

European Network Indicators of Social Quality - ENIQ -

“Social Quality” The German National Report

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Preface

This national report and the 13 others that accompany it are published as part of the final report of the European Network on Indicators of Social Quality (ENIQ). The network began in October 2001 and completed its work in January 2005 and was funded under the Fifth Framework Programme of Directorate-General Research. Also published simultaneously are reports by the European Anti-Poverty Network and the International Council of Social Welfare, European Region based on the work of ENIQ. All of these reports and the deliberations of the Network contributed to the final report which contains a comprehensive overview of all of ENIQ's activities both theoretical and practical.

ENIQ has been focussed mainly on the operationalisation of the four conditional factors of social quality: socio-economic security, social cohesion, social inclusion and social empowerment. This huge collective effort has produced a very original and theoretically grounded instrument for comparative research aimed at understanding the nature and experience of social quality in different countries and in assessing the impact of policy changes. These national reports also reveal the highly differentiated character of the European Union (EU) which cannot be captured by reduction to a small number of social models. At the same time there is clearly an intrinsic affinity in the emphasis on equity and solidarity between most of the countries involved. This intrinsic, philosophical affinity is intriguing for future research.

The work presented in the national reports and the Network's final report will contribute substantially to the major book that will be published by the end of this year. There will also be articles based on the national reports in the European Journal of Social Quality.

The preparation of these national reports was an extremely difficult task. Developing a new approach, a new instrument, and analysing important social and economic trends and their consequences entailed considerable efforts for both established scientists and their junior assistants. The whole network had to grapple with the theoretical aspects of social quality as well as the empirical dimensions. Therefore we want to express our deep gratitude, on behalf of the European Foundation for Social Quality, for the work done by all participants in ENIQ. We will endeavour to ensure that this effort is not wasted and that Europe benefits from their expertise. We also want to acknowledge the excellent contributions of the staff of the Foundation - Margo Keizer, Helma Verkleij, Robert Duiveman and Sarah Doornbos - to the successful completion of this project. They made substantial inputs to all stages of the Network. Finally our thanks to the European Commission for funding ENIQ.

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1 Introduction

This report intends to give an overview over the German situation with regard to the conditional factors of social quality. It has been written as part of a comparative study within the *European Network on Social Quality Indicators* (ENIQ). In addition to productive discussions at the regular meetings of the network, the authors received critical support by a national reference group of German social scientists.

Social quality as a scientific concept was developed by the *European Foundation on Social Quality* (EFSQ), based in Amsterdam and coordinator of the *Network*, since the early 1990ies and formally presented during the Dutch EU presidency in 1997 in order to strengthen the social dimension of the European integration and to overcome the identified economic bias in that process. The Foundation defines social quality as “the extent to which people are able to participate in the social and economic life of their communities under conditions which enhance their well-being and individual potential.” (Beck et al. 1997, p.7) On the basis of ontological considerations about “the social”¹ social quality theory defined a “social quality quadrangle” containing the four basic conditions that determine the development of social quality: socio-economic security, social inclusion, social cohesion and social empowerment.² Each of these four conditions of social quality constitutes one chapter of our report.

With regard to the applied methods the social quality approach tries to break new ground as, alongside objective indicators, qualitative instruments, so-called *profiles* and *criteria*, are integrated in the research design. At present the construction of profiles and criteria is still work in progress. Therefore the *European Network on Social Quality Indicators* confined itself to the first step of the empirical phase, the development of social quality indicators. After the identification of relevant domains and sub-domains, a restricted set of “ideal” indicators, most of them objective but some also subjective, was chosen. The point of orientation in that process was less the current availability of data, but rather the claim that the indicators should reflect the main dialectic of self-realising and the formation of collective identities. That means that the project does not only want to deliver a description of social quality in Europe but also to work as a stimulus to gather new relevant data on the “forgotten” aspects of the topic. From a national perspective the set of indicators is, of course, not necessarily an “ideal” one, because it constitutes a compromise between the 14 included national research groups. However, every national group was invited to add further specific indicators in order to reflect the national situation properly.

Social indicator research has already a long tradition in Germany, which enabled us to draw effectively upon the results of regularly conducted surveys. Especially the ZUMA Mannheim is strongly engaged

¹ The main thesis is “that the social will be realised (*verwirklicht sich*) thanks to the interdependencies between the self-realisation of individual people as social beings and the formation of collective identities, based on the outcomes or consequences of these interactions.” (Beck et al. 1997a, p.313)

² A more in-depth introduction into social quality theory is presented in the annex.

in that kind of research and publishes, among other things, in collaboration with the National Statistical Office and the WZB Berlin every second year the “Datenreport” (data report) which contains a comprehensive set of objective and subjective indicators. Currently ZUMA is also trying to develop a “European system of social indicators”. It will provide even more information on the social situation of European citizens, but has in contrast to the social quality project a weaker tie to theoretical considerations.

In the four chapters on data analysis we will present the available data on the indicators, describe trends and try to explain the identified developments. The data will be differentiated by gender, ethnicity, income group and age group whether such differences are eye-catching or commonly expected. Furthermore, a special consideration is given to the division between East and West Germany as both parts of the country score still quite often remarkably different in many indicators. After the data section a chapter follows in which we describe initiatives somehow connected with the idea of social quality in Germany. In the last chapter we will conclude our results and give some recommendations for further research.

2 Socio-economic Security

2.1 Introduction

The German welfare state is characterised by set of institutions that guaranteed until recently a relatively high level of socio-economic security for large parts of the population. The following indicators cover quite accurately the existence of these institutions and provide therefore, on the first view, an appropriate description of socio-economic security in Germany. A closer look reveals, however, that the indicators are not integrating 'meta'-level dimensions like 'reliability' (e.g. of entitlements or institutions, more generally) and 'stability' (of employment or family careers or more generally of institutions) – a point repeatedly emphasised by Franz Xaver Kaufmann, first in his 1973 book on 'Soziale Sicherheit'. While, for instance, the vast majority of Germans still enjoys generous health care provisions, high wage replacement rates and relaxed eligibility rules for those in need of benefits and other provisions, this is up to change very soon. Hence, reliability, stability over time and optionality significantly define socio-economic security. We try to overcome the difficulties evolving from the absence of people's subjective assessment of socio-economic security by adding objective information on stability or instability of the institutional regulations.

2.2 Financial resources

2.2.1 Income sufficiency

1) Part of household income spent on health, clothing, food and housing (in the lower and median household incomes)

Before presenting evidence on household spending, the section provides data on the overall income situation of West and East German households and on poverty thresholds (own calculations³). While income thresholds are widely used in the EU to point to relative inequalities which can easily lead to various forms of exclusion, they do not inform us properly about wants and needs. In any case, threshold-related income poverty in East and West Germany cannot be qualitatively compared to rates in, say, Britain or Italy.

³ Calculations by Christoph Schmitt on the basis of the German Socio-economic Panel.

Table 1 Net income by household type and per month (in €) 2000

Household type	Germany	West Germany	East Germany
	Average income per household and month in €		
All households	2,583	2,714	2,024
Solo living	1,538	1,636	1,095
Couples* without children	2,887	3,059	2,180
Couples* with children**	3,499	3,614	2,948
Lone parents**	1,777	1,874	1,465

*Married and cohabiting couples; also post-parental couples;

**children below the age of 18


Data: Statistisches Bundesamt 2002 (households of self-employed, farmers and top earners not included)

Source: Engstler and Menning 2003, p. 149.

Living-in children and non-employed partners immediately reduce individual shares of household income. Poverty risks measured as relative income inequality increase with the number of non-employed household members. Diagrams 1 and 2 present poverty rates by households' employment status in 2000.


Workless households were poor in both parts of Germany in 2002 (Figures 1 and 2). This category includes households of pensioners and of lone mothers. Having a part-time working member in the household already reduced the risk of poverty remarkably, albeit to a smaller extent in the East than in the West. The emerging one-and-a-half-earner household fought poverty risks to a large extent, especially, in the East. In West Germany, the one-and-a-half earner model does not lower poverty remarkably better than one-earner full-time employment, especially, if hours worked and earnings capacity were considered. Dual full-time worker households reduce poverty risks to a slightly lower extent in East Germany than the one-and-a-half earner model. Dual full-time earning sometimes (increasingly?) reflects low wages.

Figure 1 East German poverty rates by households' employment pattern in 2002 (Poverty line 60% Median disposable annual income), persons in households with a head aged 25 to 60



Source: German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), own calculations.

Figure 2 West German poverty rates by households' employment pattern in 2002 (Poverty line 60% Median disposable annual income), persons in households with a head aged 25 to 60



Source: German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), own calculations.

In Germany published data on household spending on health, clothing, food and housing are not differentiated by income groups, only by household types like singles, lone parents, couples with and without children. The raw data of the EVS (Einkommens- und Verbrauchsstichprobe), a regular income and spending survey, might include information on that topic, but published data was not yet

available. Therefore table 2 shows how spending on health, clothing, food and housing for all households in Germany developed between 1999 and 2001.

Table 2 Percentage of household income spent on health, clothing, food and housing (all households)

	1999	2000	2001
EU 15	-	-	43,6
Germany	46,5	46,5	47,1

Data source: Eurostat (See Appendix)

Apart from data problems the indicator “income sufficiency” only superficially describes the potential lack of income in Germany. The German Welfare Survey (Wohlfahrtssurvey) applies a different indicator which in our view comes closer to the reality of insufficient income. The indicator includes 20 living standard items, like the existence of a TV, car, computer or the affordability of a holiday trip and regular dinners with friends. If a household lacks more than six items, it is considered as under-supplied. Unsurprisingly, table 3 shows that especially the lower income groups suffer from precarious living standards. Differentiated by social groups we see that the unemployed, lone parents and people without professional education are most likely to live in under-supplied households. But, interestingly, the proportion of unemployed persons who lacked living standard items was decreasing between 1998 and 2001, whereas the proportion of full-time employees slightly increased. The trend does not hint to an improvement of unemployment benefits as we will later show. It could indicate a flow of low skilled people into low paid jobs during the economy boom of these years. This would still be a surprising phenomenon from a German perspective, as a lot of criticism has revolved around the inability of the German labour market to include the least qualified.

Table 3 Percentage of households which are under-supplied (lacking at least 6 out of 20 living standard items) by income and social groups

	1998	2001
lowest income group	32	34
medium income group	6	6
highest income group	0	1
full-time employees	5	6
unemployed people	37	30
lone parents	27	23
people without professional education	17	22

Data source: Wohlfahrtssurvey (See Datenreport 2002)

2.2.2 Income security

2) How do certain biographical events affect the risk of poverty on household level?

Germany as the typical example of a Bismarckian or corporatist welfare state is still very much characterised by the prevalence of social insurance systems. Increasingly negative attitudes – mostly of the elites – towards the social insurance system – due to rising contributions of both, employers and

employees, and corresponding reforms, notwithstanding, the risks of illness or disability, old age and unemployment are still overwhelmingly covered by insurance transfers with the exception of parental leave: the related benefit is tax-financed, income-tested and flat rate. That means that life course events like old age, care needs, illness or unemployment cause – especially, if short-term, as in the case of illness or unemployment, – few financial problems for the better-off, but can lead to situations of relative poverty for the hitherto small number of lower income household. Up to recently, social assistance intervened as a last resort system to alleviate the risk of poverty for these households. However, eligibility rules for social assistance have become stricter and accompanied by various forms of co-payments and activation measures for the able-bodied.

The German unemployment protection was a three-layer system comprising unemployment insurance (*Arbeitslosengeld*), unemployment assistance (*Arbeitslosenhilfe*) and social assistance (*Sozialhilfe*). Whereas the first two tiers applied exclusively to unemployed people, social assistance was a minimum income scheme and social entitlement available to all needy citizens irrespective of their employment or unemployment (registered or not) status. A new two-tier system which will come into force in 2005 replaced the old one: Unemployment Benefit (UB) I and UB II; while UB I is still based on principles of social insurance with however tightened eligibility rules, UB II is merged with a meaner and leaner social assistance scheme for all employable claimants. It will follow the logic of workfare and can be seen as a measure of ‘last resort’.

Unemployed persons qualify for UB I, if they worked in insured employment for at least 12 months during the previous three years. The rate of unemployed people covered by these benefits already decreased from 49,8 percent in 1993 to 37,7 percent in 2000. (Reissert 2001: 41) The decline was caused by rising long-term unemployment, as insurance benefits were paid, in principle, for a maximum period of one year of unemployment (however, for up to 32 months for older unemployed persons till 2004). Receipt of UB I will further decline, as a new regulation reduced the maximum length of receipt to 18 months for older claimants. The level of UB I is 60 percent (67 for recipients with at least one child) of the previous net wage (12 month average).

Unemployment assistance was paid to persons who had exhausted their entitlement to the unemployment benefit but who remained unemployed. An additional possibility to receive entitlement to unemployment assistance for those who had worked for five months in insured employment, was abolished in 1999. Nevertheless, the percentage of unemployment assistance recipients of all unemployed was constantly rising between 1993 and 1999 (from 22,2 to 31,0 percent) (Reissert 2001: 41), also due to increasing long-term unemployment. At that time no time limits for the receipt of the unemployment assistance existed. The (old) benefit amounted to 53 respectively 57 (with children) percent of the previous net wage. But unlike the unemployment insurance benefit unemployment assistance was income-tested. As a consequence, a married person with an employed spouse rarely qualified for assistance benefits. The new UB II will be about € 345 for a single head of household plus housing benefit (slightly lower for partnered recipients). For the majority of recipients it will be significantly lower than the old unemployment assistance and also more conditional.

People who have reached an age of 65 are in the first place protected by the statutory pension insurance system. Private and occupational pension schemes play a minor role. The determining factors for the level of the statutory pension are the level of former income and the length of employment. The statutory pension is based on the idea of a “standard pensioner” respectively a “standard worker”: After 45 years of continuous full-time employment and respective earnings-related contributions, the “standard pensioner” would receive 68,2 percent of his or her former earnings as a pension. Measured by the average net wage in 2001 that would have been 1.043 Euro per month. Since such a “standard worker” hardly existed (especially in West Germany), only a minority worked for 45, average factual pensions were much lower (West: women 458 Euro, men 948 Euro; East: women 620 Euro, men 989 Euro). (See VDR 2004) Hence, real replacements rates for West German women were around 30 percent; only East German men “earned” the standard pension due to the non-existence of early retirement and part-time, especially, for men in the GDR. In contrast, many West German women lack years of employment needed to earn a standard pension. West German mothers stay longer periods at home in order to care for the children, but receive pension credits, for a limited time of caring. Married women, in general, work fewer hours and years in Germany.

Since the 2001 pension reform – and other ongoing reforms – the “standard pension” as well as real pensions have steadily decreased. In order to compensate the losses for pensioners a small tier of a subsidised funded pension was introduced, but take-up has been very low (15 percent of all employees). Decreasing social insurance pensions, the hitherto irrelevance of funded pensions as well as cut-backs in health and elderly care will cause serious poverty problems in old age for an increasing number of people, especially, for women, in the future. As matters stand, only 1,5 percent of people over 65 are social assistance recipients. Many women still receive widow pensions which often exceed their individual pensions. The situation will change due to family changes: One of four divorced single women over 60 had a net income below the social assistance level at the end of the last century. (See Kortmann/Schatz 1999)

3) Proportion of total population living in households receiving entitlement transfers (means-tested, cash and in-kind transfers) that allow them to live above EU poverty level.

In recent discussions about social security benefits it is often argued that Germany can no longer afford its generous benefit levels. Although less people would face relative income poverty, if they were exclusively dependent on their market income than in the European Union average (see also diagrams 1 and 2), transfer payments do not raise significantly more people above the poverty threshold than elsewhere. It is a stable 10 percent in Germany compared to between 8 and 9 percent in the EU average during 1999 and 2001. On the face of it, this may point to the weakness of the German social insurance system and of means-tested benefits with regard to poverty alleviation as some authors argue. (See for example Behrendt 2000) However, post-transfer poverty rates in Germany do still noticeably better than in most European countries.

Table 4 Proportion of total population living in households “at-risk-of-poverty” before and after transfers

	1999	2000	2001
EU 15 before/after transfer payments	24/15	23/15	24/15
Germany before/after transfer payments	21/11	20/10	21/11

Data source: Eurostat (See Appendix)

2.3 Housing and Environment

2.3.1 Housing security

4) Proportion of people who have certainty of keeping their home⁴

In order to give information on this indicator we will briefly describe German “housing security”. In general, rental contracts have no time limits and landlords cannot easily end contracts. German tenants are protected by a law, that explicitly states the circumstances that entitle a landlord to end a contract. There are two kinds of reasons for ending such a contractual relationship. One is “misconduct” by the tenant, for example, the destruction of the property, nuisance of the sanctity of the home, or a accumulation of rent arrears; in the latter case an immediate cancellation of the contract is allowed, although a judge has to decide whether the tenant’s personal situation allows to skip the legally obligated period of notice by the landlord. The second reason is an “urgent need for personal use of the housing” by the landlord himself or by his family. In that case only a regular cancellation can be made and the statutory periods of notice have to be observed.

Due to tightened eligibility rules and stricter means-testing for UB II and social assistance individuals can be expected to search for cheaper housing. This could mean the loss of social support and social capital for those who have to move to another area.

5) Proportion of hidden families (i.e. several families within the same household)

Eurostat delivered data on overcrowded households for 1999 (See appendix) which shows that Germany has indeed housing problems despite doing better than the EU average. Some 6 percent of all German families live in overcrowded households, and 11 percent of the low income households (less than 60 % of the median household income).

2.3.2 Housing conditions

6) Number of square meters per household member

Data for that indicator was only available for the year 1998. The average number of square meters per household member was 39.3, 40.8 in the West and 32.8 in the East. (See Datenreport 1999: 134)

⁴ Germany is a „renting“ society – house-ownership is relatively low (even lower in East than in West Germany) and below 50 percent. Rented housing is highly state regulated which also explains the comparably high standards (statutory square meters per household member; equipment etc.).

7) *proportion of population living in houses with lack of functioning basic amenities (water, sanitation and energy)*

According to Eurostat 10 percent of German households lack at least one of the basic amenities: water, sanitation or energy. The percentages refer to access to water or electricity amenities within flats: e.g. to lack of bathroom facilities or central heating. National Data show that in 1993 three quarters of all flats had been fully equipped with bathroom/shower, WC and central heating, and only 3.2 percent were lacking bathroom facilities. (See Datenreport 1999: 136) At that time differences between the old and new Bundesländer were still remarkable: Slightly more than half of the East German flats were fully equipped and more than 10 percent lacked a bath or a shower. But the gap closed during the last ten years due to a lot of subsidised reconstruction efforts and a decreasing number of inhabitants in East Germany. Nowadays 90 percent of the East German households are living in fully equipped flats compared to 95 percent in the West.

Table 5 proportion of population living in houses with *lack of functioning basic amenities (water, sanitation and energy) in 1999*

	All households	Household income less than 60% compared to median actual current income
EU 15	21	35
Germany	10	25

Data source: Eurostat (See Appendix)

2.3.3 Environmental conditions (social and natural)

8) *People affected by criminal offences per 10.000 inhabitants*

We can deliver some data from the official statistics of the Federal Bureau of Criminal Investigation (BKA) about people who suffered some kind of criminal offence. But in order to describe the security situation in the domain of housing it seems appropriate to present more information on subjective perceptions of security. In contrast to regularly appearing discourses about rising criminality the feeling of insecurity in the neighbourhood has been decreasing between 1993 and 1998. Only 23 percent felt very or quite unsafe when being outside the home alone at night compared to 28 percent five years earlier. The difference between East and West is still remarkable (20 percent in the West and 32 in the East), but the subjective security gap between both parts of the country is slowly narrowing (from 20 points to 12). That so many East Germans felt insecure in their neighbourhood in the immediate years after unification can be explained by the exceptional circumstances which were indeed characterised by a very sharp increase in the crime rate while a “weakened” police suffered from not knowing what an appropriate, “democratic” professional behaviour would look like. In general, developments in “fear of criminal offences” are especially interesting, when we take into account that the density of police officers decreased slightly during the years from 1994 to 1998, in contrast to the number of violent crimes, which remained rather stable. (See ZUMA 2003) Euromodul data show that in the year 2000 around 6 percent of the German population suffered stealing, 9 percent experienced menace and one percent was beaten. The numbers were almost identically in both parts of the country, whereas

feelings of security still differed a lot. (See Datenreport 2002: 630) But the probability to become a victim of a crime is not only divided by regions but also by gender, as the BKA data shows.

Table 6 People affected by criminal offences (tried or completed) per 10 000 inhabitants

	1999			2000			2001		
	all	men	women	all	men	women	all	men	women
Murder	0,35	0,47	0,24	0,38	0,49	0,26	0,36	0,46	0,25
Sexual violence	1,91	0,33	3,41	1,85	0,30	3,33	1,92	0,30	3,47
Robbery	8,32	11,48	5,31	8,08	11,34	4,98	7,79	10,94	4,78
Bodily injury	51,30	69,51	33,96	53,11	71,34	35,73	55,45	73,92	37,84
Crimes against personal freedom	17,79	21,63	14,14	19,50	23,71	15,48	20,13	24,13	16,31

Data source: BKA, Polizeiliche Kriminalstatistik 1999, 2000, 2001. www.bka.de/pks

9) Proportion living in households that are situated in neighbourhoods with above average pollution rate (water, air and noise)

It was not possible to find data containing objective information on pollution in neighbourhoods, but the German Socio-Economic panel includes questions about perceptions of the quality of the housing environment. All in all the satisfaction with the environmental conditions has improved, but there are still some differences between households in East and West Germany. It is remarkable that almost one quarter of the households felt affected by noise and more than 20 percent were not satisfied with the quality of the air in their neighbourhood. Especially low income households said to suffer from many kinds of pollution as they could only afford low rents. (See Datenreport 2002: 512)

Table 7 Perception of the environmental situation of the neighbourhood by households in 1999

Households feel affected...		West Germany	East Germany
by noise	Not at all	36,2	24,1
	little	40,3	49,4
	Just bearable	16,3	17,2
	strongly	7,2	9,3
by polluted air	Not at all	37,7	28,6
	little	40,2	47,2
	Just bearable	15,6	17,0
	strongly	6,5	7,2

Data source: SOEP 1999 (See Datenreport 2002)

2.4 Health and Care

2.4.1 Security of health provisions

10) Proportion of people covered by statutory/ voluntary health insurance (including qualitative exploration of what is and what is not covered by insurance system)

The statutory health insurance system plays in Germany the most important role for the prevention of the financial risks of illness. Participation is obligatory for all white and blue collar employees who do

not exceed a certain income level, as well as for pensioners, people in professional education, students, the unemployed and some small groups of self-employed. If one member of a family pays contributions, all non-working dependents are covered by the system as well. Civil servants have their own health security system and employees above the income threshold are allowed to insure themselves privately. Social assistance either pays contributions for recipients, if they were insured previous to the receipt, or it covers the real costs of the medical treatment. The German Mikrozensus presents every four years data on the number of the insured persons in the different schemes. In 1999 almost the whole population (99,8 percent) enjoyed some kind of health security with the statutory system (GKV) covering 88,5 percent of it and the private system (PKV) 8,9 percent.

Table 8 Proportion of people covered by statutory/ voluntary health insurance in 1999

	all	men	women
GKV-statutory	36,3	40,5	32,4
GKV-voluntarily	5,6	7,8	3,5
GKV-pensioner	19,0	16,5	21,4
GKV-dependent	27,6	21,0	33,8
PKV	8,9	10,6	7,3
Other system	2,4	3,1	1,7
Not insured	0,2	0,2	0,1

Data source: Mikrozensus (See Statistisches Bundesamt 2002: 62)

Although statutory insurance covers still the majority of people Germany is moving towards a basic provision health system with co-payments and additional private insurance bits. Provisions are defined according to diagnosis-related groups and 'qualys' ('quality of added life years'), which will definitively reduce hitherto universal (indiscriminate, inclusive) provisions and increase income (in interaction with age) inequality. The latest health reform stipulated an entrance fee of 10 Euro for every visit to a doctor's surgery as well as co-payments. As a result the number of visits declined by 8 percent in January 2004 compared to the same month a year before. Whether this trend will continue, is still an open question, as many people tended to see a doctor in the last month when they had not to pay the fee, but recently the doctors association claimed again that turning up for visits decreased by 10 percent. Furthermore it is planned to introduce a special insurance for dental treatment, which will further increase patients' payments.

2.4.2 Health services

11) Number of medical doctors per 10.000 inhabitants

According to Eurostat data (See Appendix) the number of doctors per 10.000 inhabitants increased in Germany from around 32 in 1999 to roughly 33 in 2001. These results are in line with a long-term trend of rising numbers of medical professionals. Whereas in 1970 a doctor was responsible for about 615 inhabitants, the number declined to 279 in the year 2000. (See Datenreport 2002: 183) However, Germany increasingly experiences a scarcity of doctors, especially, in the countryside (and even more

so in the East), where a growing number of surgeries are closing, because living conditions and earnings prospects seem no longer as attractive for young doctors as those in bigger cities.

12) Average distance to hospital, measure in minutes, not in meters

Despite rising numbers of doctors Germany scores only on average compared to the 15 EU countries in 2002 when measuring the access to a hospital or a general practitioner's surgery in less than 20 minutes. But remarkably is the small difference between the highest and the lowest income group which is in the case of the access to a general practitioner even in favour of the lowest income group. Responsible for the almost equal access to medical help in 20 minutes could be the fact that the members of the lowest income groups live often in inner city areas where the net of surgeries is dense.

Table 8 Proportion having access to a hospital in less than 20 minutes by income group

	Total	Highest quartile	Lowest quartile	Difference
Germany	52,7	48,0	56,8	8,9
EU 15	52,8	44,9	60,4	15,5

Data source: Eurobarometer (See Appendix)

Table 9 Proportion having access to a general practitioner's surgery in less than 20 minutes by income group

	Total	Highest quartile	Lowest quartile	Difference
Germany	81,9	82,9	81,0	-1,9
EU 15	84,7	83,3	86,0	2,7

Data source: Eurobarometer (See Appendix)

13) Average response time of medical ambulance

Although the indicator is important in order to draw an adequate picture of the health security situation in Germany, especially against the background of closing surgeries in the countryside, data has probably not yet been collected.

2.4.3 Care services

14) Average number of hours spent on care differentiated by paid and unpaid

The German Federal Statistical Office produced a time budget study in the years 1991/92 and again in 2001/02, which contains some information about average hours of care activities of household members, but not exactly in the way the indicator is formulated. (See Statistisches Bundesamt 2003b) The closest data is concerning child-care activities and shows that women spend much more hours with children than their male partners.

Table 11 Child-care activities of lone parents and couples in hours per day in 2001/02

	Men in couples	Women in couples	Lone parents (women only)
Child-care as main activity	1:09	2:43	3:01
Child-care as by-product activity	0:26	1:14	1:24

Data source: Time budget study (See Statistisches Bundesamt 2003b)

Care for parents or parents-in-law is wide spread, especially, in the age group between 40-65. About 24 percent of the sample has such obligations. Since men care for their wives, the gender gap is not very big and sometimes even reversed.

Table 12 Care activities for parents or parents-in-law by hours per week (age group 40-65) in 2001/02

	All men	Caring men	All women	Caring women
Shopping, household organisation, etc.	00:36	3:33	00:47	4:23
Sick-nursing	00:16	8:22	00:24	7:31

Data source: Time Budget Study (See Statistisches Bundesamt 2003b)

However, the gender gap is still wide for care activities, in general, and did not change much between 1992 and 2002. In West Germany it even widened, as women spent 2,3 times the hours for care responsibilities than men in 2002 (compared to 2,2 in 1992). East German women spent less time for caring than their West German counterparts: 1,9 times the hours of men, fewer hours than ten years before (2,0). (See Statistisches Bundesamt 2003b:14)

2.5 Work

2.5.1 Employment security

15) Length of notice before employer can change terms and conditions of labour relation/contract

An employer is allowed to change terms and conditions of a labour contract only through a so-called "dismissal with the option of altered conditions of employment". For such a dismissal he/she has to accept the legal periods of notice (See indicator 16) and must bring forward operational reasons for the necessity of changed conditions of employment. Some groups, for example pregnant women, disabled people and members of a work council, enjoy a special protection, e.g. against dismissal with the option of altered conditions of employment.

16) Length of notice before termination of labour contract

Periods of notice are in Germany regulated by law, labour contract or collective labour agreement. A labour contract, which is not oriented at a collective agreement, can only extend the legally defined periods of notice whereas in a collective labour agreement a reduction is possible. The legal period of notice is differentiated by time of prolonging to the firm. During the probation time, which can last up to

24 month, an employee enjoys the shortest period of notice, but after 20 years in the same firm an employee can stay 7 further month before he/she gets dismissed.

Table 13 Periods of notice before termination of labour contract

Job tenure in years	Period of notice in month
Probation time (up to 24 month)	0,5
More than 2	1
More than 5	2
More than 8	3
More than 10	4
More than 12	5
More than 15	6
More than 20	7

In general German protection against dismissal is rather strict and a permanent issue in political debate. At present the protection against dismissal act applies to all employees in establishments⁵ with more than 10 workers. The threshold scale is based on the concept of full-time equivalent employees whereas employees on fixed-term contracts or employed for less than 6 month a year as well as vocational trainees and marginally employed persons are excluded from the calculation. The act allows dismissals only in three circumstances: personal incapability or health problems, bad conduct and redundancy. In the last case the employer has to adhere to social selection criteria. Furthermore he is obliged to prove that less severe remedies are not available (principle of proportionality). As employers have often problems to show that all requirements for legal dismissal are met, many cases end in settlements (mostly severance payments), both in court and out of court.

It is often argued that the tight dismissal protection regulation prevents employers in small firms from hiring during boom phases because they fear the costs of dismissals in a later recession and is therefore responsible for the high structural unemployment in Germany. Empirical evaluation does not support this view for the case of Germany. German governments have changed the exemption threshold three times in the last ten years. In 1996 it was relaxed from 5 to 10 employees by the centre-right government, in 1999 reversed and in 2004 the red-green government again established the 10 employee threshold. The first two changes had no effect on hiring and firing in the affected small firms. (Bauer et al. 2004) But some negative impacts of the dismissal protection are possible. Employers probably tend to increase flexible employment instead of full-time permanent employment. Especially the number of marginally employed persons is steadily rising in Germany.

17) Proportion employed workforce with temporary, non permanent, job contract

The number of people employed in temporary jobs in Germany is slightly lower than the EU average and further decreased in the covered three years.

⁵ "An establishment is a production unit at a single location. It can economically or legally depend on other establishments building up to a firm." (Bauer et al. 2004, p. 8)

Table 14 Proportion of employed workforce with temporary job contract

		1999	2000	2001
EU 15	all	13,2	13,4	13,4
	men	12,4	12,5	12,1
	women	14,2	14,5	14,5
Germany	all	13,1	12,7	12,4
	men	12,8	12,5	11,8
	women	13,4	13,1	12,7

Data source: Eurostat (See Appendix)

From the mid-eighties onwards temporary jobs did not rise significantly; their number remained around 10 percent of the workforce. There are no gender differences in the probability to be temporary employed but regional aspects are quite important as in 2000 in the West 10,7 percent have had a temporary contract compared to 17,7 percent in the East according to Mikrozensus data. (See Klammer/Tillmann 2001: 52)

18) Proportion of workforce that is illegal/informal

The growth of illegal/informal employment is widely considered as a real threat for the German economy and, especially, for the state budget as billions of potential tax payments and social insurance contributions are lost. According to recent estimations, the illegal/informal economy produces as much as 16,5 percent of the German BIP, but this percentage ranks Germany just in the middle field when compared with other OECD countries. (See Enste 2003: 6) A survey found out that at least 10 percent of the German population between 18 and 74 had done some kind of illegal/informal work in the last year and almost half of them said that they could think of doing illegal work. (See Pedersen 2003) Many illegal, in fact, 'informal' workers see their work as an additional form of income, not as a main breadwinning activity. Hence they are not at the mercy of exploiting employers. 'Illegal migrants', as the German government defines them, or 'migrant workers without documents', as the UN decided to call these people, constitute the de facto vulnerable group, since they lack any right. The number of 'illegals' rose sharply in the 1990s, especially, in the aftermath of the tightened asylum law in 1993. Welfare organisations estimated a number of 500.000 people without residence permit in Germany for the year 1998. (See Gaserow/Hauptmeier 1998)

2.5.2 Working conditions

19) Number of employees that reduced work time because of interruption (parental leave, medical assistance of relative, palliative leave) as a proportion of the employees who are entitled to these kinds of work time reductions

It is difficult to find numbers on that indicator, but we can at least present some data on the use of parental leave by gender, region and type of household does exist. In the time between 1992 and 2000, 80% of all entitled mothers took up child-care leave (Erziehungsurlaub, since 2001 called Elternzeit). (Engelbrech/Jungkunst 2001) In West Germany 73% of the entitled mothers took up child-care leave whereas in East Germany 85% did so, the latter, however, for a shorter period than their

Western counterparts. When the child born (or adopted) between 1992 and 2000 was not the first child, then 62% of the entitled West German mothers (83% of the East Germans) took up child-care leave. (Beckmann/Kurtz 2001) In the time period 1992 to 1997, 81% of all mothers with a partner took child-care leave for the first child and 46% of all lone mothers. For the second and subsequent children, 80% of all mothers with a partner decided to go on child-care leave and only 21% of all lone mothers. (John 2002) There are no data on the percentage of fathers taking up child-care leave, but the numbers must be very low regarding their share in parents in child-care leave. This share was 1,6% (or 6 032 men) in 1999, whereas 382 755 women in child-care leave meant a share of 98,4%. (Deutscher Bundestag 2001)

20) Number of accidents (fatal / non-fatal) at work per 100.000 employed persons (if possible: per sector)

Trends with regard to accidents at work have been very positive in Germany. The number of non-fatal accidents per 100.000 employed persons declined from 5.583 in 1994 (which was rather high compared with other European countries) to 4.958 in 1998. Eurostat data (See Appendix) show as well an even more impressive drop of fatal accidents for Germany. They were halved between 1994 and 2001. With two fatal accidents per 100.000 employees Germany is now below the EU average (2,7). The reduction cannot be explained by structural factors, since the number of accidents decreased remarkably in the declining "high risk" sectors construction and agriculture, too, although Germany has a higher accident rate than the EU average. Stricter safety controls, also enforced by EU regulations, may explain the positive trend.

Table 15 Accidents at work per 100.000 employed persons

	Sector	1999	2000	2001
EU 15	Agriculture	7060	6625	6158
	Manufacturing	4471	4421	4280
	Construction	7809	7548	7213
	Transport	5702	5512	5153
Germany	Agriculture	13825	14443	13168
	Manufacturing	4639	4455	4206
	Construction	9659	8893	8013
	Transport	11000	10460	9651

Data source: Eurostat

21) Number of hours a full-time employee typically works a week (actual working week)

Germany has been well-known for reduced working hours: the trade-union fought for the 35-hour-week which was introduced in many sectors. The actual average working week, however, does not differ much from the European average. Flexible working-time regulations at the firm level allow employers to extend working hours for firm-specific reasons. Recently, some large firms left the 35-hour-week agreement which raised fears that working hours will be increased nation-wide. The 35-hours-week was never introduced in East Germany: people seem to be eager to work longer hours if that saves their jobs.

Table 16 Hours worked per week of full-time employment

	1999	2000	2001
EU 15	41,9	41,7	41,6
Germany	41,8	41,8	41,6

Data source: Eurostat (See Appendix)

2.6 Education

2.6.1 Security of education

22) Proportion of pupils leaving education without finishing statutory education (early school leavers)

The overall German performance in the prevention of school drop-out / early school leaving is rather positive when compared with other European countries. According to Eurostat data (See Appendix) only the Scandinavians achieved better results for avoiding early drop-out. Problems, however, come to the fore, when gender and migration are considered. Non-German boys face a high risk of not attaining graduation. Although second generation migrants have on average achieved better qualifications than their parents, the likelihood to finish school has decreased for Turkish young people in the last years which raised concerns about their ability to compete for jobs with better-educated Germans.

Table 17 Proportion of school leavers without any graduation in 2001/02

	All	Germans	Non-Germans
All	9,1	8,2	19,5
Girls	6,7	6,0	15,7
Boys	11,4	10,4	23,1

Data source: Statistisches Bundesamt (2004)

23) Study fees as proportion of national mean net wage

Study fees have not generally been introduced, although many of the Länder governments which due to the federal system are responsible for the education system, charge long-term students (beyond the standard number of study years) - fees are up to 650 Euro per semester - and have expressed their wish to introduce general fees. The proposed amounts of such fees vary between 500 and 2.500 Euro per semester. Reform advocates argue not only with financial needs for a high quality university education but refer as well to the inability of the actual system to include lower income groups in higher education. Social background as an explaining factor for the decision to start studies became indeed more important in the last 20 years. Whereas the number of students with high social background is now more than twice as high, the share of students with low social background almost halved despite the existence of Bafög, an income-tested credit for students. About 23 percent of the German students receive the stipend in 2003 (receipt is higher in the East with 36 percent compared to 20 percent in the West) which is ten percent less than in 1991. (Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung 2004) Entitlements to exemptions from fees are seen as a possibility to enlarge the share of students from low social background. As these exemptions are probably regulated similar to the obviously rather ineffective Bafög, the success remains questionable. But at present, the federal

framework legislation for higher education outlaws fees. The governments have challenged these restrictions before the Constitutional Court. The decision is still pending. Primary and secondary education is generally free and will remain so in the foreseeable future, although some Länder governments, like the Bavarian, plan to ask parents to pay for their children's school books (and introduce subsidies for poorer families). Books have been also free.

2.6.2 Quality of education

24) Proportion of students who, within a year of leaving school with or without certificate, are able to find employment

Although OECD data on that indicator should be available, we did not yet manage to present the numbers. An alternative way to say something about the quality of education is to look at the results of the PISA study where Germany scored surprisingly low (rank 26 of 33). (See Appendix) The quality of primary and secondary education has become a big issue in public and political debate since the publication of the results ("PISA shock" as called in the media). So far, however, it is not clear what consequences PISA will have for the German educational system. Above all, the results showed significant regional differences and a strong impact of parents' background / class regardless of type of school. Hence, it is hard to draw a simple conclusion. There are discussions about the positive and negative effects of comprehensive schools as compared to the mainly three-tiered German system of secondary education (Hauptschule, Realschule, Gymnasium), the introduction of all-day schools, the necessity of more teachers, regular independent evaluations and a system which puts more emphasis on performance as well as a on better integration of ethnic minorities. (See for example Bulmahn 2002; 2002a) However, the 'shock' would be smaller, if Germany was not compared (as it steadily is) to small homogeneous Finland but to equally big and heterogeneous France or the UK.

2.7 Trends and Reflection

The analysis of the objective indicators of socio-economic security revealed the still relatively high level of financial resources, health care, employment protection and security of education Germany enjoys. Most noticeable variation in the data was found in the household income (less in the East than in the West) and the security of education (less for migrants than Germans). It is, nevertheless, very likely that socio-economic security will decrease in the near future as a result of recent social policy reforms. Benefits for many long-term unemployed people have been cut or even abolished, extra payments for doctor's consultations have been introduced, pension levels stagnate and dismissal protection has been relaxed. If these changes already eroded the feeling of security in the subjective perception of the population we do not know yet.

A rather problematic field is despite the positive outcomes of most indicators the housing situation. Germany is a renting society and home-ownership is compared with other European countries rather low (around 40 percent). Additionally, the establishment of home-ownership by younger households has further decreased during the last decade, although there is a small but stable increase in the

overall-rate since the 1950ies. This trend is regarded as problematic because home-ownership is seen as an important source of socio-economic security for pensioners, especially if the tendency of growing gaps in the public retirement provisions continues. The main barriers for home-ownership are a too expansive supply of houses, the fear of indebtedness and the wish for mobility. Therefore the tenant market is of great importance for the supply of adequate housing in Germany. But rents have been rising much sharper than other parts of private consumption in the last 30 years. The state reacted to the problem of growing demand for accommodation and rising rents by supporting social housing, which meant that subsidies for the construction of houses had been connected with a restricted level of rent for households with low income. Social housing was most important in the period of the 1950ies and the 1960ies when the share of subsidised constructions was over 50 percent and the regulations allowed also middle class households to live in social housing estates. But since the late 1980ies only around 20 percent of all new built flats have been social flats and eligibility criteria for social housing have been tightened. Social housing estates of the 1960ies and 1970ies are nowadays rather problematic quarters, where researchers observed tendencies of social and ethnic segregation. In these districts a multiple erosion of socio-economic security is most presumably.

3 Social Cohesion

3.1 Introduction

Many of the following domains consist of purely subjective perceptions of reality and not of objective conditions. On the one hand, this is surprising as the initial idea of the social quality project was to restrict the search for indicators to objective ones and collect data on subjective attitudes with the instrument of profiles later on; the instrument is still in the process of construction. On the other hand, it is not astonishing that subjective indicators emerge in the component of social „cohesion“ as this concept has always been strongly related to perceptions of reality as well as to objective conditions. Hence, in order to give an adequate picture of cohesion the integration of subjective indicators seemed to be necessary. However, some ambiguities remain with regard to the relationship of the two kinds of indicators since objective aspects could be interpreted as precondition for subjective perceptions of cohesion. To give an example: “Trust”, although measured by subjective perceptions, is seen as an objective condition for social quality as it allows people to interact more easily. This is a possible interpretation, but it implicitly regards trust rather as an individual property associated with individual social and demographic features than a property of social systems. Delhey and Newton (2002) have shown that general trust is better explained by societal conditions and the existence of informal social networks than by demographic or socio-psychological factors, although the impact of every factor is very different in the compared countries. Generally, a further exploration of the relationship between objective and subjective indicators seem to be necessary.

3.2 Trust

3.2.1 Generalised trust

25) Extent to which ‘most people can be trusted’

Compared with East or South European countries general trust in heterogeneous Germany is rather high, but remarkably lower than in the more homogeneous Scandinavian countries - according to the European Value Surveys third wave (1999/2000). (See Appendix) It comes as a surprise that regional differences in Germany do not significantly matter: the former communist part exhibits an even slightly higher general trust rate. Data of the Euromodule for 1999-2001 show that 35 percent of the East Germans maintain that most people can be trusted whereas only 32 percent of the West Germans supported this statement. (Delhey/Newton 2002)

3.2.2 Specific trust

26) Trust in: government; elected representatives; political parties; armed forces; legal system; the media; trade unions, police; religious institutions; civil service; economic transactions

Trust in institutions has been slowly declining since the middle of the 1980s. The Constitutional Court has traditionally scored high, while parties and the government are less trusted. But 'trust in government' has always been very volatile and depended on election cycles. East Germans were very "low trusters" immediately after the unification, but changed their attitudes towards democratic institutions: in 1995 nearly any difference existed between West and East German attitudes. (Walz 1996) Low trust in institutions which were completely transferred from the West to the East cannot immediately be interpreted as a rejection of democracy and the market economy, but above all as a dissatisfaction with their functioning in the early years of unified Germany. (Pollack 2001) Trust in institutions seemed to rise in East Germany (Preller 1999), the recent (2004) elections in Brandenburg and Saxony, however, which weakened seriously both, the SPD and the CDU and remarkably strengthened right and left wing parties indicate ambivalent and/or instrumental attitudes towards democratic institutions.

Table 18 Proportion of the population who has trust in the media

	EU 15		Germany		West Germany		East Germany	
	2000	2001	2000	2001	2000	2001	2000	2001
Press	38	46	30	43	30	44	31	38
Radio	55	62	49	60	48	61	50	55
TV	54	62	50	61	49	62	53	61

Data source: Eurobarometer

Table 19 Proportion of the population who has trust in the political system

	EU 15			Germany			West Germany			East Germany		
	1999	2000	2001	1999	2000	2001	1999	2000	2001	1999	2000	2001
Political parties	18	18	18	18	17	17	19	17	17	13	17	16
Civil service	42	45	44	43	46	45	44	48	46	39	39	40
Government	40	-	48	43	-	47	45	-	49	35	-	43
Parliament	41	42	51	45	41	52	47	42	54	36	38	45

Data source: Eurobarometer

Table 20 Proportion of the population who has trust in other institutions

	EU 15			Germany			West Germany			East Germany		
	1999	2000	2001	1999	2000	2001	1999	2000	2001	1999	2000	2001
Legal system	45	50	51	52	55	61	54	58	64	42	42	50
Police	62	70	67	65	74	74	66	75	77	61	68	65
Army	63	71	70	61	66	67	63	66	68	56	65	61
Church	50	52	44	43	46	38	47	50	41	26	34	24
Trade unions	35	43	39	35	41	38	34	40	39	37	46	36
Big companies	35	35	33	29	29	26	30	30	28	26	26	22
United Nations	48	61	59	39	53	54	41	43	56	34	52	47
NGOs	40	43	42	34	28	31	34	27	31	35	32	28
Charitable organisations	60	62	56	49	48	44	48	48	44	50	48	46
Educational system		65			60			61			59	

Data source: Eurobarometer

27) Number of cases being referred to European Court of Law

The numbers of actions for failure of Germany to fulfil its obligations the European Court of Justice took in the last five years rose from 9 in 1999 to 18 in 2003. In member state comparison Germany takes up a middle rank, whilst the top-ranked Italy and France experiencing regularly more than 20 cases. With regard to new references for a preliminary ruling Germany is with 50 cases on average the most active “employer” of the European Court. (Court of Justice 2003)

28) Importance of: family; friends; leisure; politics; respecting parents. parents' duty to children

The family constitutes an important feature of their life for almost all Germans. However, when compared with other EU 15 countries the level of importance is no longer impressive: only Finland and the Netherlands display lower numbers. The picture of relatively low affection becomes clearer, if one looks just at the answer category “very important”. Again only Finland and the Netherlands have similarly low results, but the gap to other EU countries is wider. With regard to friends Germany scores high with only some Northern countries scoring higher. Apparently, individualisation supported by generous welfare states has loosened traditional bonds, but new forms of relationships have stepped in. Many Germans consider leisure time as an important part of their lives, but the scores are higher in Western and Northern countries. Furthermore only two out of five respondents maintained that work was very important which is the second lowest number of the EU 15 countries and seems to contradict the familiar cliché of a German work ethic. Instead, it is politics which matters more for Germans than for their fellow Europeans.

Table 21 Proportion of the German population for whom work, family, friends, leisure time, politics is quite or very important in its life

	Quite important	Very important	Both categories taken together
Work	37,9	44,8	82,7
Family	16,0	80,9	96,9
Friends	46,5	48,0	94,5
Leisure time	51,2	32,0	83,2
Politics	30,1	9,4	39,5

Data source: EVS (European Value Study) third wave (See Appendix)

The influence of individualisation processes that change traditional norms is also visible in the questions about the duties parents have for their children and vice versa. Again less people than in most other countries emphasise these duties in Germany.

Table 22 Proportion of the German population who thinks that one has a duty to respect its parents and parents' duties to their children are more important than their own well-being

Respecting parents	58,5
Parents' duties to their children	63,1

Data source: EVS third wave (See Appendix)

3.3 Other integrative norms and values

3.3.1 Altruism

29) Volunteering: number of hours per week

Empirical knowledge about voluntary work in Germany is rather rare despite the prominent role voluntary work plays at present in the public discourse and in reality. (Behr/Liebig/Rauschenbach 1998) Therefore we were not able to find data on hours volunteered per week, but at least we can present some data on the percentage of the population who is engaged in voluntary work. The German Socio-economic panel (SOEP) which was established in 1984 (1990 in the East) entails such a question. Answers show that the percentage of people who volunteer in one type of association or another at least once a month has revolved around 15 percent during the last 18 years. (ZUMA 2003) Several studies have used the SOEP data to gain more information on the distribution of voluntary work and on explaining factors. Cross-sectional analysis shows that more men (slightly more than 40%) did voluntary "work" in 1996 than women (some 30%) – mostly 'political' work, women 'social' work – whereas the differences between the age groups have been marginal. Only the highest age group (60 years and over) was significantly less active than the other age groups. (Erlinghagen/Rinne/Schwarze 1999) Unemployment has a negative impact on the probability of volunteering (and a positive one on the probability to end it). Only short-term unemployed women were more likely to start voluntary work than the employed reference group. (Erlinghagen 1999) These results notwithstanding, the number of people engaged in voluntary work increased from 25,1 % in 1985 and 27,6% in 1992 to 32,1% in 1999. (Deutscher Bundestag 2002: 26) Responsible for that rise

was the increasing number of people who performed voluntary work on an irregular basis which means less than once per month (from 8,2% in 1985 to 15,1% in 1999). (ibid.) Obviously, volunteering has become more short-term which may negatively affect areas – like care for the disabled or elderly – where long-term commitment is needed.

Data of the European Value Study (EVS) show higher numbers of volunteers (56,5 percent at least once a month) in Germany which probably results from the way the question was formulated (“How often do you spend time in clubs or voluntary associations?”). Although Germany has the lowest number of people who say they never spend time in voluntary associations, it scores beneath the majority of EU countries in almost every specific category, apart from sports or recreation, when people are asked “Are you currently doing unpaid work for that kind of association?”. (See appendix)

30) Blood donation

Blood donation is surely a good indicator for altruism, since no financial incentive for donors exists in Germany. According to Eurostat data 31 percent of the German sample said they had donated blood at least once in their life which matches exactly the EU average. (See Appendix)

3.3.2 Tolerance

31) Views on immigration, pluralism and multiculturalism

Prejudices against foreigners have been observed in Germany; Although only few Germans say they are proud of their country (See indicator 32), many have prejudices against foreigners. Surveys of the mid 1970s showed that only half of the population would have invited a foreigner for dinner into their home, and a majority supported the opinion that foreigners should be fired first, should not take part in municipal elections and will become a serious problem in the future. (ibid.) However, tensions between Germans and immigrants relaxed during the 1980s and discriminatory statements about foreigners decreased. (Datenreport 2002) Foreigner related topics gained importance again in the public debate in the early 1990s. Rising numbers of asylum seekers led to a polarised discourse, but hardly changed the percentage of people (slightly more than 50%) who thought the number of foreigners in Germany was too high. (Piper 1998) The German Federal Parliament nevertheless passed a harsher asylum law by the necessary two third majority in 1994. Since then the number of asylum seekers has substantially declined (from more than 400 000 in 1992 to some 70 000 in 2003) and proposals for an improved integration of ethnic minorities have come again onto the political agenda. But a majority of the German population rejected attempts to simplify naturalisation procedures in the mid 1990s. Some members of the conservative party made successful use of this atmosphere for election campaigns in questioning the idea of dual citizenship which was proposed by the Red-Green government in the late 1990s. Hence the new citizenship and immigration laws brought only small improvements for immigrants as a result of still existing prejudices, especially, among the potential CDU voters. However, the trend in opinion polls shows a different direction. In 2002 a clear majority of West Germans rejected the statements, that foreigners should not be allowed any political activity (63%), that they should be forced to go back to their home country if jobs are scarce in Germany (63%) and that

they should marry someone of their own nationality (77%). The refusal of exclusionary ideas is steadily rising since 1980, with the exception of 1996, maybe a late result of the asylum debate in an unfavourable economic climate. East Germany shows distinctly lower numbers of liberal opinions, but nevertheless the same trend. The difference between East and West is largest in the job question (18%) and lowest regarding political activity (8%). (Datenreport 2004)

But in international comparison Germany is still not among the most tolerant countries. A tolerance index shows above average numbers of people who are intolerant or ambivalent towards minority groups, although more Germans are considered as actively tolerant than people in most other European countries.

Table 23 Typology of people according to their attitudes towards minorities

	Intolerant	Ambivalent	Passively tolerant	Actively tolerant
EU 15	14	25	39	21
Germany	18	29	29	24

Data source: Eurobarometer (See Appendix)

32) Tolerance of other people's self-identity, beliefs, behaviour and lifestyle preferences

The tolerance of the German population varies with regard to specific attributes which characterise a group they have to live with. Race, ethnicity or religion are not important factors for the formulation of intolerant positions when comparing Germany with other European countries. Deviant behaviour or illness is not acceptable for roughly the same proportion of Germans as for other Europeans. Germans slightly less tolerate political extremists than the EU average which is a positive result, if one considers the nation's history. The East German attitudes differ here to some extent, especially with regard to migrants, homosexuals and people with health problems. (Heitmeyer 2002, p. 140)

Table 24 Proportion of the population who would not like to have a certain group as a neighbour

Criminal record	25,0
Different race	4,8
Heavy drinkers	56,3
Left-wing extremists	49,5
Right-wing extremists	76,7
Large families	5,9
Emotionally unstable people	21,8
Muslims	11,0
Immigrants and foreign workers	8,6
People who have AIDS	11,0
Drug addicts	58,6
Homosexuals	13,1
Jews	5,2
Gypsies	32,4

Data source: EVS third wave (See Appendix)

In a long-term perspective the tolerance of different behaviours or lifestyles of migrants increased until 1994, but is falling again since that time in West as well as in East Germany. In 2002 even more people agreed with the formulation that foreigners should adapt a bit more to the German lifestyle (72% West, 71% East) than in 1980 (65% West Germany). (Datenreport 2004) With the rising acceptance of rights for migrants (See indicator 31) in mind one could conclude that the majority of the German population realised that migrants are a necessary part of their society, but demands now in return efforts for integration. Hence decreasing tolerance of different lifestyles could be interpreted as a small step to an improved inclusion and, in the long-term, more cohesion.

3.3.3 Social contract

33) Beliefs on causes of poverty: individual or structural

A majority of Germans believes poverty to have above all structural causes (56 percent). The belief does not surprise, since the legitimacy of rather generous welfare states, like the German one, would be seriously undermined, if individuals were fully responsible for their poor circumstances. Nevertheless it is just slightly more than the EU 15 average. Much more outstanding is the fact that a vast majority of Germans believes that poverty is not an unavoidable destiny but that the individual or the society have means to prevent it. Roughly 65 percent of people with that perception one can find also in some South European countries, whereas the North and West Europeans consider poverty rather as a fate of modern societies.

Table 25 Proportion of the population which considers unluckiness, laziness, injustice in society or the modern progress as reason for living in need

	Unluckiness	Laziness	Injustice in society	Modern progress	other
EU 15	19,3	22,1	31,1	23,0	4,2
Germany	11,7	28,4	36,9	19,6	3,5

Data source: EVS third wave (See Appendix)

34) Willingness to pay more taxes if you were sure that it would improve the situation of the poor

To accept higher taxes in order to improve the situation of the poor clearly reflects a sense of solidarity and the idea of a social contract. Germany does not belong to the countries where solidaristic attitudes are most widespread. (West) Germany has traditionally supported an interaction of solidarity and self-reliance or 'subsidiarity' and had a strong history of a social-liberal market economy. Hence, Gallie and Paugam (2002: 121) are right in assuming "that in Germany thanks to the application of the subsidiarity principle and the important role given to charity associations at local level, it is more acceptable to look for solutions for poverty first in local affinity networks before turning to the idea of greater tax-funded intervention by the central government." In fact, a lot of large-scale redistribution is hidden in the social insurance system, above all, in the statutory health insurance. It is a well-known truism that redistribution is more easily accepted in smaller and homogeneous societies, like the Nordic ones, and also when implicit. The institutional argument put forward by the authors – that large-scale transfers to East Germany enabled by increases in taxation "may in the end have made the

Germans somewhat more lukewarm about redistribution towards the poor” (ibid.) – appropriately explains German attitudes towards explicit redistribution but needs further empirical analysis. Taken together taxes and contributions are amongst the highest in Europe. Reduction, especially, of non-wage labour costs and taxes have been a driving force of recent reforms.

35) Intergenerational: willingness to pay 1% more taxes in order to improve the situation of elderly people in your country

The indicator does not fit the German situation, if we agree with Esping-Andersen that Germany is a ‘pensioners’ welfare state’ – privileging older people at the expense of the younger. During the second half of the 20th century (West) Germany managed to gradually improve incomes of pensioners and their families. As already mentioned, pension levels were attached to employment records and followed the principle of status maintenance: Living standards of workers should not significantly decline after retirement. East German pension levels were adapted to West German ones after unification. Both, the relative prosperity of pensioners as well as the costs of pensions in a pay-as-you-go pension system led to ongoing reforms since the early 1990s which have tried to reverse the logic of old age insurance and functionally recalibrate social policies in favour of children - at the expense of older people. While pensions – including widows’ pensions – have been cut back, the 2001 pension reforms guaranteed pensioners with an income below the poverty level (threshold for entitlement to social assistance) a minimum pension (at the level of social assistance); the reform simultaneously abolished for poor pensioners the obligation to first ask children for support – it weakened ‘subsidiarity’ for this group. On the other hand, ongoing reforms are steadily reducing pensions, either directly, or by increasing contributions and payments of pensioners. They will also tighten the eligibility rules for the statutory care insurance. Hence, more old people will have to rely on the means-tested basic minimum pension in the future, among them many women, disabled and frail people.

36) Willingness to actually do something practical for the people in your community/ neighbourhood (picking up litter, doing some shopping for elderly/ disabled/ sick people in your neighbourhood, assisting neighbours/ community members with filling out (fax/ municipal/ etc) forms, cleaning the street/ porch/ doorway etc.)

The German Socio-Economic Panel contains data on the frequency of help for friends, relatives or neighbours, but not differentiated by the kind of activity. In 1999 some 40 percent of the German population lent help to other people in their spare time at least once a month whereas 11,5 percent said that they never do that. The proportion of regular helpers increased to 43 percent in 2001 as well as the number of people who never do something practical for friends, relatives or neighbours (to 12,5 percent). (SOEPinfo 2003)

37) Division of household tasks between men and women: Do you have an understanding with your husband/ spouse about the division of household tasks, raising of the children, and gaining household income?

Although Germany is in many aspects a typical conservative welfare state, it has in European comparison a relatively equal division of unpaid housework, and, remarkably, not only in the Eastern

part, but also in the West. This is not due to few hours women are actively doing housework (in fact West German women with children have the highest number of homework hours), but significantly more hours men are engaged in this kind of work. Hence the ratio between women's work and men's work (East 2,21 and West 2,28) is far better than in Finland, France, the Netherlands and Italy (between 2,52 and 4,17). (Arn/Walter 2004)

3.4 Social networks

3.4.1 Networks

38) Membership (active or inactive) of political, voluntary or charitable organisations

Membership in associations had risen since 1978 in West Germany (from 51% to 58% in 1998), but decreased in the Eastern part since the unification (from 47% in 1993 to 38% in 1998). (ZUMA 2003) Compared with other EU countries Germany has rather low numbers of people who are organised in different kinds of groups, apart from sports and recreation (28 percent) where membership is clearly above EU 15 average. Relatively many Germans are also taking part in the live of religious or church organisations (13,5 percent), whereas political and charitable groups enjoy much lower interest. (See Appendix)

39) Support received from family, neighbours and friends

In the survey conducted by Gallie and Paugam (2002) people have been asked "if you felt depressed, if you needed help finding work for yourself or for a family member and if you had to borrow money to help pay an urgent bill like the electricity or gas bill, or the rent or a mortgage payment, would you then have someone to count on?". The results for Germany do not look good. In their study Germany had the lowest proportion of people who said they could count on someone in all three situations (around 40 percent) in 2001, West Germany was also among the very few cases which experienced a decrease in support from 1996 to 2001. Furthermore the proportion of people in the lowest income quartile who would expect support from family, neighbours or friends was also lower than in every other country of the EU 15. Again the situation has worsened between 1996 and 2001, but for the low income group this is an European trend. (Ibid.: 40)

These results raise the question, if the generous German welfare state, which relieved the family of many tasks, absorbed solidarity between family members. But several empirical studies in recent years rejected the so-called "crowding-out-thesis". (Kohli 1999; Kühnemund/Motel 2000; Attias-Donfut 2000) Instead, it is argued, that the welfare state enables new forms and directions of solidarity, for example financial transfers from pensioners to their children. Analyses of the German "elderly survey" showed that 27 percent of people over 54 gave money or payments in kind to their adult children, whereas only 3 percent of the children generation did the same for their parents. However, many children (22 percent) supported their parents with instrumental help (household related work), whereas less parents (10 percent) were engaged in that kind of support. (Kühnemund/Motel 2000, p. 127)

As a further argument against the “crowding-out-thesis” one could argue that Germany is in European comparison still a rather “familialistic” welfare state and did only recently relax statutory obligations for transfer payments between family members. (Ostner 2004) Nevertheless, the “de-obligation” of the family might indeed cause negative short-term effects (gaps until family members renew their support in different ways) and maybe even negative long-term effects, we do not know by now because we lack systematic long-term studies of the quite recent phenomenon.

40) Frequency of contact with friends and colleagues

Against the background of the results of the last two indicators it is not any longer surprising that Germans do, in international comparison, not very frequently meet their friends and colleagues. Apart from high numbers of unemployment a higher regional mobility might have contributed to that fact, since only very few people do not meet friends at all. Our assumption is backed by the fact that especially the highly qualified and most wealthy people experienced the most significant drop in the frequency of meeting friends during the last two decades. (See also indicator 68)

Table 26 Proportion of the population who spends time with friends and colleagues

	Every week	Once or twice a month	Few times a year	Not at all
Friends	49,3	36,7	12,3	1,7
Colleagues	11,3	27,0	39,9	21,8

Data source: EVS third wave (See Appendix)

3.5 Identity

3.5.1 National / European identity

41) Sense of national pride

“National identity” is a problematic concept in the German case. Positive feelings for being a German have been emotionally burdened by the atrocities of the Nazi past, especially in West Germany: A majority rejected notions like ‘nation’ and ‘patriotic’ feelings and was said to have developed instead a so-called “economic patriotism” (Weidenfeld/Korte 1991) as a result of the economic miracle of the post war years. Attempts to redefine German identity positively (for example by Nolte during the “historians’ controversy” with Habermas in 1986) had been mainly rejected until 1990 due to the fear that such redefinitions would lead to a pre-war type of nationalism. (Piper 1998) Hence (West) Germans have been the Europeans who felt least proud of their nationality in 1986 (20% very proud and 13% not proud at all). Since right-wing extremists had adopted the slogan “I am proud to be a German” in the 1980s as a kind of buzzword to attract people the pride about one’s nation became further denigrated and explains the wide-spread rejection of the phrase in questionnaires, regardless of existing patriotic feelings. It does not come as a surprise, however, that Germans used to score highest for first ‘feeling European’ (15%).

After German unification advocates of the notion of 'national pride' became more influential in political and scientific debates; the feeling of "national identity" in the population changed during the 1990es, although not immediately after 1990. (Westle 1999) In 1996 even less West Germans had been very proud of their nationality (18%) than ten years before, but slightly more in 2002 (21%). Surprisingly, East Germans do not differ much from their fellow Western citizens with regard to national pride. Some 20% said, that they felt very proud to be a German in both years. (ZA 2002) The picture becomes clearer if one compares national and European identity. Only 9% of Germans regarded themselves first as Europeans in 1996 and 38% (compared to 33% in 1986) exclusively as German nationals. (Piper 1998) The development could have been caused by the new role the united Germany was allowed and expected to play in global affairs (for example UN military action), although the trend to higher levels of national identity has been observed in other European countries as well, as Eurobarometer data confirms.

Table 27 Proportion of the population which is very or fairly proud of its nationality

	1994	2003
EU 12/15	70	85
Germany	45	66

Data source: Eurobarometer 42 (1994), 60 (2003)

From a German perspective it would be more appropriate to look at people's attachment to their country, if one is interested in the extent to which people feel responsible for their society. Feeling responsible for the state of affairs in one's country is indeed an important feature of social cohesion. When Germans were asked about these feelings, the answers were much more similar to those of other EU countries.

Table 28 Proportion of the population which feels very or fairly attached to its country

	2000	2002
EU 15	89	89
Germany	85	89

Data source: Eurobarometer 54 (2000), 58 (2002)

42) Identification with national symbols and European symbols

Although Germans are still hardly proud of their country, their identification with the European Union is no longer outstanding. When asked to express their opinion on four propositions about the European flag ("This flag is a good symbol for Europe", "This flag stands for something good", "This flag should be seen on all public buildings in (our country) next to the national flag", "I identify with this flag") in 2002, positive German answers did not significantly exceed the EU 15 average.

Table 29 Proportion of the population which agreed on propositions about the European flag in 2002

	Good symbol for Europe	Stands for something good	On all public buildings	Identification
EU 15	80	66	51	44
Germany	82	67	47	45
West Germany	83	68	49	45
East Germany	79	66	40	46

Data source: Eurobarometer 58 (2002)

Data on the identification with national symbols were unfortunately not available.

3.5.2 Regional / community / local identity

43) Sense of regional / community / local identity

Germans' attachment to their region or local community does not differ much from that to their country. However, the smaller the unit under consideration the stronger is people's attachment. But regional and local identities of Germans are not outstanding when compared with the rest of Europe.

Table 30 Proportion of the population which feels very or fairly attached to its region

	2000	2002
EU 15	83	86
Germany	87	88

Data source: Eurobarometer 54 (2000), 58 (2002)

Table 31 Proportion of the population which feels very or fairly attached to its town/village

	2000	2002
EU 15	85	87
Germany	86	89

Data source: Eurobarometer 54 (2000), 58 (2002)

3.5.3 Interpersonal

44) Sense of belonging to family and kinship network

The indicator is very much related to indicator 28 (importance of family), where Germany scored high but nevertheless below the EU 15 average. Recent results of network analysis confirm the assumption that the sense of belonging between the generations is still very strong in Germany. (Bertram 2000) The older cohorts named most often their children and grandchildren as persons they have strong personal ties with, whereas in the younger cohorts the parents score highest. Other relatives are more often named than friends, apart from the youngest cohorts, where friends are the second most important group for strong relationships.

3.6 Trends and reflection

With a view to the results of the indicators, social cohesion in Germany is less developed than in other EU countries. The differences are rather small in the domain of trust but more pronounced concerning altruism, tolerance, the social contract, networks and especially national identity. Regional variation (East/West) is still distinctive in institutional trust and views on immigration and multiculturalism. However the trends are similar and for most indicators are not worrying. Most remarkably are the results on tolerance, where a change in attitudes towards migrants away from exclusionary ignorance into demands for assimilation, i.e. including cohesion, occurred. In the domain of networks contradictory results have been found. Whilst the German research on family networks emphasises its persistent strength and importance, international comparison showed weaker networks. All in all social cohesion is not eroding as also a look at the subjective perceptions of the German population confirms.

Subjectively the German society is nowadays less conflictual than 20 years ago. The number of people who perceive relationships of different societal groups as marked by conflict decreased remarkably between 1978 and 1998/2000 (for left/right from 83% to 64%, for young/old from 64% to 26% and for men/women from 18% to 15%). Exceptions are the relationships between the rich and the poor and between Germans and different forms of migrants, which are relatively stable and high. The perception of conflict between employers and employees is very volatile dependent on the economic cycle and was in 2000 on rather low levels (40%). (Datenreport 1999, 2002) The overall trend of "low conflict perception" can however not be observed in the Eastern part. In almost every category have more East than West Germans perceived conflict-driven relationships in 2000 (except gender). This applies specially to the East/West relationship which has been perceived in a different way in the two parts of the country. Whereas in the West less people regarded the relationship as one of conflicts almost ten years after unification, the majority of East Germans still thought that there was an East-West conflict. (Datenreport 1999)

4 Social Inclusion

4.1 Introduction

Most indicators of social inclusion fit well to the German situation. It is especially reasonable to pay attention to marginalised groups in the society, which are mainly effected by exclusionary processes. Unfortunately, information on original ethnicity of German citizens is not available in German surveys which causes some problems for a few number of indicators. Lack of data was generally a difficulty in the preparation of the chapter on social inclusion which underlines that indeed “forgotten” aspects have been discovered in the process of indicator development, due to the serious guidance by a theoretical frame.

4.2 Citizenship rights

4.2.1 Constitutional / Political rights

45) Proportion of residents with citizenship

The number of foreigners who received German citizenship steadily increased during the last decade (from roughly 60 000 in 1994 to more than 150 000 in 2002). Since the 1999 ‘naturalisation law’, which eased the requirements for becoming a German citizen⁶, the number of ‘naturalised’ foreigners has steadily risen. (Statistisches Bundesamt 2003a) Parents who do not qualify or who do not want to become German citizens gained the right to apply for German citizenship for children born between 1990 and 2000⁷. The new regulations can be interpreted as a weakening of the prevailing German ‘*ius sanguinis*’ (principle of descent). The proportion of residents without German citizenship, however, has remained rather stable, also because more foreigners enter than leave the country. Nevertheless the positive balance of immigration and emigration has become much smaller than in the early 1990s (some 150.000 in 2002).

Different residence status exist, hence non-Germans are treated differently that is they are treated according to their respective status. Residence entitlement (*Aufenthaltsberechtigung*) is the most secure form of status: an immigrant can obtain this status after eight years of permitted residence (*Aufenthaltsurlaubnis*=permit of residence). The second best status applies to, for instance, asylum seekers whose application was successful. Authorised residence (*Aufenthaltsbewilligung*) is bound to a special purpose, e.g. being a student, whereas a residence warrant (*Aufenthaltsbefugnis*) is a possible status for civil war refugees and allows them to stay in Germany as long as the ‘humanitarian’ situation in their home country does not permit a return. Some people are just ‘tolerated’ which is not an official residence status but describes a situation where a person cannot be forced to leave the

⁶ Requirements are: 8 years of steady residence, no criminal conduct and no dependence on short-term benefits

⁷ This regulation is temporary. It will be reconsidered and presumably changed in favour of the migrants – also through EU pressures.

country, because the country of origin does not allow the entry or the person faces the death penalty at home. Finally, a large number of immigrants are not registered at all.

Table 32 Proportion of population without citizenship

	1998	2003
Non-Germans	8,9	8,9
Entitlement	1,0	0,9
Unlimited permit	2,2	2,5
Limited permit	2,4	2,0
Permit for EU-citizens	0,9	1,3
Authorisation	0,3	0,4
Warrant	0,2	0,3
Toleration	0,3	0,3
Illegality	0,6-1,8*	-

*Estimations Caritas (1998)

Data source: Statistisches Bundesamt (2004), isoplan (1998)

46) Proportion having the right to vote in local elections and proportion exercising it

All German citizens aged 18 and older have the right to vote in all kinds of political elections. With the exception of EU-citizens who can vote in municipal and European elections non-Germans have no vote. The voter turnout of entitled non-Germans has been very small (e.g. 17% in Bremen in 1997) which could result from a lack of interest of short-term residents as well as from a lack information about rights and the election system.

4.2.2 Social rights

47) Proportion with right to a public pension (i.e. a pension organised or regulated by the government)

We already gave sufficient information on this indicator. The German old age (social) insurance includes wage earners and their families. Civil servants get a state pension. The schemes are comparatively inclusive. Every person who contributed as a wage earner to the statutory old age insurance at least once in their life is entitled to a “public” pension. Hence a vast majority of the population receives a pension latest at the age of 65 (60 for women of older cohorts⁸). Married persons can claim after their partners’ death widows’ pensions derived from their partners’ contributions. Germany established a (male) wage-earners’ (or male breadwinner) welfare state and attached benefit levels to “standard” full-time employment. This explains both, its inclusiveness, but also why certain groups have constantly lost out: first of all, those self-employed persons who try hard to make a living and cannot afford to buy private insurance for health or old age; women, and increasingly, men who are only discontinuously and/or contingently employed during their life course and who cannot claim ‘derived’ pensions. (See indicator 2).

⁸ As a consequence of binding EU equal treatment directives retirement ages have been equalised for women and men in Germany. It is now 65 for both genders – with the exception of women born before 1945 who can still retire at 60.

From a German perspective it would be more appropriate to ask what proportion of the population older than 65 receives a pension above the level of social assistance and who can at the same time claim health or care insurance provisions. Such information does not yet exist, we can present, however, data on the proportion of older persons who claim social assistance. We thereby surely underestimate the problem, as a remarkable number of elderly people refrains from claiming social assistance - their wants notwithstanding. Non-take-up rates of benefits are between 25 and 50 percent in that age group. The data indicate that, especially, women and non-Germans are vulnerable, whereas the pension insurance system apparently works still quite well for German men. On the other hand, many old people – even those with decent pensions – have to claim social assistance once they have to enter expensive institutional care, since the statutory care insurance does not fully cover the costs of care.

Table 33 Proportion of the social group claiming social assistance in 1999

	60-70	70 and older
All	1,9	1,2
Germans	1,4	1,0
Non-Germans	12,6	11,7
Men	1,7	0,8
Women	2,0	1,4

Data source: Datenreport (2002), own calculations

48) Women's pay as a proportion of men's

The gender pay gap is still rather wide in Germany and noticeable above the average of the EU 15 countries. It can be partly explained by high proportions of part-time employed women compared to overwhelmingly full-time employed men as well as by women's educational preferences. If we control for education and hours worked, empirical evidence suggests that women tend to work to a larger extent than men in firms that pay low wages. Such evidence can explain why during the 1990s East German women earned on average (per hour and per year) slightly more than men. Since 2001 women are losing out again.


Table 34 Gender pay gap

	1999	2000	2001
EU 15	15	16	16
Germany	19	21	21

Data source: Eurostat (See Appendix)


Figures 3 and 4 illustrate the gender wage gap in West Germany and its reversal for full-time working East German women during the 1990s.

Figure 3 Median annual female earnings as percentage of male earnings, West Germany, full-time workers aged 25 to 60



Source: German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), own calculations⁹.

Figure 4 Median annual female earnings as percentage of male earnings, East Germany, full-time workers aged 25 to 60



Source: German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), own calculations¹⁰.

The socialist East German production regime was in its peculiar way horizontally and vertically segregated (Steiner and Wagner 1997). Women dominated the private and public service sector.

⁹ Calculations by Christoph Schmitt

¹⁰ Calculations by Christoph Schmitt

Lower skilled workers, male or female, earned lower incomes. After unification skilled employed women profited from the rapid expansion of the public and private sector. Their post-unification advantage eventually led to on average (median) equal or even higher hourly and per year female incomes from full-time paid work. Their West German counterparts did not catch up. Full-time working West German women earn on average (median) 85.3 percent of the hourly male income in 2001.

4.2.3 Civil rights

49) Proportion with right to free legal advice

Legal advice is free only for people who qualify for social assistance. Some voluntary associations offer free legal advice on certain issues. In general a person who needs legal advice has to have paid contributions to a legal protection insurance or to pay the advocate. Only if a person is charged and faces a trial on court, he or she has a right to an assigned counsel. If a person loses her/his case before the court, she or he will have to pay for the costs of the trial with again the exception of those who receive social assistance.

50) Proportion experiencing discrimination

According to the Eurobarometer only about 3 percent of the Germans experienced racial discrimination in 2003 which is exactly the average of all 15 EU countries. But these data should be carefully interpreted: only EU citizens had been asked and the variation of the proportions who had been discriminated was to a large extent explained by the size of the ethnic groups in each country, less by the size of groups with discriminatory behaviour. Hence the lower number of East Germans experiencing racial discrimination does mirror the low number of EU citizens belonging to a different "race" or "ethnic group" in the East, but does not mean that the probability of being discriminated for the fewer migrants is lower than in the West.

Table 35 Proportion of the population which experienced or witnessed racial discrimination

	experienced	witnessed
EU 15	3	22
West Germany	3	19
East Germany	1	15

Data source: Eurobarometer 57 (Report 05/2003)

4.2.4 Economic and Political Networks

51) Proportion of ethnic minority groups elected or appointed to parliament, boards of private companies and foundations

Due to the Nazi past 'race' or 'ethnic minority' are categories which have not (yet) been used in official (West) German statistics. Therefore, it is not easy to get information on that indicator. Although some European countries employ such categories, the differentiation between ethnic minority groups is only possible on the grounds of subjective self-assessment. It is not clear at all, what it means to

objectively belong to a peculiar 'ethnicity' beyond 'nationality' or 'citizenship'. Nevertheless we dare to say that the number of representatives with some kind of migration background in the German parliament does not mirror the share of migrants in Germany. Some change is occurring, though: during the last European election the successful entrepreneur Vural Öger, born in Turkey but German citizen, played a prominent role in the social democratic election campaign; nearly every seventh of the elected greens and socialists had a migration background.

52) Proportion of women elected or appointed to parliament, boards of private companies and foundations

At present women's representation in the German government almost equals their share of the population and gives Germany the top position in the EU. This positive outcome results mostly from quotas established by the parties in government (Social Democrats and Greens). A second look, however, shows that women attained "less important" ministries than men (family, education, development, social affairs). And women's attainment might change again, if the conservatives and liberals win the next elections, although it is very likely that the CDU will for the first time in its history nominate a woman for the chancellor candidacy. The proportion of women in the parliament is not as high as in the Scandinavian countries but still above EU 15 average.

Table 36 Proportion of women in national governments and parliaments

	Government		Parliament	
	2001	2002	2001	2002
EU 15	24,7	-	20,5	-
Germany	38,6	43,6	29,8	32,3

Data source: Europäische Datenbank 'Frauen in Führungspositionen' (www.db-decision.de)

Women are much less likely to be employed in leading positions in most kinds of associations, apart from welfare associations and trade unions. Even worse, hardly any woman is working in a top position in the 30 biggest German companies.

Table 37 Proportion of women in boards of associations and big companies

Biggest 30 companies	5,3
Employer associations	2,0
Trade unions	19,1
Welfare associations	21,7

Data source: Europäische Datenbank 'Frauen in Führungspositionen' (www.db-decision.de)

4.3 Labour market

4.3.1 Access to paid employment

53) Long-term unemployment (12+ months)

Long-term unemployment is relatively high in unified Germany. High rates are regularly explained by the German labour market institutions: generous protection against dismissal, low wage dispersion (due to trade-union pressure), also generous early retirement schemes; relatively high wage replacement etc. On the face of it, these institutional rules explain differences between German and the EU 15 long-term unemployment rates, especially if compared to Denmark where dismissal rules are very relaxed. This causes high fluctuation, and lower long-term unemployment, although overall unemployment is not much lower than in Germany. The overall unemployment rate, however, still strongly influences long-term unemployment. If overall unemployment went down, long-term unemployment would also decrease in Germany. A second look reveals that unemployment is significantly higher in East Germany, and much lower than the EU average in Baden Wuerttemberg or Bavaria. Hence, institutional factors only partly explain labour market outcomes; structural ones have to be added.

Quite a large proportion of the long-term unemployed used benefits as a financial bridge to retirement. Hence long-term unemployment is not always a perfect indicator for social inclusion / exclusion in Germany. Many of the discontinuously or contingently employed who often participate more or less voluntarily in activation schemes, might even feel more excluded than some long-term unemployed. This is true, especially, for East Germany, where the share of long-term unemployed of all unemployed is similar to West Germany but obligatory activating measures have been often been used to manipulate statistics without increasing real employment opportunities.

Table 38 Unemployment rate and long-term unemployment rate

	1998		1999		2000		2001		2002		2003	
	UR	LT	UR	LT	UR	LT	UR	LT	UR	LT	UR	LT
EU 15	9,4	4,4	8,6	4,0	7,8	3,5	7,4	3,1	7,7	3,1	8,1	3,3
Germany	9,1	4,7	8,4	4,3	7,8	3,9	7,8	3,8	8,7	4,1	9,6	4,6

Data source: Eurostat (See Appendix)

54) Involuntary part-time or temporary unemployment

According to the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions (Corral/Isusi 2004) Germans less likely work part-time involuntarily than the EU average. Similar to the other European countries, apart from Scandinavia, more men than women are involuntary part-timers. Whereas job career starters and people close to retirement have lower numbers of involuntary part-time employment than those in the intermediate age group all over Europe, differences are also caused by regional factors in the German case. Klammer and Tillmann show on the basis of Mikrozensus data that East Germans, men as well as women, are more often complain about being

part-time or marginally employed than West Germans. (Klammer/Tillmann 2001) The authors argue that discontent with the employment situation results from the difficult job situation in the East, but can be also interpreted as a rejection of (however modernised) traditional gender relations by East German women who had been expected to be full-time workers in the past.

Table 39 Proportion of part-time employment which is involuntary

	Men	Women	All
EU 15	19,0	12,3	14,1
Germany	18,4	11,1	12,3
West Germany*	13,9	6,2	-
East Germany*	33,1	52,3	-

Data source: ELFS 2002 (See Corral/Isusi 2004), *Mikrozensus 2000 (See Klammer/Tillmann 2001)

4.4 Services

4.4.1 Health services

55) Proportions with entitlement to and using public primary health care

Entitlement to 'public'¹¹ health care is almost universal. (See indicator 10 and table 7) The vast majority of the German population (88,5%) earns entitlements through the statutory health insurance system or as non-employed family members, whereas 8,9 percent are privately insured which allows them to receive additional treatment. (Up to recently, services were assigned according to illness-related needs and best available technology in both, the private and the statutory system; meanwhile health services are distributed according to 'evidence based' therapy guidelines, DRGs ('diagnosis related groups') and best available technology at 'sustainable' cost principles and increasingly rationed, especially, in the statutory scheme). Slightly more than two percent have a different form of protection: to this category belong, for example, some social assistance recipients who lack insurance but who can use the health care system because the social assistance offices pay the costs. Only 0,2 percent of the German population are not protected against health risks. However, we do not know the numbers of self-employed people who cannot afford health insurance – they have to pay both, their own and the employer's part of the contribution, if they opt for the statutory scheme, or rather expensive risk related contributions to private insurers – and hence, are insufficiently insured.

4.4.2 Housing

56) Proportion homeless, sleeping rough

Few statistics on homelessness exist and the existing ones are difficult to interpret. First of all, the definition of homelessness differs between countries and studies. Extensive definitions also include precarious housing situations; restrictive definitions only look at the most marginalised people who live

¹¹ Note again that Germany does not have a national health service. However, nearly all Germans are included in one way or another in the statutory health insurance, a *social* insurance scheme.

on the streets. A further problem refers to methods to quantify homelessness. Most data are based on estimations put forward by social organisations which support the homeless. Therefore data are vague and probably underestimate homelessness; they rather count 'supported' homeless people; they do not measure factual homelessness. The European Federation of National Organisations Working with the Homeless (FEANTSA) tried to produce more or less comparable data. They asked official agencies and social organisations to tell the number of homeless people who had asked for help or advice. If absolute numbers are considered, then Germany scores highest among the 15 European countries with 490 700 homeless people on the day of the inquiry and estimated 876 450 in one year. (EU Ausschuss der Regionen 1999: 9) According to a recent article in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (September 27, 2004) homelessness has changed its face: It is increasingly younger people, boys and, also growingly, girls – the latter are less visible, though, – who left their families, dropped out of school etc. and live rough.

57) Average waiting time for social housing

There is no data on waiting times for social housing in Germany available, apart from some anecdotic evidence delivered by newspapers. In the city of Düsseldorf, for example, singles have to wait 2-3 months whereas larger families must face waiting times of over one year. (NRZ October 20, 2003) Overall, the importance of social housing in Germany is declining which is a problematic development in terms of social inclusion for the metropolitan areas in the Western part but less for East Germany. Above all, it is problematic in a 'renting' society like Germany. In contrast, the housing market in East Germany is still suffering a sharp population decline which has led to an oversupply of flats. In order to avoid dilapidation of empty housing facilities, some cities even started to knock down buildings. As a reaction to the new housing market situation – over-supply and under-supply – the government changed the social housing act in 2002. Decision processes are now more decentralised with the aim to better accommodate regional peculiarities. The reformed law states that social housing should focus on the poorer households and on people in metropolitan areas who cannot find affordable accommodation. At the same time, the government plans to abolish subsidies for those who want to buy or build their own house and, instead, redirect the subsidies to education. The plan has so far been blocked by the parties in opposition. They see still a need for supporting home-ownership. (see also Mieterbund 2003)

4.4.3 Education

58) School participation rates and higher education participation rates

Primary and secondary education are obligatory in Germany which leads to participation rates of almost 100 percent. According to Eurostat data the age group of the 16 year olds has indeed a rate of 100 percent which is almost unique in Europe. (See Appendix) Many schools even allow and/or force children of illegal migrants to take part in the school education without jeopardising the residence of the migrant families by informing further offices; school attendance is seen as an important instrument of social inclusion. The structure of the participation rates in the secondary education system has changed in the last decades. Whereas in 1960 the vast majority of the 13 year olds attended a

Hauptschule (lowest level of secondary education), in 2000 the highest proportion of pupils received secondary education at a Gymnasium (highest level). (See Datenreport 2002) With regard to received degrees of school leavers the Realschule degree (middle level) is the most widespread. Around one quarter of all school leavers (239 854 in 2000) finished the Gymnasium with the Abitur (final exam grammar school) which enabled them to study. The number of first year students on German universities was even higher (315 000 in 2000) and is still growing. Only medicine and engineering have experienced a serious decline in the number of students whereas cultural studies and social sciences as well as economics and law are among the disciplines which still attract an increasing number of students. One factor behind that development could be the rising share of women in university education. Women reached already equality regarding the number of beginners (49,2%) and do not lag much behind men in the categories 'students' (46,1%) and 'graduates' (44,8%). But the higher the qualification level the lower is the share of women, although a stable increase is observable in each category. (See Datenreport 2002: 74)

Table 40 Degrees of school leavers

	1998	1999	2000
Abitur	24,4	25,1	25,6
Realschule	40,1	39,9	39,8
Hauptschule	26,5	26,1	25,4
No degree	9,0	8,9	9,2

Data source: Datenreport 2002

4.4.4 Social Care

59) Proportion of people in need receiving care services

In 1995 Germany established the statutory Care Insurance, the fifth pillar of its social insurance system¹². Everybody who was in insured employment once in their life has a right to care services if in need. The care insurance allows private help at home and domiciliary services as well as stationary care but only for defined circumstances and with restricted amounts of money. Their entitlement, notwithstanding, people who apply for statutory care benefits or services will first to be assessed by a team of professionals. Three levels of needs to receive care exist (minor, medium, major needs). The professionals decide about the level of care a person will get. Many act as gatekeepers to these provisions. "Minor" needs are already defined very restrictively¹³.

¹² The German social insurance system consists the following programmes (in chronic order): Statutory Health Insurance (1883); Statutory Accident Insurance (1884); Statutory Old Age Disability Insurance (1886); Statutory Unemployment Insurance (1927); and, eventually, the statutory Care Insurance (1995). It is argued that the rules and principles of the Care Insurance already indicate a paradigm shift in the German welfare state: e.g. towards „basic“ instead of „comprehensive“ provisions, hence, high co-payments; the retreat of the employers who do no longer contribute; marketisation of care etc. (Lessenich 2003) In fact, this shift has just been continued and even deepened by the recent merging of Unemployment Benefit II and Social Assistance further distancing the old Unemployment Insurance the very idea of social "insurance" (contribution-based rights).


¹³ A typical and frequent example for *not qualifying* despite obvious needs is a (typically, married) couple, both partners in their late 70s or even older, one partner (typically the husband) seriously suffering from Alzheimer, his wife increasingly too frail to take care of both, their household and her husband.

Hence the number of accepted applications for care provision could work as an indicator for “people feeling in need receiving care provision”. Since the introduction of the Care Insurance it has been around 70 percent (68,2 percent in 1999) for domiciliary care provision and around 80 percent (slightly increasing to 83,5 percent in 1999) for institutional care. (Bundesregierung 2001, p. 33, 34) But if the recommended level of provision really matches the needs of the person is still another question.

60) Average waiting time for care services (including child-care)

Since 1996 each pre-school child older than three has a right to, part-time, though (4 hours per day), child-care (Kindergarten). Due to the principle of subsidiarity, the state is only one – and by no means the primary – provider of child-care. Child-care is, typically, offered by non-profit welfare associations, the churches, by subsidised “day-care mothers” (Tagesmütter), by private non-profit and self-organised initiatives and by the market. Costs of child-care are shared between parents, (fees for public or “para”-public child-care are income-tested), the localities and the welfare associations. The Federal state also subsidises child-minding (“nannies”) at home for working parents via tax allowances. Due to the plurality of supply the quality of child-care and the fees do differ despite existing framework guidelines. This plurality also elucidates why waiting lists exist: Most parents strive for high quality / high reputation child-care facilities. Subsidiarity, “choice” and, respective, “plurality” also explain why reliable data, including data on average waiting times, hardly exist. (Deutsches Jugendinstitut 2002)

Chart 1 Child care facilities – per 100 children in 1998



Source: Statistisches Bundesamt – Kinder- und Jugendhilfestatistik 1998, quoted in Büchel and Spiess 2002

Note: Versorgungsquote = coverage in %; blue: total coverage; purple: full-time child-care.

Due to the legacy of the communist past, the child-care guarantee could be more easily implemented in East Germany. GDR mothers had been expected to be employed, the state, in turn, had offered full-

time facilities for children of all age groups¹⁴. Despite large cuts in child-care facilities in the East, supply is still much better than in West Germany, especially, supply for toddlers ("Kinderkrippe", children under 3 years) and for school-children ("Kinderhort", after school care) places. Meanwhile, the West has been catching up, although mostly by providing part-time care for children older than three: In 1994, only about 2 percent of West German, but 40 percent of East German children under 3, 5 percent of West German, but 60 percent of East German children over 6 were in child-care. (Deutsches Jugendinstitut 1998) Four years later West German coverage for the age group under 3 only slightly increased (to roughly 3 percent) whereas in the East it even declined (36 percent) due to rising numbers of children. A similar development occurred for school-children care, but there the decline in coverage in East Germany was caused by a reduced supply of places. For kindergarten children the coverage varied¹⁵ between 87 and 102 percent in the West, compared to 112 or 132,4 percent of entitled children in East Germany – an oversupply which is also due to fertility decline in the East in the early 1990s (Deutsches Jugendinstitut 2002; Datenreport 2002: 57). Germany, too, has taken up the idea of a "child-centred social investment strategy" (Esping-Andersen 2002) and started to put more money into early childhood education and full-time child-care.

The related principles of subsidiarity, plurality and choice also apply to the provision of care for the elderly. However, since these provisions are regularly – though, as said, partially – paid by the Care Insurance, we know how many people in need of care receive cash and/or care benefits resp. services. We also know – although we lack exact data – that waiting lists for higher quality / good reputation institutional care exist despite guidelines for total quality management. As the biggest barrier to overcome for a person applying for care provision is assumingly to be assessed as qualifying for at least the lowest level (level I), a proxy measure of waiting time for social care could be the period a person in need of care has to wait before eligible for "level I" provisions. The average waiting time for a decision about an application for domiciliary care provision was in 1999 61 days (maximum 78 days), for institutional care provision 43 days and at most 62 days. (Bundesregierung 2001)

4.4.5 Financial services

61) Proportion denied credit differentiated by income groups

Information on denied credits is not available in Germany, because credit institutes only have statistics on approved credits but not on denied ones. In order to shed some light on the access to financial resources, we can present some related findings. According to EVS data the proportion of indebted households slightly decreased between 1993 and 1998, but regional differences are recognisable. In the Eastern Länder the proportion rose from 19,4% to 21,6%, whereas in the West it declined from

¹⁴ The state was also interested in early socialist education and, hence, in a weakening of the families' cultural, especially, ideological influence on their children.

¹⁵ Variation is due to different concepts of the age group. In international comparison usually children between 3 and 6 are considered, whereas German statistics enhance the age group to 6,5, because German children stay in child-care from their 6th birthday until school starts.

17,6% to 16,7%. Other surveys found remarkably higher ratios of "credit using" households (34% to 51%), but the differences between East and West have been similar. (See Korczak with Roller 2000) Other remarkable results concern different income groups. Low income households (below 1000 Euro net income) are unlikely to be credit users (13,4%) whereas higher income households (more than 2000 Euro) are the likeliest (39,0%). But a more relaxed system of credit allowance must not be a positive achievement for low income households as it could lead to over-indebtedness, an already very common phenomenon in Germany which in many cases consolidates social exclusion. (ibid.) A better way to enhance life chances of low income groups could be to avoid the risk over-indebtedness by supporting innovative entrepreneurship with subsidies. The recent labour market reforms have brought new forms of subsidies for unemployed people who like to start self-employment. The so-called "Ich AG" programme entitles people to receive up to 600 Euro a month for a period of three years, if their income does not exceed 25.000 Euro a year. Take up was very high, as the eligibility criteria were very relaxed. Hence, the failure rate of these entrepreneurs was also rather high. At the same time, the programme had unexpected allocational effects: Many of these "entrepreneurs" have been married women who could afford the risk of failure. The rules for eligibility will be changed, therefore.

62) Access to financial assistance / advice in case of need

Individuals with huge debts can use a debtor advising office (Schuldnerberatung) In 2000 1.160 free of charge working offices existed in Germany, however, only 15% of the 2,77 million seriously indebted households asked for help in a debtor advising office. Debtor advisors can negotiate with creditors about the reduction of debts, teach efficient spending and, hence, improve the debtors' self-responsibility. Many of these volunteering advisors feel over-burdened by the wide range of tasks in the mostly under-funded offices. Therefore, some have proposed to professionalise these services. In 1999 the Consumer Insolvency Act (Verbraucherinsolvenzgesetz) was passed. Consumer insolvency (individual bankruptcy) gives individuals the chance to get rid of their debts through a "debt reducing plan" (Schuldenbereinigungsplan) accepted by the creditors and after a period of "good conduct" (Wohlverhaltensperiode) of seven years. In 1999, only 20 832 households had applied for a consumer insolvency procedure, 2.305 procedures had started, but only 370 ended with a positive outcome for the indebted household. The data suggest that the act is still in its teething troubles and further reform necessary. (Korczak with Roller 2000)

4.4.6 Transport

63) Proportion of population who has access to public transport system

The development of both forms of mobility, individual and public, corresponds clearly the political priorities set by the conservative governments since 1982. Car ownership has risen continuously since the 60s (76% of the German households owned a car in 1998), whereas access to public transport close to the accommodation has been declining (however, 83% lived only 10 minutes away from the next stop of a public transport vehicle). (ZUMA 2003)

64) *Density of public transport system and road density*

With 182 km per 100km² road density in Germany is one of the highest in Europe. (See www.welt-in-zahlen.de) But as more roads also mean more traffic, high road density does not necessarily enhance congestion-free mobility. Furthermore, problems of air pollution and limitations of natural habitats are connected with German road density. In contrast to road density, railway density has been declining in the last years, but with about 13 km per 100km² still occupies the top in Europe still. The privatisation of the German Railway (Deutsche Bahn) has supported a bias investment towards new high-speed railway lines which cannot compensate for the loss of many of the regional lines.

Table 41 Transport infrastructure in 1000 km

	2000	2001	2002
Road networks	230,7	230,7	230,8
Autobahn	11,5	11,7	11,8
Railway system	44,7	44,5	44,3

Data source: Statistisches Bundesamt (2004)

4.4.7 Civic / Cultural Services

65) *Number of public sport facilities per 10.000 inhabitants*

The number of sports clubs rose from 85.500 in 1994 to 87.700 in 2000; similarly, the number of people who were organised in a sports club rose from 22,3 million to 23,4 million, whereas the respondents who said that they do sports actively remained relatively constant (half of the youth and one third of the adults). (Datenreport 1997, 2002) Furthermore, there are an estimated 3,5 million people who work-out regularly at one of the roughly 6.000 commercial gyms in Germany. (www.lifeline.de)

66) *Number of public and private civic & cultural facilities (e.g. cinema, theatre, concerts) per 10.000 inhabitants*

In contrast to the public debate about indebted communities closing their theatres and other leisure time facilities, the supply of leisure services increased in Germany between 1994 and 1999 (theatres from 613 to 727, cinemas from 3 216 to 4 438 and museums from 3 947 to 4 570). Only the number of libraries did decline which could be related to the rise of new forms of electronic information, especially the internet. Due to the higher supply of cultural facilities more people go regularly to the cinema, disco, pop concerts and sporting events (three thirds of the young people, but only one fifth of the 26 plus). (Datenreport 1997, 2002)

Table 42 Seats per 10.000 inhabitants

	1997	1999
Theatres	32,9	33,0
Cinemas	95,3	101,6

Data source: Datenreport (1999, 2002), own calculations

4.5 Social networks

4.5.1 Neighbourhood participation

67) Proportion in regular contact with neighbours

Eurostat provides data on contact with neighbours, but unfortunately not for Germany. A social contact index developed by Gallie and Paugam (2002) entails among six other questions one about talking to neighbours. Germany scores low on that index compared with other European countries. The German Welfare Survey contains another question which can be used as a proxy for the information the indicator should provide. People were asked whether they think they have good opportunities to meet people and develop friendships. Regular contact with neighbours should enhance these opportunities. The data show that the proportion of the population with good opportunities for social contact had increased steadily until 1998, not only on average but for almost all social groups and especially distinctive for women. Nevertheless low income groups and low skilled people have still more problems to develop social relationships; this seems also to be true for East Germans who still significantly differ from the West in all social groups.

Table 43 Proportion with good opportunities for social contact in West Germany

	1988	1993	1998
All	75	79	81
Men	79	82	81
Women	72	76	80
Low qualified	70	73	76
Medium qualified	82	82	84
High qualified	80	87	84

Data source: German Welfare Survey (See Schöb 2001)

4.5.2 Friendships

68) Proportion in regular contact with friends

This indicator is almost identical with indicator 40. We already showed there that Germans are underrepresented among the people with a high frequency of social contacts. The development of the last years shows that especially the financially best and worst off in society experienced the biggest losses of frequent social relationships. Possible explanations could be rising unemployment and regional mobility.

Table 44 Proportion meeting their best friends almost everyday or at least once a week in West Germany

	1988	1993	1998
All	66	65	60
Low qualified	68	64	62
Medium qualified	62	65	62
High qualified	55	56	47
Lowest wealth quintile	72	66	57
2 to 4 wealth quintile	67	64	62
Highest wealth quintile	64	66	46

Data source: German Welfare Survey (See Schöb 2001)

4.5.3 Family life

69) Proportion feeling lonely/isolated

Feelings of loneliness had very much decreased in Germany during the 1950s and 1960s, probably as a consequence of “post-war normalisation”; since 1973, they have declined to a lower extent. In 1995, about 5 percent of Germans felt often lonely. (Döring 1997) This seems to support the “ambivalence thesis” which assumes states (post)modern societies to be characterised by new options for happiness as well as by new risks for distress. (Münch 1991) But there is also some evidence of polarisation effects, as low qualified people feel more often lonely and are more often socially isolated than highly qualified men and women. (Döring 1997) Gallie and Paugam developed a subjective “social isolation” index for EU countries where Germany reached almost average results in 2001 despite scoring very low on an objective social contact index. (Gallie/Paugam 2002)

70) Duration of contact with relatives (cohabiting and non-cohabiting)

We are able to present data about the distance of the place of residence and the frequency of contact between different generations. Although households with more than one adult generation are rare in Germany, most people have frequent contact with their children or parents. (Kohli et al. 2000) With rising distance the frequency of contacts goes down, but hardly its assessment as appropriate. Some authors argue that the separation of households between generations enabled an even better understanding and closer ties between them. (Bertram 2000)

Table 45 Distance to the place of residence of parents and children for the age group 40-54 in 1996 (in percent, cumulated)

	Parents	Children
In the same household	5,4	77,4
In the same house	12,1	79,1
In the neighbourhood	23,6	83,6
In the same town	48,2	89,9
Different town, 2 h away	83,1	97,6
Further away	100	100

Data source: Alters-Survey 1996 (Kohli et al. 2000, p.186)

Table 46 Frequency of contacts with parents and adult children with own households in 1996 (in percent, cumulated)

	Parents	Children
Everyday	22,5	35,7
Several times a week	51,9	67,4
Once a week	74,8	85,4
Once to three times a month	88,8	94,3
Several times a year	95,4	97,3
Less often	98,0	98,8
Never	100	100

Data source: Alters-Survey 1996 (Kohli et al. 2000, p. 190)

71) Informal (non-monetary) assistance received by different types of family.

Data of the elderly-survey shows also that the middle-age-generation (40-54 years) is strongest engaged in instrumental help (cleaning, shopping etc.) for their relatives. Some 27 percent did that for their parents and 10 percent for their adult children, whereas they received help only in about 9 respectively 10 percent of the cases (Kohli et al. 2000, p. 193) But with regard to potential instrumental help only 28 percent of all interviewees did not know anybody outside the household who could support them. Social differences are not very strong, but East German men over 70 are most likely to mention at least one person. The potential cognitive and emotional support for older people is even higher. About 90 percent of the sample said that they have someone to ask for advice as well as find some encouragement. Again the influences of gender, region and age are not very strong.

(Künemund/Hollstein 2000)

4.6 Trends and reflection

The data confirms that the inclusion of minority groups in Germany is still not satisfactory despite some recent reforms in that direction. Further alerting developments have been identified. The coverage of the health system became porous in the last years due to new forms of employment, homelessness is still a serious problem and the care system does not include all people in need, although rights have been strengthened and a new insurance system has been introduced. With regard to the inclusion in social networks, again, different results have been found. Rather “rough” index data show disappointing figures for Germany in international comparison whereas more differentiated German research is less worrying. Unsurprisingly, labour market integration remains a weak point, especially in East Germany. However, some positive signs are even in that domain observable.

Although people spend longer times in the educational system, the activity rate in Germany has remained more or less stable compared with the 1950s; it even increased if compared with the early 1970s. This trend was caused by an increasing participation of women, especially of married women, in the labour market. (Datenreport 1999) Many women are working part-time which indicates that they want to combine work and care responsibilities. New regulations on part-time and parental leave in the

last years have underpinned the right of women to paid employment. But the trend is thwarted by the development in the Eastern part, traditionally with high activity rates of both genders, where women increasingly withdraw from the labour market. Potentially, the tighter unemployment benefit regulations will stop that process in the near future, although a simple status change from unemployment to inactivity is possible as well.

5 Social Empowerment

5.1 Introduction

As empowerment is a rather young concept compared with the other three components the development of indicators could hardly emanate from already existing comprehensive sets of indicators. Hence the choice of indicators was most extensively discussed among the ENIQ participants. Eventually convincing decisions have been made. The chosen set of indicators reveals that empowerment is not interpreted as just a compensatory strategy to overcome problems arising by the withdrawal of the state from social policy fields. In fact the state is still attributed a role in the creation and guarantee of appropriate conditions for the empowerment of citizens. Nonetheless, we miss some domains where indeed the concept of empowerment is discussed widely in the German context, for example, health and social work. In these areas empowerment could mean not only access to certain institutions but also the possibility of choice between different providers and forms of provisions as well as possibilities to influence the decision making process within/of institutions.

5.2 Knowledge base

5.2.1 Application of knowledge

72) Extent to which social mobility is knowledge-based (formal qualifications)

Education has a strong impact on social mobility in Germany. More than in other countries formal qualifications are a necessary precondition to gain access to professional positions and promote an occupational career. But the emphasis on qualifications does not mean that social mobility is high in Germany, because the decision for a specific education is still very much dependent on the social background of the person. Children of parents with better professional positions are much more likely to get a better education than those of low qualified parents. Hence blue-collar jobs are relatively homogenous filled with working class children, and sons (less likely daughters) of high-qualified managers are quite often found as well in leading positions.

Table 47 Proportion of population experiencing social mobility

	Mobility	West Germany		East Germany	
		1981-1990	1991-2002	1991-1992	200-2002
Men	Overall	66	68	60	61
	Horizontal	24	20	20	22
	Vertical	43	48	41	39
	Upwards	30	33	26	18
	Downwards	13	15	15	21
Women	Overall	75	75	75	75
	Horizontal	35	33	31	37
	Vertical	40	43	44	38
	Upwards	20	24	25	20
	Downwards	20	19	20	18

Data source: Allbus, SOEP, ZUMA-Standarddemographie (See Datenreport 2004)

Nevertheless, some social mobility does exist, and, more important, the upward mobility is higher than the downward mobility, especially for West German men but recently as well for West German women. Only East German men are more likely to receive positions which are lower than their fathers positions. Taking structural changes into account (i.e. decrease of working class jobs) equality of opportunity, which is characterized by a weak connection between social background and the own professional position, is slightly rising since the mid 1970ies, but decreased in East Germany during the 1990ies. Remarkably, the former very high equality of opportunity for Eastern women did lower so much that it reached already the level of the West German women. (See Datenreport 2004: 614-622)

5.2.2 Availability of information

73) Per cent of population literate and numerate

According to the International Adult Literacy Survey (IALS 1997) the standard of literacy was comparatively good in Germany. The survey defined "literacy" as "the ability to understand and use printed information in day-to-day activities, at home, at work and in the community." (IALS 1997) If we look at the indicators for reading skills ("prose" and "document literacy"), Germany had the smallest percentage of people (around 10 percent) with the lowest level of literacy together with Sweden and the Netherlands. With regard to "numerical (quantitative) literacy", Germany scored even best with less than 10 percent in the lowest category. A remarkable number of people, however, had second lowest level skills (skills needed to manage everyday life task, but difficulties in acquiring new job skills); this gave Germany only medium rankings for reading skills when both categories were merged.

74) Availability of free media

Generally speaking free media coverage of societal affairs has never been a problem in Germany. While the bankruptcy of Kirch Media, once among the largest and most influential German media enterprises, stopped monopolistic tendencies, these are by no means banned. For example, many daily newspapers have been in a serious crisis, as the economic recession sharply decreased advertisement.

75) Access to the internet

An ISPO survey found out that the number of internet users in Germany rose from 12% in 1998 to 20% in 1999 which is almost identical with the EU average (13% compared to 19%).

(<http://europa.eu.int/ISPO/esis/default.htm>) According to the German Welfare Survey in 2001 the number reached 35% for West Germany and 25% for the Eastern part. In both regions 12% of the population said they can not afford private access to the internet. (See Datenreport 2002: 468)

5.2.3 User friendliness of information

76) Provision of information on social services in multiple languages

The web-site of the Ministry for Health and Social security which is responsible for the largest part of the social security system contains information on all important practical issues (rights, regulations etc.) in English, French, Spanish and Turkish, whereas the Ministry for Economy and Labour which regulates the unemployment benefit system¹⁶ provides only some general information on its main topics in English. The Federal Labour Agency which is responsible for the transfer payments and the supply of job offers provides information on its web-site solely in German.

77) Availability of free advocacy, advice and guidance centres

As already outlined in indicator 49 legal advice is only free for social assistance recipients. Apart from that, many voluntary organisations offer free (or low-cost) advisory service on different issues. The consumer association "Verbraucherzentrale", an umbrella organisation presenting several voluntary associations, is one of the most prominent organisations supporting people with information on their rights regarding contracts (e.g. rents, insurances), the quality of products etc.

5.3 Labour market

5.3.1 Control over employment contract

78) Percentage of labour force that is member of a trade union (differentiated to public and private employees)

Germany has few but rather large trade unions. Eleven single industrial trade unions are associated in the umbrella association DGB (Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund). The DGB attracts the majority of organised labour independently of workers' religious or political party preference. Other unions are the Civil Servant Association (Deutscher Beamtenbund), the White-collar Employee Union (Deutsche Angestelltengewerkschaft) and, less important, a Christian Union (CGB). The trade unions have traditionally played a significant role in collective bargaining, since labour conditions and wages are to be primarily regulated by collective agreements between unions and employers' associations. Large firms normally respect their employees' trade union membership with the exception perhaps of some supermarket chains which have been recently reported of mobbing activists (see

¹⁶ Note that German social security is a multi-tiered governance system!

www.sueddeutsche.de/wirtschaft/artikel/944/22922/). Trade union membership has sharply decreased since the mid nineties. Membership in 2001 was highest for civil servants; the Civil Servant Union is the only union with a still growing membership; roughly 40 percent of the organised civil servants are also DGB members. Roughly 39 percent of blue-collar workers are organised and only 19 percent of white-collar employees. Women are to a lower extent than men trade union members.

Table 48 Union density in 2001

	Gross (with pensioners and unemployed)	Net
All	33,8	22,6
Civil servants	64,1	-
Blue-collar workers	39,1	25,7
White-collar employees	19,2	12,9
Women	23,7	15,9

Data source: IW Köln (2003)

79) Percentage of labour force covered by a collective agreement (differentiated by public and private employees)

Germany is well-known for its corporatist and very consensus oriented system of industrial relations. The unions are traditionally seen as blocking reforms. Although the economic situation has steadily worsened and the pressure on trade unions to accept moderate collective agreements has increased in the last years, the number of hours per employee lost through strikes between 1998 and 2001 was – even for German conditions – on very low levels. (IW Köln 2003) On the other side, a growing number of employers do not join their associations or cancel membership and, hence, centralised collective bargaining and agreements; they prefer, if any, firm-level – not centralised agreements. As a consequence, social partnership has been successively eroded and trade unions' bargaining power weakened. Unions now speak for an ever decreasing number of workers/employees. This is particularly true for East Germany. Social partnership, membership of employers and employees, is much weaker. After unification the West German industrial relation regime was transferred to the East, some argue in order to prevent cheaper labour competition. Indeed, trade unions, often headed by West Germans and in any case suspected by many to pursue a strategy that first of all protect West German employees, fought for immediate equalisation of wages. In contrast to West Germany, coverage of collective agreements is relatively low; and they cover a steadily decreasing number of people. In 2003, only a minority of employees was paid a wage which was the result of a regional collective agreement.

Table 49 Proportion of employees covered by collective agreements (CA)

	1996		1998		2000		2002	
	West	East	West	East	West	East	West	East
Regional CA	69	56	68	51	63	46	63	43
Firm CA	-	-	-	-	7	10	7	12
Oriented on CA	-	-	-	-	15	24	16	24
No CA	-	-	-	-	15	21	14	21

Data source: IAB-Betriebspanel (See IAB 2004; IW Köln 2002, 2004)

5.3.2 Prospects of job mobility

80) Proportion of employed labour force receiving work based training

In 1999 67 percent of German firms offered their employees training courses. Although the number of these courses had increased by seven percent points since 1993, Germany hold only the ninth place in a European ranking. A slightly bigger percentage of enterprises (72 percent) provided other forms of training, e.g. workplace based training. The most common forms of further education for employees were “information delivering” events, like conferences, seminars etc. and training in work situations; job rotation, “quality circles” and self-organised learning hardly exist. Strikingly, only 36 percent of the employees of firms that offer training took part in some kind of training activity. The percentage is lower than in any other EU country – apart from Austria and Greece. The vast majority (98 percent) of larger companies (more than 250 employees) offered continuing training in contrast to smaller firms (71 percent offer training). (See Grünewald et al. 2003) The relatively smaller number of German firms that offer adult training can be explained by the highly reputed bifurcated vocational training system (secondary education). The number of vocational training places has, however, steadily declined – shortage has become a big problem, especially, in East Germany where youth unemployment has been high since unification.

81) Proportion of labour force availing of publicly provided training (not only skills based).

Publicly provided training is in Germany restricted to the unemployed which are covered by the next indicator.

82) Percentage of labour force participating in any “back to work scheme”

Pre-unification West Germany abstained from enforced “back to work schemes”, since “activation”, e.g. workfare, had been widespread both in NAZI and in GDR Germany. Social assistance recipients were expected to accept any job offer, the rule, however, was rarely restrictively enforced. *Active* labour market policies – in contrast to *activating* policies – were introduced in West Germany in 1969 for two reasons: a lack of qualified workers in expanding sectors and the comeback of unemployment since the late 1960s. It first lost political support when economic policies changed during the 1980s, but gained new importance after unification: Active labour market policies were to compensate for job losses which resulted from the sudden breakdown of the Eastern economy. Many doubted however that these programmes would lead to large scale (successful)- labour market integration. Recently, critical voices about the traditional “back to work schemes” (job-creation measures, professional

training) have become more influential again, although their effects on social inclusion has remained nearly uncontested; the schemes have had also some positive macroeconomic effects. Existing objections against these programmes rather come from a “social empowerment point of view”. This raises some doubts about the accuracy of the indicator in this component, because the quality of most schemes does not allow people to develop many relevant skills and, maybe even more important for labour market integration, it does not earn them any reputation.

“Active” labour market policies combined “re-training” and “de-commodifying” measures (relatively wage replacements for all unemployed persons). While old “active” labour market policies were “human resource development oriented” and aimed at improving standard workers’ qualifications, hence, safeguarding workers’ occupational and social status, the parties in government (SPD, GRÜNE) have meanwhile fully shifted towards the Anglo-American model of “activating labour market policies”, the “work first approach”. The latter rules very restrictive eligibility criteria for benefit entitlement, a stronger emphasis on job placement, agency work and support for self-employment, – in sum, it implies a shift from “de”- to enforced “re”-commodification. Since German unemployment, especially in the East, is predominantly structural and results to a minor extent from “supply-side” factors, “work-first” approaches have so far not led to more jobs and employment. Factors like the financial costs of unification, very low economic growth etc. added to this failure. As already mentioned, only the subsidised self-employment programme for long-term unemployed (Ich-AG) had been partly successful. It was, however, just stopped, because generous eligibility rules enabled a lot of unemployed people with rather unpromising ideas to receive financial support. Despite the many drawbacks of “old” active labour market policies the number of unemployed people who participate in active measures is still rather high: both unemployment benefit recipients and social assistance claimants often take part in “back to work schemes” as of yet financed by the local communities.

Opposing public perceptions of “lazy paupers on the dole” or “exploited workfare participants”, notwithstanding, the number of activated social assistance claimants had already risen sharply in the last decade (to up to 300.000 or 30% of all employable claimants in 1998) and the design of the schemes has become more targeted to the needs of heterogeneous groups, although street cleaning is still part of the picture. At the time being the government sticks to its reforms despite slowly rising bottom-up pressure; in the future, it will be rather the market than the state which offers “last resort” employment. Whether that means gains in terms of social empowerment remains at least doubtful.

Table 50 Proportion of the unemployed in active labour market programmes financed by the Federal Labour Agency

	2001	2002	2003
Professional training	7,0	6,4	4,6
Short term training	1,0	1,2	1,4
Training for disabled	2,7	2,5	2,8
Language courses	0,5	0,5	0,4
Job-creation measures	4,4	3,4	2,5
Special measures for the East	0,5	0,2	0,1
Wage subsidies	2,2	2,3	2,7
Subsidies for long-term unemployed	0,7	0,6	0,1
Subsidies for self-employment	0,9	1,0	2,0
Short time work	2,5	4,0	3,6
Agency work	0	0	0,2
All	22,4	22,1	20,4

Data source: ANBA (2004), own calculations

5.3.3 Reconciliation of work and family life (work / life balance)

83) Percentage of organisations operating work life balance policies

As a term “work-life balance” is relatively new in German reality and academic discussion; its content, however, has traditionally played a large role in politics and policies, e.g. in family policies, collective agreements and in many political conflicts of the past decades as well – be it in feminist battles for gender equality or in trade union campaigns for working-time reductions. Employers have increasingly demanded further flexibilised employment and deviated from standard employment. Some employees, many of them women, have interpreted these trends as possibilities to better balance work and family life. In fact, in many instances, flexibilisation goes hand in hand with growingly precarious incomes and social security prospects. Hence, new regulations have been passed – many more are still required – to enhance flexibility while still maintain social security.

In 2000, the German government passed a major reform of the Parental Leave Legislation (first established in 1986). While the old law strictly ruled that the three-years-leave had to be taken immediately after the child's birth and the parent on leave was only allowed to work a maximum of 19 hours per week, parents are now given various options: Parents can share the up-to-three years of leave; they can care for their child at home together for some time or concentrate their leave on one year only and thereby be entitled to a thirty per cent higher (income-tested) parental leave benefit; and, parents can decide to split the leave, for instance, to take two years after the child's birth and the remaining year when the child enters school which is still part-time in Germany. The leave has to be taken, however, before the child will be eight years old. The mother or father on leave is now allowed to work up to thirty hours per week which, in fact, equals reduced full-time in Germany. Thresholds for income-testing for entitlement of the benefit and for being employed while on leave have first been significantly raised, but recently (2003) lowered again which indicates that the Red-Green-Government wants to seriously restrict parental leave and now favours the employment of mothers of small children, too. The measure will in effect especially

pertain to lone mothers, although German lone mothers have on average a higher employment rate than married ones – and as, for instance, British ones.

The 2001 reform primarily aimed at adapting the existing rules to the needs of *employed* parents, of both, mothers and fathers, who growingly worked flexible jobs, by giving them more options; it also reacted to employers' needs by providing incentives for parents to stay in (reduced full-time) employment while being eligible for parental leave; and, as it was explicitly stated, the reform wanted to increase fathers' take-up rate by flexibilising eligibility rules and providing incentives better tailored for men. Taken together these changes constituted major shifts in the logic of old parental leave. Working men were recast as caring fathers, mothers as workers, households as two-earner units which continuously shared their resources be they time or income – everything in the best interest of the child – who needed two earner parents.

As already said, the government has shifted its policies towards increasing jobs, employability and re-commodification of men and women, including mothers. In order to create conditions favourable for job creation, working-time has become flexibilised to an extent that also allows up to 60 hours per week – some employers even want more hours. Trade-unions have been put under serious pressure and had to give in many cases. These trends obviously contradict the phrase of the “Work-Life Balance”. Pessimists would argue it serves those who can afford it.

Since the Red-Green government has come into power in 1998, politics and policies have become very volatile. Improving the “work-life” balance while eroding it at the same time or some time later have regularly gone hand in hand. A major reform in 2001 established a new part-time act which grants everybody a right to be part-time employed. Employers have to put forward good reasons, if they deny full-timers to reduce their hours. In addition, those who opted for part-time have the corresponding right to go back to full-time¹⁷. The family minister who drafted the law argued that employers often hindered men willing to take part-time and that the new rule therefore also wants to help fathers to reduce working hours and share child-care at home. A first evaluation of the new law showed that in only 9 percent of the West German enterprises employees asked for working time reductions (and in just one percent of the enterprises for longer hours) and very few of the roughly 85.000 applications in the whole country were rejected (some 3 percent). (See Magvas/Spitznagel 2002)

Further instruments which are believed to contribute to a better work-life balance, are working-time accounts. But recent qualitative research found out that flexible working time regulations very often benefit first of all the firms and hardly the employees. Only highly qualified employees could decide when to take time-off in order to compensate their over-time work. Unsurprisingly, most employees prefer stable rhythms of working and living and use accounts only there is no alternative, whereas firms can employ flexible regulations to adapt working time to their needs. (See Eberling et al 2004)

¹⁷ The Part-Time Law has been recently attacked as hindering job creation, although – as we show – it has not yet been widely used by employees. The Christian Democratic Party proposed in September 2004 to abolish the law.

Against that background it is not surprising that the number of enterprises using working time accounts rose from 19 % in 1998 to 29 % in 2001. (See Pfahl/Reuyß 2002)

Sabbaticals are less wide-spread in Germany; apparently they do not fit the flexibility demands of most enterprises. Furthermore, sabbaticals are a very recent phenomenon: three out of five firms who offer sabbaticals introduced these as late as in 1998. Overall only 2,6 % of the German enterprises allowed their employees in 2001 to take a leave for more than three months. Small firms (less than 20 employees), in particular, are cautious about sabbaticals (only 2 % have such regulations), whereas larger enterprises (more than 500 employees) have more commonly sabbatical regulations (16 %). (ibid.)

84) Percentage of employed labour force actually making use of work/life balance measures

The German part-time rate has been steadily increasing since the beginning of the 1990s. It reached 41 % for women and almost 6 % for men in 2003. The impact of the new part-time act on this trend seems to be small, if the 83 000 applications for reduced working hours are compared to almost 10 million employees who work less than 35 hours in 2001. (Statistisches Bundesamt 2004) And the hopes for a higher share of men who work part-time have been disappointed as well. Almost four out of five applications under the new Part-Time Law came from women. (See Magvas/Spitznagel 2002) While the vast majority of West German women works part-time voluntarily, many East German women and men do so involuntarily.

The number of employees using working time accounts has been as well rising. In 2001 already 40 % of German employees had the possibility to work flexible hours. But in one third of the cases the accounts resulted from uneven working time allocation in the firm which reduced the degree of freedom in choosing working and spare time for the employees. (See above and Munz et al 2002) And even if employees had the opportunity for a self-determined working time design, many did not dare to take time-off because of shortages of staff in their firms and the perceived negative impact on the career. (See Eberling et al 2004)

Table 51 Proportion of enterprises and employees using working time accounts

	1998	2000	2001
Enterprises	19	25	29
Employees	33	37	40

Data source: ISO-Betriebsbefragung (See Munz et al 2002)

5.4 Openness and supportiveness of institutions

5.4.1 Openness and supportiveness of the political system

85) *Existence of processes of consultation and direct democracy (e.g. referenda)*

Due to negative historical experiences, Germany does not allow for referenda on the Federal level. Recently, in the context of the future European constitution, the issue has reached the political agenda again. The Länder constitutions concede the right to demand a referendum, however, the bureaucratic barriers for a successful appeal are high. To give an example: In the 1990s almost ten times more appeals for a referendum (106) were made than in the 1980ies (12), but only ten referenda took place in the end. According to the Association for Direct Democracy "Mehr Demokratie", many issues had already reached the parliament before a referendum had been initiated. Taken together, one quarter of all initiatives were fully or partly successful. (See Mehr Demokratie 2003) The most popular issues for direct democracy initiatives are education and democratic rules, as these are spheres where the regional governments have competences for decision-making. According to a "Mehr Demokratie" ranking (ibid.), direct democracy is best developed in Bavaria and Hamburg, least in Baden-Württemberg, Saarland and Berlin.

5.4.2 Openness of the economic system

86) *Number of instances of public involvement in major economic decision making (e.g. public hearings about company relocation, inward investment and plant closure)*

German local communities have no direct influence on major economic decision-making but regularly provide favourite investment conditions ("infrastructure") to attract and please big firms. At best case that means network building in order to strengthen the regional attachment ("embeddedness") of enterprises in or playing a negotiator role between employers and employees when conflicts about dismissals, relocations or closures arise. But it can also lead to a race for subsidies which can have negative impacts, since it diverts resources for other issues, e.g. social policy issues.

5.4.3 Openness of organisations

87) *Percentage of organisations/ institutions with work councils*

Although employees in enterprises with at least five wage earners have a right to found a work council, only about every ninth firm of that size had such an instrument of codetermination in 2002. Small firms, in particular, often lack work councils, whereas the vast majority of larger enterprises have work councils and co-determination. Some well-known and economically successful supermarket chains have been recently reported of trying to prevent employees from founding work councils. (See www.sueddeutsche.de/wirtschaft/artikel/944/22922/) Hence the number of employees covered by work councils reaches almost 50 percent. Compared with 1998 the quantitative range of codetermination did not change significantly. (Ellguth 2003)

5.5 Public space

5.5.1 Support for collective action

88) Percentage of the national & local public budget that is reserved for voluntary, not-for-profit citizenship initiatives

Unfortunately, quantitative data on that topic are not available. However, local communities used to regularly subsidise some initiatives which follows consequently the principle of subsidiarity. The 2000 Health Care Reform introduced new regulations which are enabling systematical financial support for self help groups through flat-rate grants by the health insurance. (Borgetto 2002, 2003) These groups have existed since the 70s in (West) Germany, but could not count on reliable support, because subsidies for self-help groups are voluntary payments by the state, the Länder and the communities and depend therefore on changing political priorities. A parliamentary commission on civic engagement summarised in 2002 that the support of self help groups is still insufficient. (Deutscher Bundestag 2002, p. 302) All in all, non-profit-initiatives have recently gained a lot of encouragement by the government, but hardly in financial terms. Voluntary engagement is rather seen as a cheap possibility to close gaps in the social infrastructure, especially in areas where the state decided to cut financial support.¹⁸ Hence non-monetary recognition plays the crucial role as an incentive in the opinion of political actors and enterprises are expected to enhance their financial support. (Ibid. p. 16, 17)

89) Marches and demonstrations banned in the past 12 months as proportion of total marched and demonstrations (held and banned)

Few information exists on that topic. In principle, a citizen has the right to announce a demonstration, but in practice not every application will be accepted. For instance, marches of right-wing extremists are controversially discussed and sometimes forbidden. However, one may argue that such bans which go against the fundamental right of assembly will in fact lower social empowerment.

5.5.2 Cultural enrichment

90) Proportion of local and national budget allocated to all cultural activities

The Federal Office for Statistics offers overall budget data only for education, science and culture. Spending increased in the last three years on all levels, but, especially, in the Länder which provide the biggest share of the overall budget. Distinct spending for culture is characterised by relative stability, as the share of the payments for cultural activities on the overall budget has not changed a lot.

¹⁸ If this development leads to more influence of the citizens in decision making, as some authors argue (Evers 2002), is debatable.

Table 52 Budget for cultural activities

	2000	2001	2002	2003
In million Euro	7.302	7.411	7.466	7.366
Euro per inhabitant	88,84	90,01	90,01	89,29
Share of overall budget in %	1,46	1,47	1,48	1,46

Data source: Statistisches Bundesamt (2004)

91) Number of self-organised cultural groups and events

Apart from the vagueness of the definition of the term “self-organised”, few data on groups and events exist in Germany. Media coverage of the work of self-organised cultural groups suggests that these groups have recently received less money from the regional governments and, hence, have had to cut their activities.

92) Proportion of people experiencing different forms of personal enrichment on a regular basis

The German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) provides data on several activities which could be interpreted as contributing to people’s personal enrichment. Whereas the attendance of commercial cultural events seems to have decreased due to the economic recession, self-organised activities have increased from 2001 to 2003. With regard to “going to the cinema”, “pop” and “jazz concerts”, “disco” etc. the number of people enjoying these activities is much higher among the youngest cohort (17-25), but apart from this result social differences (East/West, men/women, German/Non-German) do not play a significant role. (Datenreport 2002: 546)

Table 53 Proportion of population experiencing forms of personal enrichment at least once a month

	1999	2001	2003*
Attend opera, classical concerts, theatre	13,1	15,1	11,3
Attend cinema, pop, jazz concerts	16,3	25,9	22,7
Artistic and musical activities	-	14,6	21,3

Data source: SOEPinfo (2003), own calculations - *survey questions slightly different from previous years

5.6 Personal relationships

5.6.1 Provision of services supporting physical and social independence

93) Percentage of national and local budgets devoted to disabled people (physical and mental)

We can present some data on the national social budget, which is devoted to disabled people, whereas data on local budgets differentiated with regard to disability was not available. Until 1998 the proportion of the social budget which was paid for invalidity (people with health problems which cause a loss or reduction of employability, disabled people) rose to 7,4 percent, but is slightly decreasing since that point (to 7,1 percent in 2002) But as a share of GDP payments for invalidity are since 1997 (until 2002) at a stable 2,3 percent. (Bundesministerium für Gesundheit und soziale Sicherung 2002) The rise of the budget share in the early 1990ies could derive from an addition to the constitution which obliged political actors and the society to actively engage in the integration of

disabled people. Some new regulations aiming at better inclusion were introduced in the following years. Later (2001) a new social law came into force. It hardly improved the programmes for disabled people but strengthened the terminology of inclusion and personal responsibility. Alongside medical rehabilitation measures for the integration into the labour market are the most important features of policies for disabled people. In 2001 some 200.000 disabled people worked in sheltered workshops which should many of them educate for a job on the regular labour market. However, the employment rate for the disabled decreased to 3,7 percent in 1999 (5,9 percent in 1981). Improved financial incentives for employers are therefore discussed by the government. (Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Sozialordnung 2002)

5.6.2 Personal support services

94) Level of pre-and-post-school child-care

As already explained in indicator 60 differences between East and West are existent in the provision with child-care facilities. In the age group 3-6.5 Germany has almost fulfilled the statutory aim to offer every child a child care place (with some exceptions in the West). But care facilities for younger children are hardly existent in the West (although demand is also rather low) and insufficient in the East. The same has to be said about post-school child-care. But as a consequence of the worrying results of the PISA study the introduction of all-day schools, which could also solve the care problem for school children, is pushed by the red-green government.

5.6.3 Support for social interaction

95) Extent of inclusiveness of housing and environmental design (e.g. meeting places, lighting, layout)

Quantitative data about meeting places or community centres is not yet available for Germany, but the issue of enhancing the inclusiveness of housing and environmental conditions gained more attention by politicians in the last years and is part of the programme "Soziale Stadt" (socially integrated city), which we will describe in the chapter about important social quality initiatives in Germany.

5.7 Trends and reflection

The data situation for many indicators is, not surprisingly considering the explorative stage of the component of empowerment, far from being satisfactory. Nonetheless, we can conclude some trends. With regard to the domain knowledge base Germany does relatively well in international comparison, although social mobility is still rather strong dependent on social background. The results for the domain labour market are ambiguous. On the one hand side, the influence of German employees in economic decisions decreases, because membership in trade unions and the coverage by collective agreements is steadily declining and restrictions for codetermination are regularly debated. On the other hand side, some attempts to enable a better work-life balance have been made as well. But it is not yet proved, whether these measures does meet the needs of the employees just as well as employers needs. The same has to be said about programmes, which are targeted at the

improvement of living conditions in deprived districts (domains public space and personal relationships). Some commentators raised doubts about the ability of the measures to reach the most marginalized groups and to support their empowerment.

Empowerment as a form of civic right is discussed in Germany especially with regard to reforms of the health system and social work. It is planned to enhance the rights of patients in the process of therapy by giving them access to quality evaluation. (Erdmann 2003) Nevertheless, that goes along with reduced possibilities for the choice of a specialist doctor and higher costs for the patients, which in turn could be interpreted as decreasing empowerment. In the field of social work concepts that give less attention to the deficits but concentrate more on the strengths of the clients and try to build networks between them are piloted. In the quarter (Stadtteil) management and the work with migrants one can find examples for the implementation of such approaches, but evaluation data is so far hardly available. The programme “socially integrated city”, we will describe in the chapter below, does not explicitly refer to the term empowerment, but uses similar approaches. Civic engagement corresponding with ideas of empowerment have been spreading in many areas of former state responsibility in the last years (Evers 2002), but it is contested if this development led to more influence of the citizens in decision making. Case management for social assistance claimants is one example where the interests of the clients are very often subordinated to the financial interest of the community. (Spindler 2003)

6 Social Quality initiatives

We will portray two initiatives in this chapter, which are characterised by different levels of implementation. The first, “socially integrated city”, is already in operation and even rudimentary evaluated, whereas the second, “flexicurity respectively transitional labour markets”, did so far, at least as a comprehensive concept, not reach the status of a political guidance instrument. Nevertheless, some elements have been implemented into the German system of social security and the labour market regulation.

The Federal/Länder funded programme ‘socially integrated city’ was implemented in 1999 as a reaction on negative trends regarding aggravated social inequality in urban neighbourhoods in the last 20 years and the failure of traditional urban development support to solve these complex problems. Critical developments have been identified in various fields that are very similar to the four components of social quality and their domains. Hartmut Häußermann, for example, describes four processes of exclusion affecting the population in these districts: “Economically, because they have no access to the labour market; institutionally, because insurmountable barriers spring up between them and political and public welfare organizations; culturally, if stigmatization and discrimination lead to a loss of self-confidence and moral integrity ...; and socially, if social isolation and life in a closed milieu destroy the links to ‘normal society’.” (Häußermann cit. in Becker et al. 2003, p.1) The overall objective of the programme is therefore to improve the actual living and housing conditions (in “our language” increase the socio-economic security and inclusion), to increase residents’ personal opportunities (empowerment) and to boost the districts image as well as the identification with the neighbourhood (cohesion). Currently the programme covers roughly 300 ‘urban districts with special development needs’ in more than 200 cities and towns. (Becker et al. 2003)

Different strategies are used to pursue the goals of the programme. *Neighbourhood management* is thought to enable networked cooperation between the municipal government and all locally relevant actors, *integrated action plans* are designed to take account of all necessary activity fields and to steer the process of implementation and *resource pooling* contributes to the harmonisation of already existing funding programmes for the use in programme districts. (Becker et al. 2003) The evaluation of the first three years of the programme has brought, all in all, rather positive results, as many things have been set in motion and a sense of optimism occurred among the actors. Most municipal administrations, many sceptical in the beginning, consider the tools of the programme now as appropriate. (Becker 2002 et al.) With regard to the living conditions of the people in the districts less information is so far available. Encouraging examples are that a majority of the municipal actors perceived in the pilot districts a “better atmosphere” (77 percent), a “better infrastructure” (73 percent) and an “image gain” (67 percent). (Becker/Löhr 2003)

However, the programme received criticism as well. The most vulnerable groups in the districts, migrants, long-term unemployed and elderly people, have up to now not been reached and hardly

participate. Most activities remain middle-class affairs. (Becker et al. 2002) In general, commentators have warned that separating district-based developments from citywide and macrosocial trends might solely move problems to other areas. Furthermore some argue that the solving of social problems is switched to local people in order to blur cuts in social services by divided responsibilities. An important complaint is that the programme lacks an adequate theoretical basis and is not consistently evaluated. For the question "What makes a city socially integrated" widely accepted indicators are still not existent. (Becker et al. 2003) Hence there might be a potential point of contact for social quality theory.

An initiative still rather at the stage of academic debate than in political practice is the idea of flexicurity (Keller/Seifert 2002, Klammer/Tillmann 2001) or transitional labour markets (Schmid 2002). What does flexicurity mean? It is a combination of flexibility and social security, two political goals which have been often considered as antagonistic. The idea of flexicurity is to undo the Gordon knot by creating a new balance between policies which flexibilise employment relations and policies which enhance the social security of employees and unemployed persons. Point of departure is the hypothesis that new interests in flexibility have developed during the last decades. On the one hand side there is a perceived strong interest of employers in flexible employment relations as a reaction on globalisation processes. On the other hand side also employees are considered as interested in flexible employment since more flexible work regulations could help to create a new balance of work, care and leisure, thereby facilitating the inclusion of employees in all spheres of life. Especially for women this could open up new possibilities to combine employment with care responsibilities.

But the flexibilisation of work relations is still seen as blocked by the old systems of social security. The German systems of social security are mainly wage labour centred which means that only employees in standard employment relationships do have an acceptable level of income in case of unemployment or retirement. Hence flexicurity policies should reform the systems of social security in a way that enables people to work in flexible employment *and* to experience a high level of social security. Some authors, especially those close to the trade unions, prefer internal flexicurity solutions (for example working time accounts or qualification measures) and an increased social security in the post employment life phase. (Keller/Seifert 2002) First steps in that direction are already made as we have shown in the sections on the indicators. Nevertheless, with the latest labour market reforms the security aspect, especially income security, lost significance and former flexicurity advocates (e.g. the Green party) do not promote the concept enthusiastically anymore. But it is not only income security that should be fostered by a flexicurity strategy. Another important goal is the support of successful transitions from unemployment in employment, from one job to another or from one qualification level to another by occupying activation policies. These involve, for example, education, training and life long learning.

Günther Schmid's idea of transitional labour markets comprehends various propositions that point in that direction. The concept abandons unlimited fulltime-employment as point of orientation for labour market policy and promotes new types of work and transitional phases. "The institutionalisation of 'transitional labour markets' establishes stable 'bridges' linking all forms of productive activity and

facilitating movement in one direction or the other: paid work with variable employment relationships or working times, lifelong learning, unpaid family or do-it-yourself work, other recognised forms of social work, such as voluntary work or neighbourhood schemes, as well as time for creative leisure (sabbaticals), during which new abilities can be tested without any requirement to be successful.” (Schmid 2002, p. 188) Although in the meantime several components of the concept (working time accounts, part-time law, sabbaticals, job-rotation etc.) have been introduced in Germany, on different scales and with more or less success, the concept did not gain much influence as a guiding instrument in that process. That might be due to a certain vagueness with regard to systematic theoretical foundations and operationalisations.

An attempt to connect the idea of flexicurity with the concept of social quality has been made by the research network *Employment policies and social quality* of the EFSQ, in which the authors of this report have been engaged as well. Currently we are trying to shed some more light on that relationship by adding information on subjective perceptions of the German population on flexicurity measures that we collected through a representative survey.

7 Conclusion

The aim of this report was to describe the German situation with regard to the four conditions of social quality. We were able to present data on most of the indicators, although not always corresponding with the concrete formulation of the indicator. This is hardly surprising as the choice of indicators in the project followed primarily theoretical considerations and was only partially oriented at the current availability of data. Several domains appear in all four components, or at least in some of them. That enables us to compare the development of a domain with regard to different aspects of it. Thereby it is possible to highlight the danger that efforts to raise the objective conditions of social quality in one component might reduce it in another.

Labour (market) is a good example for that relationship. Germany enjoys at present a generous protection system against the financial consequences of unemployment. However, the inclusion of unemployed people into the labour market turns out to be problematic as the long-term unemployment rate reveals. Current attempts to tackle the problem of labour market inclusion involve measures which reduce socio-economic security (tighter eligibility rules, benefit cuts) and social empowerment (reduction of training schemes). Even if this policy will be successful, which is currently far from assured, and less people face the destiny of long-term unemployment, the objective conditions of social quality will suffer. It remains a point for further elaboration, how to interpret such developments adequately concerning the level of social quality.

Similar trends can be expected in the near future in other domains as well. Health security will be weakened because of fragile coverage and rising payments, whilst the support for self-help groups improves. The quality of housing shows positive signs, but tendencies of exclusion from the housing market, affecting an increasing number of young people, are observable as well. Slightly expanded citizenship rights for migrants will contribute to their inclusion, whereas shrinking tolerance of different lifestyles jeopardises social cohesion.

Apart from these general trends variation with regard to social attributes has been identified. Very interesting for the German case is the development of the regional differences between the new and the old Länder. Fortunately, some indicators indicate a trend of an equalisation of living conditions. Quality of housing improved as well as environmental conditions remarkably in East Germany, trust in institutions slowly converges to West German levels, whereas, for example, care facilities and national, regional and local attachment in the West came closer to the Eastern reality. Social networks, where Germany shows relatively weak results in international comparison, are similarly developed in both parts of the country. An analogical situation is recognizable for social mobility, although that is due to a deterioration of equality of opportunity in the new Länder. However, there are still domains, in which East Germans face much more problematic conditions. Disadvantages occur especially with regard to labour market issues (e.g. unemployment, involuntary flexible employment), but also financial resources. East Germans show furthermore still less willingness to include migrants

into the society, although for recent years indicators illustrate, like in the West, more acceptance of several forms of participation but also higher demands for assimilation. The participation of the East German population in social and political associations diminished during the 1990ies, much more than in the West. Again, a slow recovery is identifiable recently.

Gender inequalities remain evident particularly in the domains labour market and social care. Despite a closing pay gap in the West and almost equal earnings in the East, the gender pay gap is still bigger than the EU average. Women are also much more often part-time employed than men. Whereas in the West the vast majority are voluntary part-timers, more than 50 percent of Eastern women work part-time involuntarily. Discontinuous and flexible employment can lead to precarious income situations in the old age. The numbers of female social assistant claimants in retirement age are low at the moment, but already twice as high as men's rates and will probably rise in the future. The convergence of both genders concerning good opportunities for social contact could be a positive effect of higher employment rates of women. But more paid work does hardly mean less unpaid work for women. Care responsibilities adhere to women, although German men are among the most active in Europe with regard to household work. An equal division of unpaid work is nonetheless far from achieved. Apparently, the further elaboration of concepts like flexicurity or transitional labour markets could contribute to an adjustment of the division of paid and unpaid between men and women and improve their work-life balance.

Migrants suffer from high rates of school leavers without any graduation. That entails various problematic developments. Especially boys with migration background face returning spells of unemployment and low paid jobs. Many are part of the lowest income groups and find accommodation only in disadvantaged districts. Hence segregation processes are observable. In order to tackle the problems of the most vulnerable groups in disadvantaged urban areas, state and regions launched the initiative "socially integrative city". Although it brought an encouraging activation of many actors in these areas, migrants have been hardly reached. The introduction of low threshold measures, which are oriented at the capabilities of the Non-German population, might possibly ease the process of inclusion.

All in all, the state of affairs of social quality in Germany is mixed. Positive developments alternate with negative trends and the position of Germany in European comparison differs dependent on the subject as well. Surely we need more information on subjective perceptions of living conditions in order to draw a clear picture of social quality in Germany. The development of profiles and criteria should enable us to do that.

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Annex Social Quality indicators

Indicators of Socio-economic Security

Domains	Sub-domains	Indicators
Financial resources	Income sufficiency	1. Part of household income spent on health, clothing, food and housing (in the lower and median household incomes)
	Income security	2. How do certain biographical events affect the risk of poverty on household level. 3. Proportion of total population living in households receiving entitlement transfers (means-tested, cash and in-kind transfers) that allow them to live above EU poverty level
Housing and environment	Housing security	4. Proportion of people who have certainty of keeping their home 5. Proportion of hidden families (i.e. several families within the same household)
		Housing conditions
	Environmental conditions (social and natural)	8. People affected by criminal offences per 10.000 inhabitants 9. Proportion living in households that are situated in neighbourhoods with above average pollution rate (water, air and noise)
Health and care	Security of health provisions	10. Proportion of people covered by compulsory/ voluntary health insurance (including qualitative exploration of what is and what is not covered by insurance system)
	Health services	11. Number of medical doctors per 10.000 inhabitants 12. Average distance to hospital, measure in minutes, not in meters 13. Average response time of medical ambulance
	Care services	14. Average number of hours spent on care differentiated by paid and unpaid
Work	Employment security	15. Length of notice before employer can change terms and conditions of labour relation/contract 16. Length of notice before termination of labour contract 17. proportion employed workforce with temporary, non permanent, job contract 18. Proportion of workforce that is illegal
		Working conditions
Education	Security of education	22. Proportion of pupils leaving education without finishing compulsory education (early school leavers) 23. Study fees as proportion of national mean net wage
	Quality of education	24. Proportion of students who, within a year of leaving school with or without certificate, are able to find employment

Source: M. Keizer and L.J.G. van der Maesen: Social Quality and the Component of Socio-economic security 3rd Draft, Working Paper, Amsterdam, September 2003

Indicators of Social Cohesion

Domains	Sub-domains	Indicators
Trust	Generalised trust	25. Extent to which 'most people can be trusted'
	Specific trust	26. Trust in: government; elected representatives; political parties; armed forces; legal system; the media; trade unions, police; religious institutions; civil service; economic transactions
		27. Number of cases being referred to European Court of law
		28. Importance of: family; friends; leisure; politics; respecting parents. parents' duty to children
Other integrative norms and values	Altruism	29. Volunteering: number of hours per week
	Tolerance	30. Blood donation
		31. Views on immigration, pluralism and multiculturalism
	Social contract	32. Tolerance of other people's self-identity, beliefs, behaviour and lifestyle preferences
		33. Beliefs on causes of poverty: individual or structural
		34. Willingness to pay more taxes if you were sure that it would improve the situation of the poor
		35. Intergenerational: willingness to pay 1% more taxes in order to improve the situation of elderly people in your country
Social networks	Networks	36. Willingness to actually do something practical for the people in your community/ neighbourhood, like: picking up litter, doing some shopping for elderly/ disabled/ sick people in your neighbourhood, assisting neighbours/ community members with filling out (fax/ municipal/ etc) forms, cleaning the street/ porch/ doorway
		37. Division of household tasks between men and women: Do you have an understanding with your husband/ spouse about the division of household tasks, raising of the children, and gaining household income?
		38. Membership (active or inactive) of political, voluntary, charitable organisations or sport clubs
		39. Support received from family, neighbours and friends
		40. Frequency of contact with friends and colleagues
Identity	National/ European identity	41. Sense of national pride
	Regional/ community/ local identity	42. Identification with national symbols and European symbols
		43. Sense of regional / community / local identity
	Interpersonal identity	44. Sense of belonging to family and kinship network

Source: Y. Berman and D. Phillips: Indicators for Social Cohesion, 5th Draft, EFSQ Working Paper, Amsterdam, June 2004

Indicators of Social Inclusion

Domains	Sub-domains	Indicators	
Citizenship rights	Constitutional/ political rights	45. Proportion of residents with citizenship	
		46. Proportion having right to vote in local elections and proportion exercising it	
	Social rights	47. Proportion with right to a public pension (i.e. a pension organised or regulated by the government)	
		48. Women's pay as a proportion of men's	
	Civil rights	49. Proportion with right to free legal advice	
		50. Proportion experiencing discrimination	
	Economic and political networks	51. Proportion of ethnic minority groups elected or appointed to parliament, boards of private companies and foundations	
		52. Proportion of women elected or appointed to parliament, boards of private companies and foundations	
	Labour market	Access to paid employment	53. Long-term unemployment (12+ months)
			54. Involuntary part-time or temporary employment
Services	Health services	55. Proportions with entitlement to and using public primary health care	
		Housing	56. Proportion homeless, sleeping rough
			57. Average waiting time for social housing
	Education	58. school participation rates and higher education participation rates	
		Social care	59. Proportion of people in need receiving care services
			60. Average waiting time for care services (including child care)
	Financial services	61. Proportion denied credit differentiated by income groups	
		62. Access to financial assistance / advice in case of need	
	Transport		63. Proportion of population who has access to public transport system
			64. Density of public transport system and road density
Civic / cultural services		65. Number of public sport facilities per 10.000 inhabitants	
		66. Number of public and private civic & cultural facilities (e.g. cinema, theatre, concerts) per 10.000 inhabitants	
Social networks	Neighbourhood participation	67. Proportion in regular contact with neighbours	
	Friendships	68. Proportion in regular contact with friends	
	Family life	69. Proportion feeling lonely/isolated	
		70. Duration of contact with relatives (cohabiting and non-cohabiting)	
	71. Informal (non-monetary) assistance received by different types of family		

Source: A. Walker and A. Wigfield: The Social Inclusion Component Of Social Quality, EFSQ Working Paper, Amsterdam, September 2003

Indicators of Social Empowerment

Domains	Sub-domains	Indicators
Knowledge base	Application of knowledge	72. Extent to which social mobility is knowledge-based (formal qualifications)
		73. Per cent of population literate and numerate
	Availability of information	74. Availability of free media
		75. Access to internet
		76. Provision of information in multiple languages on social services
Labour market	User friendliness of information	77. Availability of free advocacy, advice and guidance centres
		78. % Of labour force that is member of a trade union (differentiated to public and private employees)
	Control over employment contract	79. % Of labour force covered by a collective agreement (differentiated by public and private employees)
		80. % Of employed labour force receiving work based training
	Prospects of job mobility	81. % Of labour force availing of publicly provided training (not only skills based). (Please outline costs of such training if any)
		82. % Of labour force participating in any "back to work scheme"
		83. % Of organisations operating work life balance policies.
Openness and supportiveness of institutions	Reconciliation of work and family life (work/ life balance)	84. % Of employed labour force actually making use of work/life balance measures (see indicator above)
		85. Existence of processes of consultation and direct democracy (eg. referenda)
	Openness of economic system	86. Number of instances of public involvement in major economic decision making (e.g. public hearings about company relocation, inward investment and plant closure)
Public space	Openness of organisations	87. % of organisations/ institutions with work councils
	Support for collective action	88. % Of the national & local public budget that is reserved for voluntary, not-for-profit citizenship initiatives
		89. Marches and demonstrations banned in the past 12 months as proportion of total marched and demonstrations (held and banned).
	Cultural enrichment	90. Proportion of local and national budget allocated to all cultural activities
91. Number of self-organised cultural groups and events		
92. Proportion of people experiencing different forms of personal enrichment on a regular basis		
Personal relationships	Provision of services supporting physical and social independence	93. percentage of national and local budgets devoted to disabled people (physical and mental)
	Personal support services	94. Level of pre-and-post-school child care
	Support for social interaction	95. Extent of inclusiveness of housing and environmental design (e.g. meeting places, lighting, layout)

Source: P. Herrmann: Discussion Paper on the Domain Empowerment, 3rd Draft, ENIQ October 2003

Annex Collective data

1. Socio-economic security

Domain: Financial resources

Sub-domain: Income security

3. Proportion of total population living in households receiving entitlement transfers (means-tested, cash and in-kind transfers) that allow them to live above EU poverty level.

At-risk-of-poverty rate before and after social transfers: total

The share of persons with an equivalised disposable income below the risk-of-poverty threshold, which is set at 60% of the national median equivalised disposable income

	1997		1998		1999		2000		2001	
	before	after	before	after	before	after	before	after	before	after
EU 15	25	16	24	15	24	15	23	15	24	15
EU 25	:	:	:	:	24	15	:	:	24	15
Belgium	26	14	25	14	24	13	23	13	23	13
Germany	22	12	22	11	21	11	20	10	21	11
Greece	23	21	22	21	22	21	22	20	23	20
Spain	27	20	25	18	23	19	22	18	23	19
France	26	15	25	15	24	15	24	16	24	15
Ireland	32	19	32	19	30	19	31	20	30	21
Italy	22	19	21	18	21	18	21	18	22	19
Hungary	:	:	:	:	:	:	19	9	20	10
Netherlands	23	10	21	10	21	11	21	10	21	11
Portugal	27	22	27	21	27	21	27	21	24	20
Slovenia	17	11	17	12	18	11	17	11	:	:
Finland	23	8	22	9	21	11	19	11	19	11
Sweden	28	9	28	10	28	9	27	11	27	10
UK	30	18	30	19	30	19	29	19	29	17

Source: Eurostat; free data, social cohesion

At-risk-of-poverty rate before and after social transfers: males and females

The share of persons with an equivalised disposable income below the risk-of-poverty threshold, which is set at 60% of the national median equivalised disposable income

	1999		2000				2001					
	males		females		males		females		males		females	
	before	after	before	after	before	after	before	after	before	after	before	after
EU 15	23	15	25	16	22	14	24	16	22	14	25	16
EU 25	23	15	25	16	:	:	:	:	23	14	25	17
Belgium	23	11	26	14	22	12	25	14	21	12	25	15
Germany	20	10	21	12	19	10	22	11	20	10	23	12
Greece	22	20	23	21	22	19	23	20	21	19	24	22
Spain	23	18	23	19	21	17	23	19	22	17	25	20
France	24	15	25	16	24	15	25	16	23	15	24	16
Ireland	28	17	32	20	29	19	33	21	29	20	32	23
Italy	20	18	21	18	20	18	21	19	21	19	23	20
Hungary	:	:	:	:	18	9	19	10	20	10	21	10
Netherlands	21	10	22	11	21	11	21	10	21	12	21	11
Portugal	27	19	28	22	26	19	28	22	25	20	24	20
Slovenia	17	11	19	12	17	10	18	12	:	:	:	:
Finland	19	9	22	12	18	9	21	13	17	9	20	14
Sweden	26	9	29	10	26	10	28	11	25	10	29	11
UK	27	18	32	21	26	16	32	21	26	15	32	19

Source: Eurostat; free data, social cohesion

Domain: Housing and environment

Sub-domain: Housing conditions

7. Proportion of population living in houses with *lack* of functioning basic amenities (water, sanitation and energy)

Percentage of household lacking at least one of the three basic amenities by income group, 1999

	EU	B	D	EL	E	F	IRL	I	NL	P	FIN	S	UK
All households	21	19	10	38	62	11	16	15	12	89	4	-	11
Household income less than 60% compared to median actual current income	35	33	25	70	84	24	33	40	16	96	9	-	16

Source: Eurostat 2003, Living conditions in Europe

Domain: Health and care

Sub-Domain: Health services

11. Number of medical doctors per 100.000 inhabitants

Number of practitioners per 100 000 inhabitants

	EU15	B	D	EL	E	F	IRL	I	NL	P	FIN	S	UK
1997	-	386	345	410	428	325	214	578	-	306	296	278	168
1998	368	395	350	426	436	426	219	583	295	312	300	278	172
1999	375	405	355	438	444	328	227	589	311	318	306	283	176
2000	-	411	359	-	454	329	250	599	321	325	308	-	180
2001	-	419	362	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

Source: Eurostat, Yearbook 2003

12. Average distance to hospital, measure in minutes, not in meters

Proximity to hospitals by income (% having access to a hospital in less than 20 minutes by quartiles of household-equivalence income)

	Total	Lowest quartile	Highest quartile	Difference in percentage points
EU 15	52,8	44,9	60,4	15,5
Belgium	66	53,6	78,9	25,3
Germany	52,7	48	56,8	8,9
Greece	39,9	35,7	44,3	8,5
Spain	41,4	38,4	44,2	5,8
France	54,4	43,4	65,3	21,9
Ireland	44,6	40,5	48,7	8,2
Italy	60,9	47	75,2	28,2
Hungary	31,4	16	46,8	30,8
Netherlands	72,5	66,8	77,8	11
Portugal	37,8	27,2	49	21,9
Slovenia	37,9	30,5	46,2	15,7
Finland	50,9	48	53,8	5,8
Sweden	58	56	60	4,0
UK	45,5	34,2	57,8	23,6

Source: Eurobarometer 52.1

Domain: Work

Sub-domain: Employment security

17. Proportion employed workforce with temporary, non permanent, job contract

Proportion employees with a contract of limited duration (temporary job contracts)

	1999			2000			2001			2002		
	total	females	males	total	females	males	total	females	males	total	females	males
EU 15	13,2	14,2	12,4	13,4	14,5	12,5	13,4	14,5	:	13,1	14,3	12,1
Belgium	10,3	13,7	7,7	9	12,1	6,6	8,8	12,1	:	7,6	10,3	5,5
Germany	13,1	13,4	12,8	12,7	13,1	12,5	12,4	12,7	:	12	12,2	11,8
Greece	13	14,7	12	13,1	15,7	11,5	12,9	15,4	:	11,3	13,4	9,8
Spain	32,7	34,9	31,4	32,1	34,6	12,1	31,6	34,1	:	31,2	34,2	29,2
France	14	14,8	13,3	15	15,7	14,3	14,9	16,3	:	14,1	16	12,5
Ireland	9,4	12,1	7,1	4,6	5,8	3,6	3,7	4,5	:	5,3	6,3	4,5
Italy	9,8	11,8	8,5	10,1	12,2	8,8	9,5	11,5	:	9,9	12,1	8,3
Hungary	:	:	:	:	:	:	7,5	6,8	:	7,4	6,8	8
Netherlands	12	15,4	9,4	14	17,2	11,1	14,3	17,5	:	14,3	17	12,2
Portugal	18,6	20,4	17,1	20,4	22,7	18,4	20,3	22,1	:	21,8	23,4	20,5
Slovenia	:	:	:	:	:	:	13,1	13,3	:	14,7	16,7	12,9
Finland	18,2	21,2	15,2	17,7	20,9	14,5	17,9	22	:	17,3	20,5	13,9
Sweden	13,9	16,6	11,2	14,7	16,9	12,1	14,7	16,9	:	15,7	17,9	13,3
UK	6,8	7,5	6,2	6,7	7,7	5,7	6,7	7,5	:	6,1	6,8	5,5

Source: Eurostat; Statistics in Focus

Sub-domain: Working conditions

20. Number of fatal accidents (fatal / non-fatal) at work per 100.000 employed persons (if possible: per sector)

Incidence rate of accidents at work. Incidence = (number of accidents at work that occurred during the year/number of persons in employment in the reference population) x100000

	1994		1998	
	non-fatal	fatal	non-fatal	fatal
EU 15	4539	3,9	4089	3,4
Belgium	4415	6	5112	3,1
Germany	5583	3,7	4958	3
Greece	3702	4,3	2936	3,7
Spain	6166	7	7073	5,5
France	5515	4,3	4920	4
Ireland	1494	3,9	1433	5,9
Italy	4641	5,3	4105	5
Hungary	:	:	:	:
Netherlands	4287	:	3909	:
Portugal	7361	8,4	5505	7,7
Slovenia	:	:	:	:
Finland	3914	3,6	3435	2,4
Sweden	1123	2,1	1329	1,3
UK	1915	1,7	1512	1,6

Source: Eurostat; Statistics in Focus

Evolution of the accidents at work, 1998 = 100

	1997		1998		1999		2000		2001	
	serious	fatal	serious	fatal	serious	fatal	serious	fatal	serious	fatal
EU 15	100	100	100	100	100	85	98	82	94 (p)	79 (p)
Belgium	96	100	100	100	96	106	82 (b)	100	83	124
Germany	101	90	100	100	99	80	96	70	88	65
Greece	113	76	100	100	93	170	88	73	86	78
Spain	95	115	100	100	107	91	108	85	106	81
France	101	103	100	100	101	85	102	85	98	79
Ireland	115	120	100	100	90	119	72	39	105	43
Italy	100	84	100	100	99	68	99	66	92	62
Hungary	103	97	100	100	93	107	94	95	86	71
Netherlands	107	140	100	100	108 (b)	107	105	106	92	79
Portugal	100	108	100	100	92	79	88	104	:	:
Slovenia	106	130	100	100	102	88	98	83	94	105
Finland	98	117	100	100	91	75	89	88	87 (b)	8 (b)
Sweden	81	169	100	100	107	85	111	85	113	105
UK	102	100	100	100	106	88	106	106	110	92

p) provisional value

b) break in series

Source: Eurostat, free data, employment

Fatal work accidents (per 100 000 employed persons), 2000

	EU	B	D	EL	E	F	IRL	I	NL	P	FIN	S	UK
Total	5	5	4	3	7	6	2	7	2	9	2	2	2
Age group under 25	3	7	3	1	5	4	-	7	1	5	1	3	1
Age group 45 and over	7	6	5	5	10	10	-	10	4	16	3	3	3

Source: Eurostat 2003; Living conditions in Europe

21. Number of hours a full-time employee typically works a week (actual working week)

Hours worked per week of full time employment

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
EU 15	42.1	42.1	42.1	41.9	41.7	41.6	41.4	:
Belgium	40.3	40.6	41.2	38.4	38.5	41.2	41.4	41.3
Germany	41.6	41.7	41.7	41.8	41.8	41.6	41.4	41.0
Greece	44.6	44.4	44.5	44.7	44.2	44.2	44.2	44.4
Spain	42.2	42.3	42.3	42.2	42.1	42.0	41.8	41.6
France	41.2	41.1	41.0	40.9	40.2	39.6	38.9	40.7
Ireland	43.9	43.2	42.9	42.1	41.9	41.5	41.2	41.0
Italy	40.6	40.5	40.6	40.5	40.6	40.6	40.5	40.5
Hungary	42.1	42.0	41.8	42.0	41.9	41.5	41.4	41.4
Netherlands	41.5	41.3	41.0	41.0	41.0	40.9	40.7	40.6
Portugal	43.7	43.1	43.1	42.4	42.0	41.9	41.9	41.6
Slovenia	43.6	43.8	43.9	43.6	43.1	43.2	43.1	42.6
Finland	40.5	40.9	40.9	41.0	40.9	40.7	40.6	40.6
Sweden	41.4	41.4	41.3	41.3	41.2	41.0	41.0	40.8
UK	44.8	44.9	44.8	44.4	44.2	44.2	43.9	43.8

Source: Eurostat; free data, long term indicators, people in the labour market

Domain: Education

Sub-domain: Security of education

22. Proportion of pupils leaving education without finishing compulsory education (early school leavers)

Early school-leavers - total - Percentage of the population aged 18-24 with at most lower secondary education and not in further education or training

	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
EU 25	:	:	17.2 (p)	16.5 (p)	15.9 (b)
EU 15	20.5 (p)	19.4 (p)	18.9 (p)	18.5 (p)	18.0 (b)
Belgium	15.2 (b)	12.5	13.6	12.4	12.8
Germany	14.9	14.9	12.5	12.6	12.6 (p)
Greece	17.8	17.1	16.5	16.1	15.3 (b)
Spain	29.5	28.8	28.6	29.0	29.8
France	14.7	13.3	13.5	13.4	13.3 (b)
Ireland	:	:	:	14.7	12.1 (b)
Italy	27.2	25.3	26.4	24.3	23.5
Hungary	13.0	13.8	12.9	12.2	11.8 (b)
Netherlands	16.2	15.5	15.3	15.0	15.0 (p)
Portugal	44.8	42.9	44.3	45.5	41.1
Slovenia	:	:	7.5	4.8 u	4.3
Finland	9.9	8.9 (b)	10.3	9.9	10.7 (b)
Sweden	6.9	7.7	10.5 (b)	10.4	9.0 (b)
UK	19.7 (p)	18.3 (p)	17.6 (p)	17.7 (p)	16.7 (p)

p) provisional value

b) break in series

Source: Eurostat SC053 IV.5.1

Early school-leavers - males and females - Percentage of the population aged 18-24 with at most lower secondary education and not in further education or training

	1999		2000		2001		2002		2003	
	females	males	females	males	females	males	females	males	females	males
EU 25	:	:	:	:	15.0(p)	19.5(p)	14.2(p)	18.7(p)	13.9(b)	17.9(b)
EU 15	18.4(p)	22.6(p)	17.1(p)	21.6(p)	16.6(p)	21.2(p)	16.1(p)	20.9(p)	15.9(b)	20.2(b)
Belgium	12.7(b)	17.7 b	10.2	14.8	12.3	15.0	9.9	14.9	10.8	14.7
Germany	15.6	14.2	15.2	14.6	12.8	12.2	12.6	12.6	12.6(p)	12.6(p)
Greece	14.8	21.2	12.9	21.8	13.0	20.4	12.3	20.1	11.0 (b)	19.6(b)
Spain	23.6	35.4	23.2	34.3	22.2	34.9	22.3	35.4	23.4	36.1
France	13.4	16.0	11.9	14.8	12.0	15.0	11.9	14.9	11.6 (b)	15.0(b)
Ireland	:	:	:	:	:	:	10.8	18.5	9.2(b)	14.9(b)
Italy	24.2	30.3	21.9	28.8	22.6	30.2	20.7	27.9	20.1	26.8
Hungary	12.7	13.3	13.2	14.3	12.6	13.3	11.8	12.5	11.1(b)	12.4(b)
Netherlands	14.9	17.5	14.8	16.2	14.1	16.5	14.3	15.7	14.3 p)	15.7(p)
Portugal	38.8	50.7	35.4	50.3	37.0	51.6	38.1	52.9	33.8	48.3
Slovenia	:	:	:	:	5.6	9.3	3.3	6.2	2.3	6.2
Finland	7.9	12.0	6.5(b)	11.3(b)	7.7	13.0	7.3	12.6	8.6(b)	12.9(b)
Sweden	6.1	7.7	6.2	9.2	9.7 b	11.3 b	9.3	11.4	8.2(b)	9.8(b)
UK	19.3(p)	20.1(p)	17.8(p)	18.8(p)	16.6(p)	18.6(p)	16.6(p)	18.8(p)	16.4(p)	17.0(p)

p) provisional value

b) break in series

Source: Eurostat SC053 IV.5.1-2

2. Social cohesion

Domain: Trust

Sub-domain: Generalised trust

25. Extent to which 'most people can be trusted'

Proportion of the population who thinks that most people can be trusted

	B	D	EL	E	F	IRL	I	HU	NL	SL	FIN	S	UK
most people can be trusted	29,3	34,8	19,1	38,5	22,2	35,2	32,6	21,8	59,7	21,7	58	66,3	29,9
you cannot be too careful	70,7	65,2	80,9	61,5	77,8	64,8	67,4	78,2	40,3	78,3	42	33,7	70,1

Source: European Values Study; A third Wave (question 8)

Extent to which the population thinks that most people can be trusted, 2002

The table includes the country means in a 0-10 scale, where 0 means the distrust and 10 means the trustfulness

	B	D	EL	E	IRL	I	HU	NL	P	SL	FIN	S	UK
country means	4,81	4,61	3,64	4,86	5,46	4,54	4,08	5,71	4	3,98	6,46	6,09	5,05

Source: European Social Survey (ESS) 2002

Sub-domain: Specific trust

26. Trust in: government; elected representatives; political parties; armed forces; legal system; the media; trade unions, police; religious institutions; civil service; economic transactions

Trust in different institutions in European countries 2002/2003

	Trust in country's parliament	Legal system	Police	Politicians	European Parliament
Belgium	4,99	4,39	5,64	4,28	4,88
Germany	4,47	5,73	6,73	3,5	4,46
Spain	4,83	4,31	5,43	3,37	4,8
Finland	5,79	6,75	7,95	4,78	4,88
UK	4,68	5,03	6,04	3,79	3,61
Greece	4,83	6,27	6,43	3,46	5,69
Hungary	5	5,11	4,91	3,88	5,67
Ireland	4,43	5,14	6,53	3,75	5,11
Italy	4,83	5,49	6,66	3,54	5,51
Netherlands	5,22	5,38	5,82	4,87	4,67
Portugal	4,44	4,26	5,13	2,82	4,76
Sweden	5,92	6,06	6,76	4,72	4,02
Slovenia	4,04	4,28	4,89	3,07	4,65

Source: European Social Survey 2002.

Remarks: The table includes the country means in a 0-10 scale, where 0 means the distrust and 10 means the trustfulness.

28. Importance of: family; friends; leisure; politics; respecting parents. parents' duty to children

Proportion of the population for whom work, family, friends, leisure time, politics is quite or very important in its life (those two answer categories are taken together)

	work	family	friends	leisure time	politics	religion
Belgium	92,8	97,6	89,1	86,2	33,1	47,6
Germany	82,7	96,9	94,5	83,2	39,5	35
Greece	87,2	99,1	85,5	76,9	34,9	79,7
Spain	94,6	98,9	86,6	80,9	19,3	42
France	94,8	98,2	94,4	88,1	35,4	36,9
Ireland	84,7	98,5	97,3	86,9	32,1	70,7
Italy	95	98,6	89,8	81,2	33,8	72,1
Hungary	88,7	97,8	82,3	79,7	18,2	42,3
Netherlands	86,5	92,7	96,3	94	57,7	39,8
Portugal	95,1	98,7	87,9	83,7	27,1	75,5
Slovenia	95,8	97,2	88,3	79,7	14,5	36,6
Finland	89,2	96,2	95,2	90	19,8	45,1
Sweden	91,1	97,9	97,6	93,9	55	35
UK	78,6	98,8	96,6	92,5	34,3	37,4

Source: European Values Study; A third Wave (question 1)

Domain: Other integrative norms and values

Sub-domain: Altruism

29. Volunteering: number of hours per week

Volunteer work and informal help among persons aged 20-74 (Hours and minutes per day)

	B	D	F	HU	SI	FIN	S	UK
Volunteer work and help among women aged 20-74	0:10	0:15	0:14	0:08	0:06	0:16	0:12	0:14
Volunteer work and help among men aged 20-74	0:11	0:17	0:18	0:13	0:11	0:16	0:12	0:10

Source: How Europeans spend their time everyday life of women and men – Luxembourg

30. Blood donation

Blood donation (%), 2002

	EU	B	D	E	F	IRL	I	NL	P	FIN	S	UK
Yes	31	23	31	25	38	32	24	26	22	39	25	32

Source: « Le don de sang », Eurostat, 2003, p.2, Eurobarometer 58.2

Sub-domain: Tolerance

31. Views on immigration, pluralism and multiculturalism

Proportion of different opinions according to the inclusion of immigrants in different countries, 2000

Country	Let anyone come who wants to	Let people come as long as there jobs available	Put strict limits on the number of foreigners who can come here	Prohibit people coming here from other countries
Belgium	7,4	33,5	50,5	8,6
Germany	4,5	32,6	56	7
Greece	3,5	40,9	41	14,6
Spain	19,1	56,2	22,4	2,3
Ireland	8,3	46,7	42,1	2,9
Italy	9,7	47,4	38,3	4,6
Hungary	2	12	59,1	26,8
Netherlands	3,9	35,9	55,6	4,7
Portugal	11,5	61,4	23,2	3,9
Slovenia	4,6	48,1	38,9	8,4
Finland	10,4	34,7	51,9	3
Sweden	16,3	54,4	28,7	0,5
UK	4,3	34,1	48,5	13,1

Source: European Values Survey 1999/2000, Q74

Proportion of different opinions in connection with the cultural identity of immigrants in different countries

Country	For the greater good of society it is better if immigrants maintain their distinct customs and traditions	For the greater good of society it is better if immigrants do not maintain their distinct custom and traditions but take over the customs of the country
Belgium	28,1	71,9
Germany	23,8	76,2
Greece	68,7	31,3
Spain	52	48
Ireland	56,7	43,3
Italy	59,7	40,3
Hungary	33,4	66,6
Netherlands	29,1	70,9
Portugal	48,9	51,1
Slovenia	30,8	69,2
Finland	32	68
Sweden	36	64
UK	44,7	55,3

Source: European Values Survey 1999/2000, Q75

32. Tolerance of other people's self-identity, beliefs, behaviour and lifestyle preferences

Typology of people according to their attitudes towards minorities

Proportion of the population that is intolerant, ambivalent, passively tolerant and actively tolerant by country

	Intolerant	Ambivalent	Passively tolerant	Actively tolerant
EU15	14	25	39	21
Belgium	25	28	26	22
Germany	18	29	29	24
Greece	27	43	22	7
Spain	4	18	61	16
France	19	26	31	25
Ireland	13	21	50	15
Italy	11	21	54	15
Netherlands	11	25	34	31
Portugal	9	34	44	12
Finland	8	21	39	32
Sweden	9	15	43	33
UK	15	27	36	22

Source: Eurobarometer 2000 survey

Tolerance of other people's self-identity, beliefs, behaviour and lifestyle preferences

	B	D	EL	E	F	IRL	I	HU
Claiming state benefits which you are not entitled to	2,57	1,91	3,64	2,67	3,39	1,9	1,88	1,7
Cheating on tax if you have the chance	3,64	2,36	2,88	2,35	3,06	2,35	2,39	2,12
Taking and driving away a car belonging to someone else (joyriding)	1,2	1,24	1,39	1,64	1,38	1,11	1,46	1,14
Taking the drug marihuana or hashish	1,72	1,91	2,04	2,16	2,15	1,99	2,03	1,26
Lying in your own interest	3,62	3,32	2,58	2,93	3,71	2,32	2,41	2,53
Married men/women having an affair	2,72	2,85	2,12	2,48	3,52	1,84	2,75	2,1
Someone accepting a bribe in the course of their duties	2	1,8	1,66	1,68	2,08	1,42	1,5	2,67
Homosexuality	5,22	5,69	3,39	5,51	5,27	4,4	4,83	1,45
Abortion	4,45	4,61	4,18	4,34	5,64	2,9	4,04	3,92
Divorce	5,64	5,86	5,42	6,1	6,32	4,8	5,14	4,5
Euthanasia (terminating the life of the incurably sick)	5,83	4,34	3,49	4,73	6,16	3,31	3,86	3,83
Suicide	3,27	2,61	2,26	2,77	4,34	2,07	2,28	1,56
Throwing away litter in a public place	1,48	2,22	1,88	1,86	1,62	1,81	1,58	1,72
Driving under the influence of alcohol	1,64	1,45	1,49	1,52	1,88	1,4	1,43	1,16
Paying cash for services to avoid taxes	4,29	2,89	3,46	3,35	4,18	2,89	2,5	2,62
Having casual sex	2,86	3,15	3,6	3,92	3,91	2,71	3,07	2,74
Smoking in public buildings	2,92	4,05	4	3,74	3,38	3,33	3,46	2,85
Speeding over the limit in built-up areas	2,39	1,99	2,19	1,93	2,84	1,85	2,61	1,98
Avoiding a fare on public transport	2,39	2,13	2,89	:	2,71	:	2,17	:
Sex under the legal age of consent	:	2,64	4,57	:	:	1,45	:	:
Prostitution	:	4,19	2,37	3,25	:	2,54	2,4	:
Political assassinations	:	1,49	1,93	:	:	:	:	:
Scientific experiments on human embryos	2,07	1,52	1,38	1,74	:	1,92	1,95	:
Genetic manipulation of food stuff	2,42	2,21	2,32	2,05	:	:	2,31	:

Tolerance of other people's self-identity, beliefs, behaviour and lifestyle preferences (continued)

	NL	P	SL	FIN	S	UK	Total
Claiming state benefits which you are not entitled to	1,51	2,03	2,82	2,3	2,08	1,99	2,28
Cheating on tax if you have the chance	2,67	2,45	2,34	2,46	2,41	2,42	2,63
Taking and driving away a car belonging to someone else (joyriding)	1,34	1,62	1,68	1,31	1,29	1,21	1,41
Taking the drug marihuana or hashish	3,06	2,02	2,3	1,65	1,77	3,1	1,83
Lying in your own interest	3,14	2,45	2,54	2,71	2,56	3,01	2,85
Married men/women having an affair	2,69	2,47	3,47	2,36	2,38	2,31	2,56
Someone accepting a bribe in the course of their duties	1,58	1,77	1,78	1,43	1,83	1,77	1,82
Homosexuality	7,8	3,19	4,62	4,94	7,65	4,89	4,3
Abortion	5,4	3,81	6,19	5,42	7,38	4,54	4,58
Divorce	6,54	5,46	6,58	6,64	7,8	5,57	5,51
Euthanasia (terminating the life of the incurably sick)	6,65	3,5	5,37	5,4	6,07	4,99	4,82
Suicide	4,34	2,2	3,54	3,04	4,12	3,16	2,63
Throwing away litter in a public place	1,7	1,83	1,94	2,27	2,72	2,61	1,88
Driving under the influence of alcohol	1,44	1,83	2,04	1,35	1,35	1,51	1,54
Paying cash for services to avoid taxes	4,2	2,25	3,28	3,48	3,78	3,53	3,25
Having casual sex	3,7	2,76	4,08	3,75	4,8	3,44	3,15
Smoking in public buildings	3,81	3,34	3,57	3,1	3,18	4,02	3,51
Speeding over the limit in built-up areas	1,8	2,38	2,93	2,82	2,72	2,3	2,33
Avoiding a fare on public transport	2,72	:	:	2,36	:	2,68	2,82
Sex under the legal age of consent	:	:	5,78	3,31	:	1,96	2,53
Prostitution	:	:	3,31	3,2	:	3,42	2,84
Political assassinations	:	:	:	1,44	:	1,99	1,63
Scientific experiments on human embryos	2,5	:	1,86	2,47	:	2,35	2,08
Genetic manipulation of food stuff	3,07	:	2,83	2,6	:	2,3	2,42

Source: European Values Survey 1999/2000, Q65, 1-10 scale

Sub-domain: Social contract

33. Beliefs on causes of poverty: individual or structural

Proportion of the population which considers (respectively) unfortunateness, laziness, injustice and the modern progress as the most important reason for living in need

	unlucky	laziness or lack of willpower	injustice in society	part of the modern progress	none of these
Belgium	26,8	16	35,3	20	1,9
Germany	11,7	28,4	36,9	19,6	3,5
Greece	14,3	29,8	18,2	34,4	3,3
Spain	19,8	19,6	48,4	10,4	1,9
France	14,4	11,4	44,3	26,9	2,9
Ireland	23,2	20,6	33	19,3	3,9
Italy	19,5	23	37,7	15,6	4,2
Hungary	13	27,6	37,7	18,8	2,9
Netherlands	32,8	14,3	25,8	17,5	9,7
Portugal	23,3	41,9	21,6	11,6	1,6
Slovenia	10,4	33,2	35,4	17,3	3,7
Finland	14,8	23	23,8	35,3	3,1
Sweden	10,2	7,1	49,5	33,1	0
Great Britain	16,4	24,6	30,5	24,4	4,1

Source: European Values Study : A third Wave (question 11)

38. Membership (active or inactive) of political, voluntary, charitable organisations or sport clubs

Proportion of people member of non-governmental organizations (NGO's) in different countries, 2002/2003

	B	D	EL	E	IRL	I	HU	NL	P	SL	FIN	S	UK
Male	65,1	72	24,8	36,7	68,6	37	27,9	84,4	31,1	51,3	64,6	82,8	71,4
Female	57,1	61,7	16,4	29,5	59,3	24,9	17,7	77,4	18,6	33,3	57,2	78,8	62

Source: European Social Survey 2002/2003

Proportion of population which belongs to....

	B	D	EL	E	F	IRL	I
social welfare services for elderly, handicapped or deprived people	11,4	3,9	10,2	3,7	5,6	5,9	6,4
religious or church organisations	12,2	13,5	11,8	5,8	4,3	16,2	10,3
education, arts, music or cultural activities	18,9	7,9	11,2	7,3	7,8	10,1	9,9
trade unions	15,7	7,2	6,5	3,5	4	10	6,2
political parties or groups	7	2,8	4,9	2	2	4,4	4,1
local community action on issues like poverty, employment, housing, racial equality	5	0,7	2,8	2,2	2,3	5,6	2,4
third world development or human rights	9,8	0,6	1,8	2,4	1,4	2,4	2,9
conservation, the environment, ecology, animal rights	10,4	2,7	5,8	2,5	2,2	2,8	3,8
professional associations	8,3	4,4	7,7	2,6	3,1	7,7	7,1
youth work	7,5	1,9	2,5	2,6	2	7,1	4,2
sports or recreation	23,8	28	9,6	8,5	16,4	27,6	11,5
women's groups	8,7	3,6	2,2	2,3	0,4	4,4	0,4
peace movements	2,3	0,2	2,9	1,6	0,5	1,7	1,4
voluntary organisations concerned with health	5	2,5	3,6	2,7	2,5	4,1	4,7
other groups	10,6	3,9	6,8	3,7	6,9	5,4	2,6

Proportion of population which belongs to.... (continued)

	HU	NL	P	SL	FIN	S	UK
social welfare services for elderly, handicapped or deprived people	1,9	21,6	2	5,4	10,4	20,8	6,7
religious or church organisations	12,1	35,1	5,6	6,7	47	71,5	4,9
education, arts, music or cultural activities	3,4	46,2	3,1	9,2	14,3	26,4	9,7
trade unions	7	23,4	1,7	16,9	32,3	64	8,2
political parties or groups	1,6	9,5	0,9	3	6,6	10,6	2,5
local community action on issues like poverty, employment, housing, racial equality	1	7,4	1	9,2	2,6	9,5	3,8
third world development or human rights	0,3	24,6	0,8	0,8	5,9	15	2,6
conservation, the environment, ecology, animal rights	1,7	44,3	0,5	3,3	4,4	11,3	1,5
professional associations	3,7	18,5	1,1	6,7	5,6	14,5	1,6
youth work	0,8	7,3	1,2	4,5	6,7	6,9	5,7
sports or recreation	3,8	50,3	8,6	16,9	23,7	37	3
women's groups	0,3	4		1,9	4	3,5	1,7
peace movements	0,3	3,4	0,6	0,8	1,3	1,5	0,6
voluntary organisations concerned with health	2	9,6	2,2	2,9	9,2	6,7	3
other groups	2,6	9,7	3,2	9,9	11,8	25	5

Source: European Values Study; A third Wave (question 5)

40. Frequency of contact with friends and colleagues

Frequency of spending time with friends

	B	D	EL	E	F	IRL	I	HU	NL	P	SL	FIN	S	UK
every week	50,2	49,3	62,1	67,5	58,5	72,1	61,9	37,0	66,7	63,6	57,7	60,3	66,5	74,2
once a week	30,9	36,7	23,6	18,5	28,0	21,1	20,2	29,1	25,5	14,5	25,7	27,7	28,2	18,5
few times a year	14,1	12,3	11,3	10,1	11,0	5,3	13,3	22,0	6,5	16,3	14,0	11,0	5,0	5,2
not at all	4,9	1,7	3,1	3,9	2,5	1,6	4,6	11,9	1,3	5,6	2,6	1,0	0,3	2,1

Source: European Social Survey (Q6A)

Frequency of spending time with colleagues

	B	D	EL	E	F	IRL	I	HU	NL	P	SL	FIN	S	UK
every week	12,9	11,3	24,1	27,0	12,5	25,0	16,8	13,6	14,7	35,4	24,4	23,3	17,8	18,6
once a week	22,5	27,0	23,3	18,7	18,7	27,5	21,9	17,3	29,2	17,8	25,6	23,8	35,9	24,2
few times a year	33,4	39,9	21,6	18,8	24,0	20,4	26,4	20,5	38,3	16,5	28,2	33,8	37,0	26,8
not at all	31,2	21,8	30,9	35,4	44,7	27,0	35,0	48,5	17,7	30,2	21,9	19,1	9,3	30,3

Source: European Social Survey (Q6B)

Domain: Identity

Sub-domain: National / European pride

41. Sense of national pride

Sense of pride : proportion of the population which is proud of being (country) / European

	EU15	B	D	EL	E	F	IRL	I	NL	P	FIN	S	UK
national pride	85	83	66	96	92	86	96	93	84	92	96	90	90
european pride	61	64	49	64	74	58	75	81	62	66	73	70	47

Source: Standard Eurobarometer 6;: full report (categories very and fairly proud taken together)

Sense of national pride

	B	D	EL	E	F	IRL	I	HU	NL	P	SL	FIN	S	UK
very proud	24,3	16,8	65	44,1	39,7	71,8	39,3	50,9	19,5	79,1	55,7	56,1	41,4	50,5
quite proud	50,9	50,8	25,6	45,2	49,6	26,2	49	38,4	60,5	17,7	34,9	37,5	45,6	39,5
not very proud	17,5	24,3	8,6	7,8	7	1,7	9,8	8,5	14,8	2,3	7,4	5,6	11,6	7,9
not at all proud	7,3	8,1	0,9	3	3,7	0,3	1,9	2,3	5,2	0,9	2	0,9	1,4	2,1

Source: European Values Study; A third Wave (Q71)

Sub-domain: Regional / community / local identity

43. Sense of regional / community / local identity

Which of these geographical groups would you say you belong to first of all?

	B	D	EL	E	F	IRL	I	HU	NL	P	SL	FIN	S	UK
locality or town	32,1	55,2	44,8	45,6	43,7	56,6	53,4	67,3	39,1	36,3	52,8	48,9	58,7	48,9
region of country	20,3	29,6	12	16,5	12,1	15,8	10,6	6,3	7,7	16	8,7	12,3	9,5	13,7
country as a whole	27,9	10,1	33,2	26,8	28,5	24	23,3	20,1	41,2	41,6	32,1	31,2	22,4	28,4
Europe	9,3	2,9	1,2	1,7	4,3	2,2	4,2	2	4,8	1,6	2,4	3,2	4,2	1,9
world as a whole	10,4	2,2	8,8	9,4	11,4	1,4	8,5	4,3	7,2	4,5	3,9	4,4	5,3	7,2

Source: European Values Study; A third Wave (Q67)

3. Social inclusion

Domain: Citizenship rights

Sub-domain: Constitutional / political rights

46. Proportion having right to vote in local elections and proportion exercising it

Proportion voting in national elections (as the percentage of the voting age population)

	B	D	EL	EL	F	IRL	I	HU	NL	P	SL	FIN	SL	UK
1995-1999	83,2	:	83,9	80,6	59,9	66,7	87,4	:	:	79,1	:	71,1	:	69,4

Source: IDEA (1997), Voter Turnout from 1947 to 1997 and OECD : Society at a glance 2001

Sub-domain: Social rights

48. Women's pay as a proportion of men's

Gender pay gap

as the difference between average gross hourly earnings of male paid employees and of female paid employees as a percentage of average gross hourly earnings of male paid employees.

	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
EU (15 countries)	16	16	15	16	16
Belgium	10	9	11	12	12
Germany	21	22	19	21	21
Greece	13	12	13	15	18
Spain	14	16	14	15	17
France	12	12	12	13	14
Ireland	19	20	22	19	17
Italy	7	7	8	6	6
Hungary	22	18	19	20	19
Netherlands	22	21	21	21	19
Portugal	7	6	5	8	10
Slovenia	14	11	14	12	11
Finland	18	19	19	17	17
Sweden	17	18	17	18	18
United Kingdom	21	24	22	21	21

Source: Eurostat; free data, employment

Earnings of men and women

Annual gross earnings of women as a percentage of men's, 2000

	EU15	B	D	EL	E	F	IRL	I	NL	P	FIN	S	UK
Industry and services	75	83	-	80	77	82	-	-	73	71	79	86	68
Industry	77	83	78	83	73	84	-	-	77	67	82	89	69
Mining and quarrying	75	99	91	81	-	92	-	-	-	94	77	90	68
Manufacturing	75	79	76	74	-	79	-	-	75	65	80	89	68
Electricity, gas and water supply	78	68	82	81	-	83	-	-	81	89	77	83	70
Construction	88	99	91	94	102	100	-	-	82	90	82	90	76
Trade and repairs	72	79	74	76	-	77	-	-	68	71	73	83	63
Hotels and restaurants	79	91	-	77	-	85	-	-	82	74	90	90	72
Transport	84	91	-	64	-	90	-	-	74	98	87	92	81
Financial intermediation	62	70	75	73	-	64	-	-	62	80	57	66	46
Real estate	70	76	-	91	-	72	-	-	70	71	75	78	66

Note: The share refers to full-time earnings.

Source: «Living conditions in Europe», Eurostat, 2003, p.60

Sub-domain: Economic and political networks

52. Proportion of women elected or appointed to parliament, boards of private companies and foundations

Proportion of women in national governments and parliaments, 2001

	B	D	EL	ES	F	IRL	I	NL	P	FIN	S	UK	Total
government	22,2	38,6	12,5	17,6	29,4	21,9	10,3	36	9,8	38,9	50	32,9	24,7
parliament	24,6	29,8	8,7	27,1	8,3	14,2	10,2	32,4	20	37	44,3	17	20,5

Source: Europäische datenbank Frauen in Führungspositionen (www.db-decision.de)

Domain: Labour market

Sub-domain: Access to paid employment

53. Long-term unemployment (12+ months)

Total long-term unemployment

	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
EU 15	4.9	4.4	4.0	3.5	3.1	3.1	3.3
Belgium	5.4	5.5	4.9	3.7	3.2	3.5	3.7
Germany	4.9	4.7	4.3	3.9	3.8	4.1	4.6
Greece	5.3	5.8	6.4	6.0	5.4	5.1	5.1
Spain	8.9	7.6	5.9	4.7	3.9	3.9	3.9
France	4.8	4.6	4.2	3.6	3.0	3.0	3.4
Ireland	6.0	3.9	2.6	1.6	1.2	1.3	1.5
Italy	7.5	7.0	6.8	6.4	5.8	5.3	4.9
Hungary	4.5	4.2	3.3	3.0	2.5	2.4	2.4
Netherlands	2.3	1.5	1.2	0.8	0.7	0.7	1.0
Portugal	3.3	2.2	1.8	1.7	1.5	1.8	2.2
Slovenia	3.4	3.3	3.2	4.1	3.5	3.4	3.4
Finland	4.9	4.1	3.0	2.8	2.5	2.3	2.3
Sweden	3.1	2.6	1.9	1.4	1.0	1.0	1.0
UK	2.5	1.9	1.7	1.5	1.3	1.1	1.1

Source: Eurostat;; free data, social cohesion

Long-term unemployment: females and males (1997-2000)

	1997		1998		1999		2000	
	females	males	females	males	females	males	females	males
EU 15	5.8	4.2	5.4	3.7	4.7	3.3	4.2	2.9
Belgium	7.1	4.2	7.0	4.5	5.9	4.1	4.6	3.0
Germany	5.6	4.3	5.3	4.2	4.7	4.0	4.2	3.7
Greece	9.3	2.8	9.9	3.1	10.5	3.7	9.8	3.5
Spain	14.1	5.7	12.4	4.8	9.4	3.7	7.6	2.8
France	5.7	4.0	5.5	3.9	5.1	3.5	4.4	2.9
Ireland	5.1	6.5	2.8	4.6	1.9	3.2	1.0	2.0
Italy	10.5	5.7	9.5	5.4	9.3	5.2	8.8	4.9
Hungary	4.0	4.9	3.9	4.5	2.9	3.6	2.5	3.4
Netherlands	3.1	1.8	1.8	1.3	1.5	0.9	1.0	0.6
Portugal	3.6	3.0	2.7	1.9	2.1	1.5	2.1	1.4
Slovenia	3.3	3.6	3.3	3.3	3.0	3.4	4.1	4.0
Finland	4.9	4.9	4.0	4.3	2.8	3.2	2.7	2.8
Sweden	2.0	4.0	1.8	3.2	1.4	2.2	1.0	1.7
UK	1.5	3.3	1.2	2.5	1.0	2.2	0.9	1.9

Long-term unemployment: females and males (continued) (2001-2003)

	2001		2002		2003	
	females	males	females	males	females	males
EU 15	3.7	2.7	3.6	2.7	3.7	2.9
Belgium	3.6	3.0	4.1	3.2	4.0	3.4
Germany	4.1	3.7	4.2	4.0	4.6	4.6
Greece	8.6	3.1	8.3	3.0	8.5	2.8
Spain	6.3	2.3	6.3	2.3	6.0	2.4
France	3.7	2.4	3.5	2.6	3.9	3.1
Ireland	0.8	1.6	0.7	1.7	0.9	1.9
Italy	8.0	4.5	7.2	4.1	6.7	3.9
Hungary	2.1	2.9	2.1	2.7	2.3	2.5
Netherlands	0.8	0.5	0.8	0.6	1.1	1.0
Portugal	1.9	1.2	2.2	1.4	2.6	1.8
Slovenia	3.6	3.4	3.4	3.4	3.6	3.3
Finland	2.3	2.7	2.0	2.5	2.0	2.6
Sweden	0.8	1.2	0.8	1.2	0.8	1.2
UK	0.8	1.7	0.7	1.4	0.7	1.4

Source: Eurostat; free data, social cohesion

Domain: Social networks

Sub-domain: Neighbourhood participation

67. Proportion in regular contact with neighbours

Percentage of population aged 16 and over talking to neighbours, 1999

	EU	B	D	EL	E	F	IRL	I	NL	P	FIN	S	UK
At least once a week	81	71	-	96	90	-	89	80	70	86	79	-	78
Once or twice a month	10	17	-	2	5	-	7	10	14	8	12	-	13
Less than once a month or never	9	12	-	2	5	-	4	10	16	6	9	-	9

Source: Eurostat 2003, Living conditions in Europe

Sub-domain: Friendships

68. Proportion in regular contact with friends

Percentage of the population aged 16 and over meeting people (at home or elsewhere), 1999

	EU	B	D	EL	E	F	IRL	I	NL	P	FIN	S	UK
At least once a week	81	78	-	90	92	66	97	81	85	74	80	-	87
Once or twice a week	14	18	-	9	6	26	3	13	13	16	17	-	10
Less than once a month or never	5	4	-	2	2	8	1	6	2	9	4	-	3

Source: Eurostat 2003, Living conditions in Europe

4. Social Empowerment

Domain: Knowledge base

Sub-domain: Availability of information

73. Per cent of population literate and numerate

Competence poverty: proportion of educationally „poor” individuals in different countries based on literacy competences

	B	D	EL	F	IRL	I	HU	P	FIN	S	UK
students aged 15	19	22,6	24,4	15,2	11	18,9	22,7	26,3	6,9	12,6	12,8
Population aged 16-65	15,3	9	-	-	25,3	-	32,9	49,1	12,6	6,2	23,3

Source: PISA2000; Adult Literacy Survey, 1994-98

75. Access to internet

Internet use in different European countries (% of individuals aged 14 and over)

	B	EL	E	IRL	I	HU	NL	P	SL	FIN	S	UK
Never use	56,3	86,6	75,1	58,3	69,8	80,4	40,7	69,9	64,1	43,9	33	51,4
Everyday use	18,1	4,2	9,3	13	9,9	5,7	21,7	14,8	10,6	18,8	27,8	17,7

Source: European Social Survey, 2002/2003

Domain: Labour market

Sub-domain: Prospects of job mobility

80. % of employed labour force receiving work based training

Continuing vocational training (CVT) in enterprises (1999)

	EU	B	D	EL	E	F	IRL	I	NL	P	FIN	S	UK
Training enterprises as a % of all enterprises	62	70	75	18	36	76	79	24	88	22	82	91	87
Employees in training enterprises as a % of employees in all enterprises	88	88	92	56	64	93	92	56	96	52	95	98	97
Participants in CVT courses as a % of employees in all enterprises	40	41	32	15	25	46	41	26	41	17	50	61	49
Hours in CVT courses per employee (all enterprises)	12	13	9	6	11	17	17	8	15	7	18	18	13
Hours in CVT courses per participant	31	31	27	39	42	36	40	32	37	38	36	31	26

Source: Eurostat 2003, Living conditions in Europe

Distribution of companies and enterprises that provide vocational training, 1999 (%)

Branch	B	D	E	HU	NL	P	SL	FIN	S
Industry	68	73	38	34	90	19	53	77	90
Commerce	72	83	41	39	87	24	30	85	94
Finanacial services	100	100	74	79	97	67	66	100	100
Economic services	86	87	41	48	90	43	60	86	90
Other public and personal services	75	89	33	35	88	29	69	93	100
Other	63	65	29	31	86	18	46	79	84

Source: Eurostat 2002, Statistics in Focus

Annex Social Quality theory

1 Introduction

In the 1990s representatives of universities from different European countries started to elaborate the theory of social quality. Stimulated by neo-liberal globalisation and the dominance of economic interests and herewith related economic thinking and policies in the process of European integration, they were searching for an alternative. Important was to develop international standards with which to counteract the downward pressure on welfare spending (the race to the bottom). But which standards were acceptable, which theoretical criteria could be applied and why? The social quality initiative addressed these questions and could be seen as a possible theoretical foundation upon which judgements for acceptable standards could be made. The initiative was launched formally under the Dutch Presidency of the European Union in 1997. The European Foundation on Social Quality, localised in Amsterdam was founded and presented its first study; *The Social Quality of Europe* (Kluwer Law International, 1997; paperback version by Policy Press, 1998). Social quality is a new standard intended to assess economic, cultural, and welfare progress. One that can be used at all levels to measure the extent to which the daily lives of citizens have attained an acceptable level. It aspires to be both a standard by which people can assess the effectiveness of national and European policies and a scientific yardstick for evidence-based policy making. Its ambition is to contribute to public policies that improve the democratic relations on European and national levels and that enhance social justice and equity in the cities and regions of Europe.

From the beginning the theory's aims has been to contribute to a comprehensive understanding of societal processes and to develop an interdisciplinary approach. The social quality approach is a strategy for analysing the reciprocity between societal structures and actions of citizens. The most renewing aspect of this approach – and especially in this respect social quality differs from the traditional (passive) welfare policies – is the addition of the concept of empowerment; a concept that strengthens the roles of citizens in their communities. The goal is to contribute to the personnel development of citizens to enable them to elaborate their own conditions for social quality in daily circumstances.

The first study delivered the points of departure for the Amsterdam Declaration of Social Quality (June 1997) which opens with the words; *“Respect for the fundamental human dignity of all citizens requires us to declare that we do not want to see growing numbers of beggars, tramps and homeless in the cities of Europe. Nor can we countenance a Europe with large numbers of unemployed, growing numbers of poor people and those who have only limited access to health care and social services. These and many other negative indicators demonstrate the current inadequacy of Europe to provide social quality for all citizens”*. This Declaration was finally signed by thousands scientists all over Europe and presented solemnly to the President of the European Parliament in October 1997.

In this appendix to the national reports about the indicators of social quality we will not present the whole theory, but only the aspects relevant for the application of this theory and for the analysis of societal trends and processes in the European Union. The project, for which these national reports

are made, tries to determine and compare the nature of social quality in the different European countries.

2 The European Network on Indicators of Social Quality (ENIQ)

2.1 The Foundation's second book as point of departure

The policy of the European Foundation on Social Quality is based on five pillars: (i) theorising social quality, (ii) developing its measurement instruments, (iii) applying these instruments to policy outcomes as well as circumstances in cities and regions, (iv) disseminating the Foundation's outcomes, and (v) stimulating public debates. In January 2001 the Foundation published the outcomes of the 'permanent symposium' about social quality and the outcomes of its projects in a second book; *Social Quality, A New Vision for Europe* (Kluwer Law International, 2001). In the Foreword of this book Mr. R. Prodi, the former President of the European Commission, says that "*The concept of quality is, in essence, a democratic concept, based on partnership between the European institutions, the Member States, regional and local authorities and civil society. Quality conveys the sense of excellence that characterises the European social model. The great merit of this book is that it places social issues at the very core of the concept of quality. It promotes an approach that goes beyond production, economic growth, employment and social protection and gives self-fulfilment for individual citizens a major role to play in the formation of collective identities. This makes the book an important and original contribution for the shaping of a new Europe*".

Thanks to this work the Foundation was rewarded for a manifold of grants. The most important were, first, a grant by DG Employment and Social Affairs for analysing employment policies from a social quality perspective. The main theme concerned the way the social quality approach may underpin flexibility and security in employment. The outcomes were published by Berghahn Journals in the double issue of the European Journal of Social Quality in 2003. The second important grant was rewarded by DG Research to develop a robust set of indicators with which to measure the conditional factors of social quality. This resulted in the start of the European Network on Indicators of Social Quality in October 2001. Representatives of fourteen universities in Europe and of two European NGOs participated in this network (see page iv of the national report). They were funded to appoint part-time junior scientists as assistants.

2.2 The challenge of the Network Indicators

The network had to deal with a couple of challenges. Within the network people, firstly, used different interpretations of the social quality theory. Secondly, they used different research methodologies. Thirdly, they had different cultural backgrounds (including different scientific backgrounds; like economics, political science, sociology, social policy), and fourthly, they had to deal with the language problem for proper communication. Therefore one of the major objectives of this network was to develop a common understanding. This goal was reached by a combination of deductive and inductive analysis in different stages of the project. In the first stage a preliminary consensus about the theory – discussed during plenary sessions - was tentatively applied in the fourteen national contexts. It concerned the first assessment of data availability in national and European databases for one conditional factor of social quality. The outcomes stimulated to deepen the common understanding and relationship between the four different conditional factors of social quality. The next stage was used for a second tentative application, now for all factors. The outcomes of the second exploration of data availability paved the way for the elaboration of the commonly accepted interpretation of the conditional factors (see below).

Especially thanks to the input by the network, the co-ordinating team and its advisors could specify and clarify the theory by defining the essence of the four conditional factors from a new interpretation of 'the social'. This was done also by analysing the general scientific and European policy debates about the concepts. The outcomes of this theoretical work paved the way for the third (and last) exploration of data availability in the fourteen countries, resulting in the national reports about indicators of social quality. In other words, the work by the network stimulated an incessant reciprocity between empirical exploration and theoretical work. The outcomes of this theoretical work and the interpretation of the outcomes of the national reports will be published in the Foundation's third study, forthcoming at the end of 2005.

3 Some aspects of the theory and its indicators

In this section a short overview will be given of the theoretical research of the project. This theoretical background is essential to understand the choice of the indicators for social quality on which the empirical research of the national reports is based.

3.1 The reciprocity between structure and action


A fundamental problem of any comprehensive theoretical approach is to grasp the structural and dialectical interdependence of what Emile Durkheim called 'social facts'. The reason for mentioning Durkheim here is that in his definition of 'social facts' he explicitly showed the supposed independence of 'the social'. We should however remark that 'the social' can only accurately be understood by reference to the individual as actor. The actual problem can be seen in the fact that we are challenged to think the seemingly impossible – the simultaneity of independence and dependence. Furthermore, we have to accentuate the position of individual people as social actors in order to realise the goal of social quality, namely understanding the reciprocity between social structures and actions of citizens.

The social quality approach tries to resolve the actual tension behind action and structure in a dialectical way. Social science is by definition a theory of action (this is not the same as the so-called 'action theory'), as the social cannot be imagined without actions or interventions by individual people. Instead of leaving this to spontaneous and voluntarist assessments it is proposed to search for criteria that allow the analysis of the developmental interconnectedness of both, the biographical and societal momentum of interaction; (i) amongst individual people, (ii) between individual people and society, (iii) amongst societal subsystems and not least (iv) between the various social actors and the natural environment. The social quality approach can serve as a comprehensive or meta-theory for addressing this interconnectedness. Rather than referring to actors and structure, this approach refers on the one hand to biographical and on the other hand to societal development. At the very same time, another reference is made to systems on the one hand and communities on the other hand.

3.2 The four conditional factors

Starting point of developing such a perspective is to look at a common denominator, i.e. criteria which are necessary for their constitution. This is not achieved by looking for minimal standards. Rather, the idea is that there should be a strong commonality in terms of the recognition of all four angles of the social fabric. This is meant to be a substantial dimension of the relationship between action and structure. We recognise four conditional factors of social quality, namely: (i) socio-economic security, (ii) social cohesion, (iii) social inclusion, and (iv) social empowerment. These four conditional factors define the concrete qualitative frame, in which society, individuals and their interaction develop.

Figure-1 The quadrangle of the conditional factors



This frame refers to the institutional level and the space for direct interaction. Furthermore it refers to the development of the actual interaction and the behavioural framework for this interaction. Each of these conditional factors has a different meaning, specific for what could be called 'elements of the social', i.e. for societal processes, biographical processes, systems and institutions, and communities and configurations. However, at the same time all of them are – individually and by their interaction – crucial as conditional factors.

3.3 A referral to the four constitutional factors

As important as this is, it is necessary to go a step further. Namely, to be able to go further into detail of analysing the actual interaction between people, we have to look as well for constitutional factors that realise the individual's competence to act. These factors are derived from the first basic assumption of the theory of social quality. It says, that individual people are essentially social beings.

They interact with each other and these interactions constitute the collective identities as contexts for their actions, resulting in processes of self-realisation.


This theme is presented for the first time in the Foundation's second book of January 2001 and will be elaborated in the Foundation's third book. The relationship between the constitutional factors and the conditional factors – theoretically and practically – will be analysed. For the European Network on Indicators of Social Quality the nature of the conditional factors in the fourteen national countries is the 'heart of the matter'.

4 The national reports about the indicators of social quality

4.1 The steps made by the network

The measurement tools of the conditional factors are indicators. Indicators of social quality are thus – to be precise – 'indicators of the conditional factors of social quality'. As said, the network's challenge was to develop a robust set of these indicators. A condition was to clarify and to elaborate the social quality theory. This was done by applying deductive and inductive approaches that increased the understanding of the nature of the four conditional factors substantially. Thanks to four plenary sessions of the network's participants and three plenary sessions of their assistants, all those engaged could reach an agreement on the final definition of the four conditional factors, and recognise their domains and sub-domains. This delivered the consensus necessary for the development of indicators for all sub-domains that are relevant for the understanding of the nature of the conditional factor in question. The outcomes of this process are presented in the national reports. The following steps are made to syntonize all relevant concepts and to define the set of indicators: firstly, to determine the subject matter and definition of the conditional factors; secondly, to relate these definitions to each other as well as to the subject matter of 'the social'; thirdly, to determine the conditional factors' most essential domains; fourthly, to determine the nature of the sub-domains. As argued already these steps were based on the reciprocity between empirical explorations in the different countries and theoretical elaboration of the conditional factors of social quality, thus between inductive and deductive approaches. It may be illustrated as follows:

Figure-2 Determination of related concepts




4.2 The definitions of the four conditional factors

The process resulting in the definitions of the relevant concepts will be extensively described in the network's Final Report. At this stage we will only present the consensus about the definitions of 'the social' and the four conditional factors.

The social will come into being thanks to the outcomes of reciprocal relationships between processes of self-realisation of individual people as social beings and processes leading to the formation of collective identities. Its subject matter concerns the outcomes of this reciprocity. The definition of social quality is based and derived from this reciprocity. **Social quality** is the extent to which people are able to participate in the social and economic life of their communities under conditions which enhance their well-being and individual potentials.

Figure-3 Subject matter of 'the social' and the definition of social quality



The herewith related definitions of the four conditional factors are:

- Socio-economic security is the extent to which individual people have resources over time.
- Social cohesion is the nature of social relations based on shared identities, values and norms.
- Social inclusion is the extent to which people have access to and are integrated in different institutions and social relations that constitute everyday life.
- Social empowerment is the extent to which personal capabilities of individual people and their ability to act are enhanced by social relations.

We mean by individual people, 'social beings' that interact with each other and influence the nature of collective identities. These collective identities on their turn influence the possibilities for self-realisation of the individual people. Thus this theory is oriented on social life, not on individuals potentials only. The theory rejects individualistic oriented propositions. Furthermore, there exists a form of overlap between the four conditional factors. This plays a role on the level of defining domains for the factors. In some cases domains can play a role in two or three different conditional factors. But the way of analysing these domains will differ by their sub-domains and indicators, because they are determined by the specificity of the conditional factor in question.

5 Conclusions

In all national reports the domains, sub-domains and indicators are presented in order to assess the data availability for these indicators. At this stage we will summarise some results of this approach:

- The indicators reflect processes of interacting social beings. In comparison with other approaches, the social quality approach has paid a lot more attention to the theoretical foundation of the indicators. It distinguishes ‘the social’ from the economic. Or more precise, the economic is seen as an aspect of ‘the social’ as is the cultural, the juridical etc. This prevents the trap of explaining social policy (or welfare policy) as a productive factor for economic policy and economic growth. The social has its own *raison d’être*.
- For the first time in the academic world concepts as socio-economic security, social cohesion, social inclusion and social empowerment are theoretically related with each other. The social quality theory demonstrates the intrinsic affinity of these four conditional factors. Herewith it addresses the existing scientific and policy-making fragmentation.
- Thanks to the applied method we have the possibility to analyse the nature and relationships between different policy areas. For example the relationship between economic policy, social policy and employment policy – see the Lisbon strategy – cannot be properly analysed without an intermediary. Social quality and the knowledge about the nature and changes of the four conditional factors deliver the points of departure for such an intermediary.
- The network has constructed indicators for measuring the nature and changes of the four conditional factors. By applying these indicators we dispose of a new tool for international comparison that is based on theoretically grounded concepts. Thanks to the application of this tools we are able to analyse the convergence and divergence between the Member States of the European Union with regard to these conditional factors of social quality. This could have added value for international comparison.
- Thanks to the assessment of the data availability of the indicators – as is done in each national report – we recognise the highly differentiated character of the countries of the European Union. This differentiated character cannot be captured by a reduction to a small number of social models. At the same time we recognise an intrinsic affinity in the emphasis on equity and solidarity between most of the countries involved. This outcome of the national reports will deliver good points of departure for future research on the comparison of the essence of the developmental approach of the European Union, the USA and the Asian countries.