

European Network Indicators of Social Quality
- ENIQ -

“Social Quality”
The Greek National Report

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European Foundation on Social Quality

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Preface

This national report and the 13 others that accompany it are published as part of the final report of the European Network on Indicators of Social Quality (ENIQ). The network began in October 2001 and completed its work in January 2005 and was funded under the Fifth Framework Programme of Directorate-General Research. Also published simultaneously are reports by the European Anti-Poverty Network and the International Council of Social Welfare, European Region based on the work of ENIQ. All of these reports and the deliberations of the Network contributed to the final report which contains a comprehensive overview of all of ENIQ's activities both theoretical and practical.

ENIQ has been focussed mainly on the operationalisation of the four conditional factors of social quality: socio-economic security, social cohesion, social inclusion and social empowerment. This huge collective effort has produced a very original and theoretically grounded instrument for comparative research aimed at understanding the nature and experience of social quality in different countries and in assessing the impact of policy changes. These national reports also reveal the highly differentiated character of the European Union (EU) which cannot be captured by reduction to a small number of social models. At the same time there is clearly an intrinsic affinity in the emphasis on equity and solidarity between most of the countries involved. This intrinsic, philosophical affinity is intriguing for future research.

The work presented in the national reports and the Network's final report will contribute substantially to the major book that will be published by the end of this year. There will also be articles based on the national reports in the European Journal of Social Quality.

The preparation of these national reports was an extremely difficult task. Developing a new approach, a new instrument, and analysing important social and economic trends and their consequences entailed considerable efforts for both established scientists and their junior assistants. The whole network had to grapple with the theoretical aspects of social quality as well as the empirical dimensions. Therefore we want to express our deep gratitude, on behalf of the European Foundation for Social Quality, for the work done by all participants in ENIQ. We will endeavour to ensure that this effort is not wasted and that Europe benefits from their expertise. We also want to acknowledge the excellent contributions of the staff of the Foundation - Margo Keizer, Helma Verkleij, Robert Duiveman and Sarah Doornbos - to the successful completion of this project. They made substantial inputs to all stages of the Network. Finally our thanks to the European Commission for funding ENIQ.

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1 Introduction

The ENIQ project explored the four conditional factors of social quality -defined as “the extent to which people are able to participate in the social and economic life of their communities under conditions which enhance their well-being and individual potential” (ENIQ 2004, p. 2; see also Beck et al. 2001)-, and developed a range of indicators for measuring their constitutive aspects. The main objective of this national report is to comment upon the social quality principles (and particularly the indicators for measuring the four conditional factors - socio-economic security, inclusion, cohesion and empowerment) from the point of view of social structures, daily experience and policy making in Greek society.

In the following sections, we discuss the suggested domains and sub-domains of each conditional factor of social quality, examine the availability of data and make an effort to give quantitative values for the suggested indicators. Within the comparative framework developed by the Network, we try to highlight particular features of Greek society, stress similarities and differences with other EU countries and draw attention to some country specific features, which should be taken into account for assessing main trends in Greece from the point of view of the social quality theory. Finally, we briefly touch upon major issues to be addressed by policy reform.

Beginning with the central premise of the “social quality” theory, that policy measures and practices should aim at enhancing self-realization while at the same time strengthening collective identity, let us remark that different socio-cultural traditions and historical trajectories across Europe account for significant variations in the mix of these constitutive dimensions of social quality in each country (or region) and influence the prospects of change. Greece differs from the other EU countries in that a tradition of contractual relations, collective solidarity and universalist values upholding social citizenship has persistently been rather weak. Instead phenomena of statism and clientelism (i.e. an extensive intervention of the state in the economy and widely observed processes of creation and distribution of revenue through political -rather than market- criteria) have been prevalent for a long time. As a result, significant socio-political cleavages between different groups on the basis of their success in establishing political credentials of access to the state and its revenue-yielding mechanisms acquired prominence in Greek society, alongside class conflicts and interests that were of crucial importance elsewhere in Europe (see Petmesidou 1991, 1992, 1996a, 2000 and forthcoming [a] & [c]; Petmesidou & Tsoulouvis 1994; Sotiropoulos 2003; see also Tsoukalas 1981 and Mouzelis 1986 for a historical examination of state-society relationships in Greece)¹ These features condition a number of “domains” (and “sub-domains”) of socio-economic security, social inclusion, cohesion and empowerment in Greece. Most importantly, the distinctive statist logic highly influences socio-economic cleavages, availability of and differential access to (material and immaterial) resources for coping with “uncertainties and risks of daily life”, as well the conditions of social exclusion/inclusion.

¹ It is striking, that even nowadays a significant number of posts in the public sector (more than 10 thousand) still change hands after a shift of the political party in office. For a commentary on how Greece differs from other EU countries, from an “outsider’s point of view” see Taylor-Gooby forthcoming.

In addition, social capital needs to be redefined: though familialism may have been traditionally strong, values of trust, consensus and social concertation – at the local, regional and national level- remain weak in Greece. This is reflected in the weakness of civil society, the highly conflictual character of industrial relations, the rudimentary social dialogue on major social problems and reform issues, and an almost absent proactive rationality that could mobilize partnerships and other forms of local collaboration, networking and collective initiatives. To add also here that, even though state intervention was extensive and all pervading, it did not lead to the formation of effective and efficient socio-economic planning processes. Legitimation to bring about the required structural reforms in public administration and set goals for social and economic planning has been persistently weak. Moreover, as argued elsewhere (see Petmesidou forthcoming [a], p. 25), “for a long time, the only practice which garnered a wide level of legitimation was that of using the state apparatus as a means of direct or indirect appropriation of resources and social surplus by the winners in the struggle for power”.²

In order to better capture the particular configuration of relationships between the various domains of social quality in Greek society, the particular institutional arrangement of statism, familialism and “soft budgeting” needs to be stressed. Only a few years ago the absence of a national income safety net could be identified as a defining feature of the rudimentary social assistance regime of south Europe. It is rather characteristic of the pace of change in this area that what a few years ago held for all southern Europe now is only true for Greece (Matsaganis et al. 2004). For a long time the absence of an efficient welfare state in Greece has been compensated by the central role of the family and kin ties in welfare provision supporting the individual in conditions of hardship, unemployment and bankruptcy. However, family support can function as a welfare policy substitute in close link with practices that allow families to take advantage of “soft budgets” (that is, budgets in which expenses are higher than earnings; see Petmesidou 1996a, 1996b, 2000 and forthcoming [a]). An institutional configuration is thus developed in which budget imbalances for the individual and the family are transferred to the state through strategies of income appropriation by political means. Housing practices offer a suitable illustration. In the post-war period, in the context of a rapidly expanding informal process of urbanization, surplus land values created by illegal building activities and the spontaneous or uncontrolled concentration of economic activities in urban centres were privately appropriated by individuals and families, so that people could deal with their housing needs. On the basis of political decisions responding to particularistic demands, the value of land might increase dramatically in certain areas by the legitimation of illegally constructed buildings and the incorporation of new territories into the city plan area.

Clearly this is a practice of wealth creation and appropriation through political means that allows individuals, families and enterprises to take advantage of “soft-budgets” (Petmesidou 1996a, pp. 329-

² In this context, also the Greek Orthodox Church has not been particularly strong in welfare provision, as is the case with the Catholic Church in the other South (and North) European countries. The Greek Orthodox Church has always been more strongly linked with the state (through a relationship of dependence) and, thus, has only marginally contributed to the development of voluntary action in welfare provision. To the extent that the Greek Orthodox Church promoted voluntarism, it widely maintained an attitude of philanthropic assistance (Petmesidou 1996b, p. 101).

330 and forthcoming).³ In a sense, this institutional configuration compensates for the lack of universalist social citizenship rights, but, at the same time, sustains particularism, discretion and deep inequalities in welfare provision. Also, it sharply contrasts with the standards of the very strict system of planning and social welfare policies of north European countries (see Tsoulouvis 1987) and highly influences the institutional (and problem solving) capacities for welfare reform in Greece.

Some major imbalances in terms of socio-economic security arise in this context. First, the welfare system tends to individual needs and promotes a perverse redistribution, as social groups and individuals benefit of available welfare state provisions on the basis of their political bargaining power and their position in the clientelistic clusters rather than of the basis of their needs and citizenship rights. Thus, it is not surprising that, most often than not, categorical entitlements in Greece do not reflect corporatist solidarities, but a differential access to the state and discretionary power. For this reason, there is a high degree of fragmentation and polarization in social insurance schemes and benefits (not only between but also within socio-professional groups), while universalist service provision and social assistance safety nets remain underdeveloped. These characteristics were further exacerbated by the fact that in Greece, late industrialization (in the 1960s and 1970s) was followed by a rapid shift to post-fordism in the early 1980s, well before a culture of contractual relationships and attendant modes of social solidarity were widely developed (Petmesidou forthcoming [a] p. 25).

Second, social protection is geared towards income maintenance, and particularly pension benefits, while social services are little developed. Yet, the social security system is doubly fragmented. Income maintenance consists of contributive social benefits (mainly pensions) for those who can secure an uninterrupted work career, while social assistance programmes for those outside the formal sector (i.e. the long term unemployed, those working in the informal economy –among them a large number of illegal immigrants-, women with large spells of inactivity or unemployment, elderly people who do not qualify for an occupational pension and the young unqualified persons) are rudimentary. Furthermore, wide inequalities in the level of benefits offered by the more than one hundred social security funds increases polarization of social insurance.⁴ The introduction of a national health care system in the early eighties manifests an attempt to promote universalist citizenship services in the country. Yet with little success up till now, as discretionary privileges and complex ties with the private sector have been incorporated in the system, leading to waste of resources and low efficiency.

Third, the emphasis on old-age risks puts limits on provision for the protection of the family (especially of families with young children) and housing policies. Thus, although the family is the main provider of welfare (as reflected in high-flown political rhetoric), policy measures hardly support the family in this role. What is more, given the rudimentary development of a welfare state, those individuals who lack family support (or their families do not possess the required assets) have no resources to rely upon in

³ Other examples include the writing off of debts from housing loans by the Housing Organization for Workers from time to time, as well as the conceding of land rights to trespassers by the Ministry of Agriculture (Tsoulouvis 1996).

⁴ Among south European countries, Greece exhibits the highest degree of fragmentation of social insurance (see Petmesidou 1996a and Ferrera 1996).

conditions of hardship, bankruptcy or unemployment. As the family is progressively coming under stress, and traditional support structures are declining, without however being replaced by a fully-fledged welfare state, the risk of poverty increases considerably, especially among the most vulnerable social strata (young people lacking skills, women with a deficient work record, those working in the informal sector of the economy, long term unemployed, disabled and elderly people unable to secure a right to social security, as well as migrants, and particularly those entering and living in the country illegally).⁵

Fourth, given the high degree of fragmentation and polarization of social insurance, pensions are not effective in reducing poverty among the elderly. Poverty risks appear to be high among single- and two-person households of pensioners. Equally high are also poverty risks among families with three or more dependent children, and in this respect the paucity of family/housing benefits and social assistance schemes is a crucial negative factor (Papatheodorou and Petmesidou 2004 and forthcoming).

Finally, the familialist model has significant negative effects on women. Caring for family members hinders women's access to the labour market and hardly supports individual autonomy (in socio-economic and cultural terms). Greek women bear a disproportionate burden in caring for family members. Often women also contribute to family businesses as helping but unpaid members. Working-age women who need to combine work with caring services face serious problems in respect to paid employment. Recently introduced measures to combine family responsibilities with work, which are discussed below, may have a positive effect on female employment, but under no circumstances totally solve the problems.

Greece's ranking last among EU countries with regard to the redistributive effect of social transfers (as shown in the next section) offers a strong indication of major imbalances of social protection. Even though social expenditure significantly increased in the last two decades, the effectiveness of social transfers in reducing inequality and poverty remained limited.

⁵ On the extent and intensity of poverty (and the redistributive effect of social transfers) in Greece, in comparison to other EU countries, see Papatheodorou & Petmesidou 2004 and forthcoming; Papatheodorou 2003; Matsaganis 2002 and forthcoming; and Tsakoglou 2000 and forthcoming.

2 Socio-economic Security

2.1 Introduction

Social quality is defined as the extent to which citizens are able to participate in the social and economic life of their communities under conditions that enhance their well being and individual potential. As one of the four conditional factors of social quality, socio-economic security refers to the material and other resources required for “the enhancement of the interaction of individual people as social beings” (van der Maesen 2004, p. 3). Hence socio-economic security encompasses issues such as risk related to existential security, basic security of daily life, freedom, safety, justice, and life changes dependent on institutions, norms and regimes. Whether from employment, social security, health care or other sources, socio-economic security will protect people from poverty and other forms of material or immaterial deprivation. So we defined its subject matter as the degree to which people have command over material and immaterial sources over time in the context of social relations. Table 1.1 presents the chosen domains, sub-domains and indicators of socio-economic security. Our focus is on the extent to which these capture the current situation in Greece.

Table 1.1 Indicators of socio-economic security

Domains	Sub-domains	Indicators
Financial resources	Income sufficiency	1. Part of household income spent on health, clothing, food and housing (in the lower and median household incomes)
	Income security	2. How do certain biographical events affect the risk of poverty on household level. 3. Proportion of total population living in households receiving entitlement transfers (means-tested, cash and in-kind transfers) that allow them to live above EU poverty level
Housing and environment	Housing security	4. Proportion of people who have certainty of keeping their home 5. Proportion of hidden families (i.e. several families within the same household)
	Housing conditions	6. Number of square meters per household member 7. Proportion of population living in houses with lack of functioning basic amenities (water, sanitation and energy)
	Environmental conditions (social and natural)	8. People affected by criminal offences per 10.000 inhabitants 9. Proportion living in households that are situated in neighbourhoods with above average pollution rate (water, air and noise)
Health and care	Security of health provisions	10. Proportion of people covered by compulsory/ voluntary health insurance (including qualitative exploration of what is and what is not covered by insurance system)
	Health services	11. Number of medical doctors per 10.000 inhabitants 12. Average distance to hospital, measure in minutes, not in meters 13. Average response time of medical ambulance
	Care services	14. Average number of hours spent on care differentiated by paid and unpaid
Work	Employment security	15. Length of notice before employer can change terms and conditions of labour relation/contract 16. Length of notice before termination of labour contract 17. proportion employed workforce with temporary, non permanent, job contract 18. Proportion of workforce that is illegal
	Working conditions	19. Number of employees that reduced work time because of interruption (parental leave, medical assistance of relative, palliative leave) as a proportion of the employees who are entitled to these kinds of work time reductions 20. Number of accidents (fatal / non-fatal) at work per 100.000 employed persons (if possible: per sector) 21. Number of hours a full-time employee typically works a week (actual working week)
Education	Security of education	22. Proportion of pupils leaving education without finishing compulsory education (early school leavers) 23. Study fees as proportion of national mean net wage
	Quality of education	24. Proportion of students who, within a year of leaving school with or without certificate, are able to find employment

Source: M. Keizer and L.J.G. van der Maesen: Social Quality and the Component of Socio-economic security 3rd Draft, Working Paper, Amsterdam, September 2003

2.2 Financial resources

In Greece, as in other south European countries, income maintenance depends upon a full and uninterrupted occupational career through which contributive entitlements are established. Yet a large number of social groups (e.g. workers in the underground economy), who cannot secure such a (long and continuous) career in the primary labour market, are left unprotected given the dearth of social assistance. In addition, social assistance measures (and minimum income schemes), to the extent that they have developed in each country/region, did so in a fragmented (categorical) and incremental manner, with benefits having no correlation with each other, although they are targeted to vulnerable groups with similar characteristics and needs. Furthermore, wide inequalities in the level of social protection guaranteed by the various social security funds deepen polarization between hyper-protected and weakly protected beneficiaries. Social protection is characterized by a strong “pension bias”. The counterpart of this condition is a comparatively modest involvement of the state in other social transfers (for supporting the family, the unemployed and other disadvantaged groups) and in health and social care services.

In comparison to the other south European countries, no major social policy reform in the field of social assistance took place in Greece in the last decade. The few non-contributory (some of them means-tested), categorical benefits are characterized by great gaps in coverage and high fragmentation. Equally fragmented and polarized are social insurance benefits. Greece exhibited the highest poverty rate both in 1994 and 2000, and the income transfers system is the least effective. Further, despite the pressures exercised by both exogenous (e.g. European integration) and endogenous factors (e.g. strongly prevalent poverty phenomena, rapidly increasing unemployment and a growing wave of mostly illegal immigrants experiencing high risks of poverty and social exclusion), social consensus on rationalizing and expanding social security has been rather weak. The highly politicised and conflictual character of industrial relations, and the antagonisms and deadlocks generated by statist-paternalistic structures, greatly limit the possibility of widely binding agreements on policy goals and strategic reform (Petmesidou 2001).

Table 1.2 Poverty rates for household income before and after social transfers, in 1994 and 2000 in Greece.⁶

	Before Social Transfers	After Soc. Transfers before Pensions	After Pensions before Other Soc. Trans.	After Total Social Transfers
1994	45.4	43.8	26.0	24.3
2000	48.2	45.7	23.9	21.5

Source: Papatheodorou, C. and Petmesidou, M. (forthcoming)

In 1994 Greece was the country with the highest poverty rate (24% for household income after total social transfers, see Table 1.2). She was followed by Portugal, Italy and Spain, in this order. In 2000

⁶ Poverty lines defined as 60% of the country's median equivalent household income.

the incidence of poverty marginally decreased in all countries but the ordering remained unchanged.

According to a recent survey by the National Statistical Service of Greece and the National Centre for Social Research (see Tables 1.3 & 1.4), 18% of households (13.6% of non-poor and 32.8% of poor households respectively) afford the necessities of everyday life with great difficulty; 30.5% of households (28.7% of non-poor and 37% of poor households) can afford them with difficulty and 29.2% (31.6% of the non-poor and 20.5% of the poor households) with some difficulty. Of the rest, about 23% (almost 25% of the non-poor and 10% of the poor) can afford necessities of life rather easily and only 0.6% with great ease.

Table 1.3

Degree of difficulty	Poor households	Non-poor households	Total
With great difficulty	32.8%	13.6%	17.7%
With difficulty	37.0%	28.7%	30.5%
With little difficulty	20.5%	31.6%	29.2%
Almost easily	7.7%	17.9%	15.8%
Easily	1.7%	7.5%	6.2%
With great ease	0.3%	0.7%	0.6%

Source: Data obtained by the National Statistical Service of Greece (2002 survey, carried out in the context of the SILC programme –Statistics on Income and Living Conditions- of Eurostat)

Furthermore, on the basis of this survey (Table 1.4), two thirds of the poor households cannot afford the expenses of one weak vacation per year, and this is also the case for 43% of the non-poor households; one third of the poor and 10% of the non-poor households cannot afford to eat chicken, fish -or vegetables of equal nutritive value for vegetarians-, every other day; and 40% of the poor and 14% of the non-poor households can hardly afford heating expenses.

Table 1.4

	Number of households	Per cent constitution	Number of poor households	Per cent constitution	Number of non-poor households	Per cent constitution
Afford the expenses of one-week holidays per year						
Yes	1,789,872	48.9	163,222	20.7	1,626,650	56.6
No	1,873,921	51.1	624,310	79.3	1,249,611	43.4
Total	3,666,793	100	787,532	100	2,876,261	100
Afford the expenses of eating chicken, fish or vegetables (of the same nutritive value, for vegetarians) every other day						
Yes	3,128,186	85.4	529,011	67.2	2,599,175	90.4
No	535,607	14.6	258,521	32.8	277,086	9.6
Total	3,663,793	100	787,532	100	2,875,261	100
Afford heating expenses						
Yes	2,945,768	80.4	471,362	59.9	2,474,124	86.0
No	718,307	19.6	316,170	40.1	402,137	14.0
Total	3,663,793	100	787,532	100	2,876,261	100

Source: Data obtained by the National Statistical Service of Greece (2002 survey, carried out in the context of the SILC programme –Statistics on Income and Living Conditions- of Eurostat)

Over 900,000 low-income employees of the private sector receive salaries that amount to less than 900 euro, and thousands of pensioners receive pensions by the Social Insurance Institute (IKA) that do not exceed the amount of 392 euro. Indicatively one out of ten pensioners receives a pension of less than 400 euro. Furthermore, the upsurge of re-evaluations that have spread over the market during the last period (petrol, commodities and services) has hiked-up prices of basic commodities resulting in a further increase of household expenditure.

The total monthly income of a couple of pensioners that both receive the minimum pension by the Social Insurance Institute amounts to 784 euro. However, their basic needs exceed by far the amount of money they get as a monthly pension (1,030 euro, see Table 1.5). Such data denote the great number of households living on the edge of poverty or even below it. Things get worse as far as young couples are concerned. Although they only refer to the comparison of nominal wages and do not include the impact of the increase of prices, the data of Eurostat, which show that Greece together with Portugal hold the record in poverty among the countries of the European Union are of great importance. Additionally the percentage of poverty even if social benefits are counted in, amounts to 21% of the total population. The livelihood conditions of various types of households are illustrated below.

Table 1.5 Basic expenses of four types of households

Expenses	4-member family, private house	Young couple in rented accommodation	Couple of pensioners in rented accommodation	Pensioner, private house
monthly rent	-	300	250	-
food	600	300	300	180
household materials	100	70	70	30
health	40	-	100	50
telephon bill	60	40	20	10
electricity	120	90	35	15
water	30	10	10	5
2 mobile phones	60	60	-	-
credit cards (monthly payment)	120	80	-	-
transport (benzine, tickets)	150	110	60	40
education	800	-	-	-
clothing	80	40	25	10
entertainment	300	250	50	30
other expenses	200	130	110	65
total	2,660	1,480	1,030	435

Source: ICAP, 2003.

The fixed expenses for a four-member family that own the house it lives in, amount to 2,660 euro per month at the best. At the same time the mean net earnings for a couple that works in the private sector is barely 2,221 euro. Most of these expenses are for food (600 euro) and tutorials for the

children. It has been estimated that for two children, 17 and 12 years old respectively this couple has to spend 800 euro or 40% of its total income for private lessons and foreign language schools. As a result, both parents have to cut down on their basic needs in order to come off.

If a young couple without any children rents an apartment, both spouses have 3 years of previous employment, work in the private sector, receive the minimum salary and rent a house, their net monthly earnings amount to only 1,036 euro, which not only are insufficient, but do not cover their net monthly expenses (1,480 euro) as well. The majority of young people of this category gets help from their parents. If both spouses of a couple of pensioners of the basic insurance fund (IKA), have a pension (the minimum IKA pension) but do not own a house and therefore rent an apartment, their monthly income is 784 euro, while their expenses, after a moderate estimation, amount to 1,030 euro. For rent they have to spend 250 euro, for food 300 euro and for medical expenses 100 euro. Similar is the case of a pensioner who lives alone with the minimum monthly IKA pension of 392 euro. The bare minimum expenses amount to 435 euro (180 for food, 50 for medical expenses, 15 euro for the upkeep), that a pension does not cover. Thousands of households live in a state of despair, something that is expected to worsen even more in the future, if the scenario, according to which the consumer's income (and standard of living) will fall due to a further upsurge of expensiveness, comes true. This is so, on one hand due to the increase of the international petrol prices and its impact on the market and, on the other hand, due to the extra cost that arises as a result of the organization of the Olympic Games.

Social benefits have least impact on poverty rates in Greece. Income from social benefits other than pensions makes up 8% of the equivalised income of EU citizens and is approximately half the income from pensions. The share of these benefits is 2% in Greece: the average equivalized income before benefits amounts to 6,784 PPS per capita, pensions to 1,647 PPS per capita, social benefits other than pensions to 169 PPS per capita and total income 9,093 PPS per capita. Social benefits other than pensions account for only 11% of total income of the bottom quintile that includes those with the lowest original income. Although at EU-level social benefits are strongly targeted, as half of them go to the first quintile in terms of original income and the share decreases rapidly with rising original income, Greece pays only 37% of them to this group. A comparison of the number of people on low incomes before and after social benefits other than pensions, among EU countries, illustrates one of the main purposes of social benefits: their redistributive effect and in particular their ability to reduce the percentage of the population on low incomes. A person on a low income is defined here as someone whose equivalised income, (original or total, depending on the context), is less than 60% of the national median of the total equivalised income distribution. People with such an income are sometimes referred to as "poor", poverty being defined here in strictly monetary and relative terms. The low income thresholds thus defined are between 5,200 and 7,800 PPS in nine out of the 13 countries covered. In Greece it is 4,558 PPS.

Social benefits reduce the percentage of "poor" people in all member states, but to very disparate degrees. The reduction is smallest, only 8%, in Greece. Gini coefficients also provide an overall

indicator of disparities in income distribution. These benchmarks do not depend on the choice of low-income threshold and can vary from 0 to 100% (0 to total inequality). The ability of social benefits to reduce monetary inequality is different from their ability to reduce poverty rates. In that context, before social benefits Greece has a disparity that equals the EU average, while after benefits she scores significant above it (34 to 31). Another measure of inequality in income distribution is the S80/S20 income quintile ratio. For any given country this is the ratio between the share of the total (equivalised) income received by the top 20% and the bottom 20% of the country's population. Applied to original income, the ratio in Greece is lower than for the EU as a whole. After benefits, exactly as in the Gini coefficients, Greece shows above-average income dispersions.

Table 1.6 Poverty rates for household income before and after social transfers and average income by activity status of head of household, 2000 (ECHP Data).

Activity status of head of household	Poverty rates before social transfers	Poverty rates after social transfers before Pensions	Poverty rates after total social transfers	Mean income (% of average total eq. income)	Contribution to total poverty (%)
working with an employer in paid employment	11.5	10.0	7.2	123.3	9.4
self-employment	31.9	29.8	26.2	99.0	29.9
unemployed	51.0	40.2	26.5	72.3	3.2
retired	84.8	82.5	29.2	88.9	44.8
doing housework, looking after children or other persons	72.6	70.7	20.1	86.1	7.9
other economically inactive	52.8	43.1	30.1	78.4	4.4
Total	48.2	45.7	21.5	100.0	100.0

Source: Papatheodorou and Petmesidou (forthcoming)

The above table may give us an idea of how certain biographical events affect the risk of poverty at household level in Greece. In this respect, in examining poverty trends in south European countries, Papatheodorou and Petmesidou (forthcoming) make a very interesting remark on current policy priorities for poverty reduction: "Since the late 1980's high-flown rhetoric by governments and the EU has increasingly focused on employment policies and the reduction of unemployment, as key weapons for alleviating poverty. However, the above figures do not support this enthusiasm. The poverty rates among the unemployed are not high in the four south European countries [Portugal, Spain, Italy and Greece]. In addition, given the relative size of the unemployed population, even when the poverty rates in this group are very high, the absolute contribution to overall poverty is rather marginal. This argument is not made against employment policies. On the contrary, what is really stressed is that fighting poverty needs more active government interventions and more effective social policies, which cannot be limited to reducing unemployment rates. Alleviating poverty among old-age people, and supporting families with dependent children would have a more profound impact on reducing the country's overall poverty than simply reducing unemployment".

In Greece social benefits account for a fifth of the total income of each adult equivalent, while the EU

average is one quarter. More than 70% of all EU citizens live in households receiving some sort of social benefit. At the EU-level pensions account for two thirds of income from social benefits, while in Greece they account for 90%. 39% of Greeks live in households where at least one member draws a pension. For other social benefits the figure is 19%. For all social benefits together the figure is 50%, since some households receive more than one type of social benefit. Pensions are per equivalent lowest (3,586 PPS) in Greece. The percentage of households dependent on income support is 8.8% of the total population. The indicator refers to social assistance beneficiaries only. If we include other types of social benefits –except for pensions– beneficiaries amount to 19%.

2.3 Housing and environment

Greece has 2,623,998 privately owned and 717,392 rented residences. The average household size was in 1980 3.1 members, the largest in Europe by that time. The average number of rooms though is 3.8. Regarding housing quality 26% of households in Greece declared that they experienced shortage of space, 25% leaky roof or damp or rot, 20% noise from neighbours or outside, and 7% vandalism or crime in the area (corresponding EU-15 averages are: 16%, 19%, 25% and 18%).

2.3.1 Housing security

According to an informal research carried out by the Greek Borrowers' Association, 2,840 pieces of real estate property were auctioned in the 1970s, approximately 3,100 in the 1980s, while for the 1990s it has been estimated that this number was over 250,000. Behind these developments there is a very powerful mechanism, which is based on inadequate laws and state tolerance. It is fed with illegal additional interest, spreads on the less or more powerful people of financial life and ends up in legal functionaries, attorneys, and notaries. Besides, auction and sale offices – i.e. offices that sell property before auctions – have already created sections with relevant advertisements in Greek newspapers. The rural population is in the worst position of all. Plots, houses, barns and livestock are sold more and more often in the countryside, since more than 50% of the farmers' property has been foreclosed or levied on by banking institutions. The ever-growing tendency of Greek households to resort to bank loans, in combination with the general financial uncertainty, as well as the prospect of an increase in interest rates by the banks, hold serious dangers according to all estimations. The possibility to be faced with an increase in auctions due to the debtors' inability to pay back their loans is not just a prediction of impending calamities. The first estimations offered by banks have already confirmed this tendency, which remains to sit in judgment. The estimations raise the number of auctions the banks held during a year to a total of 6,000. How much this phenomenon will lead to a new wave of auctions is in direct relation to a long-term consolidation of the recession climate.

Such a development, in combination with the prospect of an increase in interest rates and the decrease of available consumer income, will affect the real estate market and housing mortgages that flourished in the last couple of years. The euphoria during the period of low interest rates, especially in the field of housing credit, where the interest rates broke the 4% barrier, has passed. What is left is a

dramatic increase in household demand mainly for housing loans. Moreover, borrowing by small or medium size businesses has, also, become disturbing since this field is experiencing increasing interest rates, too. According to the evidence provided by the Bank of Greece, the rate of increase in borrowing by Greek households remains above 32%. At the same time, business borrowing has made a significant increase. As a result, the rate of increase in middle or long-term loans (more than a year) is at more than 28%, a fact that must be evaluated along with the more general recession climate and the inability to draw funds from other sources. The majority of the average of 6,000 auctions that the five greatest banks participate in each year concerns mainly real estate property, that is property ensuing from unsettled private loans.

2.3.2 Environmental conditions (social)

After a period of recession, armed attacks were increased in 2003 and returned to the levels of 1998, a year during which robberies reached a peak. In the past robberies were classified according to whether they were committed by Greek or foreign citizens. However, in the last few years, the proportion of domestic delinquents has gradually increased. Despite this fact, Greeks still believe that immigrants are involved more often in criminality than the average (see Table 1.7). In the daily news, at least two armed robberies against banks in the area of Attica are reported. During the last two years bank robberies were boosted while in the last year criminal activity reached the highest level of the decade. Greek gangs have resorted more acrimoniously to robberies (aiming either at individual citizens or at banks) restricting the actions of foreigners.

Table 1.7 “Are immigrants more often involved in criminality than the average?”

	tend to agree	tend to disagree	do not know
Greece	81 %	15 %	3 %
EU 15	58 %	30 %	12 %

Source: Halman, 2002.

Breaking and entering houses and shops have slowed-down by approximately 27%. The offenders have decided to break and enter stores. From 1998 until 1999 car thefts reached the highest levels where 22,500 cars were disappearing. After a period of slow down in 2003 car thefts increased. Three categories of offenders are distinguished: those who steal cars or motorcycles to use them as a means of transportation for illegal activities and upon finishing they desert them; those who set apart and sell their spare parts; and those who steal luxurious cars, forge the accompanying documents and finally sell them. Most bloody attacks that preoccupied the Athenian authorities during the last years were conflicts between foreign gangs. These are offenses where foreign delinquents have the highest participation rate and the case is even worse in Attica. Moreover, over the last years, "death contracts" cases were reported where Greek criminals were leading figures. A phenomenon new in the Greek society is the appearance of gangs of very young people, mostly boys, whose members are frequently involved in all sorts of criminal activities (Table 1.8).

Table 1.8 Juvenile delinquency

crimes	% of pupils	% of pupils-gang members
graffiti	18	56.2
destruction of school facilities	52.8	14
shop lifting	46.1	8.7
use of drugs	46.1	14.6
hooliganism	37.1	8.4
street fighting	37.1	5.5
destruction of property	22.5	3.5
threatening	21.3	3
car or bike robbery	19.1	2.6
stealing by person	16.9	2.3
gate-crash	14.6	2
drug buying	1	9
drug selling	5.6	9

Source: Law School of Athens, Laboratory for Penal and Criminal Research, 2004.

During the last five years a rapid increase of internet child pornography has been reported. Websites with cyberpimps have deluged the internet offering rich pornographic material to users. Trained officers working in Services for the Protection of Minors and Prevention of Economic Crime are searching the internet to trace the doers. Regarding children pornography through the internet, it is mostly material drawn from websites from abroad that is used. Only in one case the protagonists were children from Greek families.

According to police officers methadone programs for heroine users play a significant role to reduce deaths of users, which have increased during the last years. Since 2001, the year in which deaths reached the outstanding number of 132, the number of deaths has been reduced. The authorities have expressed their concern for young people's turning to ecstasy-type drugs. As it results from confiscation data, the usage of this drug is increasing. Organized crime gangs in Greece develop their activities mainly in blackmails, forgeries and "selling protection". According to the police, protection to shopkeepers has lost its glory and the tariffs have fallen down. The members of the gangs develop other illegal activities. At the same time forgery "rates" have been augmenting. In 1991, there were 397 cases, while in 2002 forgery offences increased to 3,208 cases. In this type of crime foreign offenders lead in false document drafting to assist their compatriots stay illegally in Europe. Credit cards forgery belongs to the category of High Tec offenses. In this case criminals focus their interest on cloning credit cards, after having stolen the authentic data with the aid of technology.

2.3.3 Environmental conditions (natural)

As regards the quality of the environment, Athens and Thessaloniki are among the cities with the highest levels of suspended particles (PM 10) in the atmosphere; while disturbingly high are also the levels of dioxins and furans in food. PM 10 are minute particles (their diameter is less than 10 millionths of the metre), which are considered to be among the most dangerous pollutants. They are

emitted to the atmosphere by factories and cars, and when inhaled by human beings they enter deeply into the lungs and cause damage (inflammations, transmission of toxic and carcinogenic substances and severe respiratory problems). According to the World Health Organisation, PM 10 are even dangerous in small concentrations (10 micrograms per cubic metre – $\mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$), while the European Union has instituted 50 $\mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$ as a maximum limit, provided that there is no excess for over 35 days a year. However, in Greece, especially during the summer the excess of PM10 is a common phenomenon. According to the Hellenic Ministry for the Environment, Physical Planning and Public Works, in some regions their limits range between 19 mg/m^3 to 71 mg/m^3 . In addition, according to the Environmental Research Institute their mean concentration during the entire year is 56 $\mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$ (the relative measurements refer to the period between October 2002 and October 2003). Dioxins and furans are extremely dangerous toxic compounds that cause cellular mutations and are thought to be responsible for carcinogenesis both in animals and in human beings. These compounds are so dangerous that the World Health Organisation, on the basis of its judgement that it is totally inappropriate for human beings to be exposed to them, has set strict security limits.

According to the World Health Organisation, in our country their average concentration in plant products is 1 pg/g .⁷ Beside our country, other countries like Italy (1.4 pg/g) and Germany (1.7 pg/g) are equally in danger, while in Belgium, where a dioxin scandal erupted a few years ago, their levels are even higher (4 pg/g). In contrast, Denmark and Malta, with 0.2 and 0 pg/g respectively, are in a much better position. The report by the World Health Organisation also rings the alarm as far as solar radiation is concerned. According to it Greece has an average level of ultraviolet radiation from 5 to 7 (5 in Northern Greece and 7 in Crete), which means that protection measures against the sun is necessary to be always taken.

Greece has also fallen behind in the field of material retrieval from waste. She occupies the last place among the 15 countries of the European Union. This is so because she retrieves only 30-35% of materials. Greece was granted an extension in order to meet the goal of 50% in 2005, a deadline that has expired for the rest of the countries four years ago. Even though, Greece is obliged to recycle and reuse a particular amount of its litter until 2006 – batteries, lubricants, useless tires, vehicles, electric-electronic wastes – the operation of institutions for the management of these materials has not been initiated yet. Furthermore, there is also a delay as far as the establishment of the national organization of alternative waste and other materials management is concerned, which will supervise the operation of all relevant institutions. The development of these management institutions and their final approval are expected shortly. However, there is an even further delay in the establishment of an organization responsible for the control of building materials (some of which may contain hazardous substances such as asbestos or other toxic elements). The Presidential Decree for the establishment of this institution has not yet been issued.

⁷ Picogram per gram of food, a picogram equals to 1 billionth of grammar.

2.4 Health and care

2.4.1 Security of health provisions

The establishment of the Greek National Health System, in 1983, drew upon the principles of universalism, equity of access and efficiency. The aim was to expand coverage of health care, reduce inequities, particularly in finance, access and resource allocation and to provide health care services free at the point of use. However, these principles and aims only marginally have been met up to now. According to Davaki and Mossialos (forthcoming p. 11), “groups of the population enjoy different levels of cover and access to health care providers; patients face significant direct costs or have to purchase services in the private sector; there is an over reliance on expensive inputs, allocation of resources on a historical basis, and there are weak incentives for providers to be efficient”. In their analysis they find out that “there are disparities in the levels of benefits and services provided to civil servants, employees of public utilities and the banking sector as well as to the self-employed” (ibid. p. 21). In terms of access to health care there are no significant inequalities in access to primary health care but high-income groups tend to use more specialist ambulatory services. On the other hand, low-income groups use more often hospital services, but as the above authors stress, it is not clear whether this type of access reflects higher need or results from the fact that such services are free of charge. They also stress that there is no mechanism to strictly monitor and control “resource inputs and outputs”, while the existence of “multiple sources of finance lead to unnecessarily high administrative costs and poor co-ordination of planning and financing” (ibid. pp. 21-22). In addition, informal transactions are quite frequent in the public health system. Consequently, a number of NHS specialists enjoy significant incomes on top of their salaries, while “perverse incentives” are maintained and reproduced throughout the system: doctors attract “clients” for private consultation –even though this is prohibited by law –, and may even utilize the public health system infrastructure for this purpose; nurses may get extra paid by patients even for the care that the latter are entitled to within the public health care system; and high commissions are earned by various hospital staff categories in the context of equipment procurement and the existing discretionary and complex ties with the private health care sector.

2.4.2 Health services

Regarding the human resources of the Greek NHS, Davaki and Mossialos state the following (pp. 8-9) : “By 2002 there were about 47,944 doctors, 12,394 dentists, 41,151 nurses and 8,977 pharmacists in Greece. The oversupply of doctors, dentists and pharmacists and the under-supply of nurses is revealed through comparisons with other EU countries. Greece has the highest ratio of doctors (4.5), specialists (3.0) and dentists (1.2) per 1000 inhabitants. Greece’s ratio of pharmacists per 1,000 population is ranked fourth in the EU. Conversely, Greece had one of the lowest ratios of nurses per 1,000 inhabitants (3.9) in 1999, less than half the EU average. The supply of nurses is low because of the oversupply of doctors, who are substituting for, and taking on many of the responsibilities typically allocated to nurses. Also nurses’ salaries are quite low, which further discourages people from

entering this field. This distribution of personnel reveals that Greece relies on expensive inputs to deliver health care and also indicates that doctors and dentists can act as a powerful interest group, shaping the future direction of the health care system. Nearly all primary care providers are specialists; less than 2 per cent of all doctors in Greece were general practitioners. General practice as a specialty was first established in 1987 for physicians with three years' training. However, because it is not highly esteemed and not as well paid, the majority of medical graduates prefer clinical specialization. Because of the lack of general practitioners, a system of referral has not been established. Patients' access to second level providers is based on self-referral or a visit to an outpatient department."

The quantity and quality of services greatly vary between regions; Athens and Thessaloniki persistently exhibit the highest concentration of services. In 2000 the Greek Ministry of Health and Welfare launched a major project of developing a geographical information system in the form of a "Health and Welfare Atlas" of the country. Among others the project aims at recording all basic data about health care facilities, assessing the health care needs of the population (at various levels of geographical desegregation), and monitoring public health issues. This effort has proceeded with great difficulties till now. The project of drawing up a "Health and Welfare Services Atlas", extensively advertised by the Ministry of Health as a tool for gathering and elaborating the required information for a systematic health and social care planning process, has hardly progressed any further than the initial preparatory stage. There has been a serious lack of co-ordination between the health and social care sections of the Ministry over the planning and implementation of this project. Latent political rivalries and ill-defined priorities sustain compartmentalization of interests –as this is reflected in a unilateral attempt by the welfare division of the Ministry to develop a distinct "Welfare Services Chart"- and lead to a wasteful duplication of efforts and doubtful results (Petmesidou forthcoming [b]).

2.4.3 Care services

The percentage of the adult population, whose daily activities include caring for children or adults without pay, is 13% for males and 39% for females. More detailed data are not available. Social welfare in Greece is oriented to the provision of residual services to the most vulnerable persons. It has never succeeded to cater for the needs of a great range of groups and has scarcely encompassed preventive measures. Instead, it is limited to the confrontation of serious problems, when these have already erupted. No state managerial autonomy has been developed capable of overcoming political pressure, nor an adequate state mechanism that could integrate local level, second and third tier social welfare institutions, regional health and welfare systems, N.G.O. and other organizations. Families bear the main responsibility for welfare provision.

2.5 Work

Over the 1990s, in Greece, debate on labour market policy reform focused mainly on "how to tackle employment and labour market rigidity, as a way of improving labour market performance and combating unemployment" (Petmesidou 2000, p. 314). Greece was considered to have "a highly

restrictive employment protection legislation in the EU (strict rules for dismissals, high severance payments, strict job demarcations and work schedules)” (ibid., p. 312-317). This was held to account for deteriorating economic performance and rapidly growing unemployment over the 1980s and 1990s. However rigidity of institutional rules should be counter posed to a high degree of flexibility in the rather extensive informal sector fostering flexible work relations and low pay. Circumventing employment regulations is a frequent practice by small firms that constitute the majority of enterprises in the Greek economy. Obviously these conditions are not favourable to employment security for a large part of the labour force. Since the late eighties illegal in-migration has further exacerbated phenomena of irregular and concealed employment in Greece.

2.5.1 Employment security

According to existing legislation, a unilateral change of terms or conditions of labour relation/contract implies a termination of the contract. The length of notice before termination of labour contract depends on the length of time in employment. It varies from 1 month, for those with an employment record of 2 months, to 24 months for those being in employment for 28 years. The administrative procedures for dismissal consist in a written notice to the employee(s) plus additional notification to the Greek Manpower Organization. Previous warning in case of dismissal for personal reasons may be advisable. A letter should be sent by mail or handed directly to the employee. In the Greek legislation, the denouncement of the work contract is a unilateral legal act with no obligation to state the causes of termination (with the exception of some cases that are differently defined by law). The definition of justified or unfair dismissal is derived from case law. As fair are considered dismissals for non-performance or business needs (production requirements, work organisation). In larger companies, dismissals have to be a “last resort”, possible only after exhaustion of oral and written warnings, pay reductions and suspensions, and after consultation with employee representatives.

Dismissals of trade union representatives are considered as unfair. For an unjustified dismissal indemnity is provided for the period of time between notice of termination and court ruling. There is no reinstatement, if severance pay has been requested. The typical compensation at 20 years tenure is 9.5 months for blue collar and 14 months for white-collar employees. After 3 renewals, a fixed-term contract is converted into a working relationship of an indefinite term. The maximum cumulated duration of successive fixed-term contracts without the existence of specific reasons stated by law cannot exceed 2 years in total. Any dismissal of four or more workers in firms with 20-200 employees, and 2% or more than 30 workers within a month in firms with more than 200 employees is regarded as a collective dismissal. If social partners agree and Ministry approves, notice can be given after 10 days. The Ministry can extend the time for negotiation by another 20 days.

Those employed under contract in the greater public sector are over 250,000 according to certain estimations. Achieving tenure constitutes a permanent conflict issue on the Greek political scene. The social demand for transforming short-term contracts into tenured employment by people working for years in the same position via successive renewals of their short-term contracts contradicts the

commands of the Greek Constitution that provides for hiring people in public employment only through specific procedures and criteria.

The number of illegal workers is estimated to be 6 to 12% of the total work force. About 300,000 of them are Albanians who work in low paid seasonal jobs of the primary and secondary sector. Also, it is estimated that a substantial number of immigrants (more than 20,000) are employed in domestic work, given the fact that demand for domestic help considerably increased. A precise record of all immigrants in the country is impossible to be calculated, because illegal working is the rule for foreign workers. For example, controls conducted in the year 1999 have disclosed 150,000 cases of illegal employment. On the other hand, a European report estimated that the informal economy amounts to about 35% of GDP – other estimates put it at about 45%.

2.5.2 Working conditions

There are nine major types of leave, concerning mostly caring activities: pregnancy, child's adoption, marriage, child's birth (for the father), illness of dependent family member, single parent, relative's death, child care and parental leave (see Table 1.9). According to the National General Collective Labour Agreement, that regulates the matters of the private sector, the leave for pregnancy and child adoption can last up to 17 weeks; the leave for marriage can last up to 6 days; the leave for child's birth (for the father) can last up to 2 days; the leave for illness of dependent family member can last up to 12 days/year; the leave of single parent (with children up to the age of six) can last up to 6 additional days/year; the leave for a relative's death can last up to 2 days; the leave for child care (regarding children up to the age of six) can last up to 1 hour a day for 30 months; and parental leave (for either parent) can last up to 3 ½ months. The replacement rate of salary is 100% in all cases except for the last one, where there is no remuneration, though it can be recognized as insurance time, as long as the claimant pays his/her contribution and employer's contribution as well.

In the public sector, according to Law 2683/98, the leave for pregnancy can last up to 5 months; the leave for child's adoption can last up to 3 months; the leave for marriage can last up to 5 days; the leave for relative's death can last up to 3 days; the leave for child care (regarding children up to the age of six) can last up to 9 months or 2 hours a day for 2 years plus 1 hour a day for the next 2 years, while there is also possibility of an additional two-year leave without remuneration; and, finally, parental leave can last up to 9 months for either parent. The replacement rate of salary is 100% in all cases except for the last one, where there is no remuneration, but it can be recognized as insurance time.

Table 1.9: Types of leave

Type of leave (concerning mostly caring activities)	Private Sector (National General Collective Labour Agreement)		Public Sector (Law 2683/98)	
	Duration	Replacement Rate	Duration	Replacement Rate
pregnancy	17 weeks	100	5 months	100
child's adoption	17 weeks	100	3 months	100
marriage	6 days	100	5 days	100
child's birth (for the father)	2 days	100	-	-
illness of dependent family member	12 days/year	100	-	-
single parent	6 days/year (additional)	100	-	-
relative's death	2 days	100	3 days	100
child care	1 hour a day for 30 months	100	9 months or 2 hours a day for 2 years plus 1 hour a day for the next 2 years ²	100
parental leave	3 ½ months (for either parent)	no remuneration	9 months (for either parent)	no remuneration (yet it is recognized as insurance time)

Source: Petmezidou and Polyzoidis, 2003.

The actual working week in 1994 was 41.85 hours and then 41.13 in 1995, 41.18 in 1996 and 40.87 in 1997 and 41.13 in 1998. The average yearly working hours were 819.7 for men and 735.7 for women in 1990; 830.1 for men and 738.7 for women in 1991; 854.8 for men and 757.7 for women in 1992; 860.7 for men and 759.8 for women in 1993; and 851.2 for men and 755.7 for women in 1994. In 2003 Greeks were the champions at work, since they worked more than an average of 43.2 hours per week. (Table 1.10). 34,000 farmers and fishmongers, 21,000 technicians and merchants, 16,000 professionals, 15,000 executives and 12,000 sale representatives and employees in service rendering firms have stated that they hold a second job. A total of 120,000 individuals claim two jobs. However, it is estimated that this number far exceeds 500,000. Five out of 10 Greeks state that they spend the greatest part of their day at work.

Table 1.10: Average weekly working hours

Country	all workers	private sector	employees
Belgium	37.5	54.3	35.7
Denmark	35.8	48.7	34.8
Germany	36.5	48.5	35.2
Greece	43.2	48.6	40.2
Spain	39.9	46.3	38.6
France	36.3	52.4	35.2
Ireland	37.5	49.7	35.8
Italy	39.1	44.5	37.2
Luxembourg	38.0	48.6	37.3
Holland	31.1	39.4	30.1
Austria	37.9	47.8	36.6
Portugal	39.5	40.3	39.3
Finland	38.2	47.6	36.9
Sweden	36.7	43.3	36.0
U.K.	37.6	41.7	37.2

Source: Eurostat, 2003.

The larger working hours are affecting many aspects of everyday life. 81% of the Greeks prefer to rest at home during their spare time, 35% visit some bar or restaurant, 27% go to the movies, 19% exercise and 16% attend cultural activities. 62.1% of the Greek people spend time with friends once a week, 23.6% once or twice a month, 11.3% few times a year, and only 3.1% not at all. 24.1 % spend time with colleagues once a week, 23.3 % once or twice a month, 21.6 % few times a year and 30.9 % not at all. The duration of holydays diminishes steadily (Table 1.11). Mostly economic hardship and work commitments are the main reasons of this (Table 1.12). The average vacation time considerably decreased in the early 2000s: from 7.8 days in 2002 to 4.2 days in 2003.

Table 1.11 Duration of holidays

days	7	10	15	20	30
% of people	24%	36%	31%	7%	2%

Source: GfK/Wall Street Journal Europe, 2003

Table 1.12 Reasons for not having holidays

not enough money	71 %
because of the job	19 %
family reasons	8 %
other reasons	2 %

Source: GfK/Wall Street Journal Europe, 2003

On the other hand, the average time of TV watching increased from 183 minutes in 1993 to 233 minutes in 2003. Also, fast food restaurant turnover is steadily increasing. From 76.3 million Euro in 1992, it reached 487.8 million in 2002. The occurrence of accidents at work is considerably high in Greece. Yet, since the mid-1990s the number of accidents has been decreasing (see Table 1.13).

Table 1.13: Accidents at work

year	concerning men	concerning women	total	fatal
1995	18,626	2,917	21,540	91
1996	18,395	2,860	21,255	77
1997	17,632	2,684	20,046	80
1998	16,002	2,613	18,615	78

Source: Hellenic Institute for Occupational Health and Safety, 2002.

2.6 Education

2.6.1 Security of education

The percentage of children in school (till the age of 18) was 83 % in 1998. In 2000, 17 % of the 18-24 year-olds had left the education system without completing a qualification beyond lower secondary schooling.

There are no fees for any level of the Greek education system. Furthermore, students in higher education can have free or very cheap meals and receive all textbooks free of charge. A main problem is the coexistence of a private sector that provides auxiliary teaching (particularly at the primary and secondary level of education) with payment of tuition. The so-called “frontisteria” provide auxiliary teaching for almost all courses included in the curricula of primary and secondary schools. Particularly they specialize on preparation courses for entrance examinations in higher education institutions in Greece. Table 1.14 provides an example of the amount of money Greeks pay to learn foreign languages, although foreign-language classes are provided by the public schools for free. Inadequacies of teaching and curricula in public schools and a fierce competition for entrance into higher education institutions are among the main reasons for the expansion of a subsidiary private education sector. To add here that, over the last decade, enrolments in private primary and secondary schools has also increased – particularly in the large urban centres (e.g. Athens and Thessaloniki). Some tertiary level colleges -constituting offshore branches of foreign Universities (mainly British and American)-, have also been established in the last decade, due to widespread demand for University education among Greek youth, that cannot be met by the existing public higher education system in the country. The issue of the recognition of the degrees offered by these tertiary level colleges has been at the forefront of public debate in the last few years. This is due to a major conflict that has erupted, as on the one hand the Greek Constitution forbids private education at University level, yet on the other hand this provision of the Constitution runs counter to some EU regulations (particularly those concerning equivalences in degree recognition across the EU in close relationship to the three freedoms of labour, capital and goods within the “internal market”).

Table 1.14 annual private expenses for the study of foreign languages (in €)

	pupils (in thousands)	expenses (in thousands)
fees	1,000	750,000
licenses and certifications	150	20,000
books	--	30,000
total	--	800,000

Source: Newspaper Ta Nea, 19/4/04.

2.6.2 Quality of education

It is considered that the Greek educational system is not well adapted to the labour market; though this varies widely among the different sectors of the economy. The high rate of youth unemployment constitutes an indicator of the inadequate links between the educational system and the labour market. Greece exhibits one of the highest rates of youth unemployment among EU countries and what is more formal protection for the young unemployed is rudimentary. Thus, the young people who have difficulties in entering the labour market have to rely upon the support of their family. In 2000, 11.4 % of the population aged 15-24 was unemployed, while the EU average was 7.8 %. But we should take into account also that Greek young males have to join the army, normally right after leaving school.

2.7 Trends and Reflection

Since the adoption of the Euro, the economic situation of most households in Greece has been getting worse. According to official indications, while the prices of products and primarily of services have markedly increased, revenue has not followed a similar upward trend. At the same time unemployment skyrocketed, while social protection diminished. Bank lending reached, suddenly, high levels and many households are openly complaining that they cannot even meet their basic needs.

In addition, the imbalances of social protection, briefly mentioned above, seriously question the effectiveness of social policy. What is most striking is that, although the level of original income poverty (that is, the poverty rate before taking into account social transfers -including pensions) is not particularly high in Greece, in comparison to the other EU countries, after taking into account social transfers, Greece exhibits the highest incidence of poverty in the EU. Furthermore, persistently high long-term unemployment among the young, comparatively high risk of unemployment even among persons with tertiary-level education, and great inefficiencies in vocational training until the late nineties are indications of a deficient social investment strategy with significant negative effects on socio-economic security. In terms of social assistance, it is worth mentioning the introduction of a new supplementary pension benefit (EKAS) in 1996, targeted to low-income pensioners in order to tackle increasing disadvantage and deterioration of income levels for a large number of pensioners. Finally it is important also to take into account Greece's place in a changing south-eastern Europe. The collapse of communist regimes was followed by an extreme capitalist prevalence and by the

suppression of even elementary social protection. This situation, however, does not leave our country uninfluenced, as most Greek businesses transport their productive activities to the neighbouring countries with the aim to benefit from the high levels of profit that are associated with these practices. Thus, inevitably, we are driven to social dumping facing danger of further devaluation of the level of domestic social protection (Petmesidou 2003a).

3 Social Cohesion

3.1 Introduction

The subject matter of social cohesion refers to the nature of outcomes of processes of integration and disintegration. Cohesion is influenced and changed by processes of social, economic and cultural differentiation in societies. In order to measure cohesion the emphasis should be on the positions, ideas and feelings of social beings in concrete circumstances. Cohesion is a relational concept that expresses the strength or weakness of social relations at the societal, community and local level. Before proceeding to a discussion of the domains, sub-domains and indicators (for social cohesion), defined in the context of the ENIQ project, some qualifications are required with regard to Greece's peculiarity.

First, in Greek society, social cohesion should be examined in close relation to the statist/clientelistic mode of social organization and the "implicit" social policy strategies, through informal processes of revenue appropriation and soft-budgeting. At the family/community level strong kinship ties have contributed to a relatively cohesive society. Historically the family/kin group pooled resources to help the young buy a house or start up a business, provided unpaid female labour for caring services and acted as a lending institution in case of emergency; it even supplied jobs, either in the family business or that of other kin members.

Second, collective solidarity (and generalized trust) has persistently been weak in Greece. Socio-economic integration took place in a "vertical" way through patronage and clientelistic networks (see for instance Mouzelis 1986, pp.73-94), rather than through the more "horizontal", class-based patterns of northwest European countries. Value choices and solidarities are strongly influenced by such conditions. Political parties dominate over civil society, which up to now has hardly been able to build its own system of values and rules outside the sphere of the state. Under these conditions a contradictory relationship between state and society is formed. On the one hand, a considerable part of the population derives revenue from direct or indirect access to the state apparatus, yet on the other hand an incessant confrontation with state institutions and policies is observed (hence an "over-politicization" of social and economic life).⁸

Third, the statist-paternalistic mode of social organization favours an extensive reproduction of the socio-professional groups that constitute the traditional middle classes. As shown elsewhere (Petmesidou 1998, p. 118), "the weak concentration of capital, the low degree of rational competition (through market mechanisms), and high opportunities of windfall profits and state support to even inefficient businesses on the basis of political criteria, create favourable conditions for small scale businesses and self-employed people to survive". In parallel, an "overbloated" public administration

⁸ For a brief examination of social values in Greece in comparison to value patterns in other European countries see Petmesidou 2003a.

has historically been the basis for the formation and socio-political integration of large sections of the middle and lower middle classes (Petmesidou 1991, p.40; see also Tsoukalas 1983).

Fourth, following the collapse of communism in Eastern and southeastern Europe, Greece experienced a new phenomenon of large-scale (mostly illegal) immigration, with serious multi-faceted effects on economy and society. Obviously, such a development, in a more or less culturally homogenous country, has important repercussions on social cohesion. We would like also to express a note of caution. Most of the data presented here in respect to the social cohesion indicators draw upon cross-country value surveys. We had not the opportunity to examine the conditions under which these surveys were conducted in Greece (size and constitution of the sample, survey method and procedure used). Often, culturally and socially sensitive meanings (in respect to values, norms, individual perspectives etc.) cannot easily be recorded through rigidly structured questionnaires, and responses to such questionnaires may contradict value-patterns underlying every day interaction. Social researchers are familiar with such discrepancies between what people consider as appropriate answer to a “formally” stated question and what they actually think and do in real life. We located significant contradictions in the available data and express our caution in respect to their relative importance for grasping the major value dimensions of social cohesion.

Table 2.1 Social cohesion

Domains	Sub-domains	Indicators
Trust	Generalised trust	25. Extent to which 'most people can be trusted'
	Specific trust	26. Trust in: government; elected representatives; political parties; armed forces; legal system; the media; trade unions, police; religious institutions; civil service; economic transactions
		27. Number of cases being referred to European Court of law
		28. Importance of: family; friends; leisure; politics; respecting parents. parents' duty to children
Other integrative norms and values	Altruism	29. Volunteering: number of hours per week
	Tolerance	30. Blood donation
		31. Views on immigration, pluralism and multiculturalism
	Social contract	32. Tolerance of other people's self-identity, beliefs, behaviour and lifestyle preferences
		33. Beliefs on causes of poverty: individual or structural
		34. Willingness to pay more taxes if you were sure that it would improve the situation of the poor
		35. Intergenerational: willingness to pay 1% more taxes in order to improve the situation of elderly people in your country
Social networks	Networks	36. Willingness to actually do something practical for the people in your community/ neighbourhood, like: picking up litter, doing some shopping for elderly/ disabled/ sick people in your neighbourhood, assisting neighbours/ community members with filling out (fax/ municipal/ etc) forms, cleaning the street/ porch/ doorway
		37. Division of household tasks between men and women: Do you have an understanding with your husband/ spouse about the division of household tasks, raising of the children, and gaining household income?
		38. Membership (active or inactive) of political, voluntary, charitable organisations or sport clubs
		39. Support received from family, neighbours and friends
Identity	National/ European identity	40. Frequency of contact with friends and colleagues
		41. Sense of national pride
	Regional/ community/ local identity	42. Identification with national symbols and European symbols
		43. Sense of regional / community / local identity
	Interpersonal identity	44. Sense of belonging to family and kinship network

Source: Y. Berman and D. Phillips: Indicators for Social Cohesion, 5th Draft, EFSQ Working Paper, Amsterdam, June 2004

3.2 Trust

On the basis of the European Value Survey trust between Greek people does not score very high. Generally speaking only 19.1% believe that most people can be trusted, while 80.9% believe that one should be very cautious while dealing with people. Greeks show a median satisfaction with the way democracy is developing in Greece. Trust in Greek Parliament is even weaker, as about 70% are not satisfied with it. On the other hand, the trust in armed forces is very high, as more than 70% are

satisfied by their performance. The picture is mixed as regards the legal system, where only 7.5% are very satisfied. A meagre 5.1 % trust the media absolutely, while trust in trade unions is extremely low, as about 80% are not very satisfied or even not satisfied at all. A similar profile of satisfaction/dissatisfaction is expressed also with regard to major companies. Dissatisfaction is even higher with regard to the civil service. As regards religious institutions, 28.7% are very satisfied, 37.5% rather satisfied, 22.9% not very satisfied and 12.7% not at all satisfied. In this specific field there is a growing public discourse about the need for de-linking the Orthodox Church from the state, which would result in greater autonomy by the Church, on the one hand, and a higher degree of secularisation of state activities, on the other.

Finally, as shown in Table 2.2, the European Value Survey has recorded a comparatively limited interest in politics in Greece. In this case, we must *read and interpret the* “responses” of the Greek sample to the question about “interest in politics”, posed in the context of the European Value Survey, with great caution. The results depicted the table are rather controversial. To stress, here, that vote turnout has persistently been very high in Greece, in contrast to declining trends in other European countries (e.g. the UK). This has to do partly with the fact that voting (in national, local and Euro-elections) is obligatory in the country. However, another important aspect, which starkly contrasts with the “limited interest in politics” recorded by the above survey, is the “overpoliticization” of everyday life in Greece. This characteristic has extensively been documented by historical studies as well as studies of contemporary social structure. It is closely linked with the statist-clientelistic patterns, we briefly discussed above, and manifests the strong hold of political criteria in the distribution of resources in Greek society.

Table 2.2 Interest in politics

Greece	31.4 %
Spain	21.8 %
Portugal	37.9 %
U.K.	52.7 %

Source: National Centre for Social Research, European Social Survey, 2004

Family remains very important for a very large majority of the Greeks, as 92% believe it to be very or quite important and thus more important than work, friends and acquaintances, leisure time, politics or religion. We should also mention that: 96.8% tend to agree that a child needs a home with both, a mother and a father; 85% have a positive opinion for friends and 75% are supporting the importance of leisure. 76.5% think that children should love and respect parents regardless of their qualities and faults. On the other hand, regarding parents' responsibilities to children, 69.5% believe that parents have to do the best for their children even at the expense of their own well-being, while only 20.4% believe that they should have a life on their own, and not to sacrifice everything.

3.3 Other integrative norms and values

3.3.1 Altruism

The national need for blood comes up to 600,000 units each year, only 40% of which is covered by volunteer blood donors, 50% by relatives of those in need and 5% by the army. Organized volunteerism is well tied to the economic, political and cultural development of Greece in the 20th century. In this context, volunteer organizations always went ahead of a marginal social state, with novel initiatives and a serious presence in many fields of service provision. Their main goals were to promote human rights, meet specific needs and enhance collective solidarity, compassion and welfare. Children, seniors, individuals with special needs (of all ages), minorities, refugees, immigrants, repatriates and the unemployed are some of the recipients of voluntary work and also of the forces that promoted volunteering. The increase in unsatisfied needs and intensity of social problems should be considered in close association with changes in attitudes about public participation (particularly at the local/community level). Needless to say, there has always been a tension between the values of volunteering and, on the one hand, a strong individualist culture enhanced by consumerist values that affect also people's relationship to the (welfare) state, and on the other the values underpinning the dense networks of family/kin reciprocal relationships and strong intra- and intergenerational dependencies in the context of an ultra protective domestic place.

Overall, the size, power and organization of the volunteering field remain weak and Olympic Volunteerism was an exception. At the end of April 2004, three months before the start of the games, the Organization of Athens 2004 announced the successful completion of the stage to attract volunteers. 160,000 applications by volunteers, a number unknown before in the history of the Olympic Games, prove the faith and dedication shown by everybody to the great vision of the Games and exhibit an attitude for authentic volunteerism and participation. The volunteers' applications in Sidney were 75,665, while in Atlanta they reached 78,000. The volunteers in Athens are mainly women (55%) and young people up to the age of 35 (78%). 2% are 18-years of age and 5% more than 55-years old. 60% of the applications were submitted by e-mail. 29% of the applicants hold a university degree, 12% have a post graduate degree while 59% have completed elementary and secondary education. After the games it was a common statement that volunteers have made a great job at all levels.

3.3.2 Tolerance

The massive influx of foreigners, especially from Albania, has caused some chain reactions in Greek society. A great majority of Greek people believes that: immigrants are more often involved in criminality than the average; that the presence of people of another nationality disturb their daily life (Table 2.3); and that the presence of people from minority groups increases unemployment (Table 2.4). Only 3.5 % think that the government should accept everybody who wants to work in Greece; 40.9 % think that it should accept only as many people as the labour market can absorb; 41.0 % think

that there should be strict limits on the number of foreigners and 14.6 % believe that nobody should be accepted. About two thirds expressed the view that for the common good of society it is better if immigrants maintain their own customs and traditions, and only a third believe that immigrants should be integrated into Greek society.

On the other hand, Greece comes first in xenophobia (38%, followed by Denmark with 24%, while the average in the EU is 15%) and supports the implementation of a European body of guards for the borders. Undoubtedly Greece is the weakest outer border of the European Union, from a geographical point of view. The majority of stowaways travelling to countries of the EU move through Greece and, mainly, through her sea borders. The same applies to the greatest part of smuggling legal or illegal substances and items. The EU must contribute to the reinforcement of the Greek borders, and Greece must persuade its partners about the necessity of this for the future of the Union. On account that Greece has a long history of emigration⁹, it is imperative that Greek society should be sensitive to immigration issues and, above all, hospitable to those entering in order to find legal employment and live normally.

Table 2.3 “Do you personally find the presence of people of another nationality disturbing in your daily life?”

	disturbing	not disturbing	do not know
Greece	38 %	61 %	2 %
EU 15	15 %	81 %	4 %

Source: Halman, 2002.

Nonetheless, the situation regarding the treatment of immigrants in Greece is particularly disappointing. Up until this day, nothing has been done to inform Greek citizens on immigration issues, which has resulted in the appearance of racist and xenophobic sentiments. Nothing has been done to inform businesses and enterprises about facilitating the access of immigrants to employment, or to inform the immigrants about issues regarding Greek language learning, employment, education and health; their health care and medical examination in case they carry infectious diseases or epidemics; or how to deal with their housing problem. At the same time, many immigrants work in Greece with salaries lower than those provisioned by the laws and many of them are illegally uninsured. Greece has done very little in the field of infrastructure concerning immigrant hosting and has no clear goals in its immigration policy, which seems to be at an incipient stage.

Table 2.4 The presence of people from minority groups increases unemployment in your country?

	tend to agree	tend to disagree	do not know
Greece	85 %	12 %	3 %
EU 15	51%	35 %	14 %

Source: Halman, 2002.

⁹ Since the 19th century Greece has sent about 7 million Greek immigrants all over the world.

Some people would not like to have as neighbours people with a criminal record (68.1%); people from different race (24.4%); left wing extremists (28.9%); heavy drinkers (47.5%); right wing extremists (29.5%); large families (11.4%); emotionally unstable people (57.4%); Muslims (31.1%); immigrants and foreign workers (19.4%); people who have AIDS (37.4%); drug addicts (50.9%); homosexuals (41.8%); Jews (29.4%); or gypsies (43.5%).

Greeks do not justify somebody who is claiming state benefits that he is not entitled to (mean 3.64 in a climax 1 –never justified- to 10 -always justified); equally they stress that they do not like people cheating on tax if they have the chance (mean 2.88). Again, these views appear to be controversial, as tax evasion, fraud –especially with regard to invalidity benefits-, and informal economic transactions constitute a usual phenomenon in the country.

Other value dimensions recorded by the European Value Survey led to the following views: Greeks do not justify somebody who takes and drives away a car belonging to someone else (joyriding, 1.39); who takes marijuana or hashish (2.04); who lies in one's own interest (2.58); a married men/women having an affair (2.12); people accepting a bribe in the course of their duties (1.66). Also they do not justify homosexuality (3.39), abortion (4.18), euthanasia (3.49), suicide (2.26), throwing away litter in a public place (1.88), driving under the influence of alcohol (1.49), paying cash for services to avoid taxes (3.46), having casual sex (3.60), smoking in public buildings (4.00), speeding over the limit in built-up places (2.19), avoiding a fare on public transport (2.89), sex under the legal age of consent (4.57), prostitution (2.37), political assassinations (1.93), scientific experiments on human embryos (1.38) and genetic manipulation of food stuffs (2.32). They only tend to be more tolerant about divorce (5.42). To stress once more that we cannot take these opinions at face value: e.g. Greeks do not justify tax avoidance yet they are the champions in this respect. They do not justify people accepting bribes in the course of their duties but this is the rule in many public services.

3.3.3 Social contract

Relatively few Greeks believe that the people who are in need are just unlucky (18.4%) and lazy or without willpower (19%), while most believe that the true cause is injustice in society (35.9%), or that this is a normal result of the modern progress (24%). Most of the Greeks (83%) would do something to help the elderly people because they feel they have a moral duty to help.

Nowadays the institution of marriage is undergoing a significant crisis. The divorces issued in the last decade increased by 87.2% and they are steadily more than 14% above marriages. In particular, the year 2000 was the worst of all times since divorces in Greece reached 11,309. Changes in the relationships between the two sexes and in the professional and financial position of women, as well as unwillingness by couples to maintain a relationship that does not satisfy them are the basic causes for broken marriages. From the evidence of the National Statistical Service it ensues that in 1980 the divorce percentage surpassed 10% for the first time, while in the previous 20 years it had not exceeded 6%. 1980 was, also, the first year during which divorces exceeded the 6,000 mark under which Greece had never fallen in the last 20 years. Until that time marriages were extremely stable,

due to the social, economic and cultural conditions of the time. It is characteristic that during the 1960s the divorce number did not exceed 3,505 per year, while in the worst year in the 1970s, namely 1979, they reached 4,716. 1995 was the first year that divorces exceeded 10,000, their average reaching 17.2. Evidence from 2000 reveal that the rate of divorces has been increasing rapidly in the Greater Athens Area. 6,642 divorces out of 11,309 were issued in Athens and Piraeus. On the contrary, in smaller urban centers and in the countryside, where traditions still hold strong, the number of divorces is smaller.

Households with both partners in the labour force were almost twice as numerous in 2000 as those with only one, averaging around 62% of the total at a European level. A marked divide is evident between the northern Member States, together with Portugal, where two-thirds or more of households were dual participant ones and Spain, Greece, Ireland and Italy where the proportion is under 50%. There are very few households in the European Union in which women work significantly longer hours than their male partner. In 2000, in almost every member state there were under 10% of households with both partners in full-time jobs in which women worked 40 hours or more a week and men worked less than that. In Greece, Spain, Italy, Portugal, Luxembourg and Austria, the most prevalent pattern is for both partners to work long full-time hours, in both types of households (with or without children).

3.4 Social networks

Family, as well as informal networks among friends and neighbours play a very important role. Statutory social care is provided by the decentralized units of the Regional System for Health and Welfare (PESYPs), the Health and Welfare offices of the Ministry of Health and Welfare, which function at the level of Prefectures, the newly created Employment Promotion Centres and other services of the Greek Manpower Organization and some more or less permanent schemes implemented by first-tier local authorities (some of these schemes operate on the basis of bilateral agreements between first-tier local authorities and specialized organizations, such as the Organization Against Drugs, Treatment and Cure Centers, the Research Center on Equality Issues and the National Youth Institute. These programs, however, only partly meet needs for social care (they are addressed to a very limited range of groups in need and geographical coverage is highly unbalanced). It is in this context, therefore, that the existence of a welfare service system in Greece is in question.

The active or inactive membership in political, voluntary and charitable organizations is limited, an indication of the weakness of civil society, while party support can also take place outside the formal channels of party membership. 7.5% offer some sort of unpaid voluntary work for elderly, handicapped and deprived people; 9.3% for religious or church organisations; 8.4% for education, arts, music and cultural organizations; 3.9% for trade unions; 3.2% for political parties or groups; 6.5 % for local community action on issues like poverty, employment, housing, racial equality; 3.2% for third world development or human rights; 5.8% for conservation, the environment, ecology and animal rights activities; 3.7 % for professional associations; 2.6 % for youth work (e.g. scouts, guides, youth clubs

etc.); 5.3% for sports or recreation; 2.4% for women's group; 4.7% for peace movements; and 4.8% for voluntary organisations concerned with health. 7.6% spend time in clubs and voluntary associations every week, 13.6% once or twice a month, 17.6% few times a year and 61.3% not at all.

3.5 Identity

Greeks identify with their flag quite intensely. This reality has recently come to the forefront in a dramatic way. On the occasion of the national commemoration days (March 25, October 28) as well as of the local saint celebrations, army and school parades take place in all of the big towns. A student is placed ahead of each school. This student has the best marks and carries the Greek flag. Due to the rapidly expanding number of immigrants in Greece in the last decade, the number of immigrant students in schools considerably increased. In some cases, these students perform better at school, they are, therefore, qualified to hold the Greek flag and to be heads in school parades. This aroused a hot public debate and the issue whether a non-Greek has the right to hold the Greek flag has strongly divided the Greek society. The political leadership avoids the dilemma in a diplomatic manner, referring to an ancient philosophical phrase that every person taking part in Greek education is Greek. Many people, however, do not share this view and there have been isolated but characteristic cases of extreme phenomena such as school sit-ins and threats to abstain from the parades. The issue has hardly been settled. Most people are very proud for their nationality (65 %). Fewer people are quite proud (25.6 %), not very proud (8.6 %), or not proud at all (0.9%). At the same time, in most of the Gallup polls Greeks generally express one of the most positive opinions about the European Union compared to the rest of its members. 44.8% of the people think that they belong primarily in a locality or town, 12.0% in a region of Greece, 33.2% in Greece as a whole, 1.2% in Europe and 8.8% in the world as a whole.

A very high proportion of the Greek people would be prepared to actually do something to improve the conditions of their immediate family: 85.6% answered the respective question with "absolutely yes" and 12.5% with "yes". Fewer people would be prepared to actually do something to improve the conditions of people in their neighbourhood or community as 44.5% answered the respective question with "maybe". Regarding elderly people in Greece, about 70% answered positively the question if they would be prepared to actually do something to improve the conditions of their immediate family. A similar response was expressed with regard to the sick and disabled people. Yet in respect to immigrants, it is the other way round as 52.7% answered with "maybe", 22.6% with "no" and 2.9% with "absolutely no".

3.6 Trends and Reflection

One of the greatest contemporary problems in Greece is the massive and uncontrolled influx of a large number of mostly illegal migrants. It is a complex situation because of the geographical position of Greece, in the middle of a politically very unstable region. Another problem is the formation of the sea

and continental borders, which are extensive and almost impossible to be guarded effectively.

Under these circumstances the country is the first step for illegal transfer to other European countries, while a large proportion of illegal immigrants prefer to stay in Greece for some time. The collapse of the regimes of Eastern Europe as well as the wider rearrangements in the Balkans have forced a large number of migrants to seek political and economic stability in Greece. The same reasons forced people of Greek origin to repatriate from the ex-Eastern bloc. These trends have significant demographic effects, particularly as the fertility rate among native Greeks has steadily decreased.

Greek Manpower Organization estimates that there are about 700,000 economic migrants in Greece today, while only 350,000 are registered. 65% of them are from Albania and 6% from Bulgaria. According to estimations, the population of Greece in the year 2025 will be 13.5 millions, while Greeks will be less than 10 millions, with a large proportion of people older than 65 years among them (20%). As regards the labour market, the number of illegal foreign workers is estimated to be 6 to 12% of the total work force. About 300,000 of them are Albanians who work in low paid seasonal jobs of the primary and secondary sector. A precise record is impossible, because illegal working is the rule. For example, controls conducted in the year 1999 have disclosed 150,000 cases of illegal employment. In 1980, Greece had the second best number of births (148,134) while in 1999 the worst (100,265). In the latter year the number of deaths was for the first time higher than the number of births. According to data of major hospitals, 33.28% of the births are given by foreign women, 16.46% of whom were from Albania and the rest from various other countries. According to the records of the Municipality of Athens, about 19% of the pupils in primary and secondary education are of foreign origin. The country was not prepared to integrate these migrants. Successive naturalization rounds took place in the last few years, but illegal immigration continues unabated. The issue is of growing concern to Greek public opinion and politicians and, for the first time in Greek history, phenomena of racism and xenophobia are to be seen, though at a controlled level.

Another point that should be stressed are the deadlocks of statism and traditional forms of social integration (on the basis of vertical clientelistic networks and public employment), and the attempts of modernization of socio-political and economic institutions and structures, that have not been particularly successful up to now. Social protection is strongly linked with informal strategies, social organization reproduces the statist-clientelistic pattern that hardly favours social mobility and collective solidarity remains weak.

4 Social Inclusion

4.1 Introduction

Social inclusion is the degree to which people are and feel integrated in social relationships, organizations, subsystems and structures. More specifically, it is the degree to which people have access to a wide range of social relations that constitute everyday life. As we will see in the following indicators, social inclusion is concerned with processes that are dynamic; is comprehensive in terms of the processes and subsystems it refers to; is multi layered in that it may cover exclusion from personal relationships, neighborhoods, organizations or supra national blocks; it has both, an objective and a subjective side.

Again, in the case of Greece, this conditional factor should be seen in the light of social cleavages between different groups on the basis of: (a) their success in establishing political credentials of access to the state, (b) a traditionally crucial, “vertical” mode of socio-political integration, and (c) strong family/kin solidarities. Also, the particular characteristics of the occupational structure in Greece (e.g. the large proportion of self-employed in all sectors of the economy and of workers frequently crossing the formal-informal divide) significantly impact upon processes of social exclusion. Unemployment cannot easily be detected and measured among self-employed (including the self-employed of liberal professions), and risks of social insecurity and social exclusion are not immediately observable (Petmesidou 1998).

Table 3.1: Indicators of social inclusion

Domains	Sub-domains	Indicators	
Citizenship rights	Constitutional/ political rights	45. Proportion of residents with citizenship	
		46. Proportion having right to vote in local elections and proportion exercising it	
	Social rights	47. Proportion with right to a public pension (i.e. a pension organised or regulated by the government)	
		48. Women's pay as a proportion of men's	
		49. Proportion with right to free legal advice	
	Civil rights	50. Proportion experiencing discrimination	
		Economic and political networks	51. Proportion of ethnic minority groups elected or appointed to parliament, boards of private companies and foundations
			52. Proportion of women elected or appointed to parliament, boards of private companies and foundations
	Labour market	Access to paid employment	53. Long-term unemployment (12+ months)
			54. Involuntary part-time or temporary employment
Services	Health services	55. Proportions with entitlement to and using public primary health care	
		Housing	56. Proportion homeless, sleeping rough
			57. Average waiting time for social housing
	Education	58. school participation rates and higher education participation rates	
		Social care	59. Proportion of people in need receiving care services
			60. Average waiting time for care services (including child care)
	Financial services	61. Proportion denied credit differentiated by income groups	
		62. Access to financial assistance / advice in case of need	
	Transport	63. Proportion of population who has access to public transport system	
		64. Density of public transport system and road density	
Civic / cultural services	65. Number of public sport facilities per 10.000 inhabitants		
	66. Number of public and private civic & cultural facilities (e.g. cinema, theatre, concerts) per 10.000 inhabitants		
Social networks	Neighbourhood participation	67. Proportion in regular contact with neighbours	
	Friendships	68. Proportion in regular contact with friends	
	Family life	69. Proportion feeling lonely/isolated	
		70. Duration of contact with relatives (cohabiting and non-cohabiting)	
	71. Informal (non-monetary) assistance received by different types of family		

Source: A. Walker and A. Wigfield: The Social Inclusion Component Of Social Quality, EFSQ Working Paper, Amsterdam, September 2003

4.2 Citizenship rights

4.2.1 Constitutional / political rights

In the early 1990s the process of acquiring the Greek nationality underwent a detailed and thorough

overhaul. Until then only when the interested party fulfilled all prerequisites, upon the presentation of the appropriate documentation demanded by the Law, was the final decision taken regarding the acquisition of Greek nationality. The entire time-consuming procedure was centrally and exclusively inspected by the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Following the collapse of the former Soviet Union and under the pressure of emergency needs concerning the repatriation of ethnic Greeks, a common decision was taken by the Minister of the State Department, the Minister of Internal Affairs and the Minister of National Defense. This decision allowed the Greeks of Pontian origin coming from the Soviet Union to register in the Male Registries and municipal rolls without presenting all the documents required by the Law on the grounds that they were not responsible for not being able to get hold of the required documents. Law 2130/1993, which followed suit, further clarified the meaning of repatriation. The prerequisite to confirm Greek nationality (by offering proof of Greek descent) justifies repatriation. Authority to issue the certificate of Greek nationality and registration in the Male Registries and municipal rolls is given to the Prefects. The latter were to base their decisions on the passport evidence and all evidence not shown in passports were to be covered by a simple written statement.

The industry of “making Greek” essentially started due to this relaxation and diffusion of authority, all that with great easiness and in order to serve election expediency. From a sample inspection of related files, it ensues that the required prerequisites for most, if not all, citizenship acquisitions are slightly satisfied. According to the census performed by the General Secretariat of Repatriates of Greek descent, a department of the Ministry of Macedonia – Thrace, 135,000 repatriates of Greek descent entered Greece. 91,000 of them had “repatriate visa” while the rest 44,000 of them had “tourist visa”. 58% of them settled in Macedonia, 17% of them in Thrace, 22% in Attica, and the rest of them in Crete and other areas of the country. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 95,000 out of the 135,000 have already completed the procedures and hold Greek passports. The rest of them were given a repatriate visa here in Greece that was equivalent to a permit to stay. According to documents of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, one out of four interested individuals has presented false documents.

As regards political rights everyone that holds a legal Greek passport has the right to vote both in national and local elections. There are no exceptions, as there are also no exceptions regarding the rights to a public pension that derives by the respective laws. 39% of Greeks live in households where at least one member draws a pension. For other social benefits the figure is 19%. For all social benefits together the figure is 50% (since some households receive more than one type of social benefit; see also section 1.2 above). The Greek legal system provides with a lawyer every accused that cannot afford it. A large number of state agencies and non governmental organizations provide with free legal advice and related services to various social groups, like e.g. immigrants that have not access to paid services.

4.2.2 Social rights

The average gross hourly earnings of women were 87% of those of men in 1998. (The EU average was 84%). The population consists of all paid employees aged 16-64 that are at work more than 15 hours a week. The wage gap between men and women in Greece reached 13%; it was the seventh lower among the 19 most developed countries of OECD and the sixth lower among the countries of the European Union. The wage gap in the private sector amounted to 21% in 1998 and it was higher than the EU average. In contrast, it was lower than the EU average in the public sector and it amounted to 9 %. From 1981 until recently the wage gap between the two sexes steadily decreased both in the industrial production and retail sectors. In the early 1980s, such a tendency appeared in the banking and insurance sectors initially; however soon this trends was reversed in the latter sectors and the gap widened again.

The legal-institutional framework of the labour market and wage determination directly affects wage inequalities between men and women. Although the Greek wage protection system seems to be powerful, nonetheless its efficiency is undermined by multiple violations of the labor laws. The deregulation of the work market increases the wage inequalities between the sexes and constitutes a great obstacle to whatever effort to narrow the wage gap. The professional and departmental division of employment is the most important determining factor of the wage gap between the two sexes. Shrinking the gap requires both political measures that encourage the elimination of gender-based segregation of jobs, and improvement of the relevant wages in the professions and fields that concentrate the main volume of female employment.

Women occupy 13% of the 300 seats of the national parliament. In 2001 they occupied 9%, while the EU average was 23%. 40.3% of the female population aged 15-64 were in employment in 2000 (compared to an EU average of 54%). There are no relevant data on women appointed to boards of private companies and foundations. The reputation that connects NGOs to social innovation are not proved for the Greek NGOs active in the field of social protection. Although women constitute the majority among their members, paid staff and volunteers, they represent only one third of the head management (Polyzoidis 2004).

4.2.3 Civil rights

On the basis of available information, the social groups facing discrimination in the labour market are composed of young people, women, individuals with special needs, employees with insufficient education, repatriates, refugees, prisoners, ex-convicts, juvenile delinquents, gypsies, Pomaks and ex-addicts. A new group consists of third country nationals or people without a country that have submitted an application for refuge. There are no detailed studies to cover the entire spectrum of discrimination problems. Discrimination by gender is the only exception and various reports and studies are available on this issue.

The only minority in the Greek State is the Muslim one in Thrace, which consists of three different ethnic components (Turkish, Pomaks, and Gypsies or Rom). On the basis of the 1991 census data, 33% (about 11,5000) of the total population of Thrace (338,000 inhabitants) belongs to the Muslim minority. Muslim communities vary in size among the three prefectures of Thrace. In the prefecture of Xanthi the Muslims constitute 47.2% of the local population, in the prefecture of Rodopi 59.6% and in the prefecture of Evros 6.6%. As to the ethnic composition of the Muslim minority, 37% are of Turkish origin, 31.6% are Pomaks and 21.1% are Gypsies.

Table 3.2 Living conditions and habits of the Rom

less than 2 classes in the primary school	63 %
do not use soap	47 %
do not use toothbrush	79 %
do not change clothes at night	62 %
do not eat at a programmed time	85 %
born in a tent	20 %
living in place smaller than 25 q.m.	69 %
do not use a toilet	43 %
no electricity	59 %
no fresh water	41 %
getting married to a relative	12 %
getting married while 14-18 years old-male	37 %
getting married while 13-17 years old- female	53 %
having baby while 17-21 years old	51 %

Source: University of Athens, 2nd paediatrics clinic, 2004.

Religiously, they are governed by three Muftis. They are free to fulfill their religious duties and five times a day their prayers are heard from the minarets of their mosques. The Muslim minority of Thrace is constantly developing in all sectors. In the agricultural sector they cultivate the land with new technology, and they take loans in order to improve their products, which are tobacco, cereals, vegetables etc. Farmers have access to subsidies from national or EU sources. Members of the minority run small or medium-size enterprises. Their imports and exports are flourishing. In the political field, they have elected representatives at all levels of local government. There are, also, Muslim members in the Greek parliament. In terms of education, there are elementary as well as religious schools where the official language is Turkish. Many children of the Muslim minority, however, study in Greek speaking high schools and lyceums and are accepted in Greek Universities on special terms. The Muslim minority has also a dynamic presence in the professions. Members of the professions of the minority have established an association, which is the rallying cell of the regional intellectual community. A proof of the intellectual rise of the minority is their writing and publication activity. Books are written and published on literature, social, financial and other issues. Many weekly newspapers, children's magazines, religious periodicals etc. are, also, in circulation.

However, many remote agricultural Muslim communities in Thrace (including the two Muslim quarters of the town of Komotini –Alan Kouyou and Ifestos -) lack significant amenities and exhibit a high

poverty incidence. For instance, in the two Muslim quarters of Komotini there are no piped water facilities in the houses, and children from these communities are not accepted in schools on the ground of public hygiene.¹⁰

4.3 Labour Market

4.3.1 Access to paid employment

In 2000, total activity rates in Greece amounted to 55.7% of the population aged 15-64, while the EU average was 63.2%. Combating unemployment is one of the biggest challenges for all EU member states, and particularly so for Greece. In the year 2000, 5.9 % of the labour force (including those entering the labour market for the first time) had been unemployed in Greece for at least 12 months. The respective EU average was 3.6%. According to Eurostat, 35.5% of the unemployed people in Greece have been out of work for 24-27 months, which is the highest percentage in the EU. As shown in Tables 3.3 and 3.4, the relative position of Greece has worsened during the nineties and long-term unemployment is still rising. We also observe that long-term unemployment hits women more than men.

Table 3.3: Long term unemployment among men, as a percentage of male unemployment

year	1990		2000		2001		2002		2003	
	> 6 months	> 12 months	> 6 months	> 12 months	> 6 months	> 12 months	> 6 months	> 12 months	> 6 months	> 12 months
Greece	61.8	39.9	67.1	49.4	61.8	47.0	68.0	47.1	70.4	49.2
EU av.	62.9	44.8	62.2	44.2	61.5	44.1	60.2	41.5	62.5	43.9

Source: OECD, 2004b.

As regards the age of the unemployed, 29.7% of them are 15-24 years old, so Greece is third among the EU countries. Those unemployed aged 24-49 constitute 9.5%, and the unemployed between 50-64 years of age are 4.3% (the Community average is 7.6% for the latter group). Epirus is first in unemployment regarding young people aged 15-24 (48.3%), and then follow Sterea Ellada (40.4%), West Macedonia (37.2%), West Greece and Thessaly (34.7%), North Aegean (31.4%), Attica (30.2%), Central Macedonia (29.6%), the Peloponnese (28.3%), Crete (22%), and Eastern Macedonia –Thrace (16%).

Table 3.4 Long term unemployment among women, as a percentage of female unemployment

year	1990		2000		2001		2002		2003	
	> 6 months	> 12 months	> 6 months	> 12 months	> 6 months	> 12 months	> 6 months	> 12 months	> 6 months	> 12 months
Greece	78.2	55.9	77.7	61.0	73.7	56.6	75.5	55.7	77.1	61.0
EU av.	66.7	48.0	66.1	47.3	65.0	46.6	63.8	45.6	65.3	47.0

Source: OECD, 2004b.

¹⁰ For an examination of the risks of social exclusion in a multi-cultural community of Thrace see Kallinikaki and Zaimakis 2004.

Some 420,100 of the eurozone's 11.6 million unemployed are found in Greece. Greece still lags behind the EU average, with women and young people particularly hard-pressed. Statistics unfortunately cannot be taken at face value because earnings of many Greeks and immigrant workers are off-the-books. Matching workers to jobs isn't easy though. And interestingly 18.3% of those unemployed said that they had been offered work during the past year, which they turned down due to factors such as location and payment. The areas where the most jobs are to be found today in Greece are trade, construction, industry and tourism, while most job-seekers are looking for office jobs. A comparison between Athens and Thessaloniki in 2001, for instance, reveals that while new jobs increased in Attica, due mainly to major Olympic Games construction projects, Thessaloniki's unemployment started at 10.7% and reached 11.5%. Youth unemployment is also regional, swelling up to 40.2% in Central Greece.

Table 3.5 Part-time employment as a proportion of employment

year	men					women				
	1990	2000	2001	2002	2003	1990	2000	2001	2002	2003
Greece	4.0	3.1	2.6	2.9	2.9	11.6	9.5	8.5	10.0	9.9
EU av.	4.3	6.0	5.8	6.0	6.1	27.0	27.6	27.5	27.5	27.6

Source: Soumeli, 2002.

More than 40% of those in part time employment would prefer a full time job. In 2000, 9% of the men, who had been unemployed before, were now employed in part time positions. More than 98% of these men would prefer a full time job. 26% of the women, who had been unemployed before, were now employed in part time positions. More than 90% of these women would prefer a full time job.

As regards the situation of the labour market in general, the peculiarity of Greece cannot be reflected in the suggested indicators. School attendance by age is not particularly low (and the same can be said for higher education enrollment). Yet on the other hand, youth unemployment even among university graduates is comparatively high (and even higher among women graduates): according to recent data by the Manpower Organization of Greece, in 2001 4.2% of male and 10.2% of female university graduates were unemployed, while the corresponding percentages for postgraduate degree holders were 8.2% and 9.9%. The structure and orientation of the education system (and curricula) on the one hand, and the dynamics of the labor market on the other, account for this phenomenon to a large extent.

4.4 Services

4.4.1 Social services

Greece' trajectory in respect to the service element of social spending is ambiguous (see Petmesidou forthcoming [b]). She exceeded the EU average in respect to service effort and weight of universal services to total social expenditure by the end of the nineties. Spending on benefits in kind per head,

though stagnant in the early nineties, more than doubled in 1999. Yet despite this trend Greece persistently ranks third from the bottom of the hierarchy of EU countries. What is more, Greece's position vis-à-vis the highest spenders on social services in the EU has even deteriorated over the last decade (the gap with Sweden and Denmark increased from 1,624 and 937 PPS, respectively, in the early nineties, to 1,708 and 1,575 PPS, in 1999). The distribution of expenditure in kind by service sector over the nineties does not exhibit any significant changes. Health services accounted for over two thirds of total benefits until the late nineties. The amount invested in services other than health care has only slightly risen as per cent of GDP, from 2.1 per cent in 1990 to 2.5 per cent in 1998. A steeper increase in 1999 (to 3.3 per cent of GDP) is mostly accounted for by an increase of benefits in kind for tackling unemployment and social exclusion (benefits in kind to the unemployed have been increasing fast since the mid-nineties, while services for promoting social inclusion nearly doubled during 1999). Fast rising unemployment over the nineties and increasing inequality in the second half of the decade, in parallel with dramatic changes in migration patterns are among the main causes for pronounced spending on active measures and social inclusion policies. Taking into account the sum of benefits in kind for housing, unemployment and social exclusion (as per cent of GDP), Greece scored quite high among EU countries in the end of the decade. An upward trend is also observed with respect to expenditure on benefits in kind for elderly people. On the other hand, expenditure for services to the disabled and to families and children remained stagnant as per cent of GDP and considerably shrunk as per cent share to total benefits in kind.

A noticeable increase of service effort took place especially in the second half of the nineties. In relative terms (benefits in kind as per cent of GDP and total social expenditure) there is convergence towards the EU average. However, analysis of disaggregated service components rather shows a stationary trend of a deficient and fragmented care provision (to families and children, the aged, the disabled and other groups in need of care). Admittedly, catching-up in service provision takes place under conditions in which structural change has become an endemic characteristic of the policy environment in EU countries. In parallel, post-fordist conditions undermine the role of central planning, promote decentralization and trigger off reforms that replace administrative by market (and more or less quasi-market) methods of resource allocation in public services. Diffuse influence of these conditions, often mediated by EU policies (initiatives and projects) can easily be noticed in the country. The multiplicity of projects and agents emerging at different levels is one such indication. Of particular importance, however, is the fact that current influences on Greece take place in a policy environment, which somehow skipped a fordist trajectory of development (as we argue elsewhere) and hardly developed a tradition, discourse and mechanisms geared to systematic policy planning and implementation processes.

In addition, the peculiarities of social protection maintained an extreme fragmentation of the system. This is mostly pronounced in social services, particularly so as up to now no major foci of service regulation and co-ordination (if not delivery) have been formed at the municipal and community levels. From this point of view, one could rightly argue that service expansion took place in a path dependent way. In the second half of the decade of the nineties intensifying service effort has been prompted by

demographic and family changes, fast increasing unemployment and a new problem constellation related to intensifying (mostly illegal) immigration trends in the country. Yet policies remained caught in a highly deficient ex post, reactive mode of intervening to crisis situations. Hardly any major changes towards preventative and community-based policies have been under way for dealing comprehensively with families' needs over the life cycle. Supplied services focus on the most deprived and vulnerable groups, and scarcely face the challenge of opening up debate for universal, holistic and user-focused services and how to build up wide support for them. A trend towards decentralization is evident, e.g. through the transfer of responsibility for open care centres of the elderly and nurseries to local authorities and further expansion of possibilities for LAs to take initiative in social care provision - EU funded programmes being a major spur in this direction.

Nevertheless, a statutory framework and the required administrative/management and financial mechanisms for establishing systematic social services departments across first-tier LAs in the country do not seem to be forthcoming. Further, no trends are noticeable for tackling fragmentation through specially (centrally) designed overarching programmes co-ordinating, on a categorical basis, uneven, patchy and in certain occasions overlapping provision (by municipalities, municipal enterprises, programmatic contracts between various bodies state, municipal, third sector etc.). Equally absent are policy practices experimenting with new innovative management and administration arrangements, systematic needs assessment, and user and community involvement. On the other hand, however, the need for a thorough reform becomes all the more necessary and urgent as familialist-statist patterns for dealing with social problems loose weight and ensuing deadlocks intensify. Needless to say, for reform to be effective a major priority to address is how to develop and balance universal provision with multiple funding and delivery arrangements in a way that enhances equity, accessibility, users' voice and accountability.

4.4.2 Health services

With the establishment of the National Health System in 1983 the state undertook the responsibility of providing health services with universal coverage. At the same time, the creation of private hospitals was prohibited, along with private practice by the doctors employed in the N.H.S. and state subsidies to private non-profit hospitals. N.H.S. services are offered equally to all citizens, regardless of their income and other socio-economic criteria. However, the proportion of hospital beds to population remains very low, while the exchange paid for medical purposes to foreign countries remain very high, as many Greeks travel abroad for health treatment. Primary medical care has persistently been neglected along with the creation of decentralized health centers. Exception to this is the creation of a number of primary health care centers in rural areas.

According to Davaki and Mossialos (forthcoming), "It appears there may be inequities in access in Greece arising from supply-side variation, different entitlements and benefits coverage across insurance funds, and high informal and direct payments. Although there is limited evidence on how informal payments affect access and utilization of health services, it is clear that patients who cannot

afford to pay cannot access the same level of services or have to wait longer for care“. In the past it was very common that a patient should travel abroad in order to find an appropriate cure. More and more of these cases can now be treated in Greece (see Table 3.6).

Table 3.6 Treatment for cancer, radiotherapy: Average waiting time

Hospital	Waiting time
Saint Sabbas	1-3 months
Alexandra	1-2 months
Metaxa	1 month
Aretaiion	20 days
Attiko	1 month
Hospital of Patra	15 days
Papageorgiou-Thessaloniki	10 days
Hospital of Heraklion- Creta	15-30 days

Source: Greek Association of Tumour Radiotherapy, 2004.

Although the high goals set by N.H.S. have not been completely fulfilled, because of a failure to find funds or to achieve the consent by all interested parties, the step that was taken was very important. Between 1981 and 1988 the number of hospital doctors increased by 60% and the number of hospital staff by 88%. The salaries of all categories, also, saw a significant increase so as to attract capable candidates. Offering satisfactory free services resulted in a sudden increase in demand, which caused crowding and long waiting periods. Thus, phenomena like bribing doctors were observed, along with extensive political interventions for the promotion of specific cases aiming at customer facilitation in politician's constituencies.

With regard to health policy the following characteristics are noteworthy (see Abel-Smith et al. 1994, Sissouras et al. 1999 and Venieris 2003): the incoherence between aims and goals; the inefficient and optional application of the law; the fact that priorities are publicized during election periods and are forgotten afterwards; administrative rigidities; the circumvention of laws leading to wastage of resources and corruption; and the absence of political will in order to deal with corruption. As Venieris stresses (2003, p. 284), under these conditions politics threaten dangerously health care. What is more, medical doctors have penetrated almost any aspect of politics, i.e. political parties, parliament or ministries, which means that they exert strong pressures to decision making both at the political and policy level. For a substantial improvement of the quality of health care, modernization of treatment, decentralization and rationalization of administration are urgently required. The Greek health system today remains national only by name. In reality it is a highly fragmented, mixed system, predominantly of a hospital- and doctor-centered nature. Primary care is mostly private and/or mediated by a large number of health insurance funds.

Total health expenditure is above 9% of GDP and so remains the lowest among the rest of the EU countries. Public expenditure slightly increased – from 4.8% of GNP in 1990 to 5.2% in 2000 – while private expenditure almost doubled – from 2.9% of GNP to 3.9% in 2000 – yet without taking into

consideration informal economic transactions in health care (e.g. under the table payments to hospital doctors). The low level of service quality remains a significant obstacle in using health services, and manifests a gap between the stated principles and practice of NHS. Major drawbacks are: the lack of coordination in financing the system, the lack of substantial measures for expenditure efficiency and cost containment. On the one hand, cost control never figured among the top priorities of the Greek NHS, as was the case with other EU countries and, on the other, major dimensions of the legal framework of NHS have never been implemented (as are for instance legal provisions for primary care). Overall, by the mid 1990s, it was evident that the financial problem in the domain of health care was closely linked with inefficient management rather than the level of expenditure.

As regards public health, no major developments can be observed. Regulations such as, for instance, the obligatory use of protection belts in private cars or the prohibition of smoking in public spaces are significant steps in the right direction, yet they have only partly been implemented. Furthermore, powerful medical interests maintain obsolete working standards, while a major part of the medical world continues to apply dubious practices, which increase the volume of provided services and illegal transactions.

The inefficiency of interventions in order to tackle major health care problems is linked to everlasting political, institutional and economic factors hindering reform. Such hindrances derive from powerful economic pressures and corporate interests in the area of distributing cost – profit in health. Such powerful interests control political decisions, as they are unwilling to incur an additional cost or to lose profits and thus prevent any restructuring procedure. The discourse on upgrading health services plays a significant role in the social and political scene, nevertheless the efforts for restructuring end up in a drawer of the Ministry of Health or in compromises that maintain the status quo. In the long-term the lack of appropriate collective consensus and political culture remain the crucial obstacle that postpone change in various social policy fields including health. Revising and effectively implementing the health care institutions would significantly contribute to cost reduction, removal of social injustices and higher social and political profit.

On the other hand the citizens should reassume their responsibility towards their health so that to force politicians react to the problems. Therefore the Greek society faces a serious challenge, the state is faced with unanswered questions and health politics is handicapped. Despite the poor social and political infrastructure, the health of Greeks, according to standard indicators remains satisfactory.

Table 3.7 Reasons for the pupils to start smoking

influence of friends	36 %
for fun	25.3 %
influence of the family	7.3 %
of the television	2.7 %
of advertisements	1.8 %
other reasons	26.9 %

Source: Tsahmatzides, 2004.

Smoking is an epidemic in Greece and its impact on women's life expectancy is not clear as yet, since most women started to smoke in the late 1970s. Life expectancy at birth has been consistently increasing since the 1950s and is currently 80.7 years for women and 75.4 years for men. In 2001, Greece ranked ninth for both male and female life expectancy in the EU. Between 1990 and 2000, male and female life expectancy at birth increased at a slower pace than the preceding ten-year period. Moreover, there was a slight reduction in male and female life expectancy between 1997 and 1998, which was the only year since the early 1950s that a reduction has been reported.

4.4.3 Housing

As regards homelessness there are no official data available at the present time. According to a rough estimate, in the Greater Athens Area there are about 17,000 people who experience the most acute forms of homelessness. On the basis of a survey carried out in August 2003, it was estimated that, at that time, there were approximately 2150 shelter spaces provided by the State (31%), the Church (17%) and NGOs (52%), which operated at about 93% capacity. About 50% of the homeless are not of Greek origin (see Table 3.8).

Table 3.8 The homeless population in Greece by type of accommodation

type of accommodation	estimated figure
roofless people (Greeks only)	100
urgent acc. organized by the state (Greeks only)	280
urgent acc. provided by the voluntary sector	2,800
boarding houses	500
squatters	1,000
roofless immigrants, asylum seekers, refugees in camps	3,000
roofless immigrants, asylum seekers, refugees outside camps	5,000
institutions, asylums, etc	3,000
total	17,000

Source: Edgar, Doherty, Meert, 2003.

The Organization of Workers' Housing implements mortgage programmes. Loans are granted for the purchase or construction of homes, as well as for the completion or repairing of existing houses. There is, also, a programme for families with more than four children and for those protecting disabled people. The beneficiaries of these programs are workers and pensioners insured by a major insurance organization, who have fulfilled the corresponding contribution requirements. The workers must also have completed the number of days of work required per category by the Law before the submission date of their applications. The workers themselves and their family members must not possess any real estate property sufficient enough to house them. The beneficiaries of the Organization can take a loan with low interest rates based on their net family income and depending on their family particulars.

4.4.4 Financial services

Access to loans is rather easy in Greece. This is confirmed by the rapid increase in household debts in recent years. The banks have estimated that by the year 2005 they will give housing or personal loans which amount to 19 billion euros. Bank credit as percent of GNP increased to 29% this year, compared to 26,2% in 2003. This figure is expected to reach 35% of GNP in 2005. This means that between 2003 and 2005 the level of credit will increase by over 30 percent, which reveals in a way the new conditions in the Greek economy due to the liberalization of consumption credit, falling interest rates and growing competition strongly affecting living conditions in the country. In the total sum of loans that the banks are going to give this year, 8.5 billion euros concern housing and personal loans. Next year bank loans are estimated to reach 10 billion euros and consequently household debt will amount to 35% of GNP. Bank experts believe that there are even more possibilities to extend retail banking services, because household debts (due to personal loans) as percent of GNP (8.2%) lag very much behind the Euro zone and USA average (16% and 17% respectively). The total sum of loans incurred by households for personal consumption and mortgage reached 26,2% of the total debt, compared to 46% in the Euro zone. The banks estimate to give personal loans over 3 billion euros in 2004, against 2.6 billion euros in 2003. Estimations for 2005 put personal loans at the level of 4 billion euros, which means that total household debt from credit cards and personal loans will reach 19,4 billion euros (11.8% of GNP against 9.5% foreseen for this year and 8,2% incurred in 2003). Regarding housing loans, banks foresee that this year will give 5.3 billion euros (approximately the same as last year). Thus the burden for the households will increase to 19.4% from 17.4% in 2003. In 2005 it is expected that housing loans will increase reaching 6 billion euros. This will raise total debts over 23% of GNP.

Public services offering financial assistance and advice in case of need and civil society initiatives in this respect are rudimentary. The institution of consumer self-protection through the establishment of non-governmental organizations is slowly making its appearance. However, public response is still limited.

4.4.5 Transport

Although in recent years huge efforts have been made to upgrade conditions so as to approach the European models, the traffic situation in Greece remains bad. Most of these efforts are financed by EU sources. The super modern airport of Athens, the bridge connecting the Peloponnese with the rest of the country, the Athens Underground, and the ultra modern express ways connecting the four geographic extremes on two axes constitute the most characteristic projects of the thousands of small and large projects that change the scenery all over the country. However, there are still many difficulties, which spring from the irregularities of the land, the fact that there are thousands of islands, the fact that Greek cities developed disorderly, without urban planning, and finally the fact that urban centers are extremely crowded. The percentage of car accidents remains high along with that of related injuries and deaths. High population density in the urban centers makes daily transport very problematic. Athens alone has so many vehicles moving in its streets that if they were to line up they

would reach Alexandroupolis, the city situated in the northeastern extreme of Greece, at the Turkish border. Greeks prefer to use their own car, wherever this is possible, but available parking spaces cannot cover the demand in the least. There are too many taxis that offer rather cheap transportation compared to other European countries. The newly built Underground in Athens has improved things considerably, but it has not solved all of the problems. The Underground is constantly expanding and is accompanied by a regional railway system, the tram and bus transportation.

4.5 Social networks

The number of family members living under the same roof is steadily decreasing. More and more children eat at fast food restaurants, apparently separately from their parents.

Table 3.9 Total annual turnover of the fast-food restaurants in Greece (in Millions €)

year	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002
Mil €	76.3	111.5	148.2	190.8	226	249.4	293.5	340.5	394.1	431.7	487.8

Source: ICAP, 2003.

The average time of real work is dramatically increasing while time for vacations is steadily decreasing. On the contrary, the average time of TV watching is increasing. These data lead us to the conclusion that communication time among relatives is decreasing, along with the quality of communication. Moreover, the number of young people who choose to stay single is increasing. On the other side, a great effort is made to preserve traditional family gatherings and accompanying customs in characteristic occasions such as Christmas and Easter celebrations. These bring the extended family together, possibly more now than in the past. 62.1% of the Greek people spend time with friends once a week, 23.6% once or twice a month, 11.3% few times a year, and only 3.1% not at all. 24.1% spend time with colleagues once a week, 23.3% once or twice a month, 21.6% few times a year and 30.9% not at all.

Table 3.10 Free time activity in Greece

resting at home	81 %
restaurant, bar	35%
cinema	27%
sport	19%
culture	16%
"do it yourself"	14%

Source: GfK, Wall Street Journal Europe, 2004.

As regards informal (non-monetary) assistance received by different types of family, we should stress that material provisions are not given on a regular basis and, therefore, it is not possible to record them. This is an activity developed particularly by non-governmental organizations and the church. Material provisions are preferred more than monetary aid because they are both obtained more easily and do not run the risk of being wasted on alcohol etc. However, they are more difficult to manage

(storage areas, refrigerators, vehicles, etc).

Depression afflicts a great part of the population. It has been estimated that the risk of getting down with Major Depressive Disorder is 10%-25% for women and 5%-12% for men. Every moment 5%-9% of women and 2%- 3% of men suffer from it. The percentages increase if we take into account Melancholy, Atypical forms and Secondary types of Depression (e.g. stroke). Nonetheless, Depression is not often diagnosed, or treated properly. Only a percentage of all cases reach the specialist. Psychological problems affect 14%-18% of children and teenagers. According to a major study¹¹, 13% of those asked stated that they felt unhappy. The percentages are quite higher among 15-year olds (23%) compared to 11-year olds (5%). It must be noted that the number of girls who stated that they were unhappy was double compared to that of boys. The symptoms of child and teenage depression are many and slightly different than those of adults. Usually, there are changes in their behavior. The child becomes more irritable, restless and moody. At the same time, there may be changes in the appetite, which usually decreases, as well as sleep disorders, such as insomnia or excessive need to sleep, nightmares and sleepwalking. It is, also, possible that the child might be less active; less interested in meeting friends or doing things he/she liked, have low self-esteem, lower school performance than before, or always seek approval from relatives and friends. It is, also, important and disturbing when the child starts talking about death or suicide very often. The symptoms, however, may be somatic, such as headaches, diarrheas, tummy aches. Greek children experience somatic and psychological "aches", since a considerable number states that they often experience several of the above symptoms. It is characteristic that half of the students mention that they feel nervous or moody at least once a week, get angry easily or behave badly. One out of four reports that he/she suffers from headaches and has difficulty in sleep.

4.6 Trends and Reflection

For many years, in Greek society, the family in its traditional form was the counterbalance of the lack of a robust welfare state. Nowadays though we observe a dramatic weakening of the traditional family model, while, on the other hand, there is no parallel development of the welfare state to be seen. Obviously this trend significantly affects various aspects of social quality.

Overall, one could argue that the family still represents a strong value in Greek society, in spite of changing relationships, roles and patterns of behaviour – i.e. increasing participation of women in the labour force, weakening of family ties, decreasing number of weddings and increasing number of divorces and of alternative forms of cohabitation. There is also a steady decrease of the number of births. This is linked with phenomena like the decrease of the number of weddings, the increase of the average age of women in their first marriage, a longer time-span between marriage and birth of the first child and a higher divorce rate. Two parallel trends are observed in respect to marriage: first the

¹¹ The study was performed by the University Research Institute of Psychiatric Health on 4,299 students aged 11-15, in the context of the International Research on the Health of the Student Population (1998 data).

time-span of cohabitation before marriage is increasing and thus people get married in a more and more advanced age; and second, the number of couples who choose to cohabit is growing, as is also the number of children born outside wedlock.

A household that consists of a married couple and one or more children is still the dominant model. Other household types that increase in number are: one-member households, households consisting of co-habiting adults of the same sex with or without children, single parent families as well as families with children from former relationships of the one or the two partners. Overall, however, there is a decrease in family and household size.

The number of single parent families in Greece still remains the lowest throughout Europe. Nevertheless, it all boils down to the anticipation that very soon Greece will reach the level of other European countries (see also Table 3.11). Single parent families, as well as other new types of households are not a new phenomenon. What is striking, however, is the lack of social services, the lack of systematic and efficient social protection measures for this particular social group. If we also take into account the high degree of unemployment among women, livelihood conditions of these families are deteriorating and the risk of poverty and social exclusion is increasing.

Table 3.11 Single parent families with father only

children	having under age children	having under age and/or adult children
1	14,767	39,625
2	5,848	15,805
3	869	2,629
4	194	504
5	28	89
6 or more	12	40
total	21,718	58,692

Source: National Statistic Service of Greece, 2004.

Gender barriers in the occupational structure and sex-segregation of jobs are issues that need to be tackled by the state authorities through planning and implementation of equal opportunity policies. In parallel, issues such as the demarcation of skills and wage levels for both male and female workers need to be examined by the social partners through social dialogue and collective negotiations. Women achieve a level of education as high as that of men and, thus, the level of education per se does not play any role in the wage gap between men and women. On the other hand, there are marked differences in the educational choices of the two sexes. For instance, there are significant gender differences in terms of specialization at the level of technical and higher education, which are directly tied to traditional patterns of sex segregation, with women concentrated in conventional female occupations (i.e. teaching, clerical jobs particularly in the public sector, nursing etc.) Professional orientation at high schools and lyceums must be the basic tool of eliminating occupational division.

The second most important determining factor of the wage gap is sex related wage discrimination. This is a result of both employer practices and collective negotiations, which determine the basic wages in professions and fields that have been historically affected by social notions about the inferior value of female in relation to male labour and by the relative negotiating power of those employed in these professions and fields. The third most important determining factor of the wage gap between the sexes concerns gender differences regarding work experience (and particularly duration of employment in the last job). This is not only due to the fact that the female workforce is younger than the male. It is also related to interruptions in female careers and greater output of male work experience.

Thus, bridging the wage gap between the sexes requires first the facilitation of women in their caring responsibilities so that they will not interrupt their professional activity, and, second, the improvement of their promotion and professional development prospects. Combined actions towards this direction need to be undertaken by the state (parental leave of absence, improvement of infrastructure and day care services for children and seniors), employers and unions (positive actions for women development) and women organizations (campaigns for equal participation of men and women in family obligations). A policy of equal wages must include measures that eliminate sex-segregation of occupations, decrease interruptions in women's careers, aid women to re-enter the labour market with as fewer losses as possible, and facilitate their professional development.

However, these measures have an indirect long-term impact on the wage gap. Direct measures could be informative campaigns on the wage gap, their causes and ways to face them. They must also include a critical examination of the wage classification of female jobs and occupational categories in relation to male; measures for upgrading their wages; examination of the principles governing wage systems, in order to ascertain whether they lead to indirect discrimination towards women; drafting a fair practice code for companies and social partners regarding equal wages issues; and support and publication of cases of direct and indirect wage discrimination, which are taken to court. Finally, we must fight deregulation phenomena in the labour market so as to prevent the erosion of the wage protection system, which certainly leads to the broadening of the wage gap between the sexes.

5 Social Empowerment

5.1 Introduction

Empowerment is concerned with the means and processes necessary for people to be capable of actively participating in social relations and actively influencing the immediate and more distant social and physical environment. It is a process that is concerned with the individual or a social group of which the status of being empowered is one which is inherent in the individual rather being linked to factors outside the personal side. It is obvious that we cannot just measure empowerment. What we can try to do is to analyze it from different perspectives, while bearing in mind its three dimensions: access, participation and control. One qualification to be added with respect to Greek society: empowerment is strongly linked with family and kin solidarities –embedded in clientelistic networks– given the fact that such networks offer access to material and immaterial resources. Yet there are significant negative effects of such value patterns and practices. Such negative effects are: the strong grip of narrowly defined party-political interests on civil society and the persistent weakness of the latter, the low development of universalist citizenship values with significant repercussions on individual autonomy (e.g. of the disabled), and the suppressive side-effect of family solidarities particularly on women and the young. Moreover, as shown in recent studies (see for instance the contributions in Mossialos & Petmesidou forthcoming), in the last decade deadlocks in prevailing modes of social and political integration produced “institutional freezing and inertia instead of precipitating reform and system rationalization” in the country (Petmesidou and Mossialos forthcoming, p. 7).¹²

¹² Also there are strong indications that the influence of European integration particularly on welfare policy has been rather procedural and formalistic (see Sotiropoulos 2004).

Table 4.1 Indicators of social empowerment

Domains	Sub-domains	Indicators
Knowledge base	Application of knowledge	72. Extent to which social mobility is knowledge-based (formal qualifications)
		73. Per cent of population literate and numerate
	Availability of information	74. Availability of free media
		75. Access to internet
		76. Provision of information in multiple languages on social services
Labour market	User friendliness of information	77. Availability of free advocacy, advice and guidance centres
		78. % Of labour force that is member of a trade union (differentiated to public and private employees)
	Control over employment contract	79. % Of labour force covered by a collective agreement (differentiated by public and private employees)
		80. % Of employed labour force receiving work based training
	Prospects of job mobility	81. % Of labour force availing of publicly provided training (not only skills based). (Please outline costs of such training if any)
		82. % Of labour force participating in any "back to work scheme"
Openness and supportiveness of institutions	Reconciliation of work and family life (work/ life balance)	83. % Of organisations operating work life balance policies.
		84. % Of employed labour force actually making use of work/life balance measures (see indicator above)
	Openness and supportiveness of political system	85. Existence of processes of consultation and direct democracy (eg. referenda)
		86. Number of instances of public involvement in major economic decision making (e.g. public hearings about company relocation, inward investment and plant closure)
Public space	Openness of economic system	87. % of organisations/ institutions with work councils
		88. % Of the national & local public budget that is reserved for voluntary, not-for-profit citizenship initiatives
	Support for collective action	89. Marches and demonstrations banned in the past 12 months as proportion of total marched and demonstrations (held and banned).
Cultural enrichment		90. Proportion of local and national budget allocated to all cultural activities
		91. Number of self-organised cultural groups and events
	92. Proportion of people experiencing different forms of personal enrichment on a regular basis	
Personal relationships	Provision of services supporting physical and social independence	93. percentage of national and local budgets devoted to disabled people (physical and mental)
		94. Level of pre-and-post-school child care
	Support for social interaction	95. Extent of inclusiveness of housing and environmental design (e.g. meeting places, lighting, layout)

Source: P. Herrmann: Discussion Paper on the Domain Empowerment, 3rd Draft, ENIQ October 2003

5.2 The knowledge base

Meritocracy in the labour market and occupational careers is not sufficiently safeguarded in Greece. Employment in the public sector was a field that served political interests for many decades. The institutionalization of tenure for public servants put an end to staff turnover each time there was a change of the party in government. However, it did not solve the problem but rather inflated state bureaucracy. In 1994 an independent authority was established in order to implement hiring procedures on merit-based criteria. This authority is called the Highest Committee for the Selection of Personnel (ASEP) and is not subject to governmental or other control according to the Constitution. ASEP is composed of 24 prestigious members with adequate professional qualifications, especially people who have served as higher judicial functionaries, state officials or private sector executives, university professors, public organization officials or officials of other legal entities of the public sector. Among the functions of ASEP are: the selection of permanent personnel for the public sector; the control of public organizations regarding the selection of permanent and seasonal personnel; the execution of written examinations for school teachers; the imposition of penalties on employers for illegally employed individuals; notifying the Parliament and the Prime Minister about violations of the regulations regarding contract employees; inviting the representatives of public services and legal entities to give directions in order to keep uniform principles on issues falling under ASEP jurisdiction; supervising changes in the status of public sector employees (e.g. from a contract status to tenure), as well as of local authorities employees. ASEP can not solve the complex set of problems that have accumulated over the years. Besides, the principle of meritocracy is being violated in many more cases and in multiple ways.

5.2.1 Availability of information

As regards the availability of information and especially the availability of free media, there are no specific problems in Greece. Even if some media have close links with particular political parties, powerful political personalities and economic interests, there is no monopolisation. Fifteen major political newspapers sell about 400,000 sheets monthly. In 1995 there was 610 radio stations and 2,951,000 listeners, in 1998 692 stations and 3,179,000 listeners, in 2002 963 stations and 3,485,000 listeners. Today there are 749 operating stations with an audience of 3,655,000, 41.8% of whom listen from 2 to 3 hours daily.

The total number of internet users was 476,000 (5 per 100 inhabitants) by the end of 1998 and 737,310 (7 per 100 inhabitants) by the end of 1999, showing a yearly growth rate of 55%. In the same time period the penetration rate of internet in companies in Greece went up from 25% to 32%, that is, it increased by a rate of 28%. Evidence from another research¹³ indicates that the use of internet increased rapidly in 2002, compared to 2001, in Athens, Thessaloniki and other urban areas. In 2003

¹³ GfK Market Analysis, via telephone interviews on a representative national sample – including semi-urban and rural areas – of 1250 persons, women and men aged 18 to 64.

this tendency seems to have stabilized. Among the users of the network: 50% are aged 18-24, 50% have higher education and 53% belong to the higher social strata. Athens (38%) and Thessaloniki (42%) have the highest use percentages compared to the rest of Greece. As far as the place of use is concerned, 59% of the users have access from their home and 30% from their work place; internet cafes and the Universities follow with 5% and 7% respectively. A very small percentage (2%) surfs at their relatives' or friends' homes. Young people aged 18-24 and 25-29 prefer their home, 69% and 62% respectively. Those with a higher or secondary education use it more at home, 60% and 62% respectively. Those preferring to use the internet at internet cafes and Universities are young people aged 18-24 at 7% and 16% respectively. Finally, in rural areas 6% of the users visit the internet at relatives' or friends' homes. 86% of the users responded that the most important reason for using the internet is information and the amount of information one may find on any topic. The second most important reason (40%) is entertainment, especially for young people aged 18-24, where the percentage reaches 55%. Electronic mail follows at 34%, especially for young people aged 25-29 where the percentage reaches 40%. Professional reasons rate lower (2%), as well as looking for products (10%) and downloading (5%). As far as electronic commerce (e-commerce) is concerned, the most active group is that aged 45-54 at 16%. According to the above research, 8% of the sample stated that they intend to make a connection with the internet within the next year. Those willing to do so are young people aged 18-24 and 25-29 at 16%, as well as those belonging to a higher or middle social class at 9% and those with secondary or higher education at 11% for each case.

5.2.2 User friendliness of information

As regards the user friendliness of information and especially the provision of information in multiple languages on social services and the availability of free advocacy, advice and guidance centres, we should stress that the performance of the Greek state in providing relevant information is very poor even in the Greek language. On the contrary, as we can see in the next indicator, some major non-governmental organizations, active especially in the field of supporting migrants, are very well organized in this field.

Amnesty International is active in Athens and Thessaloniki. They offer legal support on matters of human rights. The International Catholic Migrant Committee (I.C.M.C) has a formal annex in Greece aiming at the facilitation of refugees in moving from the country-refuge to other countries through the implementation of international agreements and offering specialized services to refugees torture victims. The annex of International Social Services (I.S.S) in our country faces the problems of moving populations through social support services and the implementation of international agreements. It is responsible for the management of a social service at the Reception Center for Political Refugees in Lavrio. This service receives immigrants and those applying for asylum and offers them Greek and English language learning programs, mother language programs (Kurdish and Farci at the moment), support in elementary and high school classes and reinforcement programs for student refugees. Moreover, the Social Support Network for Refugees and Immigrants offers legal aid, counseling on employment matters and Greek language programs.

The Athenian Volunteer Work organization offers psychological and social support services, family counseling, legal protection, consultation on finding accommodation and employment, creative development programmes for children, and Greek and English language programs. Simultaneously, it develops sensitizing actions for the public on related matters. The Greek Committee for Refugees (G.C.R.) offers counseling on psychological, social and family issues, medical coverage, consultation on health, employment and housing issues, financial support, housing and employment, as well as professional education and training. In addition, they develop welfare programs for children refugees, reinforcement school programs for student refugees, service programs for juvenile refugees without an escort, and Greek and English language programs. The Social Work Institute offers a series of social and psychological support services for refugees aiming at their incorporation in the local societies. These services are medical, health consultation, support for repatriation, financial aid, housing, employment, support for self-employment, professional education and training, welfare programs, reinforcement school programs, creative development programs, Greek and mother language programmes. The Greek Red Cross and the annex of Caritas in Greece are, also, active in the sensitive field of protecting and supporting refugees and immigrants, offering a great variety of programs and services.

5.3 The labour market

5.3.1 Control over employment contract

There are two major trade-union third-tier organizations: the General Confederation of Greek Labour (GSEE) and the Supreme Administration of Greek Civil Servants Trade Unions (ADEDY). The former encompasses first and second tier unions of the private sector employees/workers and of employees/workers of public enterprises. The latter includes first and second tier unions of public servants. A major feature of these groups is their close relation to the political parties, which are represented in the Greek Parliament. This situation results in the intrusion of the political parties in trade-union life. Regarding the trade-union density in Greece, we find a significant differentiation between the private and the public sector. In the private sector the syndicalism rate does not exceed 15% while in the public it reaches 90%. This difference is due to the fact that the average private sector worker is not in favour of trade unions and rather distrusts them. The high rate of trade-union participation in the public sector can be linked to the higher level of security public functionaries feel. By the end of the 1990s trade-union membership amounted to approximately 769,794 people. Of them 529,331 were members of GSEE (according to the data of the 30th Conference of GSEE) and 240,463 were members of ADEDY (according to the same source).

The National General Work Contract is the object of negotiations between the Federation of Greek Industries (SEB), the General Confederation of Greek Small Enterprises (in trade, manufacturing and services) (GSEBEE), the National Confederation of Greek Trade Enterprises (ESEE), the General Confederation of Greek Self-Employed Workers and Artisans and the General Confederation of Greek Labour (GSEE). Thus, it covers all of the private sector employees, except for those employed in

illegal trade, which is quite extensive in our country and is worsening further due to the influx of illegal immigrants.

As regards the percentage of organizations and institutions with work councils, theoretically speaking, Law 1767/1988 that supports the institution of work councils is applicable to 6,500 enterprises. These councils consist of 3 members in enterprises with up to 300 employees, 5 in enterprises with up to 1,000 employees and 7 members when employees are more than 1,000. The actual number of enterprises with organized work councils is 126 or only 2% of the total.

5.3.2 Prospects of job mobility

The Greek Manpower Organization for the incorporation of disadvantageous social groups into the labor market provides the following special support measures: (a) Subsidy schemes for new employment positions and the establishment of new enterprises by handicapped persons, persons addicted to substances, persons released from prison, young people that committed offences or young people that are subject to social danger. (b) Programmes, co-financed by the European Union (under the Community Support Framework), e.g. Measure 2.2, within the scope of the Operational Programme "Employment and Vocational Training", favoring handicapped persons, repatriates, refugees, migrants, persons released from prison or young people that are subject to social dangers (16 – 24 years old); socio-cultural minority groups (gypsies, Pomaki, etc.); persons addicted to substances and/or ex drug-addicts; particular groups of women that are at risk of social exclusion (e.g. lone mothers, abused women); long-term unemployed aged over 45 and other categories that are at risk of social exclusion from the labor market (long-term unemployed heads of households with more than 3 children or with a household income less than 3,000 euros, or homeless and other categories of unemployed in areas or sectors exhibiting high rates of unemployment). (c) Subsidies schemes addressed to private enterprises for the employment of 15,000 unemployed persons, 18 – 64 years old, in new posts created within investment projects supported by particular development programmes. A priority is given to hiring unemployed that are at a disadvantageous position, that is, persons under 25 years old that have not been employed for 2 years after the completion of their education, unemployed lone parents, unemployed more than 50 years old, long-term unemployed, unemployed that completed only their obligatory education. (d) Special grants for starting a business. The objective of this programme is to encourage the unemployed to create their own enterprise. The total financial support amounts to 8,400 euros per person and is provided during the first year of operation of the new business. Eligible for this programme are all unemployed (18 – 64 years old) that have gone through a procedure of individualized counseling and guidance and hold a valid unemployment card.

1% of the population aged 25-64 participated in education/training in the last four weeks of 2000. The EU average was 8%. For the period 2004-2006 there is a programme concerning the training of 23,000 unemployed people in different subjects in order to facilitate their access to the labour market. This programme will also cover: 8,000 individuals employed in large-scale technical projects; 5,361

unemployed sailors; 6,700 individuals to be trained in environment protection issues; 13,000 repatriates to participate in Greek language programmes; 5,500 individuals employed in the primary sector; 6,743 individuals employed in the secondary and tertiary sector; 49,600 individuals employed in the private sector; 14,587 individuals to be trained in equal opportunity issues; and 50,000 to be trained in various other specialized fields. According to the plans, 35% of the trainees are unemployed, 36% are employed and the remaining 29% come from special population groups such as Gypsies, Muslims, disabled people, repatriates, convicts, etc. As far as their age is concerned, the majority belongs to the most productive ages (between 25 and 44 years), at approximately 50%. Young people account for 37% and people aged 45–64 account for 13%.

5.3.3 Reconciliation of work and family life

There are no official records regarding the number of enterprises and organisations operating specific policies for the reconciliation of work and family life. But it is clear that such policies have an extremely limited application in Greece, as we can assume on the basis of the indicator of occupational stress: Greece exhibits the highest rate in Europe (see Table 4.2). According to estimations of the National Statistical Service of Greece, taking into account on that the definition of part-time employment varies across occupational categories, in 2000 there were 182,000 part-time employees, that is, 4.8% of the total manpower. Among them 64,000 were men (2.6% of the total male labour force) and 118,000 were women (7.9% of the total female labour force). There is no upward ceiling concerning part-time employment as a percentage of total employment in Greece. In 1990 part-time employed men represented 2.2% of the total manpower (3.1% in 1994). The respective percentages for women were 7.6% in 1990 and 6.0% in 1994. Regarding part-time workers in employment (2000 data): 335,000 worked less than 25 hours per week, that is, 8.5% of the total manpower and 135,000 worked less than 15 hours per week (3.4% of the total manpower).

Table 4.2 Occupational stress (from 0-none to 2-very much)

Greece	1.67
Italy	1.06
France	1.02
Luxembourg	1.01
Spain	1.00
Belgium	1.00
Finland	0.91
Portugal	0.78
Denmark	0.76
Holland	0.70
Germany	0.70
U.K.	0.62
Sweden	0.55
Austria	0.48
Ireland	0.31

Source: Occupational and environmental medicine, 2004.

The allocation per sex has as follows (2000 data): 90,000 men (3.7% of the total male labour force) worked 15–24 hours per week, 58,000 men (2.4% total male labour force) worked less than 15 hours per week. 110,000 women (7.4% of the total female labour force) worked 15-24 hours per week and 77,000 women (5.2% of the total female labour force) worked less than 15 hours per week. Regarding involuntary part-time employment, more than 40% of part-time employees would prefer a position of full-time employment. In 2000, 9% of men, who were unemployed, had a part-time job before falling into unemployment. More than 98% of these men would prefer a full-time position. Also 26% of women, who were unemployed, had a part-time job before falling into unemployment; and more than 90% of those women would prefer to have a full-time employment.

In Greece employees/workers prefer full-time jobs because salaries/wages are rather low in respect to the standard of living. This is a reason why part-time employment, as a percentage of total employment is low in Greece, compared to the EU average. Another reason is that employers prefer overtime work by full-time employees instead of hiring part-time employees, in order to achieve labour time flexibility. Furthermore, in the private sector, for those who are not union members, overtime work is often non-paid work. Extensive overtime work may also be linked to high unemployment. If unpaid overtime work is not taken into consideration, part-time employment is cheaper: the hourly cost of part-time employment for an unskilled worker is 4.6 euros, while the respective cost of full-time employment is 5.8 euros. In Greece, there are more women than men in part-time employment. Men seek actively and occupy positions of full-time employment. Such positions are considered as the proper jobs for the heads of the households – that are usually men.

5.4 Openness and supportiveness of institutions

There are no processes of consultation and direct democracy in Greece. PA.SO.K. (Panhellenic Socialist Movement) - the political party that dominated the Greek political scene for a very long time and is now in the opposition-, makes great efforts to adopt such methods in its internal function. It is too early for the results to be assessed. Besides, there is no tradition to rely upon.

In Greece, for a long time, the relation of the upper strata to the state has been precarious. There is a powerful dependence of civil society upon the state. The civil society did not manage to develop autonomous rules and values far from state mechanisms, while the character of the frequent conflicts on economic matters were highly politicized. In Greece the powerful intervention of political parties in civil society limits the possibility of wide ranging structural changes, that could facilitate a more flexible response to social demands through a mix of voluntary and state sector policies. Such a prospect has not gathered momentum in society (particularly among major actors like trade unions, professional associations, political parties etc.)

5.5 Public space

5.5.1 Support for collective action

Regarding support for collective action, there are no official data on the percentage of the national and local public budget that is reserved for voluntary, not-for-profit citizenship initiatives. The budget varies strongly between different activities, time periods and regions. Government supports NGOs that are active in the field of supply of social care services to non-members with about € 6,000,000 or 10% of their total budget yearly (Polyzoidis 2004).

There are no restrictions to marches and demonstrations and such activities take place very frequently in Greece. On the other hand, as open space in the large city centres is very restricted, demonstrations cause huge traffic problems and there is much complaining from car drivers. Blocking deliberately main streets, even national roads are also a common but highly contested way of protest.

5.5.2 Cultural enrichment

Concerning cultural enrichment, the budget of the Ministry of Culture amounts to 6.4% of the total national budget. Yet only 1.2% is oriented to direct cultural activity, while the rest is allocated to administrative costs and other expenses. According to law, also municipalities should allocate 1% of their total budget to cultural activities. To underline here, that NGOs, active in the field of social care, claim that part of this money should be allocated to their organizations. The proportion of people experiencing different forms of personal enrichment on a regular basis is difficult to be measured.

There is no unified institute for recording data on self-organised cultural groups and events and consequently their exact number is not known. According to the estimations of journalistic sources, the non-state organizations in Greece are 3,000. Also a sample study that was conducted in 1997 estimated that 40% of non-state organizations develop cultural activities. These figures, however, are not particularly reliable, as, for example, many charitable organizations are "called" cultural, in order just to obtain subsidies.

5.6 Personal relationships

As regards personal relationships, expressed by the provision of services supporting physical and social independence and especially by the percentage of national and local budgets devoted to disabled people (physical and mental), we should mention that the money spent on benefits and services to handicapped persons comes from many different sources. Thus it is not possible to calculate the total sum of such expenditure. The controls, in order to ensure that somebody is truly handicapped, are regular, thorough and often cause huge discomfort to the handicapped and their families. On the other hand, however, it is presumed that a large number of beneficiaries collect

illegally the relevant allowances that are of the highest in Europe. Beside common crime (forgery, etc), favors made by parties seem to play an important role.

Concerning child care, 363 centers of creative activity for pre-school and primary school children function already and 44 more are expected to start operating soon in the region of Attica. Elementary day-schools are a new institution that developed rapidly during the last years. At a final stage 3,577 new schools are expected to function with 6,775 classes. They will have the capacity to accept 169,150 children and will employ 6,176 teachers. Furthermore, there are 1,785 day-kindergartens, with 1,946 classes. 1,933 more are expected to operate soon (with 2,115 classes); they will accept 51,825 children and will employ 2,251 teachers. Municipalities run 1,386 nursery schools and there are also 1,450 private ones (including those run by social security funds, trade unions and other organizations that have specific regulations of eligibility but do not charge tuition fees). For example, the Labor Center operates model nursery schools in privately-owned buildings. They offer considerably good quality care services to children of pre-school age (infants and babies from 8 months old up to their enrollment at school). They constitute an essential support to working mothers and facilitate their wider participation in the social, financial and political life of the country. 22 nursery schools function all over the country receiving 1,200 babies – infants. The objective of the Labor Center is to have one nursery school in the capital of each prefecture of the country.

The extent of inclusiveness of housing and environmental design is difficult to be measured. There are in Greece exceptionally interesting architectural elements, among others, neoclassical buildings and traditional houses in the mainland and the islands. The situation, however, beyond this, is disappointing. The Greek cities were not built on the basis of systematic urban planning. Urban development took place in anarchy over and around the built-up area that existed long ago and on the basis of a fragmentary and insufficient legislation, which, in any case, is not implemented effectively. The situation at the large urban centers is dramatic and is characterized by a polluted atmosphere, extreme difficulty in transportation and lack of parking, green and recreation spaces. The fact that every intense rainstorm may cause floods and a chaos lasting many hours is a stark indication of these problems.

Social dialogue and participatory procedures in socio-economic, environmental and urban planning are little developed. During the recent constitutional revision –that was completed on the 17th of April 2001-, it was strongly advocated that civil society not only should be protected by the Constitution (a self-evident fact), but must also play an active role in its formulation. The interpretation and implementation of the Constitution is not exclusively a state matter, but constitutes a participatory procedure for specifying the “common good”, which concerns the whole society and is inspired by this deliberate approach of democracy. Nevertheless, in the public debate on constitutional revision, only the political parties and the major lawyers associations essentially participated.

5.7 Trends and Reflection

With respect to social empowerment, Greece does not offer a positive picture. Despite recent efforts, employment in the public sector still remains a field that primarily serves political party interests and expediency. Moreover, there is a conflict between the government and its political party mechanism, which is pressuring an even more favorable treatment of its followers at all levels. High unemployment rates and the intensification of competition prohibits any effort to promote empowerment in the field of labour market. However, vocational programs are increasing their substantial influence in combating unemployment. The volume of information on employment issues that is traveling through the internet as well as through the mass media is steadily increasing, nevertheless at the expense of the credibility of such information. Regarding information in languages other than the official Greek language, it seems that appropriate institutions are steadily improving their records.

The political system is stable and there are no signs that this is going to change. The percentage of Greeks taking part in local and national elections is quite high, as voting is obligatory by law. Confidence in legal institutions is also high, but confidence in politicians is low, although there are many exceptions. Recent efforts to adapt methods of a direct democracy are very immature to be judged. Under these circumstances we cannot identify any significant developments in effectively confronting the barriers to empowerment in Greece. There are no indications of initiatives aiming at limiting the power of political parties vis-à-vis civil society, who remains very weak and statist/clientelistic practices still prevail in many levels of the political and social life.

6 Initiatives on Four Conditional Factors of Social Quality¹⁴

Countries with neo-liberal governments form the majority of the European Union. This political-economic situation does not encourage an expansive social policy. The same applies to Greece, which lost its chance in the past to develop a social state analogous to that of northwest European societies. Such a goal appears much more distant with the present neo-liberal government, which sets different priorities. Good practices in terms of social quality are targeted to the following groups: families and children, the elderly, people with disabilities, various vulnerable groups of population. Also good practices in terms of policy priorities concern: the establishment and support of institutions and foundations that bridge the gap between a woman's domestic and vocational life (such as the Centers of Creative Activity for Children, day-long schools, day nurseries, Elderly Day-Care Centers, Home-Assistance Programmes, Units of Elderly Care, the National Social Emergency Center and the Centers of Creative Activity for Children with Disabilities), volunteerism, public access to public administration, and the environment. Concerning the four conditional factors, each one of these initiatives could influence socio-economic security, inclusion and cohesion. The same could not be said for empowerment though, as this is the most neglected dimension of social quality in our country to this day.

(1) In the last few years 28 pilot elementary day-schools were established and an important number of schools developed an extended schedule. The 28 pilot elementary day-schools functioned as laboratories for the implementation of experimental programmes, within the scope of which the chance to push forward pedagogic benefits that arise from the implementation of this institution was given. The schools of extended schedule functioned with one teacher per class, who served the needs of the programme at its total. The Ministry of Education exploiting the pedagogic conclusions that arouse from the 28 pilot schools, as well as the experience of the organization of the schools of extended schedule, proceeded to the function of the elementary day-school, which meets the modern educational needs. Today, by the operation of 2,600 elementary day-schools and 1,800 day-kindergartens, the institution has expanded all over the country, from the urban centers till the most distant and difficult to access areas, serving 200,000 families, while the classes of day-kindergarten and elementary day-school are attended by all pupils, as long as they wish to. The day-school has an intense educational and social content. It was designed to serve high pedagogic objectives, as the pedagogic exploitation of the afternoon time of children staying at school on the full responsibility and supervision of the teachers. Its programme includes support at the Greek language and Maths, that is, study and preparation of the pupils for the lessons of the following day by the competent teacher and not parents. Pupils' choices expand over a variety of lessons and activities that upgrade the role of school - such as foreign languages, music and art. In this way subjects that form the conditions of an open educational environment and more attractive learning are incorporated into school curricula.

¹⁴ Paragraphs 1 and 3 to 7 and 10 of this section are based on information obtained by the official site of the Greek Ministry of Health and Social Solidarity, www.yppy.gr

(2) Another scheme worthy to be mentioned concerns the so-called “children of traffic lights”, that is mostly Albanian children exploited by child trafficking gangs, who were forced to illegally enter the country and beg around traffic lights in the cities of Athens and Thessaloniki. An interesting example is the four-year programme undertaken by the prefecture of Thessaloniki, in collaboration with the Ministry of Northern Greece and the “Papafeion” residential home for children (a Church-run institution), that aimed at offering support and temporary accommodation to these children with the aim to protect them from exploiting gangs, trace their families in Albania and facilitate their return home. Another new service undertaken by the “Papafeion” children’s home is the day care (or temporary hosting) for children with disabilities (a service aimed to provide support to carers).

(3) The newly established Centres of Education, Social Support and Training for Persons with Disabilities aim at: timely diagnosis of disabilities; provision of advisory support responding to the biological, sociological and psychological needs of people with disabilities and of their families; provision of services and implementation of programs supporting the social integration of the disabled in the various spheres of daily life (employment, independent leaving, sports etc.); provision of professional training to people with disabilities; provision of reliable information to people with disabilities and their families concerning on issues concerning diagnosis and relevant services; raising the awareness of the local society on issues of disability. The Centres are staffed with specialised personnel: psychologists, child psychiatrists, teachers of special education, speech therapists, nurses, physiotherapists, occupational therapists, social workers, health visitors, experts in professional orientation and other relevant specialists. For the disabled people that need to travel to visit the Centres there will Guesthouses of Hospitality, so that as many disabled people as possible - from all over the country - can profit from the services of these Centres.

(4) The Centers of Creative Activity for Children with Disabilities are units consisting of 20-25 individuals who assist children with special needs. These units also include adolescents with intellectual delay and kinetic disability. These units work jointly with educational units of specialized training, social services of the local and prefectural government, providers, and support services for people with special needs, as well as health services of their region. The purpose of the Centers of Creative Activity for Children with Disabilities is to keep the children busy with programs of expression and recreation, speech exercises, development of personal and social skillfulness/dexterity, athletic and bodily exercise. The centers’ purpose also includes children’s participation in pre-professional training and organization programs as well as support services toward the children, their families and relatives. Four hundred such centers are in operation today.

(5) The Elderly Day Care Centers are units providing daily hospitality for elderly individuals absolutely incapable of supporting themselves (i.e. kinetic difficulties, absentmindedness, etc.) whose family members responsible for their support are either employed or face serious social, economic and/or health problems preventing them from providing the necessary support. The purpose of the Elderly Day Care Centers is to improve the quality of life of the elderly and their stay at their physical and familial surrounding as well as to maintain a normal social and vocational life for their family members

and relatives who are liable for the care of these individuals. The Elderly Day Care Centers jointly work with the Elderly Open-Care Centers that are likely to be found in the same region. They also work with local providers, which offer social services and enforce analogous or similar programs, as well as health care units.

The Home-Assistance programme is offered by specialized professionals (social workers, nurses and others) on a regular basis at the residence of the individuals who need assistance. Over 1,000 programs have been approved to this day at the level of local government, which operate in 800 municipalities and assist over 80,000 individuals. The objective of the programme is that: « the elderly and disabled should be able to remain in their familiar physical and social environment; that the cohesion of their family should be preserved; that the use of institutional care should be avoided, as should situations of social exclusion; that they should be ensured a decent and healthy life and that the quality of their life should be improved» (Ministry for Health and Welfare, 2003b). Each service provision unit in the programme consists of a social worker, who is responsible for coordinating the programme, one or two nurses and one to three home helps or community carers. They work as a team and use community planning methods. The programme expands in quantity and quality the primary care services available. Social work, nursing care and family-domestic help services are provided to meet basic needs. Priority is given to the care of the elderly living permanently alone, or left alone for certain hours in the day, and who cannot take adequate care of their own needs. Of equally high priority are also the disabled, living alone or with their families, that face the risk of isolation, or whose families are being placed under excessive strain, and who may be prevented from resorting to institutional care. In both preparatory and implementation stages the programme involves: training of staff, adaptation of plan to special local features, selection of tools and techniques of implementation, procurement of necessary material and equipment, selection of methods for monitoring and (internal/external) evaluation of all phases of the programme and submission of reports on accomplishment of the programme.

The main steps in the implementation of the programme are: mapping the social needs of the local community; investigating the needs of elderly and disabled people served by the programme; setting priorities; developing cooperation with local agencies or networks -e.g. public health and welfare services, church and NGO welfare programmes; raising awareness in local community on issues concerning old-age and disability and disseminating information about the programme; encouraging voluntary activities by the public. The core activities of the programme consist in the provision of primary community care services to elderly and disabled, such as: advice and psychological – emotional support, primary nursing care, domestic help and meeting of practical living needs, care for personal health and cleanliness, health education and prevention, adaptation of home equipment so as to improve accessibility and usage, and response to needs in respect of movement, information and communication. The programme is run by municipal companies, which are established by local authorities. Municipalities are obliged to provide office space, preferably within or close to the Open Care Centre, as well as the necessary equipment, and every facility required by the programme staff for smooth provision of services to their clients.

(6) The National Social Emergency Centre is a network of care services for immediate assistance in emergency situations. It offers temporary accommodation in cases of emergency, social care and psychological support services. Seventy percent of the 11,000 requests for such services come from women with psychological or emotional problems, disturbed behavior, victims of domestic violence, women facing serious problems due to unemployment or risk factors. The most frequently recorded problems by these Centres are emotional difficulties, disruption of interpersonal relationships (particularly with close kin), psychological problems, unfolding crises, problems of the elderly, disturbances in behavior, drug abuse problems or domestic violence, problems of handicapped individuals, etc.

(7) Programmes that aim to improve the conditions of different disadvantaged groups of the population, for instance Roma, are financed to a great extent by the European Union and for the same reason follow its footsteps, that generally converge toward imposition of workfare through the realization of training programs. In this context, special services are being developed aiming mainly at guaranteeing the conditions for the equal integration and participation of the vulnerable groups of population in the socio-economic life. The actions have mostly a preventive character and they aim at dealing in time with any occurring problems. More specifically, concerning the Greek Roma the following actions have been planned: The creation of 14 Centres of medico-social care aiming at the promotion of health and the social integration of the Greek Roma. These centres will also provide counselling support and information on legal, labour, education and naturalization issues. Other actions are the extension of the vaccination programs that are already implemented by the Ministry of Health and Welfare, the publication and distribution of printed material concerning the History, the language and the culture of the Greek Roma, and their contribution to Greek society.

(8) In the Ministry of Health and Welfare an Observatory of Voluntary Action and an independent department for the promotion of volunteerism were established recently. This department is responsible for the planning, promotion and implementation of relevant programs, for the projects' evaluation and their financing. The Ministry of Health and Welfare, in cooperation with the other Ministries, initiates and coordinates activities; a Project Management Group has been established aiming at the co-ordination of actions for the development of volunteerism at national level; moral incentives are given for natural or legal entities in order to encourage, strengthen and facilitate voluntary participation; a register of voluntary organisations is to be established and training programmes for volunteers are being implemented aiming at guaranteeing for the quality of the provided services.

(9) According to the Greek National Center for the Environment and Sustainable Development Greece faces great challenges regarding the preservation of a high quality environment. "Although a number of positive steps have been made, there is a long way to go until environmental issues are fully integrated into all policy areas. Among others, issues of high priority are the ratification and implementation of all multilateral environmental agreements already signed by Greece and the commitment of the country to all its international obligations; promotion of initiatives taken to support a

restructuring of the global environmental governance system, in view of the Earth Summit in Rio; systematic monitoring of the transposition and implementation of EU legislation; creation of the appropriate mechanisms for the establishment and dissemination of comprehensive environmental information; improvement of the reporting mechanisms and publication of systematic periodic reviews on the State of the Environment; developing a set of environmental indicators that will permit the measuring of progress towards sustainability and the establishment and implementation of an action plan with clear objectives and targets; development of mechanisms to further integrate environmental policy into sectoral policies (such as agriculture, transport, industry, tourism) and social policy areas; further encouragement of public participation in the decision-making process; ensuring funding for environmental education programmes undertaken by schools and professional associations and establishment of permanent consultations with stakeholders and the civil society; strengthening of the administrative capacity in the environmental field at national, regional and local level, by promoting partnership principles in management and by upgrading technical support, information infrastructure and conflict resolution mechanisms; enforcement of environmental and physical planning regulations, by improving inspection, reporting, warning and sanction mechanisms” (National Center for the Environment and Sustainable Development, 2001)

(10) In order to improve access to public administration, Citizens Service Centres (KEPs) were established all over the country. These are organic units of the local government authorities (Regions, Prefectures, Municipalities and Communes) and are responsible for providing administrative information to the public and resolving problems or transacting business the public may have with the authorities. The KEPs inform the public, drawing the information they provide from the data bases created centrally at the Ministry of the Interior (General Secretariat for Public Administration), or other data bases and sources, local or otherwise. The central website www.kep.gov.gr created by the Ministry of the Interior to further the objective of provision of information through the KEPs and also to offer direct information to citizens with access to the internet, contains information mainly on administrative procedures and dealings which can be transacted at the Citizens Service Centres. There is a full account of all such transactions, with details of the necessary documentation, time and cost, etc. For each transaction there is also an electronic application form with all the details necessary on how to fill it in. New information is regularly added to the site, as well as new forms for various administrative applications useful to the public. Through the Internet the KEP can also cull information from websites of other agencies and pass it on to the public. For example, the KEP have access to the websites of the National Printing Office, ASEP (Senior Civil Service Recruitment Council), etc. and can allow the public access to publications of the National Printing Office, invitations to tender and application forms for participation in ASEP recruitment procedures. The KEPs can also offer the citizen more personalized information: contact details of the officer handling his case; what stage of the procedure his case has reached; when he will have a final answer; if additional details should be submitted and if so, what details, etc. The KEP employee requests these details from the appropriate government department by any means expedient.

7 Conclusion

In the foregoing analysis we attempted to illustrate some main dimensions of social quality in contemporary Greece. By drawing upon the “social quality theory” and the range of indicators developed in the context of the ENIQ project, we provided empirical data for and commented upon major aspects of socio-economic security, social exclusion, social cohesion and empowerment.

With regard to recent trends in socio-economic security, the dramatic price increases in the last few years led to a decline in the standard of living of a large part of the population. Since the introduction of the Euro, prices of many goods and services have been hiked up at unprecedented levels. However price increase was not followed by a rise of incomes and social security benefits. A considerable number of households find it difficult to meet basic necessities (concerning health, clothing, food and housing). Also, as stressed above, the redistributive impact of social transfers is limited. As a consequence about one fifth of the population live below the poverty line. On the other hand, home ownership is widespread in Greece. During the last few years, banks have stretched their efforts to sell housing loans. Economic conditions in the recent past favoured such a policy that led to a significant decline of interest rates. However, due to decreasing incomes in the last few years, many households defaulted on their mortgage and, thus, the number of foreclosures increased.

At the same time there is an increase in new forms of crime, related to new technologies, such as electronic copying of credit cards and internet pornography. The mass media emphasize crimes in which foreigners are involved. In fact, though, there are not any detailed studies indicating a proportionately greater participation of foreigners committing crimes.

Environmental pollution varies between different areas of the country. Greece does not have a heavy industry that could cause serious problems. However, the urban centers are particularly burdened because of motor vehicle traffic. The situation is burdened even more due to the congestion and the noise caused by the heavy traffic flow. Greece ranks last among other European countries in the use of alternate forms of energy, despite the fact that it has amongst others sunlight and strong winds.

The ratio of doctors to population is satisfactory, yet the national health care system is ailing. There is incongruence between aims and outcomes. Even some basic provisions of the Law that established the Greek NHS (e.g. regarding primary care and public health) have barely been realized. Most often than not, policy objectives and reform programmes are publicized during election periods but are forgotten afterwards. Administrative rigidities, unlawful practices (e.g. under the table payments to hospital doctors) and discretionary and complex ties with the private sector lead to waste of resources and inefficiency. This reality primarily burdens women with caring responsibilities (for the elderly, disabled and sick members of the family) and makes their regular participation in the job market very difficult. Measures that have been taken to combat this phenomenon are insufficient. Industrial relations were relatively smooth in the last few years. Also, employment legislation is comprehensive,

but in practice it is often circumvented. For example, there are frequent complaints about the excess of regular working hours as well as many on the job accidents as a result of the violation of security provisions. The very high percentage of illegal workers, the majority of which are Albanians, is a contributing factor to this. Greece exhibits the highest rate of average working hours, while the time spent on nightlife and vacations is steadily diminishing.

Free education is offered in Greece up to the third level (University). The standard of education is generally satisfactory. However, there coexists a private sector that provides auxiliary teaching with payment of tuition. The Greek constitution prohibits the establishment of private universities. On this matter there has been much public discussion lately, as progressively foreign universities establish offshore branches (i.e. tertiary education colleges) in Athens and Thessaloniki. What remains to be the weakest point though is the connection between education and the real needs of the job market.

In the domain of health, the proposed indicators focus on inputs; maybe some additional outcome indicators could add more valuable information with regard to socio-economic security. Further, the suggested indicators are not sensitive to distinctions between private and public sector health care (it should be more clearly stated whether we refer to public health care facilities or total facilities including private ones). Let us remark here, again, the peculiarity of Greece. Inputs measured in terms of ratios of medical personnel to population are comparatively high (though this is not the case for nursing staff), and availability of technological equipment satisfactory; yet also private spending on health care is considerably high; while administrative deficiencies of public health care account for the overall poor quality of services offered. Another noteworthy characteristic, in respect of health, is the very large proportion of Greeks who are regular smokers. Furthermore, as regards the average distance to hospital, even if we obtain the data suggested in the context of this project, it will still be a rather daunting task to calculate an average physical distance to health care facilities (see also the remarks in the previous section). Besides, in order for this indicator to make sense one has to think in terms of "catchment areas" of public health centers, clinics and hospitals.

It is still difficult to draw clear conclusions regarding social cohesion. Confidence between citizens does not appear to be very high. Confidence in institutions like the government, elected representatives, political parties, armed forces, legal system, the media, trade unions, police, religious institutions, civil service and economic transactions comes up to a middle level. Confidence in the institution of family, respect toward parents, parents' duties to children as well as the value of friendship and of leisure time are at a very high level. Organized volunteerism is still not yet fully developed. There is proof, however, that this is not due to a negative position against volunteerism but rather to the structural characteristics of Greek society. For example, there are networks of social care service providers that function at the neighbourhood level, and which are not consolidated into a clearly distinguished institutional entity. It is also important to note the exceptional service of the volunteers within the framework of the 2004 Olympiad that took place in Athens. Their contribution surpassed all other previous ones, not only in arithmetic terms, but also much more in terms of the quality of the services that they provided with great disposition, enthusiasm and responsibility. The

condition is much more complicated regarding the subject of immigrants. The collapse of the communist regimes in Eastern Europe and the Balkans, and the following increase of population movements in the area, found the country unprepared. The repatriation of Greek immigrants was properly accomplished to a great extent, since a great amount of money was disposed for a smooth social integration. Despite the criticism that endured for some time, it is certain that the politics that were enforced had significant results. However, regarding economic immigrants the condition continues to be dramatic. The population of such immigrants is disproportionately high with respect to the native population. In some small local communities, immigrants may constitute the majority, while in big urban centres there are many small clusters where the element of immigration prevails and coexists with increased crime and violence. These conditions have reversed the common view regarding immigrants, and while in the past xenophobia was an unknown term, today many more people have a negative, and even hostile opinion about immigrants.

Regarding social inclusion, it is likewise difficult to form generalized views, as there are many parameters to be examined. Even at a level of isolated indicators the situation is not always straightforward. The gender pay gap is narrower than the European average, but this does not precisely reflect the entire situation. Even today, women are still hired easier than men, while they are preferred for temporary and part-time jobs. There are also precise indications that women suffer domestic violence, but there are no studies showing this condition to its full extent. A similar condition exists at the level of political representation, where elected women constitute a small minority. It is important to note at this point, that these conditions are changing progressively. However, there is still a very long way to achieving substantial equality. Significant changes are found in the traditional family model. The trend is clear: fewer marriages, more divorces and fewer children born to older-aged parents, loose relationships between generations and autonomy of children at younger ages. Ties with friends are diminishing, while the multitude of people who feel lonely and isolated is increasing. The multitude of the homeless however, at the time being, is exceptionally limited. Public infrastructure regarding transportation is one of the most dynamically developing sectors. This condition, which was very bad in the past, is improving daily through the execution of many small and large projects throughout the entire country. Athens is surely enjoying a lion-portion of these projects as the organizing city of the 2004 Olympic Games. Accordingly, with improvement in speed and quality of the means of transportation, it is expected that the number of car accidents will decrease, which is extremely high at the moment.

As regards empowerment there are many fluctuations between the different domains. Despite great efforts for enforcement of considerable criteria, at least regarding recruitment in the public sector, there are many political interventions that distort the final result. Even in the private sector though, family rule prevails. The percentage of educated individuals is very high, as well as individuals who have received a college degree, while the increase in the number of individuals who have obtained a post-baccalaureate degree is spectacular. These trends have driven to an excessive accumulation of unemployed graduates, since, as mentioned previously, the connection of Institutions of Higher Education with the demands of the job market is not satisfactory. Education in Greece is open to

foreigners; however, their smooth enrolment depends on the teachers' efforts and the support offered by the Greek schoolmates. There are no generalized signs of violence in schools. Following European patterns, great emphasis is given on vocational training. These programmes are addressed to the employed as well as the unemployed who are seeking a job. However, there are many serious indications that the effectiveness of these programmes is very limited. Frequently, the only interest that the individuals attending these programmes have is to collect the cash-benefit for their participation, since a large number of them are often placed in vocational courses that are totally irrelevant to them. The extent as to how much this procedure constitutes a product of empowerment remains questionable. The political system however is functioning harmoniously since the restoration of democracy in 1974 with the two major political parties, the right wing and the social-democratic parties alternating in power. Nevertheless, initiatives of consultation and systematic and wide-ranging social dialogue are still at an incipient stage.

Finally, it is worthy to underline that, over the last decade, some important initiatives (briefly discussed above) for promoting equal opportunities, combating the exclusion of various vulnerable social groups from the labour market and conciliating family and working life were extensively influenced by EU policy priorities and supported by EU resources in the context of the cohesion policy framework. Undoubtedly, such initiatives have multiple positive effects in terms of social quality in Greek society. Yet, there is a negative side as well. Extensive reliance on EU resources for expanding social services and welfare programmes makes their future prospects highly uncertain. Progressive EU enlargement increases competition between old and new member states in terms of funding, particularly as most of the new (and prospective) members exhibit a comparatively low level of socio-economic development and need support for achieving convergence. Moreover, the above policy initiatives, expanded employment opportunities in the provision of social services in Greece, yet most of the jobs created are on the basis of fixed-term and temporary contracts (e.g. almost all appointments of social workers, nurses and home-helpers in the Home-Assistance Programme for the Elderly and Disabled people are of this type). This intensifies employment precariousness with adverse effects on socio-economic security. In addition, the new programmes have not contributed to expanding direct welfare provision by local authorities in a systematic and efficient way. Central control of new programmes by the Ministry continues to be strong, while at the local level there are no major foci of social service delivery (existing services are thin in scope and limited in geographic coverage).

To stress here that Europeanization has not brought about significant institutional and policy changes in Greece. Instead, socio-economic deadlocks in the country produced institutional freezing and inertia. In this respect Greece sharply contrasts with the other southern European EU member states in which substantial changes in institutional settings and social policy processes took place over the last decade (particularly in Italy and Spain, and to a lesser extent Portugal). For instance, in Greece, no major platform of social dialogue and consensus-building has emerged for radical reforms that could tackle inherent distributional imbalances and bring forth administrative and policy rationalization; decentralization is proceeding very slowly (with regard to social policies and programmes); and the scope of multilevel governance is restricted (as is also the number of actors at the national and sub-

national levels, participating in decision making, in contrast to other countries, notably Italy and Spain; see Petmesidou forthcoming [c]). As argued elsewhere (Petmesidou and Mossialos forthcoming, p. 7): “Large-scale rationalization of social policy in major fields (e.g. social security, health and social care, employment promotion) has persistently been postponed, reform plans have often been only partly implemented, and in several cases reforms have been overturned by policy reversals leading to retreats to previous conditions.” Greece’s participation in the various spheres of co-ordinated European strategies (particularly those concerning the modernization of social protection in the four areas – labour market, the viability of pensions, high and sustainable levels of health care and the promotion of the social integration of vulnerable groups), has triggered off a process of drafting plans according to EU guidelines, submitted to EU-wide discussion and peer review (e.g. in the context of the open method of coordination). Yet these “process innovations” have had limited effects on widening the scope and increasing the effectiveness of social policy in the country up to now. Whether such procedural and piecemeal changes will eventually add up to structural policy reforms with positive effects on social quality constitutes an open question to be empirically examined on the basis of future developments.

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Annex Collective data

1. Socio-economic security

Domain: Financial resources

Sub-domain: Income security

3. Proportion of total population living in households receiving entitlement transfers (means-tested, cash and in-kind transfers) that allow them to live above EU poverty level.

At-risk-of-poverty rate before and after social transfers: total

The share of persons with an equivalised disposable income below the risk-of-poverty threshold, which is set at 60% of the national median equivalised disposable income

	1997		1998		1999		2000		2001	
	before	after	before	after	before	after	before	after	before	after
EU 15	25	16	24	15	24	15	23	15	24	15
EU 25	:	:	:	:	24	15	:	:	24	15
Belgium	26	14	25	14	24	13	23	13	23	13
Germany	22	12	22	11	21	11	20	10	21	11
Greece	23	21	22	21	22	21	22	20	23	20
Spain	27	20	25	18	23	19	22	18	23	19
France	26	15	25	15	24	15	24	16	24	15
Ireland	32	19	32	19	30	19	31	20	30	21
Italy	22	19	21	18	21	18	21	18	22	19
Hungary	:	:	:	:	:	:	19	9	20	10
Netherlands	23	10	21	10	21	11	21	10	21	11
Portugal	27	22	27	21	27	21	27	21	24	20
Slovenia	17	11	17	12	18	11	17	11	:	:
Finland	23	8	22	9	21	11	19	11	19	11
Sweden	28	9	28	10	28	9	27	11	27	10
UK	30	18	30	19	30	19	29	19	29	17

Source: Eurostat; free data, social cohesion

At-risk-of-poverty rate before and after social transfers: males and females

The share of persons with an equivalised disposable income below the risk-of-poverty threshold, which is set at 60% of the national median equivalised disposable income

	1999		2000				2001					
	males		females		males		females		males		females	
	before	after	before	after	before	after	before	after	before	after	before	after
EU 15	23	15	25	16	22	14	24	16	22	14	25	16
EU 25	23	15	25	16	:	:	:	:	23	14	25	17
Belgium	23	11	26	14	22	12	25	14	21	12	25	15
Germany	20	10	21	12	19	10	22	11	20	10	23	12
Greece	22	20	23	21	22	19	23	20	21	19	24	22
Spain	23	18	23	19	21	17	23	19	22	17	25	20
France	24	15	25	16	24	15	25	16	23	15	24	16
Ireland	28	17	32	20	29	19	33	21	29	20	32	23
Italy	20	18	21	18	20	18	21	19	21	19	23	20
Hungary	:	:	:	:	18	9	19	10	20	10	21	10
Netherlands	21	10	22	11	21	11	21	10	21	12	21	11
Portugal	27	19	28	22	26	19	28	22	25	20	24	20
Slovenia	17	11	19	12	17	10	18	12	:	:	:	:
Finland	19	9	22	12	18	9	21	13	17	9	20	14
Sweden	26	9	29	10	26	10	28	11	25	10	29	11
UK	27	18	32	21	26	16	32	21	26	15	32	19

Source: Eurostat; free data, social cohesion

Domain: Housing and environment

Sub-domain: Housing conditions

7. Proportion of population living in houses with *lack* of functioning basic amenities (water, sanitation and energy)

Percentage of household lacking at least one of the three basic amenities by income group, 1999

	EU	B	D	EL	E	F	IRL	I	NL	P	FIN	S	UK
All households	21	19	10	38	62	11	16	15	12	89	4	-	11
Household income less than 60% compared to median actual current income	35	33	25	70	84	24	33	40	16	96	9	-	16

Source: Eurostat 2003, Living conditions in Europe

Domain: Health and care

Sub-Domain: Health services

11. Number of medical doctors per 100.000 inhabitants

Number of practitioners per 100 000 inhabitants

	EU15	B	D	EL	E	F	IRL	I	NL	P	FIN	S	UK
1997	-	386	345	410	428	325	214	578	-	306	296	278	168
1998	368	395	350	426	436	426	219	583	295	312	300	278	172
1999	375	405	355	438	444	328	227	589	311	318	306	283	176
2000	-	411	359	-	454	329	250	599	321	325	308	-	180
2001	-	419	362	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

Source: Eurostat, Yearbook 2003

12. Average distance to hospital, measure in minutes, not in meters

Proximity to hospitals by income (% having access to a hospital in less than 20 minutes by quartiles of household-equivalence income)

	Total	Lowest quartile	Highest quartile	Difference in percentage points
EU 15	52,8	44,9	60,4	15,5
Belgium	66	53,6	78,9	25,3
Germany	52,7	48	56,8	8,9
Greece	39,9	35,7	44,3	8,5
Spain	41,4	38,4	44,2	5,8
France	54,4	43,4	65,3	21,9
Ireland	44,6	40,5	48,7	8,2
Italy	60,9	47	75,2	28,2
Hungary	31,4	16	46,8	30,8
Netherlands	72,5	66,8	77,8	11
Portugal	37,8	27,2	49	21,9
Slovenia	37,9	30,5	46,2	15,7
Finland	50,9	48	53,8	5,8
Sweden	58	56	60	4,0
UK	45,5	34,2	57,8	23,6

Source: Eurobarometer 52.1

Domain: Work

Sub-domain: Employment security

17. Proportion employed workforce with temporary, non permanent, job contract

Proportion employees with a contract of limited duration (temporary job contracts)

	1999			2000			2001			2002		
	total	females	males	total	females	males	total	females	males	total	females	males
EU 15	13,2	14,2	12,4	13,4	14,5	12,5	13,4	14,5	:	13,1	14,3	12,1
Belgium	10,3	13,7	7,7	9	12,1	6,6	8,8	12,1	:	7,6	10,3	5,5
Germany	13,1	13,4	12,8	12,7	13,1	12,5	12,4	12,7	:	12	12,2	11,8
Greece	13	14,7	12	13,1	15,7	11,5	12,9	15,4	:	11,3	13,4	9,8
Spain	32,7	34,9	31,4	32,1	34,6	12,1	31,6	34,1	:	31,2	34,2	29,2
France	14	14,8	13,3	15	15,7	14,3	14,9	16,3	:	14,1	16	12,5
Ireland	9,4	12,1	7,1	4,6	5,8	3,6	3,7	4,5	:	5,3	6,3	4,5
Italy	9,8	11,8	8,5	10,1	12,2	8,8	9,5	11,5	:	9,9	12,1	8,3
Hungary	:	:	:	:	:	:	7,5	6,8	:	7,4	6,8	8
Netherlands	12	15,4	9,4	14	17,2	11,1	14,3	17,5	:	14,3	17	12,2
Portugal	18,6	20,4	17,1	20,4	22,7	18,4	20,3	22,1	:	21,8	23,4	20,5
Slovenia	:	:	:	:	:	:	13,1	13,3	:	14,7	16,7	12,9
Finland	18,2	21,2	15,2	17,7	20,9	14,5	17,9	22	:	17,3	20,5	13,9
Sweden	13,9	16,6	11,2	14,7	16,9	12,1	14,7	16,9	:	15,7	17,9	13,3
UK	6,8	7,5	6,2	6,7	7,7	5,7	6,7	7,5	:	6,1	6,8	5,5

Source: Eurostat; Statistics in Focus

Sub-domain: Working conditions

20. Number of fatal accidents (fatal / non-fatal) at work per 100.000 employed persons (if possible: per sector)

Incidence rate of accidents at work. Incidence = (number of accidents at work that occurred during the year/number of persons in employment in the reference population) x100000

	1994		1998	
	non-fatal	fatal	non-fatal	fatal
EU 15	4539	3,9	4089	3,4
Belgium	4415	6	5112	3,1
Germany	5583	3,7	4958	3
Greece	3702	4,3	2936	3,7
Spain	6166	7	7073	5,5
France	5515	4,3	4920	4
Ireland	1494	3,9	1433	5,9
Italy	4641	5,3	4105	5
Hungary	:	:	:	:
Netherlands	4287	:	3909	:
Portugal	7361	8,4	5505	7,7
Slovenia	:	:	:	:
Finland	3914	3,6	3435	2,4
Sweden	1123	2,1	1329	1,3
UK	1915	1,7	1512	1,6

Source: Eurostat; Statistics in Focus

Evolution of the accidents at work, 1998 = 100

	1997		1998		1999		2000		2001	
	serious	fatal	serious	fatal	serious	fatal	serious	fatal	serious	fatal
EU 15	100	100	100	100	100	85	98	82	94 (p)	79 (p)
Belgium	96	100	100	100	96	106	82 (b)	100	83	124
Germany	101	90	100	100	99	80	96	70	88	65
Greece	113	76	100	100	93	170	88	73	86	78
Spain	95	115	100	100	107	91	108	85	106	81
France	101	103	100	100	101	85	102	85	98	79
Ireland	115	120	100	100	90	119	72	39	105	43
Italy	100	84	100	100	99	68	99	66	92	62
Hungary	103	97	100	100	93	107	94	95	86	71
Netherlands	107	140	100	100	108 (b)	107	105	106	92	79
Portugal	100	108	100	100	92	79	88	104	:	:
Slovenia	106	130	100	100	102	88	98	83	94	105
Finland	98	117	100	100	91	75	89	88	87 (b)	8 (b)
Sweden	81	169	100	100	107	85	111	85	113	105
UK	102	100	100	100	106	88	106	106	110	92

p) provisional value

b) break in series

Source: Eurostat, free data, employment

Fatal work accidents (per 100 000 employed persons), 2000

	EU	B	D	EL	E	F	IRL	I	NL	P	FIN	S	UK
Total	5	5	4	3	7	6	2	7	2	9	2	2	2
Age group under 25	3	7	3	1	5	4	-	7	1	5	1	3	1
Age group 45 and over	7	6	5	5	10	10	-	10	4	16	3	3	3

Source: Eurostat 2003; Living conditions in Europe

21. Number of hours a full-time employee typically works a week (actual working week)

Hours worked per week of full time employment

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
EU 15	42.1	42.1	42.1	41.9	41.7	41.6	41.4	:
Belgium	40.3	40.6	41.2	38.4	38.5	41.2	41.4	41.3
Germany	41.6	41.7	41.7	41.8	41.8	41.6	41.4	41.0
Greece	44.6	44.4	44.5	44.7	44.2	44.2	44.2	44.4
Spain	42.2	42.3	42.3	42.2	42.1	42.0	41.8	41.6
France	41.2	41.1	41.0	40.9	40.2	39.6	38.9	40.7
Ireland	43.9	43.2	42.9	42.1	41.9	41.5	41.2	41.0
Italy	40.6	40.5	40.6	40.5	40.6	40.6	40.5	40.5
Hungary	42.1	42.0	41.8	42.0	41.9	41.5	41.4	41.4
Netherlands	41.5	41.3	41.0	41.0	41.0	40.9	40.7	40.6
Portugal	43.7	43.1	43.1	42.4	42.0	41.9	41.9	41.6
Slovenia	43.6	43.8	43.9	43.6	43.1	43.2	43.1	42.6
Finland	40.5	40.9	40.9	41.0	40.9	40.7	40.6	40.6
Sweden	41.4	41.4	41.3	41.3	41.2	41.0	41.0	40.8
UK	44.8	44.9	44.8	44.4	44.2	44.2	43.9	43.8

Source: Eurostat; free data, long term indicators, people in the labour market

Domain: Education

Sub-domain: Security of education

22. Proportion of pupils leaving education without finishing compulsory education (early school leavers)

Early school-leavers - total - Percentage of the population aged 18-24 with at most lower secondary education and not in further education or training

	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
EU 25	:	:	17.2 (p)	16.5 (p)	15.9 (b)
EU 15	20.5 (p)	19.4 (p)	18.9 (p)	18.5 (p)	18.0 (b)
Belgium	15.2 (b)	12.5	13.6	12.4	12.8
Germany	14.9	14.9	12.5	12.6	12.6 (p)
Greece	17.8	17.1	16.5	16.1	15.3 (b)
Spain	29.5	28.8	28.6	29.0	29.8
France	14.7	13.3	13.5	13.4	13.3 (b)
Ireland	:	:	:	14.7	12.1 (b)
Italy	27.2	25.3	26.4	24.3	23.5
Hungary	13.0	13.8	12.9	12.2	11.8 (b)
Netherlands	16.2	15.5	15.3	15.0	15.0 (p)
Portugal	44.8	42.9	44.3	45.5	41.1
Slovenia	:	:	7.5	4.8 u	4.3
Finland	9.9	8.9 (b)	10.3	9.9	10.7 (b)
Sweden	6.9	7.7	10.5 (b)	10.4	9.0 (b)
UK	19.7 (p)	18.3 (p)	17.6 (p)	17.7 (p)	16.7 (p)

p) provisional value

b) break in series

Source: Eurostat SC053 IV.5.1

Early school-leavers - males and females - Percentage of the population aged 18-24 with at most lower secondary education and not in further education or training

	1999		2000		2001		2002		2003	
	females	males	females	males	females	males	females	males	females	males
EU 25	:	:	:	:	15.0(p)	19.5(p)	14.2(p)	18.7(p)	13.9(b)	17.9(b)
EU 15	18.4(p)	22.6(p)	17.1(p)	21.6(p)	16.6(p)	21.2(p)	16.1(p)	20.9(p)	15.9(b)	20.2(b)
Belgium	12.7(b)	17.7 b	10.2	14.8	12.3	15.0	9.9	14.9	10.8	14.7
Germany	15.6	14.2	15.2	14.6	12.8	12.2	12.6	12.6	12.6(p)	12.6(p)
Greece	14.8	21.2	12.9	21.8	13.0	20.4	12.3	20.1	11.0 (b)	19.6(b)
Spain	23.6	35.4	23.2	34.3	22.2	34.9	22.3	35.4	23.4	36.1
France	13.4	16.0	11.9	14.8	12.0	15.0	11.9	14.9	11.6 (b)	15.0(b)
Ireland	:	:	:	:	:	:	10.8	18.5	9.2(b)	14.9(b)
Italy	24.2	30.3	21.9	28.8	22.6	30.2	20.7	27.9	20.1	26.8
Hungary	12.7	13.3	13.2	14.3	12.6	13.3	11.8	12.5	11.1(b)	12.4(b)
Netherlands	14.9	17.5	14.8	16.2	14.1	16.5	14.3	15.7	14.3 p)	15.7(p)
Portugal	38.8	50.7	35.4	50.3	37.0	51.6	38.1	52.9	33.8	48.3
Slovenia	:	:	:	:	5.6	9.3	3.3	6.2	2.3	6.2
Finland	7.9	12.0	6.5(b)	11.3(b)	7.7	13.0	7.3	12.6	8.6(b)	12.9(b)
Sweden	6.1	7.7	6.2	9.2	9.7 b	11.3 b	9.3	11.4	8.2(b)	9.8(b)
UK	19.3(p)	20.1(p)	17.8(p)	18.8(p)	16.6(p)	18.6(p)	16.6(p)	18.8(p)	16.4(p)	17.0(p)

p) provisional value

b) break in series

Source: Eurostat SC053 IV.5.1-2

2. Social cohesion

Domain: Trust

Sub-domain: Generalised trust

25. Extent to which 'most people can be trusted'

Proportion of the population who thinks that most people can be trusted

	B	D	EL	E	F	IRL	I	HU	NL	SL	FIN	S	UK
most people can be trusted	29,3	34,8	19,1	38,5	22,2	35,2	32,6	21,8	59,7	21,7	58	66,3	29,9
you cannot be too careful	70,7	65,2	80,9	61,5	77,8	64,8	67,4	78,2	40,3	78,3	42	33,7	70,1

Source: European Values Study; A third Wave (question 8)

Extent to which the population thinks that most people can be trusted, 2002

The table includes the country means in a 0-10 scale, where 0 means the distrust and 10 means the trustfulness

	B	D	EL	E	IRL	I	HU	NL	P	SL	FIN	S	UK
country means	4,81	4,61	3,64	4,86	5,46	4,54	4,08	5,71	4	3,98	6,46	6,09	5,05

Source: European Social Survey (ESS) 2002

Sub-domain: Specific trust

26. Trust in: government; elected representatives; political parties; armed forces; legal system; the media; trade unions, police; religious institutions; civil service; economic transactions

Trust in different institutions in European countries 2002/2003

	Trust in country's parliament	Legal system	Police	Politicians	European Parliament
Belgium	4,99	4,39	5,64	4,28	4,88
Germany	4,47	5,73	6,73	3,5	4,46
Spain	4,83	4,31	5,43	3,37	4,8
Finland	5,79	6,75	7,95	4,78	4,88
UK	4,68	5,03	6,04	3,79	3,61
Greece	4,83	6,27	6,43	3,46	5,69
Hungary	5	5,11	4,91	3,88	5,67
Ireland	4,43	5,14	6,53	3,75	5,11
Italy	4,83	5,49	6,66	3,54	5,51
Netherlands	5,22	5,38	5,82	4,87	4,67
Portugal	4,44	4,26	5,13	2,82	4,76
Sweden	5,92	6,06	6,76	4,72	4,02
Slovenia	4,04	4,28	4,89	3,07	4,65

Source: European Social Survey 2002.

Remarks: The table includes the country means in a 0-10 scale, where 0 means the distrust and 10 means the trustfulness.

28. Importance of: family; friends; leisure; politics; respecting parents. parents' duty to

children

Proportion of the population for whom work, family, friends, leisure time, politics is quite or very important in its live (those two answer categories are taken together)

	work	family	friends	leisure time	politics	religion
Belgium	92,8	97,6	89,1	86,2	33,1	47,6
Germany	82,7	96,9	94,5	83,2	39,5	35
Greece	87,2	99,1	85,5	76,9	34,9	79,7
Spain	94,6	98,9	86,6	80,9	19,3	42
France	94,8	98,2	94,4	88,1	35,4	36,9
Ireland	84,7	98,5	97,3	86,9	32,1	70,7
Italy	95	98,6	89,8	81,2	33,8	72,1
Hungary	88,7	97,8	82,3	79,7	18,2	42,3
Netherlands	86,5	92,7	96,3	94	57,7	39,8
Portugal	95,1	98,7	87,9	83,7	27,1	75,5
Slovenia	95,8	97,2	88,3	79,7	14,5	36,6
Finland	89,2	96,2	95,2	90	19,8	45,1
Sweden	91,1	97,9	97,6	93,9	55	35
UK	78,6	98,8	96,6	92,5	34,3	37,4

Source: European Values Study; A third Wave (question 1)

Domain: Other integrative norms and values

Sub-domain: Altruism

29. Volunteering: number of hours per week

Volunteer work and informal help among persons aged 20-74 (Hours and minutes per day)

	B	D	F	HU	SI	FIN	S	UK
Volunteer work and help among women aged 20-74	0:10	0:15	0:14	0:08	0:06	0:16	0:12	0:14
Volunteer work and help among men aged 20-74	0:11	0:17	0:18	0:13	0:11	0:16	0:12	0:10

Source: How Europeans spend their time everyday life of women and men – Luxembourg

30. Blood donation

Blood donation (%), 2002

	EU	B	D	E	F	IRL	I	NL	P	FIN	S	UK
Yes	31	23	31	25	38	32	24	26	22	39	25	32

Source: « Le don de sang », Eurostat, 2003, p.2, Eurobarometer 58.2

Sub-domain: Tolerance

31. Views on immigration, pluralism and multiculturalism

Proportion of different opinions according to the inclusion of immigrants in different countries, 2000

Country	Let anyone come who wants to	Let people come as long as there jobs available	Put strict limits on the number of foreigners who can come here	Prohibit people coming here from other countries
Belgium	7,4	33,5	50,5	8,6
Germany	4,5	32,6	56	7
Greece	3,5	40,9	41	14,6
Spain	19,1	56,2	22,4	2,3
Ireland	8,3	46,7	42,1	2,9
Italy	9,7	47,4	38,3	4,6
Hungary	2	12	59,1	26,8
Netherlands	3,9	35,9	55,6	4,7
Portugal	11,5	61,4	23,2	3,9
Slovenia	4,6	48,1	38,9	8,4
Finland	10,4	34,7	51,9	3
Sweden	16,3	54,4	28,7	0,5
UK	4,3	34,1	48,5	13,1

Source: European Values Survey 1999/2000, Q74

Proportion of different opinions in connection with the cultural identity of immigrants in different countries

Country	For the greater good of society it is better if immigrants maintain their distinct customs and traditions	For the greater good of society it is better if immigrants do not maintain their distinct custom and traditions but take over the customs of the country
Belgium	28,1	71,9
Germany	23,8	76,2
Greece	68,7	31,3
Spain	52	48
Ireland	56,7	43,3
Italy	59,7	40,3
Hungary	33,4	66,6
Netherlands	29,1	70,9
Portugal	48,9	51,1
Slovenia	30,8	69,2
Finland	32	68
Sweden	36	64
UK	44,7	55,3

Source: European Values Survey 1999/2000, Q75

32. Tolerance of other people's self-identity, beliefs, behaviour and lifestyle preferences

Typology of people according to their attitudes towards minorities

Proportion of the population that is intolerant, ambivalent, passively tolerant and actively tolerant by country

	Intolerant	Ambivalent	Passively tolerant	Actively tolerant
EU15	14	25	39	21
Belgium	25	28	26	22
Germany	18	29	29	24
Greece	27	43	22	7
Spain	4	18	61	16
France	19	26	31	25
Ireland	13	21	50	15
Italy	11	21	54	15
Netherlands	11	25	34	31
Portugal	9	34	44	12
Finland	8	21	39	32
Sweden	9	15	43	33
UK	15	27	36	22

Source: Eurobarometer 2000 survey

Tolerance of other people's self-identity, beliefs, behaviour and lifestyle preferences

	B	D	EL	E	F	IRL	I	HU
Claiming state benefits which you are not entitled to	2,57	1,91	3,64	2,67	3,39	1,9	1,88	1,7
Cheating on tax if you have the chance	3,64	2,36	2,88	2,35	3,06	2,35	2,39	2,12
Taking and driving away a car belonging to someone else (joyriding)	1,2	1,24	1,39	1,64	1,38	1,11	1,46	1,14
Taking the drug marihuana or hashish	1,72	1,91	2,04	2,16	2,15	1,99	2,03	1,26
Lying in your own interest	3,62	3,32	2,58	2,93	3,71	2,32	2,41	2,53
Married men/women having an affair	2,72	2,85	2,12	2,48	3,52	1,84	2,75	2,1
Someone accepting a bribe in the course of their duties	2	1,8	1,66	1,68	2,08	1,42	1,5	2,67
Homosexuality	5,22	5,69	3,39	5,51	5,27	4,4	4,83	1,45
Abortion	4,45	4,61	4,18	4,34	5,64	2,9	4,04	3,92
Divorce	5,64	5,86	5,42	6,1	6,32	4,8	5,14	4,5
Euthanasia (terminating the life of the incurably sick)	5,83	4,34	3,49	4,73	6,16	3,31	3,86	3,83
Suicide	3,27	2,61	2,26	2,77	4,34	2,07	2,28	1,56
Throwing away litter in a public place	1,48	2,22	1,88	1,86	1,62	1,81	1,58	1,72
Driving under the influence of alcohol	1,64	1,45	1,49	1,52	1,88	1,4	1,43	1,16
Paying cash for services to avoid taxes	4,29	2,89	3,46	3,35	4,18	2,89	2,5	2,62
Having casual sex	2,86	3,15	3,6	3,92	3,91	2,71	3,07	2,74
Smoking in public buildings	2,92	4,05	4	3,74	3,38	3,33	3,46	2,85
Speeding over the limit in built-up areas	2,39	1,99	2,19	1,93	2,84	1,85	2,61	1,98
Avoiding a fare on public transport	2,39	2,13	2,89	:	2,71	:	2,17	:
Sex under the legal age of consent	:	2,64	4,57	:	:	1,45	:	:
Prostitution	:	4,19	2,37	3,25	:	2,54	2,4	:
Political assassinations	:	1,49	1,93	:	:	:	:	:
Scientific experiments on human embryos	2,07	1,52	1,38	1,74	:	1,92	1,95	:
Genetic manipulation of food stuff	2,42	2,21	2,32	2,05	:	:	2,31	:

Tolerance of other people's self-identity, beliefs, behaviour and lifestyle preferences (continued)

	NL	P	SL	FIN	S	UK	Total
Claiming state benefits which you are not entitled to	1,51	2,03	2,82	2,3	2,08	1,99	2,28
Cheating on tax if you have the chance	2,67	2,45	2,34	2,46	2,41	2,42	2,63
Taking and driving away a car belonging to someone else (joyriding)	1,34	1,62	1,68	1,31	1,29	1,21	1,41
Taking the drug marihuana or hashish	3,06	2,02	2,3	1,65	1,77	3,1	1,83
Lying in your own interest	3,14	2,45	2,54	2,71	2,56	3,01	2,85
Married men/women having an affair	2,69	2,47	3,47	2,36	2,38	2,31	2,56
Someone accepting a bribe in the course of their duties	1,58	1,77	1,78	1,43	1,83	1,77	1,82
Homosexuality	7,8	3,19	4,62	4,94	7,65	4,89	4,3
Abortion	5,4	3,81	6,19	5,42	7,38	4,54	4,58
Divorce	6,54	5,46	6,58	6,64	7,8	5,57	5,51
Euthanasia (terminating the life of the incurably sick)	6,65	3,5	5,37	5,4	6,07	4,99	4,82
Suicide	4,34	2,2	3,54	3,04	4,12	3,16	2,63
Throwing away litter in a public place	1,7	1,83	1,94	2,27	2,72	2,61	1,88
Driving under the influence of alcohol	1,44	1,83	2,04	1,35	1,35	1,51	1,54
Paying cash for services to avoid taxes	4,2	2,25	3,28	3,48	3,78	3,53	3,25
Having casual sex	3,7	2,76	4,08	3,75	4,8	3,44	3,15
Smoking in public buildings	3,81	3,34	3,57	3,1	3,18	4,02	3,51
Speeding over the limit in built-up areas	1,8	2,38	2,93	2,82	2,72	2,3	2,33
Avoiding a fare on public transport	2,72	:	:	2,36	:	2,68	2,82
Sex under the legal age of consent	:	:	5,78	3,31	:	1,96	2,53
Prostitution	:	:	3,31	3,2	:	3,42	2,84
Political assassinations	:	:	:	1,44	:	1,99	1,63
Scientific experiments on human embryos	2,5	:	1,86	2,47	:	2,35	2,08
Genetic manipulation of food stuff	3,07	:	2,83	2,6	:	2,3	2,42

Source: European Values Survey 1999/2000, Q65, 1-10 scale

Sub-domain: Social contract

33. Beliefs on causes of poverty: individual or structural

Proportion of the population which considers (respectively) unfortunateness, laziness, injustice and the modern progress as the most important reason for living in need

	unlucky	laziness or lack of willpower	injustice in society	part of the modern progress	none of these
Belgium	26,8	16	35,3	20	1,9
Germany	11,7	28,4	36,9	19,6	3,5
Greece	14,3	29,8	18,2	34,4	3,3
Spain	19,8	19,6	48,4	10,4	1,9
France	14,4	11,4	44,3	26,9	2,9
Ireland	23,2	20,6	33	19,3	3,9
Italy	19,5	23	37,7	15,6	4,2
Hungary	13	27,6	37,7	18,8	2,9
Netherlands	32,8	14,3	25,8	17,5	9,7
Portugal	23,3	41,9	21,6	11,6	1,6
Slovenia	10,4	33,2	35,4	17,3	3,7
Finland	14,8	23	23,8	35,3	3,1
Sweden	10,2	7,1	49,5	33,1	0
Great Britain	16,4	24,6	30,5	24,4	4,1

Source: European Values Study : A third Wave (question 11)

38. Membership (active or inactive) of political, voluntary, charitable organisations or sport clubs

Proportion of people member of non-governmental organizations (NGO's) in different countries, 2002/2003

	B	D	EL	E	IRL	I	HU	NL	P	SL	FIN	S	UK
Male	65,1	72	24,8	36,7	68,6	37	27,9	84,4	31,1	51,3	64,6	82,8	71,4
Female	57,1	61,7	16,4	29,5	59,3	24,9	17,7	77,4	18,6	33,3	57,2	78,8	62

Source: European Social Survey 2002/2003

Proportion of population which belongs to....

	B	D	EL	E	F	IRL	I
social welfare services for elderly, handicapped or deprived people	11,4	3,9	10,2	3,7	5,6	5,9	6,4
religious or church organisations	12,2	13,5	11,8	5,8	4,3	16,2	10,3
education, arts, music or cultural activities	18,9	7,9	11,2	7,3	7,8	10,1	9,9
trade unions	15,7	7,2	6,5	3,5	4	10	6,2
political parties or groups	7	2,8	4,9	2	2	4,4	4,1
local community action on issues like poverty, employment, housing, racial equality	5	0,7	2,8	2,2	2,3	5,6	2,4
third world development or human rights	9,8	0,6	1,8	2,4	1,4	2,4	2,9
conservation, the environment, ecology, animal rights	10,4	2,7	5,8	2,5	2,2	2,8	3,8
professional associations	8,3	4,4	7,7	2,6	3,1	7,7	7,1
youth work	7,5	1,9	2,5	2,6	2	7,1	4,2
sports or recreation	23,8	28	9,6	8,5	16,4	27,6	11,5
women's groups	8,7	3,6	2,2	2,3	0,4	4,4	0,4
peace movements	2,3	0,2	2,9	1,6	0,5	1,7	1,4
voluntary organisations concerned with health	5	2,5	3,6	2,7	2,5	4,1	4,7
other groups	10,6	3,9	6,8	3,7	6,9	5,4	2,6

Proportion of population which belongs to.... (continued)

	HU	NL	P	SL	FIN	S	UK
social welfare services for elderly, handicapped or deprived people	1,9	21,6	2	5,4	10,4	20,8	6,7
religious or church organisations	12,1	35,1	5,6	6,7	47	71,5	4,9
education, arts, music or cultural activities	3,4	46,2	3,1	9,2	14,3	26,4	9,7
trade unions	7	23,4	1,7	16,9	32,3	64	8,2
political parties or groups	1,6	9,5	0,9	3	6,6	10,6	2,5
local community action on issues like poverty, employment, housing, racial equality	1	7,4	1	9,2	2,6	9,5	3,8
third world development or human rights	0,3	24,6	0,8	0,8	5,9	15	2,6
conservation, the environment, ecology, animal rights	1,7	44,3	0,5	3,3	4,4	11,3	1,5
professional associations	3,7	18,5	1,1	6,7	5,6	14,5	1,6
youth work	0,8	7,3	1,2	4,5	6,7	6,9	5,7
sports or recreation	3,8	50,3	8,6	16,9	23,7	37	3
women's groups	0,3	4		1,9	4	3,5	1,7
peace movements	0,3	3,4	0,6	0,8	1,3	1,5	0,6
voluntary organisations concerned with health	2	9,6	2,2	2,9	9,2	6,7	3
other groups	2,6	9,7	3,2	9,9	11,8	25	5

Source: European Values Study; A third Wave (question 5)

40. Frequency of contact with friends and colleagues

Frequency of spending time with friends

	B	D	EL	E	F	IRL	I	HU	NL	P	SL	FIN	S	UK
every week	50,2	49,3	62,1	67,5	58,5	72,1	61,9	37,0	66,7	63,6	57,7	60,3	66,5	74,2
once a week	30,9	36,7	23,6	18,5	28,0	21,1	20,2	29,1	25,5	14,5	25,7	27,7	28,2	18,5
few times a year	14,1	12,3	11,3	10,1	11,0	5,3	13,3	22,0	6,5	16,3	14,0	11,0	5,0	5,2
not at all	4,9	1,7	3,1	3,9	2,5	1,6	4,6	11,9	1,3	5,6	2,6	1,0	0,3	2,1

Source: European Social Survey (Q6A)

Frequency of spending time with colleagues

	B	D	EL	E	F	IRL	I	HU	NL	P	SL	FIN	S	UK
every week	12,9	11,3	24,1	27,0	12,5	25,0	16,8	13,6	14,7	35,4	24,4	23,3	17,8	18,6
once a week	22,5	27,0	23,3	18,7	18,7	27,5	21,9	17,3	29,2	17,8	25,6	23,8	35,9	24,2
few times a year	33,4	39,9	21,6	18,8	24,0	20,4	26,4	20,5	38,3	16,5	28,2	33,8	37,0	26,8
not at all	31,2	21,8	30,9	35,4	44,7	27,0	35,0	48,5	17,7	30,2	21,9	19,1	9,3	30,3

Source: European Social Survey (Q6B)

Domain: Identity

Sub-domain: National / European pride

41. Sense of national pride

Sense of pride : proportion of the population which is proud of being (country) / European

	EU15	B	D	EL	E	F	IRL	I	NL	P	FIN	S	UK
national pride	85	83	66	96	92	86	96	93	84	92	96	90	90
european pride	61	64	49	64	74	58	75	81	62	66	73	70	47

Source: Standard Eurobarometer 6;: full report (categories very and fairly proud taken together)

Sense of national pride

	B	D	EL	E	F	IRL	I	HU	NL	P	SL	FIN	S	UK
very proud	24,3	16,8	65	44,1	39,7	71,8	39,3	50,9	19,5	79,1	55,7	56,1	41,4	50,5
quite proud	50,9	50,8	25,6	45,2	49,6	26,2	49	38,4	60,5	17,7	34,9	37,5	45,6	39,5
not very proud	17,5	24,3	8,6	7,8	7	1,7	9,8	8,5	14,8	2,3	7,4	5,6	11,6	7,9
not at all proud	7,3	8,1	0,9	3	3,7	0,3	1,9	2,3	5,2	0,9	2	0,9	1,4	2,1

Source: European Values Study; A third Wave (Q71)

Sub-domain: Regional / community / local identity

43. Sense of regional / community / local identity

Which of these geographical groups would you say you belong to first of all?

	B	D	EL	E	F	IRL	I	HU	NL	P	SL	FIN	S	UK
locality or town	32,1	55,2	44,8	45,6	43,7	56,6	53,4	67,3	39,1	36,3	52,8	48,9	58,7	48,9
region of country	20,3	29,6	12	16,5	12,1	15,8	10,6	6,3	7,7	16	8,7	12,3	9,5	13,7
country as a whole	27,9	10,1	33,2	26,8	28,5	24	23,3	20,1	41,2	41,6	32,1	31,2	22,4	28,4
Europe	9,3	2,9	1,2	1,7	4,3	2,2	4,2	2	4,8	1,6	2,4	3,2	4,2	1,9
world as a whole	10,4	2,2	8,8	9,4	11,4	1,4	8,5	4,3	7,2	4,5	3,9	4,4	5,3	7,2

Source: European Values Study; A third Wave (Q67)

3. Social inclusion

Domain: Citizenship rights

Sub-domain: Constitutional / political rights

46. Proportion having right to vote in local elections and proportion exercising it

Proportion voting in national elections (as the percentage of the voting age population)

	B	D	EL	EL	F	IRL	I	HU	NL	P	SL	FIN	SL	UK
1995-1999	83,2	:	83,9	80,6	59,9	66,7	87,4	:	:	79,1	:	71,1	:	69,4

Source: IDEA (1997), Voter Turnout from 1947 to 1997 and OECD : Society at a glance 2001

Sub-domain: Social rights

48. Women's pay as a proportion of men's

Gender pay gap

as the difference between average gross hourly earnings of male paid employees and of female paid employees as a percentage of average gross hourly earnings of male paid employees.

	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
EU (15 countries)	16	16	15	16	16
Belgium	10	9	11	12	12
Germany	21	22	19	21	21
Greece	13	12	13	15	18
Spain	14	16	14	15	17
France	12	12	12	13	14
Ireland	19	20	22	19	17
Italy	7	7	8	6	6
Hungary	22	18	19	20	19
Netherlands	22	21	21	21	19
Portugal	7	6	5	8	10
Slovenia	14	11	14	12	11
Finland	18	19	19	17	17
Sweden	17	18	17	18	18
United Kingdom	21	24	22	21	21

Source: Eurostat; free data, employment

Earnings of men and women

Annual gross earnings of women as a percentage of men's, 2000

	EU15	B	D	EL	E	F	IRL	I	NL	P	FIN	S	UK
Industry and services	75	83	-	80	77	82	-	-	73	71	79	86	68
Industry	77	83	78	83	73	84	-	-	77	67	82	89	69
Mining and quarrying	75	99	91	81	-	92	-	-	-	94	77	90	68
Manufacturing	75	79	76	74	-	79	-	-	75	65	80	89	68
Electricity, gas and water supply	78	68	82	81	-	83	-	-	81	89	77	83	70
Construction	88	99	91	94	102	100	-	-	82	90	82	90	76
Trade and repairs	72	79	74	76	-	77	-	-	68	71	73	83	63
Hotels and restaurants	79	91	-	77	-	85	-	-	82	74	90	90	72
Transport	84	91	-	64	-	90	-	-	74	98	87	92	81
Financial intermediation	62	70	75	73	-	64	-	-	62	80	57	66	46
Real estate	70	76	-	91	-	72	-	-	70	71	75	78	66

Note: The share refers to full-time earnings.

Source: «Living conditions in Europe», Eurostat, 2003, p.60

Sub-domain: Economic and political networks

52. Proportion of women elected or appointed to parliament, boards of private companies and foundations

Proportion of women in national governments and parliaments, 2001

	B	D	EL	ES	F	IRL	I	NL	P	FIN	S	UK	Total
government	22,2	38,6	12,5	17,6	29,4	21,9	10,3	36	9,8	38,9	50	32,9	24,7
parliament	24,6	29,8	8,7	27,1	8,3	14,2	10,2	32,4	20	37	44,3	17	20,5

Source: Europäische datanbank Frauen in Führungspositionen (www.db-decision.de)

Domain: Labour market

Sub-domain: Access to paid employment

53. Long-term unemployment (12+ months)

Total long-term unemployment

	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
EU 15	4.9	4.4	4.0	3.5	3.1	3.1	3.3
Belgium	5.4	5.5	4.9	3.7	3.2	3.5	3.7
Germany	4.9	4.7	4.3	3.9	3.8	4.1	4.6
Greece	5.3	5.8	6.4	6.0	5.4	5.1	5.1
Spain	8.9	7.6	5.9	4.7	3.9	3.9	3.9
France	4.8	4.6	4.2	3.6	3.0	3.0	3.4
Ireland	6.0	3.9	2.6	1.6	1.2	1.3	1.5
Italy	7.5	7.0	6.8	6.4	5.8	5.3	4.9
Hungary	4.5	4.2	3.3	3.0	2.5	2.4	2.4
Netherlands	2.3	1.5	1.2	0.8	0.7	0.7	1.0
Portugal	3.3	2.2	1.8	1.7	1.5	1.8	2.2
Slovenia	3.4	3.3	3.2	4.1	3.5	3.4	3.4
Finland	4.9	4.1	3.0	2.8	2.5	2.3	2.3
Sweden	3.1	2.6	1.9	1.4	1.0	1.0	1.0
UK	2.5	1.9	1.7	1.5	1.3	1.1	1.1

Source: Eurostat;; free data, social cohesion

Long-term unemployment: females and males (1997-2000)

	1997		1998		1999		2000	
	females	males	females	males	females	males	females	males
EU 15	5.8	4.2	5.4	3.7	4.7	3.3	4.2	2.9
Belgium	7.1	4.2	7.0	4.5	5.9	4.1	4.6	3.0
Germany	5.6	4.3	5.3	4.2	4.7	4.0	4.2	3.7
Greece	9.3	2.8	9.9	3.1	10.5	3.7	9.8	3.5
Spain	14.1	5.7	12.4	4.8	9.4	3.7	7.6	2.8
France	5.7	4.0	5.5	3.9	5.1	3.5	4.4	2.9
Ireland	5.1	6.5	2.8	4.6	1.9	3.2	1.0	2.0
Italy	10.5	5.7	9.5	5.4	9.3	5.2	8.8	4.9
Hungary	4.0	4.9	3.9	4.5	2.9	3.6	2.5	3.4
Netherlands	3.1	1.8	1.8	1.3	1.5	0.9	1.0	0.6
Portugal	3.6	3.0	2.7	1.9	2.1	1.5	2.1	1.4
Slovenia	3.3	3.6	3.3	3.3	3.0	3.4	4.1	4.0
Finland	4.9	4.9	4.0	4.3	2.8	3.2	2.7	2.8
Sweden	2.0	4.0	1.8	3.2	1.4	2.2	1.0	1.7
UK	1.5	3.3	1.2	2.5	1.0	2.2	0.9	1.9

Long-term unemployment: females and males (continued) (2001-2003)

	2001		2002		2003	
	females	males	females	males	females	males
EU 15	3.7	2.7	3.6	2.7	3.7	2.9
Belgium	3.6	3.0	4.1	3.2	4.0	3.4
Germany	4.1	3.7	4.2	4.0	4.6	4.6
Greece	8.6	3.1	8.3	3.0	8.5	2.8
Spain	6.3	2.3	6.3	2.3	6.0	2.4
France	3.7	2.4	3.5	2.6	3.9	3.1
Ireland	0.8	1.6	0.7	1.7	0.9	1.9
Italy	8.0	4.5	7.2	4.1	6.7	3.9
Hungary	2.1	2.9	2.1	2.7	2.3	2.5
Netherlands	0.8	0.5	0.8	0.6	1.1	1.0
Portugal	1.9	1.2	2.2	1.4	2.6	1.8
Slovenia	3.6	3.4	3.4	3.4	3.6	3.3
Finland	2.3	2.7	2.0	2.5	2.0	2.6
Sweden	0.8	1.2	0.8	1.2	0.8	1.2
UK	0.8	1.7	0.7	1.4	0.7	1.4

Source: Eurostat; free data, social cohesion

Domain: Social networks

Sub-domain: Neighbourhood participation

67. Proportion in regular contact with neighbours

Percentage of population aged 16 and over talking to neighbours, 1999

	EU	B	D	EL	E	F	IRL	I	NL	P	FIN	S	UK
At least once a week	81	71	-	96	90	-	89	80	70	86	79	-	78
Once or twice a month	10	17	-	2	5	-	7	10	14	8	12	-	13
Less than once a month or never	9	12	-	2	5	-	4	10	16	6	9	-	9

Source: Eurostat 2003, Living conditions in Europe

Sub-domain: Friendships

68. Proportion in regular contact with friends

Percentage of the population aged 16 and over meeting people (at home or elsewhere), 1999

	EU	B	D	EL	E	F	IRL	I	NL	P	FIN	S	UK
At least once a week	81	78	-	90	92	66	97	81	85	74	80	-	87
Once or twice a week	14	18	-	9	6	26	3	13	13	16	17	-	10
Less than once a month or never	5	4	-	2	2	8	1	6	2	9	4	-	3

Source: Eurostat 2003, Living conditions in Europe

4. Social Empowerment

Domain: Knowledge base

Sub-domain: Availability of information

73. Per cent of population literate and numerate

Competence poverty: proportion of educationally „poor” individuals in different countries based on literacy competences

	B	D	EL	F	IRL	I	HU	P	FIN	S	UK
students aged 15	19	22,6	24,4	15,2	11	18,9	22,7	26,3	6,9	12,6	12,8
Population aged 16-65	15,3	9	-	-	25,3	-	32,9	49,1	12,6	6,2	23,3

Source: PISA2000; Adult Literacy Survey, 1994-98

75. Access to internet

Internet use in different European countries (% of individuals aged 14 and over)

	B	EL	E	IRL	I	HU	NL	P	SL	FIN	S	UK
Never use	56,3	86,6	75,1	58,3	69,8	80,4	40,7	69,9	64,1	43,9	33	51,4
Everyday use	18,1	4,2	9,3	13	9,9	5,7	21,7	14,8	10,6	18,8	27,8	17,7

Source: European Social Survey, 2002/2003

Domain: Labour market

Sub-domain: Prospects of job mobility

80. % of employed labour force receiving work based training

Continuing vocational training (CVT) in enterprises (1999)

	EU	B	D	EL	E	F	IRL	I	NL	P	FIN	S	UK
Training enterprises as a % of all enterprises	62	70	75	18	36	76	79	24	88	22	82	91	87
Employees in training enterprises as a % of employees in all enterprises	88	88	92	56	64	93	92	56	96	52	95	98	97
Participants in CVT courses as a % of employees in all enterprises	40	41	32	15	25	46	41	26	41	17	50	61	49
Hours in CVT courses per employee (all enterprises)	12	13	9	6	11	17	17	8	15	7	18	18	13
Hours in CVT courses per participant	31	31	27	39	42	36	40	32	37	38	36	31	26

Source: Eurostat 2003, Living conditions in Europe

Distribution of companies and enterprises that provide vocational training, 1999 (%)

Branch	B	D	E	HU	NL	P	SL	FIN	S
Industry	68	73	38	34	90	19	53	77	90
Commerce	72	83	41	39	87	24	30	85	94
Finanacial services	100	100	74	79	97	67	66	100	100
Economic services	86	87	41	48	90	43	60	86	90
Other public and personal services	75	89	33	35	88	29	69	93	100
Other	63	65	29	31	86	18	46	79	84

Source: Eurostat 2002, Statistics in Focus

Annex Social Quality theory

1 Introduction

In the 1990s representatives of universities from different European countries started to elaborate the theory of social quality. Stimulated by neo-liberal globalisation and the dominance of economic interests and herewith related economic thinking and policies in the process of European integration, they were searching for an alternative. Important was to develop international standards with which to counteract the downward pressure on welfare spending (the race to the bottom). But which standards were acceptable, which theoretical criteria could be applied and why? The social quality initiative addressed these questions and could be seen as a possible theoretical foundation upon which judgements for acceptable standards could be made. The initiative was launched formally under the Dutch Presidency of the European Union in 1997. The European Foundation on Social Quality, localised in Amsterdam was founded and presented its first study; *The Social Quality of Europe* (Kluwer Law International, 1997; paperback version by Policy Press, 1998). Social quality is a new standard intended to assess economic, cultural, and welfare progress. One that can be used at all levels to measure the extent to which the daily lives of citizens have attained an acceptable level. It aspires to be both a standard by which people can assess the effectiveness of national and European policies and a scientific yardstick for evidence-based policy making. Its ambition is to contribute to public policies that improve the democratic relations on European and national levels and that enhance social justice and equity in the cities and regions of Europe.

From the beginning the theory's aims has been to contribute to a comprehensive understanding of societal processes and to develop an interdisciplinary approach. The social quality approach is a strategy for analysing the reciprocity between societal structures and actions of citizens. The most renewing aspect of this approach – and especially in this respect social quality differs from the traditional (passive) welfare policies – is the addition of the concept of empowerment; a concept that strengthens the roles of citizens in their communities. The goal is to contribute to the personnel development of citizens to enable them to elaborate their own conditions for social quality in daily circumstances.

The first study delivered the points of departure for the Amsterdam Declaration of Social Quality (June 1997) which opens with the words; *“Respect for the fundamental human dignity of all citizens requires us to declare that we do not want to see growing numbers of beggars, tramps and homeless in the cities of Europe. Nor can we countenance a Europe with large numbers of unemployed, growing numbers of poor people and those who have only limited access to health care and social services. These and many other negative indicators demonstrate the current inadequacy of Europe to provide social quality for all citizens”*. This Declaration was finally signed by thousands scientists all over Europe and presented solemnly to the President of the European Parliament in October 1997.

In this appendix to the national reports about the indicators of social quality we will not present the whole theory, but only the aspects relevant for the application of this theory and for the analysis of societal trends and processes in the European Union. The project, for which these national reports

are made, tries to determine and compare the nature of social quality in the different European countries.

2 The European Network on Indicators of Social Quality (ENIQ)

2.1 The Foundation's second book as point of departure

The policy of the European Foundation on Social Quality is based on five pillars: (i) theorising social quality, (ii) developing its measurement instruments, (iii) applying these instruments to policy outcomes as well as circumstances in cities and regions, (iv) disseminating the Foundation's outcomes, and (v) stimulating public debates. In January 2001 the Foundation published the outcomes of the 'permanent symposium' about social quality and the outcomes of its projects in a second book; *Social Quality, A New Vision for Europe* (Kluwer Law International, 2001). In the Foreword of this book Mr. R. Prodi, the former President of the European Commission, says that "*The concept of quality is, in essence, a democratic concept, based on partnership between the European institutions, the Member States, regional and local authorities and civil society. Quality conveys the sense of excellence that characterises the European social model. The great merit of this book is that it places social issues at the very core of the concept of quality. It promotes an approach that goes beyond production, economic growth, employment and social protection and gives self-fulfilment for individual citizens a major role to play in the formation of collective identities. This makes the book an important and original contribution for the shaping of a new Europe*".

Thanks to this work the Foundation was rewarded for a manifold of grants. The most important were, first, a grant by DG Employment and Social Affairs for analysing employment policies from a social quality perspective. The main theme concerned the way the social quality approach may underpin flexibility and security in employment. The outcomes were published by Berghahn Journals in the double issue of the European Journal of Social Quality in 2003. The second important grant was rewarded by DG Research to develop a robust set of indicators with which to measure the conditional factors of social quality. This resulted in the start of the European Network on Indicators of Social Quality in October 2001. Representatives of fourteen universities in Europe and of two European NGOs participated in this network (see page iv of the national report). They were funded to appoint part-time junior scientists as assistants.

2.2 The challenge of the Network Indicators

The network had to deal with a couple of challenges. Within the network people, firstly, used different interpretations of the social quality theory. Secondly, they used different research methodologies. Thirdly, they had different cultural backgrounds (including different scientific backgrounds; like economics, political science, sociology, social policy), and fourthly, they had to deal with the language problem for proper communication. Therefore one of the major objectives of this network was to develop a common understanding. This goal was reached by a combination of deductive and inductive analysis in different stages of the project. In the first stage a preliminary consensus about the theory – discussed during plenary sessions - was tentatively applied in the fourteen national contexts. It concerned the first assessment of data availability in national and European databases for one conditional factor of social quality. The outcomes stimulated to deepen the common understanding and relationship between the four different conditional factors of social quality. The next stage was used for a second tentative application, now for all factors. The outcomes of the second exploration of data availability paved the way for the elaboration of the commonly accepted interpretation of the conditional factors (see below).

Especially thanks to the input by the network, the co-ordinating team and its advisors could specify and clarify the theory by defining the essence of the four conditional factors from a new interpretation of 'the social'. This was done also by analysing the general scientific and European policy debates about the concepts. The outcomes of this theoretical work paved the way for the third (and last) exploration of data availability in the fourteen countries, resulting in the national reports about indicators of social quality. In other words, the work by the network stimulated an incessant reciprocity between empirical exploration and theoretical work. The outcomes of this theoretical work and the interpretation of the outcomes of the national reports will be published in the Foundation's third study, forthcoming at the end of 2005.

3 Some aspects of the theory and its indicators

In this section a short overview will be given of the theoretical research of the project. This theoretical background is essential to understand the choice of the indicators for social quality on which the empirical research of the national reports is based.

3.1 The reciprocity between structure and action


A fundamental problem of any comprehensive theoretical approach is to grasp the structural and dialectical interdependence of what Emile Durkheim called 'social facts'. The reason for mentioning Durkheim here is that in his definition of 'social facts' he explicitly showed the supposed independence of 'the social'. We should however remark that 'the social' can only accurately be understood by reference to the individual as actor. The actual problem can be seen in the fact that we are challenged to think the seemingly impossible – the simultaneity of independence and dependence. Furthermore, we have to accentuate the position of individual people as social actors in order to realise the goal of social quality, namely understanding the reciprocity between social structures and actions of citizens.

The social quality approach tries to resolve the actual tension behind action and structure in a dialectical way. Social science is by definition a theory of action (this is not the same as the so-called 'action theory'), as the social cannot be imagined without actions or interventions by individual people. Instead of leaving this to spontaneous and voluntarist assessments it is proposed to search for criteria that allow the analysis of the developmental interconnectedness of both, the biographical and societal momentum of interaction; (i) amongst individual people, (ii) between individual people and society, (iii) amongst societal subsystems and not least (iv) between the various social actors and the natural environment. The social quality approach can serve as a comprehensive or meta-theory for addressing this interconnectedness. Rather than referring to actors and structure, this approach refers on the one hand to biographical and on the other hand to societal development. At the very same time, another reference is made to systems on the one hand and communities on the other hand.

3.2 The four conditional factors

Starting point of developing such a perspective is to look at a common denominator, i.e. criteria which are necessary for their constitution. This is not achieved by looking for minimal standards. Rather, the idea is that there should be a strong commonality in terms of the recognition of all four angles of the social fabric. This is meant to be a substantial dimension of the relationship between action and structure. We recognise four conditional factors of social quality, namely: (i) socio-economic security, (ii) social cohesion, (iii) social inclusion, and (iv) social empowerment. These four conditional factors define the concrete qualitative frame, in which society, individuals and their interaction develop.

Figure-1 The quadrangle of the conditional factors



This frame refers to the institutional level and the space for direct interaction. Furthermore it refers to the development of the actual interaction and the behavioural framework for this interaction. Each of these conditional factors has a different meaning, specific for what could be called 'elements of the social', i.e. for societal processes, biographical processes, systems and institutions, and communities and configurations. However, at the same time all of them are – individually and by their interaction – crucial as conditional factors.

3.3 A referral to the four constitutional factors

As important as this is, it is necessary to go a step further. Namely, to be able to go further into detail of analysing the actual interaction between people, we have to look as well for constitutional factors that realise the individual's competence to act. These factors are derived from the first basic assumption of the theory of social quality. It says, that individual people are essentially social beings.

They interact with each other and these interactions constitute the collective identities as contexts for their actions, resulting in processes of self-realisation.


This theme is presented for the first time in the Foundation's second book of January 2001 and will be elaborated in the Foundation's third book. The relationship between the constitutional factors and the conditional factors – theoretically and practically – will be analysed. For the European Network on Indicators of Social Quality the nature of the conditional factors in the fourteen national countries is the 'heart of the matter'.

4 The national reports about the indicators of social quality

4.1 The steps made by the network

The measurement tools of the conditional factors are indicators. Indicators of social quality are thus – to be precise – 'indicators of the conditional factors of social quality'. As said, the network's challenge was to develop a robust set of these indicators. A condition was to clarify and to elaborate the social quality theory. This was done by applying deductive and inductive approaches that increased the understanding of the nature of the four conditional factors substantially. Thanks to four plenary sessions of the network's participants and three plenary sessions of their assistants, all those engaged could reach an agreement on the final definition of the four conditional factors, and recognise their domains and sub-domains. This delivered the consensus necessary for the development of indicators for all sub-domains that are relevant for the understanding of the nature of the conditional factor in question. The outcomes of this process are presented in the national reports. The following steps are made to syntonize all relevant concepts and to define the set of indicators: firstly, to determine the subject matter and definition of the conditional factors; secondly, to relate these definitions to each other as well as to the subject matter of 'the social'; thirdly, to determine the conditional factors' most essential domains; fourthly, to determine the nature of the sub-domains. As argued already these steps were based on the reciprocity between empirical explorations in the different countries and theoretical elaboration of the conditional factors of social quality, thus between inductive and deductive approaches. It may be illustrated as follows:

Figure-2 Determination of related concepts




4.2 The definitions of the four conditional factors

The process resulting in the definitions of the relevant concepts will be extensively described in the network's Final Report. At this stage we will only present the consensus about the definitions of 'the social' and the four conditional factors.

The social will come into being thanks to the outcomes of reciprocal relationships between processes of self-realisation of individual people as social beings and processes leading to the formation of collective identities. Its subject matter concerns the outcomes of this reciprocity. The definition of social quality is based and derived from this reciprocity. **Social quality** is the extent to which people are able to participate in the social and economic life of their communities under conditions which enhance their well-being and individual potentials.

Figure-3 Subject matter of 'the social' and the definition of social quality



The herewith related definitions of the four conditional factors are:

- Socio-economic security is the extent to which individual people have resources over time.
- Social cohesion is the nature of social relations based on shared identities, values and norms.
- Social inclusion is the extent to which people have access to and are integrated in different institutions and social relations that constitute everyday life.
- Social empowerment is the extent to which personal capabilities of individual people and their ability to act are enhanced by social relations.

We mean by individual people, 'social beings' that interact with each other and influence the nature of collective identities. These collective identities on their turn influence the possibilities for self-realisation of the individual people. Thus this theory is oriented on social life, not on individuals potentials only. The theory rejects individualistic oriented propositions. Furthermore, there exists a form of overlap between the four conditional factors. This plays a role on the level of defining domains for the factors. In some cases domains can play a role in two or three different conditional factors. But the way of analysing these domains will differ by their sub-domains and indicators, because they are determined by the specificity of the conditional factor in question.

5 Conclusions

In all national reports the domains, sub-domains and indicators are presented in order to assess the data availability for these indicators. At this stage we will summarise some results of this approach:

- The indicators reflect processes of interacting social beings. In comparison with other approaches, the social quality approach has paid a lot more attention to the theoretical foundation of the indicators. It distinguishes ‘the social’ from the economic. Or more precise, the economic is seen as an aspect of ‘the social’ as is the cultural, the juridical etc. This prevents the trap of explaining social policy (or welfare policy) as a productive factor for economic policy and economic growth. The social has its own *raison d’être*.
- For the first time in the academic world concepts as socio-economic security, social cohesion, social inclusion and social empowerment are theoretically related with each other. The social quality theory demonstrates the intrinsic affinity of these four conditional factors. Herewith it addresses the existing scientific and policy-making fragmentation.
- Thanks to the applied method we have the possibility to analyse the nature and relationships between different policy areas. For example the relationship between economic policy, social policy and employment policy – see the Lisbon strategy – cannot be properly analysed without an intermediary. Social quality and the knowledge about the nature and changes of the four conditional factors deliver the points of departure for such an intermediary.
- The network has constructed indicators for measuring the nature and changes of the four conditional factors. By applying these indicators we dispose of a new tool for international comparison that is based on theoretically grounded concepts. Thanks to the application of this tools we are able to analyse the convergence and divergence between the Member States of the European Union with regard to these conditional factors of social quality. This could have added value for international comparison.
- Thanks to the assessment of the data availability of the indicators – as is done in each national report – we recognise the highly differentiated character of the countries of the European Union. This differentiated character cannot be captured by a reduction to a small number of social models. At the same time we recognise an intrinsic affinity in the emphasis on equity and solidarity between most of the countries involved. This outcome of the national reports will deliver good points of departure for future research on the comparison of the essence of the developmental approach of the European Union, the USA and the Asian countries.