaken.

The Subject Matter of the Social

Social cohesion is perhaps (arguably even undoubtedly) the social quality component that is most central to the manifestation and concretisation of ‘the social’ given that the dialectical relationship between individual self-realisation and the formation of collective identities operates via social networks and relationships and is contingent upon integrative norms and values and that solidarity is a *sine qua non* for the establishment of these collective identities. Thus the *process* of forming collective identities through constantly changing processes through which human subjects realise themselves as interactive human beings is the process of forming and concretising social cohesion and social solidarity.

In other words, without cohesion and solidarity among social actors there is no ‘social’ at all. There are different substantive varieties, or species, of the social (i.e. different *societies*) but the nature of the social glue / cohesion that holds them all together is the same. Thus social cohesion is a *universal* abstract entity.

The *outcome* of social cohesion within societies relates directly to levels of stability and social solidarity at any given time – the greater the social cohesion, the more stable and solidaristic the society is. Therefore, the *dynamics* of social cohesion are the dynamics of collective identity formation. This raises the issue of whether, and, if so then the extent to which, collective identities should be represented in the operationalisation of the social quality construct. If collective identities are to be included then it seems reasonable to presume that the component most apt for them to be manifest within is that of social cohesion (although a case can be made for social inclusion – see below). If they *are* to be included in social cohesion then is it most appropriate for this to be done under the auspices of a separate *collective identities* domain or within another domain? For the present these will be treated as open questions, to be re-addressed below.

*The Definition (and Dimensions) Revisited*

The following tentative reworking of the definition will be used as a basis to explore the operationalisation of social cohesion via domains and sub-domains. Only when the integrity of potential domains has been rigorously tested will it be possible to evaluate whether or not the items in parenthesis can be retained and, if so, as free-standing domains or as sub-domains:
Social cohesion depends on the strength of social relations (including social networks) and is a function of the integration between integrative norms and values (including trust) [and identities] in society.

‘Identities’ are included on a tentative basis, the reasons for which are discussed below on p. *. For the above definition it becomes apparent that the relevant dimensions for social cohesion are:

- social relations
- integrative norms and values
- [identities]

The Mutual Relationship of the Conditional Factors

Specific issues relating to the mutual relationships of the conditional factors are discussed in Section 7 but there are three general issues of relevance here. They are: the utilisation of resources, particularly in relation to socio-economic security and empowerment; the interaction between social cohesion and social inclusion; and the treatment of collective identities and levels of analysis.

Resources

This issue is briefly alluded to in Section 1 and concerns the blurred area between the interaction and inter-relationship between distinct elements of different conditional factors on the one hand and on the other hand areas of overlap where an element could appropriately be a part of either of two conditional factors. Command over resources in a case in point which applies equally to relation to socio-economic security and empowerment, the details are different and are discussed separately in Section 7, but the general point is common and concerns the transferability of resources.

Resources can be classified as either tangible or intangible but this in one sense is not helpful because that apparently most tangible of resources – money – is a prime example of an intangible resource being given tangible form, or quasi-form. The intangible resource is confidence or trust that a central bank will honour the promise written on banknotes, and times of hyperinflation and bank failure are vivid examples of the fragility of this confidence and trust. In reality the crucial elements relating to resources are their fungibility and their liquidity (i.e. the extent and speed to which they can be translated into other resources, particularly goods and services). There is a major debate in the economic sociology literature on whether various forms of non-physical capital are at all fungible (Phillips 2001). Most commentators take the position that the resources allied to social capital, e.g. different forms of trust, are not fungible or transferable into resources that a member of a social network can ‘cash in’. In other words, in this formulation, social capital is seen as a public good and not a private good. Bourdieu, on the other hand, sees cultural and symbolic capital as being fungible and of direct benefit to individuals. Indeed, he goes further and claims that cultural capital, for example, can be directly converted into physical capital, i.e. that it is both fungible and relatively liquid (Bourdieu, 1986).

The implications of this debate for the relationship between social cohesion and the conditional factors of socio-economic security and empowerment are as follows. If
the resources associated with social cohesion (mostly via networks and other elements of social capital) are neither fungible nor liquid in nature then they are most appropriately included in social cohesion. In these circumstances, high levels of these social cohesion resources will facilitate and enable the enhancement of socio-economic security and empowerment by providing the right environment in which they may flourish – classically it is not easy to maintain socio-economic security in a society where people do not trust each other and have limited and inward-looking associational networks.

If, on the other hand, the resources associated with social cohesion are fungible and, to some extent liquid, then there is a case that they – or the most liquid of them – should be included within the domains of socio-economic security and empowerment for the very reason that their accessibility to individuals, groups and communities makes them commensurate with other more tangible and individually-accessible resources such as money, material goods etc.

In practical terms this is probably not a binary, either-or, decision. It is likely that some sets of resources are not in practice fungible or – if they are – are highly illiquid. Other resources, such as those commonly labelled as ‘human capital’ are to a large extent fungible in principle and have some degree of liquidity. It would be most appropriate for the former to reside within social cohesion and for the latter to be within either socio-economic security, empowerment or possibly both.

**Social cohesion and social inclusion**

As noted in Section 1, there is a substantial literature on the relationship between social cohesion and social exclusion and there can be doubt that these two conditional factors of social quality are closely inter-related. Theoretical work is at present being undertaken on the conceptual/theoretical framework within which their relationship is being contextualised. The original conception of a quadrant with four entirely separate and discreet conditional factors is being reconsidered and now is probably not the time to comment in detail on the potential outcome of this debate. For the purposes of this paper it needs to be noted that social inclusion and exclusion can be seen both as outcomes and processes. In terms of outcomes, inclusion and exclusion are a continuum or a binary divide, depending on whether exclusion is seen as multiple deprivation or as a catastrophic rupture (Room 2000). In terms of processes, on the other hand, it can be argued that societal institutions regulate access to goods, services and resources operate in more complex and not necessarily interrelated ways. In other words the process of inclusion are not necessarily merely the obverse of process of exclusion: sometimes this may be the case but on other occasions these process might be entirely independent of each other.

The extent to which there is inter-relatedness or overlap between social cohesion and social inclusion will depend of the extent to which inclusion is conceptualised as an outcome or a process and, if the latter, the extent to which social inclusion is analysed independently of social exclusion.
6 DOMAINS OF SOCIAL COHESION

Taking into account the importance of the subject matter of the social and the, at present fluid, mutual relationships between the social quality conditional factors, the starting point for identifying domains for social cohesion is in elaborating the construct’s specificity, its dimensions and its definition. Its specificity is solidarity. Its dimensions are: social relations; integrative norms and values; and possibly identities.

It is defined as: depending upon the strength of social relations (including social networks) and is a function of the integration between integrative norms and values (including trust) [and identities] in society.

The following potential domains can be derived from the above: trust; other integrative norms and values; social networks; other aspects of social relations; and possibly identities. These are discussed below. Each subsection commences with a brief literature review followed by a discussion of potential sub-domains

Trust

Phillips (2001) found trust to be a ubiquitous theme in his extensive review of definition and operationalisation of social cohesion and social capital. For example, the Canadian government’s definition of social cohesion includes: ‘ongoing process of developing a community of shared values, shared challenges and equal opportunities ... based on a sense of trust, hope and reciprocity’ (Jenson, 1998:4). Berger-Schmitt and Noll (2000) and Berger-Schmitt (2000) see social cohesion as including: trust in, and quality of, institutions as well as European-specific concerns including European identity. Coleman (1990) and Kramer, Brewer et al. (1996) identify the notion of relational trust in their approaches to social cohesion. For Coleman relational trust has three components: mutual trust, intermediaries in trust and third-party trust. Kramer, Brewer et al. have four categories: reciprocity-based, elicitive, compensatory and moralistic trust.

For Fukuyama (1995) trust is the most important component of social capital: ‘the expectation that arises within a community of regular, honest and cooperative behaviour, based on commonly shared norms’ (Fukuyama, 1995:25). Here trust is seen as ‘a lubricant that makes the running of any group more efficient’ (Fukuyama, 1999:16). For Fukuyama, a central theme is the ‘radius of trust’: the further it expands beyond the family, the more likely it is to be based on ‘moral resources’ and ethical behaviours.

Sub-domains

Trust can be decomposed into two sub-sets: generalised trust; and specific trust. Two other contenders, which it is concluded are more appropriately placed elsewhere are also discussed here: these are relational trust and altruism.

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*There is no heading in the succeeding section on ‘social relations’ in general. The reasons for this are explained in the text in the subsection on Other Integrative Norms and Values.*
**General trust** follows a similar logic to Fukuyama’s notion of trust as a generic moral resource, the strength of which can be measured by applying Fukuyama’s notion of ‘the radius of trust’. A similar approach, labelled ‘generalised trust’ is used in Hall’s (1999) powerful analysis of social capital in Britain.

**Specific trust** can be subdivided into two: institutional trust and personal trust. Institutional trust relates to trust by individuals, families and communities in the civic and societal institutions within the public domain, formal institutions and community frameworks. Personal trust relates to trust by individuals in significant others in their lives.

The above two sub-domains of trust have been intransitive in nature: they relate to people’s trust either to other people in general, to institutions and agencies, or to their peers. There is another, highly transitive, sort of trust, relational trust which is reciprocal in nature. Coleman (1999) breaks it down into three types: mutual trust, intermediaries in trust and third-party trust. Kramer, Brewer et al. (1996) identify four categories of relational trust: reciprocity-based, elicitive, compensatory and moralistic trust. Relational trust will be incorporated with commonality as a sub-domain of other integrative norms and values outwith trust as presented here as a domain which is non-reciprocal in nature.

At the other extreme, as far from reciprocal trust as is possible to get without moving entirely from the notion of trust, is what Fukuyama (1995) identifies as part of the infrastructure to trust. This is altruism. Here Fukuyama’s interpretation is out of line with most other commentators who identify altruism as being independent of trust (Hall, 1999; Lockwood, 1999; Zokaei and Phillips, 2000; Roberts and Roche, 2001; Woolley, 2001). Indeed, Lockwood (1999) and Hall (1999) both refer to altruism and ‘other-regarding’ behaviour as central to enabling society to operate effectively. Altruism too will be presented as a sub-domain of ‘other integrative norms and values’.

**Other Integrative Norms and Values**

Vertovec (1997) claims that social cohesion implies ‘the presence of basic patterns of cooperative social interaction and core sets of collective values’. Stanley (1999) calls it the bonding effect within a society that arises spontaneously from the unforced willingness of individual members of society to enter into relationships with one another in their efforts to survive and prosper. Pahl (1991) sees it as a binding normative framework. In a major report on social cohesion undertaken for the Club of Rome, it is concluded that it is not possible for a society to operate only on the basis of a state’s legal and political systems, without recourse to any form of normative unity (Berger, 1998:353). Parsons’ normative integration is a manifestation of this on a theoretical level.

**Sub-domains**

The specificity of social cohesion – solidarity – is central to integrative norms and values. Indeed if *solidarity* writ large is the watchword for social cohesion as a whole then *solidarity* writ small is the watchword for those integrative norms and
values other than trust. These solidaristic norms and values can be sub-divided in several different ways but the process used here is, first, to include those two potential sub-domains of trust, discussed above, which do not sit easily with general and specific trust: altruism and reciprocal trust.

**Altruism** is undoubtedly one of the most important and integrative social norms and is central to normative integration. Indeed it is difficult to conceptualise how a society with high levels of altruism could possibly have low levels of social solidarity and social cohesion. The act of altruism in its truest sense, of giving to strangers with no consideration of reciprocity, was identified in Titmuss’ (1971) classic study of blood doning, as an indicator of ‘the good society’.

**Social justice or fairness** is central to the manifesto for social cohesion expressed in the first Foundation book on social quality, in fighting those inequalities and disparities that attack cohesiveness and corrode society. It is linked to the extent to which rights, duties and obligations are commonly accepted in society. Justice can be subdivided into two: the formal and institutional legal framework; and administrative practice.

A review of policy statements finds the term ‘justice’ linked to social cohesion (OECD 2003; Council of Europe 2003; Initiative for Social Cohesion 2000). Powell (2000) asks ‘What is the relation between social justice and social cohesion? Social cohesion can be a weapon of repression, and the concept of social cohesion is contested. Researchers must make these concepts and their values explicit, and must also be clear about how their values relate to normative values.’ Gough and Olofsson (1999:4) also stress that modern types of solidarity must be institutionalised as rights and duties, if anomic and other types of pathological consequences (the opposite of cohesion) are to be avoided’.

Finally other shared solidaristic and integrative values and norms can be identified as referring to **commonality**. These refer to: shared values (Jenson, 1998); civic responsibility (World Bank, 1998:1); civic norms (Knack and Keefer, 1997); civic engagement (Putnam, 1993; Fukuyama, 1995; Murray, 2000). These all relate to a feeling of belonging to society, community, family etc’. Relational trust, what Percy-Smith (2000) refers to as a commitment to mutual support ensuring open access to benefit and protection for all members of society and therefore can be seen as central to a notion of commonality

There is a link here to another potential domain: that of social relations. Woolcock (1998) argues that norms of reciprocity do not exist independently of social relationships. This is manifestly true and points to the plausibility of reciprocity or relational trust being subsumed under a ‘social relations’ domain (possibly along with ‘social networks’) rather than being in a ‘norms and values’ domain. For pragmatic reasons – mostly to do with neatness and parsimony – reciprocity is being kept in the ‘norms and values’ domain and ‘social networks is identified as a domain in its own right, therefore obviating any need for a separate ‘social relations’ domain.

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7 There is a question over whether this sub-domain fits better with identity than with other integrative norms and values.
Social Networks

Social networks probably comprise the most clear-cut domain of social cohesion because they are unarguably central to any definition to social capital (even to those, like Fukuyama’s where they are seen as precursors to social capital rather than social capital per se), and, of course, social capital is central to social cohesion. Furthermore, although it is true that there are bewildering variety of definitions of social capital, the classification in these definitions of social networks themselves is relatively straightforward as seen in Section 3. Briefly, social networks can be classified as horizontal and vertical, or bonding and bridging (Narayan, 1999): these will form two sub-domains of social capital. A third sub domain includes cross-cutting ties between groups.

Before sketching out the sub-domains, though, there are two facets of social capital that need addressing. The first is that not all networks are good – for example, hierarchical and coercive, gang-based networks – and the second concerns the strength or weakness of the network ties. On the one hand there are strong arguments that wide networks of weak ties are highly positive to social cohesion whereas narrow networks of strong ties (e.g. strong family loyalties but suspicion between families) have negative consequences for social cohesion (Granovetter, 1973; Liebow, 1989). On the other hands networks are highly effective where all group members are connected by obligations (Coleman, 1988) and where there is ‘closure’ (Greeley, 1997). These issues need to be taken into consideration when identifying and measuring social network indicators.

Sub-domains

**Horizontal networks** operate separately at each of the micro, meso and macro levels. family and kin (Lockwood, 1999; Berger-Schmitt and Noll, 2000); associations of civic engagement (Putnam, 1993); integration / bonding (Narayan, 1999). The most classic examples of horizontal associations are informal and voluntary associations entered into voluntarily by their members without anticipation of personal gain. At meso and macro levels these associations will not normally be voluntaristic but based on employment and contract. Here the crucial factor is integrity, fairness and lack of corruption.

**Vertical networks** operate between levels. and are variously referred to as linkage, ties and bridges (Woolcock, 1998; Narayan, 1999). These are at their most effective where local communities have networked links with national organisations or regional or national government agencies. Examples include links between local religious or ethnic communities and their national representatives. Schafft and Brown (2000) provide an interesting example of this in their discussion of Roma self governance in Hungary where the most successful Roma communities are those with effective links with both the national Roma organisation and the relevant national government ministries dealing with local government issues.

**Cross-cutting ties** are of central importance to effective and holistic social integration. As noted above, high levels of social capital within communities can lead to animosity between them. It is the presence of cross-cutting ties that reduces this risk. Narayan (1999) argues that there are further, wider-ranging beneficial effects of cross-cutting
ties, thus: ‘Voluntary cross-cutting networks, associations and related norms based in everyday social interactions lead to the collective good of citizens, whereas networks and associations consisting of primary social groups without cross-cutting ties lead to the betterment of only those groups’ (Narayan, 1999:13)

Identity

Identity, is the most complex and perhaps problematic of the potential domains of social cohesion. Its importance is undoubted: indeed collective identities pervade the whole notion of social quality. This is one facet of the complexity of identity: there is an argument that as it pervades the whole of social quality then it possibly is inappropriate to confine it to a domain of just one of social quality’s conditional factors. Also, to return to an issue mentioned above, there is a potential major overlap not just with the holistic social quality construct, but also with one of the other specific social quality conditional factors: social inclusion. Identity and a sense of belonging can be seen to be as relevant to inclusion with in society as to social cohesion. Perhaps this is not necessarily a major problem, because identity and belonging can be seen to be related to inclusion from the perspective of the relevant individual or group but a fact of social cohesion from a holistic societal orientation. In this context it is worth noting that Berger-Schmitt (2000) and Berger-Schmitt and Noll, (2000) both include identity and culture within their definition of social cohesion. This issue needs to be revisited once the theory chapter and all four chapters relating to the conditional factors of social quality have been drafted and circulated.

Sub-domains

The ‘identity’ component is unique in that it involves a potential conflict between identities at different levels of collectivity. Berman and Phillips (2000) write that community comes into perspective within the framework of the political and socio-demographic forces developing especially within Western European society. This includes three factors. The first is that the growth of the European ‘community’ and its determination of standards of social quality have challenged the nation-state as the focus of identity. The nation-state’s responsibility as a provider of social rights has decreased and is being yielded to the European community (Dogan 1998). Thus, there may be a tension between a person’s (or group’s or community’s) national and European identity.

Secondly, is the tension between a national and regional, local or ethnic identity. In particular, the notion of ethnos offers an alternative form of identification in today’s multicultural society where multiple, and sometimes conflicting, identities associated with religion, ethnic roots and acculturation exist side by side. Joppke and Lukes (1999) offer an insight into the range of possibilities here in their discussion of ‘mosaic multiculturalism’ and ‘hotchpotch’ multiculturalism. Even more potentially problematic are situations where resident aliens live side by side with citizens. Non-citizens do not and many times cannot (formally) identify with the nation-state as a community and therefore create their own community forms and relationships.

The third factor is to do with interpersonal relationships within an urban, mass-communication society with high levels of interpersonal anonymity and inherent dangers of depersonalisation and isolation. Here, new non-geographical ‘postmodern
communities (Delanty, 1998) are formed by people in their search for others with similar interests and self-identity. In addition, kinship networks are reconfiguring with the re-emergence of extended family households throughout Europe as children return to their parental homes in young adulthood after undertaking higher education (European Commission, 2001:578), thus giving rise to re-invigorated family identities.

7 INDICATORS OF SOCIAL COHESION

Trust

The indicators for trust are generally non-problematic and straightforward.

General trust

There are many well-established instruments here. The most widely-used suite of questions come from the World Values Survey (Inglehart, 1998). Hall (1999) used the following: ‘You can trust other people?’ and ‘You can never be too careful?’ This can be broken down by level of analysis by adding ‘generally’ / ‘in your region or city’ / ‘in your neighbourhood’. ‘Where people turn to for help in times of need’; can also be seen as an indicator of who people trust.

Fear of using public spaces could be seen as an indicator of general trust at the meso and micro levels.

Specific trust

Again there are many instruments available here, with the World Values Survey instruments being the widely used (Inglehart, 1998). Others are as follows:

Institutional: trust in government (at all levels); elected representatives; political parties; armed forces; police; religious institutions; media; trade unions; major companies; financial institutions; banks.

Personal: trust in family; friends; neighbours; peers (work colleagues, fellow students etc.); people in daily interactions.

Other Integrative Norms and Values

Indicators for this domain are generally less straightforward than for trust, and it may be that unique social indicators for the purpose of social quality may have to be created. The exception here is altruism, which has well-established indicators.

Altruism

The most straightforward indicator of altruism is the amount given voluntarily to charities which benefit other people who have no connection with the donor (e.g. third world charities), followed by charitable giving to general worthwhile causes. Other appropriate indicators include: volunteering; charity membership; blood doning. An
ideal indicator would relate to individual acts of charity from person to person, but this is impossible to ascertain accurately.

**Social Justice**

*Formal/institutional:* adherence to UN Declaration of Human Rights; index of civil liberties; Gastil’s Index of Political Rights; independence of courts.

*Practice:* integrity in administration of justice; extent of arbitrary imprisonment; bribery; index of corruption; percentage of population facing political discrimination; index of intensity of political discrimination; civil rights activism; contract enforceability; access to information.

**Commonality and reciprocity**

Political stability; protests and demonstrations; strikes, murder rates, suicide rates; unemployment rates.

**Networks**

**Horizontal networks**

Number and type of associations or local institutions; extent of membership; extent of participatory decision-making; reliance on networks of support. Greeley (1997) contends that the most important set of horizontal networks for maximising social capital is the extent of multiplex networks (where resources in one relationship can be use in another relationship). In his view, membership of a religious organisation is an immensely powerful source of social capital.

**Vertical networks**

Links between local/community and national organisations; links between local/community organisations and government agencies.

**Cross-cutting Ties**

Extent of cross-membership of groups and associations (a) horizontally(b) vertically. the former can be measured using standard social network analysis techniques.

**Identity**

Religiosity operates perhaps at all three levels.

**National / European**

Prejudice against foreigners; treatment of immigrants, refugees, asylum seekers; proportion of population who are citizens; sense of national pride; support for national sporting teams; percentage of population involved in separatist movements.
Regional /community/ local

Prejudice against outsiders; sense of community identity.

Interpersonal

Sense of belonging to family and kinship network.
## Appendix

### INDICATORS FOR SOCIAL COHESION

**DOMAINS, SUB-DOMAINS, SUB-SUB DOMAINS, INDICATORS**  
I – Institutional (political) – macro  
C – Community – meso  
F – Family and neighbourhood – micro

<table>
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<tr>
<th>DOMAINS</th>
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<th>INDICATORS</th>
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| **TRUST**        | Generalised trust |                | World Values Survey (WVS) or Hall (1999) generalised trust indicator questions I, C, F  
|                  |             |                 | Fear of using public spaces. I  
|                  |             |                 | Where people turn to for help in times of need C, F  
| Specific trust   | Institutional |                | WVS institutional trust questions I, C  
|                  |             |                 | Trust in: government; elected representatives; political parties; armed forces; legal system; the media; trade unions, police; religious institutions; civil service; major companies; financial institutions; banks I (and some C)  
|                  |             |                 | Trust in community leaders C  
| Personal         |             |                 | WVS personal trust question I, C, F  
|                  |             |                 | Trust in: family; friends; neighbours; peers (work colleagues etc.); people in daily interactions C, F  
| **OTHER INTEGRATIVE NORMS AND VALUES** |             |                 | Volunteering I, C  
|                  |             |                 | Charitable / voluntary body membership I,C  
|                  |             |                 | Blood donations I  
|                  |             |                 | Charitable contributions I, C  
| Altruism         |             |                 | Adherence to UN Declaration of Human Rights; Index of civil liberties; Gastill’s Index of Political rights; independence of judiciary I  
|                  |             |                 | Integrity in administration of justice; extent of arbitrary imprisonment; bribery; index of corruption; percentage of population facing political discrimination; index of intensity of political discrimination; civil rights activism; contract enforceability, access to information I, C  
| Justice          | Formal / institutional legal framework | | Political stability; protests and demonstrations; strikes, murder rates, suicide rates; unemployment rates I, C  
|                  |             |                 | Number and type of associations or local institutions; extent of membership; extent of participatory decision-making; reliance on networks of support. C, F  
|                  |             |                 | Links between local/community and national organisations; links between local/community organisations and government agencies I, C  
| SOCIAL NETWORKS  | Horizontal networks | | Extent of cross-membership of groups and associations (a) horizontally(b) vertically. the former can be measured using standard social network analysis techniques I, C  
<p>|                  | Vertical networks | |                                                                 |
|                  | Cross-cutting ties | |                                                                 |</p>
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<td>Sense of belonging to family and kinship network</td>
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